Philosophical Writings of Peirce

by Justus editor Buchler

"An excellent, discerning introduction. It should prove a real boon to the student of Peirce." — The Modern SchoolmanCharles S. Peirce was a thinker of great originality and power. Although unpublished in his lifetime, he was recognized as an equal by such men as William James and John Dewey and, since his death in 1914, has come to the forefront of American philosophy. This volume, prepared by the Johnsonian Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University, formerly chairman of Columbia's philosophy department, is a carefully balanced exposition of Peirce's complete philosophical system as set forth in his own writings.The 28 chapters, in which appropriate sections of Peirce's work are interwoven into a brilliant selection that reveals his essential ideas, cover epistemology, phenomenology, cosmology, and scientific method, with especially interesting material on logic as the theory of signs, pure chance vs, pure law in the universe, symbolic logic, common sense, pragmatism (of which he was the founder), and ethics.Justus Buchler is author of Charles Peirce's Empiricism (1939), An Introduction (with J. H. Randall, Jr., 1942), and more recently, a series of books which form an ongoing philosophic Toward a General Theory of Human Judgement (1951), Nature and Judgment (1855), and The Concept of Method (1961). It has been said of these volumes, "A fresh and vital system of ideas has been introduced into the world of contemporary philosophy." ( Journal of Philosophy )."It is a very signal advantage to have this collection of Peirce's most important work within the covers of a single substantial volume. We should all be very grateful to Mr. Buchler." — John Laird, Philosophy

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Semiotics, Logic, Classics, Science, American

Hardcover

First published June 1, 1955

Reviews

[Lee Richardson · Rating 5 out of 5]

I bought this book to prepare a presentation of Peirce's article "How to make our ideas clear", which is Chapter 2 of this book. I was interested in presenting Peirce because I had heard so much about his ideas as a founder of statistical inference, and his philosophy of "pragmatism". In statistics, there's been a recent movement to put "Frequentist" and "Bayesian" inference under a single umbrella, called "statistical pragmatism". Statistical pragmatism sees statistical methods as tools to solve problems, that should be judged by "how well they work" in an particular situation, rather than their competing philosophical foundations. Peirce actually invented the philosophy of Pragmatism, so in principle, he invented the underlying philosophical foundation of modern statistical practice.

Pragmatism as a philosophy strives to reconcile both science and religion (more along William James) and empiricism and rationality (more by Peirce). The important idea comes from the so-called "pragmatic maxim":

***Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object***

So, in order to judge what an object of our conception is, we need to understand what the object of our conception does, and these effects are the entirety of what our object of our conception is. It's a pretty genius idea.

Peirce was interested in logic, and was interested in putting forth a formal theory of scientific investigation. He saw scientific investigation as a method of "fixing belief", which arises from an "irritation of doubt". The scientific way to fix belief can be contrasted with other methods of fixing belief, such as appeals to authority, tenacity to pre-existing ideas (confirmation bias), or a priori knowledge (empiricism). Peirce argued that scientific investigation was the best method of fixing belief, and with that, he was off to develop his theory.

As a quick aside, I think the point Peirce makes that inquiry must be connected with "appeasing an irritation of doubt" is important, and shouldn't be overlooked. In modern science, at least in my opinion, it seems more common that people scope projects not to answer questions they genuinely don't know the answer to, but rather because they know that it's a "solvable problem", and more importantly, it's "likely to be published". An emphasis on why certain investigations are worthwhile, or are truly interesting, is something I at least have been missing in my scientific life.

The next big idea I learned in this book is Peirce's concept of truth, which is:

***The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality***

So, after infinite inquiry, which entails infinite conversations, infinite new technologies, and infinite anything else that can conceivably effect inquiry, is what the truth is. In some sense, scientists should believe this, since it's a particular definition of "truth-seeking". As long as they're performing an honest inquiry towards fixing belief in the presence of an appeasement of doubt, they're on a long, great, and honorable journey towards the truth.

Finally, Peirce has a very clean theory of scientific inquiry, that I think is slightly better then George Box's formulation in "Science and Statistics". Both see the process as iterative (unless the irritation of doubt has been appeased in Peirce's case). But Peirce uses three stages (abduction, deduction, and induction), instead of Box who uses a back-and-forth between deduction and induction, which he calls theory and practice. Abduction, here, is the formal stage of developing new theories and explanations to answer a particular problem. I'm glad Peirce emphasized it honestly, since new ideas and explanations are a necessary step of good science.

All of this said, it's so sad how poor of a writer Peirce was, because he had so many original ideas. Unfortunately, his ideas are so hard to parse that it takes a tremendous amount of focus to understand what the hell he's saying. But I'm glad I read it, and would recommend at least the two original papers on Pragmatism!

[Drew Canole · Rating 3 out of 5]

Goodreads really needs to implement an auto-save feature... Here's what's left anyways,

'The Fixation of Belief'

tackles the idea that many people are already made up in their beliefs and will struggle to change them for a number of reasons. Logic is something few people care to study because it's something will all already engage in. I thought it was interesting that Peirce notes the history of logic and drawing inferences; it's an art that has improved over the centuries. Every major new work of science, after a few generations, exemplifies the "defective state of the art of reasoning of the time it was written". Reasoning allows us to discover new conclusions from old data. We can be mislead from habit if it doesn't produce true conclusions from true premisses. Our daily way of dealing with things is steeped in bad logic, and this could be for practical reasons - not wanting to disturb our inner peace, not wanting to be ostracized etc. Doubt is "an uneasy and dissatisfied state" - pushing us to inquire, but preventing us from acting. Inquiry must start with a real and living doubt; from propositions that are not under doubt; and ends after doubt ends.

My favourite part in the essay is when Peirce discusses the avoidance of reasoning. "When an ostrich buries its head in the sand as danger approaches, it very likely takes the happiest course. It hides the danger, and then calmly says there is no danger; and, if it feels perfectly sure there is none, why should it raise its head to see? A man may go through life, systematically keeping out of view all that might cause a change in his opinions, and if he only succeeds -- basing his method, as he does, on two fundamental psychological laws -- I do not see what can be said against his doing so. It would be an egotistical impertinence to object that his procedure is irrational, for that only amounts to saying that his method of settling belief is not ours. He does not propose to himself to be rational, and, indeed, will often talk with scorn of man's weak and illusive reason. So let him think as he pleases." However this method may be pleasing to the ostrich-man, it may not be obtainable as "the social impulse is against it".

How to Make Our Ideas Clear

Some Consequences of Four Incapacities

[Erick · Rating 3 out of 5]

Not a bad read. Quite dry though. Peirce was a Scotist logician; and that doesn't make for an incredibly enjoyable read. My preference is for the more speculative metaphysical philosophies; but I don't mind studying rigorous epistemology on occasion.
Peirce was the founder of what came to be known as "pragmatism"; or as he later preferred to call it: "pragmaticism", to differentiate his approach from that of William James, who was influenced by Peirce. Peirce was also a pioneer in the study of semeiotics.
This book was cobbled together from numerous sources, including periodicals. It is rather a rough sketch of Peirce's output and one does get the feeling that much is lacking in the presentation; although, I must admit that it probably does merit reading more than once because his thought is often quite involved, more involved than can be fathomed from one reading alone. I have to say that one thing that caught my attention was his criticisms of Descartes, which are basically almost identical with my criticisms of him. Peirce spends a goodly amount of time dismissing different brands of philosophy in order to bolster pragmaticism and his more speculative semi-religious application he referred to as "agapism"; which is in some manner based on the New Testament, but which he also feels is in some sense practical and empirical.
Decent book. I doubt I'll be revisiting it anytime soon though. He does go over numerous subjects, including evolution, chance, probability, science, God, tychism etc. Too much to really elucidate in this review. If logic and epistemology are your cup of tea than Peirce is certainly worth reading

[Joy Marquez · Rating 5 out of 5]

I love this book. I had read other philosophers, but he was the first that made me work at understanding, and it was wonderful. He pushes you.

[Damon · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good stuff--he really cruises along until he tries to prove god. Should've let well enough be, Charles.

[Jeff · Rating 5 out of 5]

Peirce is fundamentally necessary. He is not an easy read, but once you start getting a handle on what he was about, it pays off big time.

[Nick · Rating 4 out of 5]

Peirce’s essays—The Principles of Phenomenology, The Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism, Philosophy and the Sciences: A Classification, The Essentials of Pragmatism, Critical Common-Sensism, Approach to Metaphysics, The Architecture of Theories, The Doctrine of Necessity Examined, The Law of Mind, Evolutionary Love, and The Concept of God—are the ones I found most vital to engage with. They showcase Peirce’s genius in treating metaphysics as a scientific pursuit, a method I find inspiring and flexible enough to shape my own thinking. His prose, dense with neologisms and pointed advocacy for an academic audience, can be a slog, but the ideas shine through. These essays offer a rigorous, experimental framework, and while Peirce’s conclusions don’t always align with my views, his approach is a tool I can wield.

In The Principles of Phenomenology, Peirce introduces phaneroscopy, studying the phaneron—all experience—through three categories: firstness (qualitative feeling), secondness (actual fact), and thirdness (lawful mediation). This triadic structure frames phenomena as quality, quantity, and relation, with mind as primary, setting the stage for his metaphysical system.

The Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism argues that no factual proposition achieves absolute certainty, only degrees of probability. Fallibilism embraces continuous inquiry, rejecting absolute assertions, denials, ungrounded assumptions, and final judgments. Peirce positions this as the core of a scientific mindset, open to revision and grounded in humility.

Philosophy and the Sciences: A Classification organizes knowledge into mathematics, philosophy (phenomenology, normative science, metaphysics), and empirical sciences. Philosophy, as cenoscopic, generalizes across phenomena, bridging abstract mathematics and specialized empirical studies, with metaphysics exploring reality’s broadest features.

The Essentials of Pragmatism defines pragmaticism, Peirce’s intentionally ugly word, to distinguish from later pragmatisms: the meaning of a concept lies in its conceivable effects on conduct, verified experimentally. Belief is a habit, doubt its absence, and meaning is tied to future actions, distinguishing Peirce’s rigorous method from looser pragmatist interpretations.

Critical Common-Sensism refines pragmaticism, stating that an object’s conception is the sum of its actionable effects. Indubitability applies only to primitive phenomena, not universals, and Peirce rejects Kant’s Ding an sich as a verbal construct, emphasizing practical knowledge.

Approach to Metaphysics advocates a scientific metaphysics, studying reality’s general features through observation, not dogma. Peirce favors objective idealism—matter as effete mind—structured by mind, matter, and evolution through chance, law, and habits.

In The Architecture of Theories Peirce criticises materialism as repugnant to common sense and logic and supposes mechanism to feel. Neutralism aka neutral monism fails occam’s razor, making both mind and matter on par as primordial (I think he is conflating neutralism with dual aspect monism here). In Peirce’s own objective idealism matter is effete mind where chance comes first, chance forms into habits, and habits become laws.

The Doctrine of Necessity Examined defends tychism, positing chance as inherent to the cosmos, not a knowledge gap. Peirce challenges determinism as a hypothesis, arguing that chance drives variety and complexity, countering mechanical necessity.

The Law of Mind articulates synechism, where reality is a continuum, ideas spread, and mind permeates all, even protoplasm. Consciousness is universal, and evolution is tychistic, not mechanical, with physical events as degraded psychical ones.

Evolutionary Love proposes agapasticism: evolution driven by love, not chance or mechanics. Tychism and anancasm (mechanical evolution) are lesser forms, and love fosters purposeful growth, contrasting with utilitarian or egoistic models.

The Concept of God applies pragmaticism to theology: God’s reality lies in experiential effects on conduct, known through love, not reason. God is a vague concept, real but not existent in an ordinary sense, yet grounded in empirical experience.

Peirce’s scientific approach to metaphysics, laid out in these essays, is what makes him an intellectual giant. His fallibilism, pragmaticism, and empirical rigor offer a method I find more robust than Popper’s falsificationism, which gets weighed down by positivist baggage. The flexibility of his approach—treating metaphysics as a testable, open-ended inquiry—lets me adapt it to my own framework, with idealism as a beginning of critique. Most idealists since Berkeley identified epistemology (how we know) with ontology (what exists), making mind primary and existence a mirror of knowledge, but Peirce does not make our knowledge exhaustive of ontology, rather ontology is exhaustive of our knowledge. His phenomenological trio—tychism, synechism, agapism—tie neatly to his evolutionary views and even modern science. Quantum mechanics, with its discreteness and nonlocality, can both support and challenge the continuity of synechism and rival interpretations to the Copenhagen view can complement or counter the randomness of tychism, favoring a more deterministic lens at the macro level but leaving the micro probablistic, while principles of moral value (axiarchy) or perpetual life (final anthropic principle) offer more objective teleologies alongside something subjective like love. Still Peirce is bold enough to offer his metaphysics as an example of his systematic approach.

The participatory and informational universe hypotheses of Wheeler and Tegmark respectively amount to forms of objective idealism which make better use of contemporary physics. Peirce does critically refer to neutral monism in The Architecture of Theories as an excessive explanation but I think conflates it with dual aspect monism, which makes both mind and matter fundamental, rather neutral monism posits a third substance such as mathematics or information as fundamental rather than mind or matter. These are aligned more so with Plato’s idealism, whose ideas as forms (eidos, from which idea is derived) were not the same as those of post-Cartesian philosophy’s ideas as subjective experience, critiqued by Thomas Reid, but as information allow more explanatory design and agency than abstract mathematics.

[Jared · Rating 5 out of 5]

"Most modern philosophers have been, in effect, Cartesians. Now without wishing to return to scholasticism, it seems to me that modern science and modern logic require us to stand upon a very different platform from this."

--

"The works of Duns Scotus have strongly influenced me. If his logic and metaphysics, not slavishly worshipped, but torn away from its medievalism, be adapted to modern culture, under continual and wholesome reminders of nominalistic criticisms, I am convinced that it will go far towards supplying the philosophy which is best to harmonize with the physical sciences."

[Luke · Rating 5 out of 5]

“metaphysics, even bad metaphysics, really rests on observations, whether consciously or not; and the only reason that this is not universally recognized is that it rests upon kinds of phenomena with which every man's experience is so saturated that he usually pays no particular attention to them. The data of metaphysics are not less open to observation, but immeasurably more so, than the data, say, of the very highly developed science of astronomy, to make any important addition to whose observations requires an expenditure of many tens of thousands of dollars. No, I think we must abandon the idea that metaphysics is backward owing to any intrinsic difficulty of it.
In my opinion the chief cause of its backward condition is that its leading professors have been theologians. Were they simply Christian ministers the effect of intrusting very important scientific business to their hands would be quite as bad as if the same number of Wall Street promoters and Broad Street brokers were appointed to perform the task…Even if his practical problem is no more serious than playing a game of whist, when there are only three rounds of a hand to be played, he must go upon the supposition that the cards lie so that he can win the odd trick. If he is a judge presiding over the hearing of a cause, that cause must be decided somehow, no matter how defective the evidence may be; and consequently he is constrained to lay down a rule for the burden of proof. But the idea of science is to pile the ground before the foot of the outworks of truth with the carcasses of this generation, and perhaps of others to come after it, until some future generation, by treading on them, can storm the citadel. The difference comes to this, that the practical man stakes everything he cares for upon the hazard of a die, and must believe with all the force of his manhood that the object for which he strives is good and that the theory of his plan is correct; while the scientific man is above all things desirous of learning the truth and, in order to do so, ardently desires to have his present provisional beliefs (and all his beliefs are merely provisional) swept away, and will work hard to accomplish that object. This is the reason that a good practical man cannot do the best scientific work.
The temperaments requisite for the two kinds of business are altogether contrary to one another. This is above all true of the practical teacher [who] has no calling for his work unless he thoroughly believes that he is already in possession of all-important truth, with which he seeks by every physiological means to imbue other minds, so that they shall be unable to give it up. But a scientific man, who has any such immovable beliefs to which he regards himself as religiously bound to be loyal, cannot at the same time desire to have his beliefs altered. In other words he cannot wish to learn the truth.
Hence, I say that had the business of metaphysics been intrusted to ordinary parish priests it would have been performed unscientifically enough. But what has in fact been its fate has been far more tragic, in that it has been given over not to parish priests but to the caste of theologians. How much theologians may have contributed to the cause of Christianity…”

Preach!!!

[Tom Schulte · Rating 4 out of 5]

Prefiguring Karl Popper's falsifiability requirement and bringing a real-world,. scientific focus to discovery and exploration, "Verifiable" is one Peirce core tenet for worthy and valid hypotheses to consider:

What... is the end of an explanatory hypothesis? Its end is, through subjection to the test of experiment, to lead to the avoidance of all surprise and to the establishment of a habit of positive expectation that shall not be disappointed. Any hypothesis, therefore, may be admissible, in the absence of any special reasons to the contrary, provided it be capable of experimental verification, and only in so far as it is capable of such verification. This is approximately the doctrine of pragmatism. But just here a broad question opens out before us. What are we to understand by experimental verification?

Peirce refines this to one of his many neologisms: "Falibilism":

...we cannot in any way reach perfect certitude nor exactitude. We never can be absolutely sure of any-thing, nor can we with any probability ascertain the exact value of any measure or general ratio.

This is my conclusion, after many years study of the logic of science; and it is the conclusion which others, of very different cast of mind, have come to, likewise. I believe I may say there is no tenable opinion regarding human knowledge which does not legitimately lead to this corollary. Certainly there is nothing new in it; and many of the greatest minds of all time have held it for true.

Indeed, most everybody will admit it until he begins to see what is involved in the admission-and then most people will draw back. It will not be admitted by persons utterly incapable of philosophical reflection. It will not be fully admitted by masterful minds developed exclusively in the direction of action and accustomed to claim practical infallibility in matters of business. These men will admit the incurable fallibility of all opinions readily enough; only, they will always make exception of their own. The doctrine of fallibilism will also be denied by those who fear its consequences for science, for religion, and for morality...

[...]

Though infallibility in scientific matters seems to me irresistibly comical, I should be in a sad way if I could not retain a high respect for those who lay claim to it, for they comprise the greater part of the people who have any conversation at all. When I say they lay claim to it, I mean they assume the functions of it quite naturally and unconsciously. The full meaning of the adage Humanum est errare, they have never waked up to. In those sciences of measurement which are the least subject to error-metrology, geodesy, and metrical astronomy-no man of self-respect ever now states his result, without affixing to it its probable error; and if this practice is not followed in other sciences it is because in those the probable errors are too vast to be estimated.

A master of the history of philosophy, I appreciate Peirce's summaries such as that of Descartes

DESCARTES is the father of modern philosophy, and the spirit of Cartesianism-that which principally distinguishes it from the scholasticism which it displaced-may be compendiously stated as follows:

1. It teaches that philosophy must begin with universal doubt; whereas scholasticism had never questioned fundamentals.

2. It teaches that the ultimate test of certainty is to be found in the individual consciousness; whereas scholasticism had rested on the testimony of sages and of the Catholic Church.

3. The multiform argumentation of the middle ages is replaced by a single thread of inference depending often upon inconspicuous premisses.

4. Scholasticism had its mysteries of faith, but undertook to explain all created things. But there are many facts which Cartesianism not only does not explain, but renders absolutely in-explicable, unless to say that "God makes them so" is to be regarded as an explanation.

In some, or all of these respects, most modern philosophers have been, in effect, Cartesians. Now without wishing to return to scholasticism, it seems to me that modern science and modern logic require us to stand upon a very different platform from this.

1. We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy. These prejudices are not to be dispelled by a maxim, for they are things which it does not occur to us can be questioned. Hence this initial scepticism will be a mere self-deception, and not real doubt; and no one who follows the Cartesian method will ever be satisfied until he has formally recovered all those beliefs which in form he has given up. It is, therefore, as useless a preliminary as going to the North Pole would be in order to get to Constantinople by coming down regularly upon a meridian.

I was a bit surprised to encounter the charlatan Eusapia Palladino I also met in
Illusions And Delusions Of The Supernatural And The Occult. She was apparently quite well known.

Eusapia Palladino had been proved to be a very clever prestigiateuse and cheat, and was visited by a Mr. Carrington, whom I suppose to be so clever in finding out how tricks are done, that it is highly improbable that any given trick should long baffle him. In point of fact he has often caught the Palladino creature in acts of fraud. Some of her performances, however, he cannot explain; and thereupon he urges the theory that these are supernatural, or, as he prefers to phrase it, "supernormal." Well, I know how it is that when a man has been long intensely exercised and over-fatigued by an enigma, his common-sense will sometimes desert him; but it seems to me that the Palladino has simply been too clever for him, as no doubt she would be for me. The theory that there is anything "supernormal," or super anything but superchérie in the case, seems to me as needless as any theory I ever came across.

That is to say, granted that it is not yet proved that women who deceive for gain receive aid from the spiritual world, I think it more plausible that there are tricks that can deceive Mr. Carrington than that the Palladino woman has received such aid. By Plausible, I mean that a theory that has not yet been subjected to any test, although more or less surprising phenomena have occurred which it would explain if it were true, is in itself of such a character as to recommend it for further examination or, if it be highly plausible, justify us in seriously inclining toward belief in it, as long as the phenomena be inexplicable otherwise.

Peirce's Abduction presages Bayesian priors. This Peirce-ism is accompanied by obscure terms like the obsolete Moner, other obscurities, and more of his new words like Phaneron. Overall, while it can be difficult to get through the date and unusual language, this is an interesting overview of the development of Peirce's thought including his layout of the foundations of probability.

[Steven H · Rating 5 out of 5]

A MARVELOUS SELECTION OF PEIRCE'S WRITINGS

Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) was an American philosopher, logician, mathematician, and scientist, who was the founder of Pragmatism in philosophy.

The editor wrote in the Preface, "I hope... this volume contains Peirce's best work and is at the same time thoroughly representative of his philosophy as a whole... it will perhaps, besides reaching many to whom his work has been inaccessible practically speaking, make possible a perspective of that work which might not otherwise have been attained. Unlike most important thinkers, Peirce profits from selection. His philosophic writings consist entirely of essays and manuscripts, many of the latter fragmentary, so that the process of selecting is no less one of organizing."

Peirce says in an autobiographical essay, "The works of Duns Scotus have strongly influenced me. If his logic and metaphysics... be adapted to modern culture... I am convinced that it will go far toward supplying the philosophy which is best to harmonize with physical science... Though infallibility in scientific matters seems to me irresistibly comical, I should be in a sad way if I could not retain a high respect for those who lay claim to it, for they comprise the greater part of the people who have any conversation at all... I decline to serve as bellwether. My book is meant for people who WANT TO FIND OUT; and people who want philosophy ladled out to them can go elsewhere. There are philosophical soup shops at every corner, thank God!" (Pg. 2-4)

He suggests, "There are scientists and people influenced by science who laugh at revelation; and certainly science has taught us to look at testimony in such a light that the whole theological doctrine of the `Evidences' seems pretty weak. However, I do not think it is philosophical to reject the possibility of a revelation. Still, granting that, I declare as a logician that revealed truths... constitute by far the most uncertain class of truths there are... it seems to me there is the most positive historic proof that innate truths are particularly uncertain and mixed up with error... This historical proof is, of course, not infallible; but it is very strong.

"Therefore, I ask HOW DO YOU KNOW that a priori truth is certain, exceptionless, and exact? You cannot know it by reasoning. For that would be subject to uncertainty and inexactitude. Then, it must amount to ... you take a priori judgments at their own valuation, without criticism or credentials. That is barring the gate of inquiry." (Pg. 57)

He adds, "we cannot in any way reach perfect certitude nor exactitude. We never can be absolutely sure of anything, nor can we with any probability ascertain the exact value of any measure or general ratio... I believe I may say there is no tenable opinion regarding human knowledge which does not legitimately lead to this corollary." (Pg. 56-58)

He states, "Logic, in its general sense, is... only another name for semiotic, the quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of signs." (Pg. 98)

He observes, "What is usually meant by the uniformity of nature probably is that in proportion as the circumstances are alike or unlike, so are any phenomena connected with them alike or unlike. It may be asked to what degree nature is uniform in that sense. The only tenable answer is that it is as little uniform as it possibly could be imagined to be...

"In fact, the great characteristic of nature is its diversity. For every uniformity known, there would be no difficulty in pointing out thousands of non-uniformities; but the diversities are usually of small use to us, and attract the attention of poets mainly, while the uniformities are the very staff of life. Hence, the higher and wider are our desires the greater will be the general impression of uniformity produced upon us by the contemplation of nature as it interests us." (Pg. 223)

He explains, "I have now outlines my own form of pragmatism; but there are other slightly different ways of regarding what is practically the same method of attaining vitally distinct conceptions, from which I should protest from the depths of my soul against being separated. In the first place, there is in the pragmatism of James, whose definition differs from mine only in that he does not restrict the `meaning,' that is, the ultimate logical interpretant, as I do, to a habit, but allows precepts, that is, complex feelings endowed with compulsiveness, to be such." (Pg. 287)

He argues, "The principle of continuity is the idea of fallibilism objectified. For fallibilism is the doctrine that our knowledge is never absolute but always swims, as it were, in a continuum of uncertainty and of indeterminacy Now the doctrine of continuity is that ALL THINGS so swim in continua. The doctrine of continuity rests upon observed fact as we have seen. But what opens our eyes to the significance of the fact is falliblism." (Pg. 356)

He points out, "As Darwin puts it on his title-page, it is the struggle for existence; and he should have added for his motto: Every individual for himself, and the Devil take the hindmost! Jesus, in his sermon on the Mount, expressed a different opinion. Here, then, is the issue. The gospel of Christ says that progress comes from every individual merging his individuality in sympathy with his neighbours. On the other side, the conviction of the individual's striving for himself with all his might and trampling his neighbor under foot whenever he gets a chance to do so. This may accurately be called the Gospel of Greed. Much is to be said on both sides.

"I have not concealed... my own passionate predilection... Yet the strong feeling is in itself, I think, an argument of some weight in favour of the agapastic theory of evolution... At any rate, since the warmth of feeling exists, it should on every account be candidly confessed." (Pg. 364)

Although there has been somewhat of a "Peirce revival" in recent decades, he is still not well-known enough in philosophical circles. This book is a excellent introduction to his thought.

[Richard · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent book by the founder of pragmatism. Bertrand Russell said of him, "Beyond doubt, he was one of the most original minds of the later nineteenth century, and certainly the greatest American thinker ever." He made contributions, years ahead of his time, to mathematics, logic, philosophy, and science. First read this in a philosophy course in college.

[Otto Lehto · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an excellently curated collection of the most important philosophical writings by Charles Sanders Peirce, the quixotic founder of pragmatism, innovator in logic, and king of Anglo-American semiotics. Peirce's legacy is easy to overlook, because his pragmatist students, most notably William James and John Dewey, have surpassed him in fame (although less clearly in substance). And his writing style can be turgic, dense, and impenetrable. But do not sleep on him! His triadic sign theory, for one, is a marvelous contribution to Western logic and philosophy; his version of pragmatism and the "pragmatist maxim" is incredibly powerful and radical; his rare combination of the scientific attitude and the free-flowing curiosity of a child or philosopher inspires any reader; and his writings on scientific methodology, although sometimes contradictory and murky, essentially constitute the American equivalent of Nietzsche's "gay science."

How does one approach such a bulky collection of essays? I would not recommend reading every single piece. Rather, you can start from his more famous and influential essays (conveniently placed at the beginning of the collection) and work your way around the Peircean labyrinth. At the same time, if you really ARE committed, there is no reason NOT to read everything. This marvelous collection is arranged thematically and chronologically, like an introductory course, to give you a good linear introduction to Peirce. it is possible to read it from cover to cover, including the excellent introduction, and enjoy the pedagogically useful arrangement of the texts. In addition, there are no real "duds" here. Every single essays contains something useful. Reading the whole collection highlights the impressive depth and range of Peirce's scholarly interests. He was a brilliant system-builder.

Finally, some tips to the reader! To help the novice find their way around the Peircean cathedrals and catacombs, I consider the following essays absolutely essential reading: The Fixation of Belief, How to Make Our Ideas Clear, The Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism, Some Consequences of the Four Incapacities, Logic as Semiotic: The Theory of Signs, The Essentials of Pragmatism, Pragmatism in Retrospect, Critical Common-sensism, & The Law of Mind.

[Masatoshi Nishimura · Rating 3 out of 5]

The first part of the book was really enjoyable. His cynicism of our tendency to get rid of our doubt, and how wrongly we form our belief was stimulating thought. He even mentioned the society's value and the difference among scientists, business guys, and artists. But, after around page 60, his writing got super dry. Maybe it was too technical for me. After reading 10 pages without having a single idea what he was talking about, I stopped. Now, this book belongs safely and respectfully in my bookshelf.

One day, when I am smarter, I will come back to you, Peirce.

[Andrew Noselli · Rating 3 out of 5]

I was a little disappointed in the person of Peirce, who I regarded for nearly thirty years as supremely unapproachable, but I benefited most from reading at first-hand the section of sign theory and utilitarianism. I came away thinking he was most like a drier version of a 19th-century Kenneth Burke; I'm intrigued enough to want to read other works by him but I might be better off stopping here...

[Stephen Antczak · Rating 3 out of 5]

I am generally in agreement with the philosophy presented by Peirce as I understand it, but at times find it difficult to understand just what he is trying to say.

[Nabil]

I've read most of the essays.

[mwr]

Still my favorite philosopher. The way in which these writings are here anthologized is maddening, though.