Self-Deception Unmasked (Princeton Monographs in Philosophy) by Alfred R. Mele

by Alfred R. Mele

Self-deception raises complex questions about the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. In this book, Alfred Mele addresses four of the most critical of these What is it to deceive oneself? How do we deceive ourselves? Why do we deceive ourselves? Is self-deception really possible?Drawing on cutting-edge empirical research on everyday reasoning and biases, Mele takes issue with commonplace attempts to equate the processes of self-deception with those of stereotypical interpersonal deception. Such attempts, he demonstrates, are fundamentally misguided, particularly in the assumption that self-deception is intentional. In their place, Mele proposes a compelling, empirically informed account of the motivational causes of biased beliefs. At the heart of this theory is an appreciation of how emotion and motivation may, without our knowing it, bias our assessment of evidence for beliefs. Highlighting motivation and emotion, Mele develops a pair of approaches for explaining the two forms of the "straight" form, in which we believe what we want to be true, and the "twisted" form, in which we believe what we wish to be false.Underlying Mele's work is an abiding interest in understanding and explaining the behavior of real human beings. The result is a comprehensive, elegant, empirically grounded theory of everyday self-deception that should engage philosophers and social scientists alike.

Genres: Philosophy, Psychology, Nonfiction

Paperback

First published January 1, 2000

About the author

Alfred Remen Mele is an American philosopher. He has been the William H. and Lucyle T. Werkmeister Professor of Philosophy at Florida State University since 2000. He specializes in irrationality, akrasia, intentionality and philosophy of action.

Born in Detroit, Michigan, Mele attended Wayne State University, and received his doctorate in philosophy from the University of Michigan in 1979. He took a position at Davidson College in 1979 as a visiting professor, which led to a tenured position at Davidson, where he remained for 21 years until accepting his position with Florida State.

Mele explores the concepts of autonomy or self-rule and the concept of self-control. as they relate to terms like "free will."

Without committing himself to the idea that human autonomy is compatible with determinism or incompatible (a position held by both libertarians and incompatibilists), Mele provides arguments in support of autonomous agents for both positions. He is, as he says, "officially agnostic about the truth of compatibilism" and describes his position as "agnostic autonomism."

Mele proposed a two-stage model of "Modest Libertarianism" that follows Daniel Dennett's 1978 "Valerian" model for decision making. Like Dennett, Mele requires that the indeterminism should come early in the overall process. He describes the latter - decision - part of the process as compatibilist (effectively determinist).

Reviews

[Tim · Rating 4 out of 5]

Short but interesting philosophical investigation into the possibility as to whether people can willingly pull the wool down over their eyes (as opposed to merely being mistaken in their beliefs). The author breaks self-deception down into two types which he refers to as the straight version and the twisted version. The straight form occurs when we believe something because we want it to be true and the twisted version occurs when we believe something even though we want it to be false.

The first part of the book examines the way that a desired conclusion has the potential to alter the way we evaluate information. The role of emotions in introducing bias into our thinking is also considered. One of the factors the author examines is something he calls the confidence threshold. One might assume that when evaluating the pros and cons of any particular position, we start with the assumption that there is a fifty percent chance that it is true and a fifty percent chance that it is false. We inhabit a neutral middle ground where we can dispassionately look at all the information available to us. If we were machines this might be the case. We aren't machines though and because of that our confidence threshold might not be set anywhere near fifty/fifty. It may take a lot less evidence to convince us a position is wrong than it will to convince us a position is right (the rejection threshold is low/the acceptance threshold is high). On the other hand, it might take a lot less evidence to convince us a position is right than it will to convince us a position is wrong (the acceptance threshold is low/the rejection threshold is high).

The author argues for the position that people do not knowingly deceive themselves, what he refers to a nonagency (as opposed to an agency) view. Though he spends an entire chapter dismantling arguments that people do willingly and consciously deceive themselves, at the end of the book I still found myself less than convinced. It seems to me if you are heavily invested in something – a relationship, for example – you might intentionally overlook things that an impartial observer would not.

All of the examples the author uses in this book deal with interpersonal relationships but one could apply the concepts and explanations outlined here in any situation where opposing points of view have to be assessed. It's a good idea to hold our assumptions, inclinations, and beliefs up to the light every now and then to turn them this way and that and see how they hold up. After all, none of us were born with a perfect understanding of life and none of us have a perfect understanding of it now. As Muhammad Ali once said: 'The man who views the world at 50 the same as he did at 20 has wasted 30 years of his life. ' Sound wisdom from someone who was arguably punched in the head one too many times.