Warships After Washington: The Development of the Five Major Fleets, 1922-1930

by John Jordan

The Washington Treaty of 1922, designed to head off a potentially dangerous arms race between the major naval powers, agreed to legally binding limits on the numbers and sizes of the principal warship types. In doing so, it introduced a new element of constrain into naval architecture and sponsored many ingenious attempts to maximise the power of ships built within hose restrictions. It effectively banned the construction of new battleships for a decade, but threw greater emphasis on large cruisers.

This much is broadly understood by anyone with an interest in warships but both the wider context of the treaty and the detail ramifications of its provisions are little understood. The approach of this book is novel in combining coverage of the political and strategic background of the treaty - and the subsequent London Treaty of 1930 - with analysis of exactly how the navies of Britain, the USA, Japan, France and Italy responded, in terms of types of warships they built and the precise characteristics of those designs. This was not just a matter of capital ships, carriers and cruisers, but also influenced the development of super-destroyers and large submarines.

Now for the first time warship enthusiasts and historians can understand fully the rationale behind much of inter-war naval procurement. The Washington Treaty was a watershed, and this book provides an important insight into its full significance.

Genres: History, Naval History

352 pages, Hardcover

First published October 1, 2011

About the author

John Jordan is a former teacher of modern languages. He is the author of two major books on the Soviet Navy, and has coauthored a series of books on the French Navy.

Reviews

[Mark · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Washington Treaty signed in 1922 represented the major effort by the victorious powers from the First World War to halt a budding and prospectively expensive naval arms race between them. Ratios and displacement limits were set for all major types of warships, which shaped construction for the rest of the decade. John Jordan's book is an account of how the navies of the five signatories -- the United States, Britain, Japan, France, and Italy -- developed and built warships within the confines of these limitations. This requires Jordan to define not just what those limitations were, but the often differing missions each navy set for themselves and how they attempted to develop vessels that would fulfill them, which he does in chapters that examine them by the type of ship, which makes for an effective means of comparing both the missions and the respective design choices. Supplemented by photos and sketches of the warships described, it makes for a useful study of a key period of warship development, one with important ramifications for the Second World War that shortly followed.

[Simon Mee · Rating 4 out of 5]

In service it was found that a degree of accuracy was possibly only if the guns were fired at the mid-point of the ships’ roll, which served to reduce further the rate of fire.

A solid technical overview, with interesting insights as to what drove each nation’s choices in the various classes of warships. As illustrated in the above quote, ships that appeared powerful on the drawing board were not quite so in practice. It was also interesting to see how the Washington Naval Treaty warped tactics and fleet composition according to what could be built in the post Treaty era..

In terms of the politics/strategical front, Warships After Washington differs to Sunken Treaties. The latter looked at the treaty system from a wider perspective, emphasising that agreements on technical limitations depended to an extent on confluence with political aims. Warships After Washington isn't ignorant of what each nation was looking to do, but the viewpoint is through more the tools (warships) each navy had to hand and wanted to build. Agreement on China, which was a critical element in Sunken Treaties, doesn't get a mention here, because Chinese trade didn't materially affect the design choices.

Goldman might/might not be right in her book, but it is a point of distinction with Jordan's analysis, which (admittedly usefully) instead collates a number of secondary sources for the five major signatories and runs some comparisons as to naval design and construction. The point is that there might have been wider considerations during negotiations in 1922 (Washington), 1927 (Geneva) and 1930 (First London) than just whether a 10,000 ton 8 inch cruiser was a fair compromise between the navies - i.e. was the actual driver for those negotiations the wider political environment? I don't believe Jordan is stuck delving into the diameter of barrels of the weight of fuel oil carried, he makes useful points for each country and the threats they faced. It's just not (and to be fair, he doesn't aim to make it) an exhaustive story, i.e. what was the framework in which country operated.

[Dave · Rating 5 out of 5]

Warships after Washington is excellent, discussing the design and development of the fleets of the US, Britain, Japan, France and Italy in the context of the Washington Treaty of 1922 and the economic and political context of the period. The book effortlessly intertwines the treaty limitations, the goals of the navies and the designs of the ships themselves in a way that seems effortless, but required great skill given the many competing threads of information.

The structure of the book is excellent, the quality of writing top-drawer, and the diagrams, prepared specifically for the book, help readers visualise the ship design decisions that are the text discusses, while tables present key data in a way that is easily understandable. There is also a very helpful bibliography for further reading, the text of the Washington and first London naval treaties, and descriptive footnotes providing further information and context on a number of points. The editing is of a very high standard, and I think I noticed four slips throughout the entire work, none of which materially impacted the information being presented.

The diagrams are a particular highlight, as while many naval books contain diagrams of ships, John Jordan’s are the best I’ve seen, even compared with the likes of Alan Raven and Ray Burt (who are both also very good).

All-up, I couldn’t think of a better single-volume book to discuss the development of warships in the British, American, Japanese, French and Italian fleets in the 1920s and early 1930s. For those interested in this topic, I couldn’t recommend this book more highly.

[chris zayc · Rating 5 out of 5]

I liked both books in the series.

This and the second volume are going to be re-read by me a few times. Just excellent concise books with easy to read drawings and great photographs, I bought them in digital but will probably buy them in hard copy, they would go along well with Collins, or Janes, etc.

Thanks.

[Bobble Hat · Rating 5 out of 5]

A superb study, not just of the ships, but of the treaty negotiations that made them. Much detail as a design study in it’s own right.

[Shrike58 · Rating 4 out of 5]

A really excellent examination of the period when the Washington Naval Treaty was effective and the signatory powers all at least paid lip service to it. The important point of all this is that Jordan tries to put you in the diplomatic and economic perspective that called forth the treaty regime in the first place. Perhaps the single biggest problem was what the Washington & London treaties could not control for; the drive for prestige. Even if you've already read a shelf full of books on the subject I suspect that you'll learn something new; I know that I was wondering if I should even bother with this book at this relatively late date.

Originally written: April 2, 2019.

P.S.: As a follow-up, if you're interested in the great naval arms conferences, you owe it to yourself to read Donald J. Lisio's "British Naval Supremacy and Anglo-American Antagonisms, 1914–1930," which takes a deep dive into Britain's motivations in convening the 1927 event. (May 4, 2025).

[Paulo Migliacci · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very interesting, if that's the sort of thing that interests you. (For me, it is.)
It's also thought-provoking: every arms-limitation treaty I know of had, as an immediate consequence, considerable effort on the part of all signatories to circumvent whatever it was the accord was trying to limit or forbid, in the first place. And thus, something conceived to put an end to a big arms race usually ends up by begetting a dozen small ones. Worthwhile all the same? A tentative yes, regarding the Washington Treaty. As for arms control as a whole, I really can't say.

[Jeff · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very good, readable description of the Washington Naval Treaty and its effect on the naval development of all its signatories in the 1920s and early 1930s. The book explains each nation's naval concerns and objectives, how the Washington treaty addressed (or did not address) their respective needs, and eventually how the treaty and its ramifications affected the later naval treaty negotiations in Geneva and London.