A searching examination of the moral limits of political compromiseWhen is political compromise acceptable—and when is it fundamentally rotten, something we should never accept, come what may? What if a rotten compromise is politically necessary? Compromise is a great political virtue, especially for the sake of peace. But, as Avishai Margalit argues, there are moral limits to acceptable compromise even for peace. But just what are those limits? At what point does peace secured with compromise become unjust? Focusing attention on vitally important questions that have received surprisingly little attention, Margalit argues that we should be concerned not only with what makes a just war, but also with what kind of compromise allows for a just peace.Examining a wide range of examples, including the Munich Agreement, the Yalta Conference, and Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, Margalit provides a searching examination of the nature of political compromise in its various forms. Combining philosophy, politics, and history, and written in a vivid and accessible style, On Compromise and Rotten Compromises is full of surprising new insights about war, peace, justice, and sectarianism.
Avishai Margalit (Hebrew: אבישי מרגלית, b. 1939 in Afula, British Mandate for Palestine – today Israel) is an Israeli professor emeritus in philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. From 2006 to 2011, he served as the George F. Kennan Professor at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton.
Not as good as his The Ethics of Memory, but this is still really, really good, full of insight delivered in clear and down-to-earth prose. Some takeaways are: 1) peace can trump justice; 2) rotten compromises are NEVER justified, though they can be understood and excused; 3) Nazism was a radical evil, different in KIND than in degree from Stalinism, and so Churchill made the morally right decision when he decided to side with Stalin to crush Hitler at all costs.
If you're interested in philosophy that's relevant and that can actually illuminate actual history, this is a book to read.
Philosophical discourse is the art of hashing out ideological distinctions. Margalit's primary distinction is between sacred and mundane expressions of belief. For the former he holds that sacred ideals are inviolate and therefore not open to compromise. Both the French Constitution and the American Oath of Allegiance affirm that their respective states are "indivisible", a property traditionally ascribed to God. If the nation is a sacred trust then secession is an impossibility and a cause for civil war. In contrast the mundane can be negotiated.
That is not to say that the notion of the Holy is not open to compromise. Margalit offers the example of the Christian loss of Jerusalem, where possessing an earthly Jerusalem transformed itself into a spiritual equivalent. While the Catholic Church believes that the ascetic life of a priest or a nun is an ideal, religion also recognizes human frailty is such that not everyone is suited. Per (pp149) Muslims in the time of Ali and the Caliph Muawiyah, the Murjiites (Postponers) , argued that in key matters of religious dispute, one should wait until the next world for a ruling. It's not an uncommon religious response.
For a compromise to be rotten, the consequences be severe enough to violate the sacred rights of one of the parties involved. These, in Margalit's view, are so ethically suspect that they should be avoided "come what may", irrespective of consequence, but then he backs off a bit. While never justifiable, they are understandable and perhaps forgivable, especially in cases where agreement was coerced, though this needed to be examined in more detail than it was. As case studies that were "rotten" he examines the iconic Munich agreement which sacrificed Czechoslovakia to the Nazis, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that divided Poland, the Big 3 Agreement at Yalta which consigned Eastern Europe to two generations of Soviet rule, and "Operation Keelhaul", the unnecessary repatriation of Soviet POWs where on return they faced prison and execution. Common to each is the parties agreeing did so over third parties who were adversely affected. Though one party is an evil actor, the other becomes, to a degree, complicit by the agreement. I would go further - not only is the agreement "rotten" - so is the situation.
The final chapter tackles a problem that has bothered me since reading Timothy Snyder's Bloodlandsn, which was whether Stalin's Soviet Union of the 1930s and Nazi Germany were equally evil. Synder equivocates, but then why partner with one vs the other? Was the alliance between the western powers and the Soviets an example of a "rotten compromise" that should have been avoided, "come what may"? Margalit offers reasoned support for Churchill's "good word for the devil". The evils of Stalinism were certainly multiple. The Soviet apparatus created a state of fear which was ruthless, paranoid and self consuming but the ideological goal was that of an improved society for all. It had large population transfers and widespread surveillance, cruelty and indifference and suppression of religion and lasted longer than Nazi Germany . If it's a contest for the number of dead, both Mao and Stalin win. Yet the third Reich, which had most of the same flaws, was still more radically evil in that its ideology dismantled the very idea of morality by denying forever the humanity of its victims.
Avishai Margalit is one of my favourite thinkers. And the possibility and moral questions surrounding compromise are very interesting to me. But the way it is worked out did not satisfy my needs for thinking about these themes. The question was framed in terms of Stalin or Hitler and there is so much more. The fact that it only treated these questions on the level of states was also disappointing to me. I would have liked to read more about the level of social movements or even professionals or individuals.
Margalit's book is ostensibly political philosophy but there is much more than a hint of moral philosophy embedded in the framework he creates for assessing the merits of compromise.
His focus is on international politics and it seems to me the framework he creates cannot be localized in all circumstances. The stakes in the central example he uses are incredibly high. And his discussion demands answers to profound questions of morality. Specifically, the main question examined is whether a lousy compromise with Stalin was justified during the latter part of the war to defeat Hitler's Nazi Germany.
Whether or not Republicans and Democrats can work out a budget compromise is unlikely to demand the level of contemplation undertaken here. However, Margalit's digressions on the merits of compromise, generally, are interesting and should be considered by politicians of every stripe.
As a writer, Margalit is quite good. He is able to clearly express complex ideas while still keeping the tone almost conversational. As a bonus, he also explains the basics of philosophy to ground his more high-flown arguments.
"I sin banebrydende bog, Om kompromiser og rådne kompromiser, skelner den israelske filosof Avishai Margalit mellem regimer, der hviler på grusomhed og ydmygelse, som mange har gjort det igennem historien, og dem, der går skridtet videre ved at udelukke bestemte kategorier af mennesker fra alle moralske hensyn, hvor Nazityskland er ærkeeksemplet på det sidste. Margalits sondring er ikke kvantitativ, den inddrager ikke antallet af ofre, men kategorisk: Den nazistiske racisme skabte et uforanderligt hierarki, hvor der ikke kunne eksistere fælles moralske forpligtelser. Vestens alliance med Sovjetunionen i kampen mod nazismen var ifølge Margalit et både nødvendigt og berettiget moralsk kompromis. Men grunden var ikke, at nazisterne var et større onde, pointerer han. For trods al sin undertrykkelse tilbød Sovjetunionen en fremtidsvision, der omfattede hele menneskeheden. Ved at anse det meste af menneskearten som undermennesker afviste nazismen derimod moralen selv."
This book is a beautiful and seamless blend of storytelling and argumentation on the topic of political compromise, and in particular what makes a compromise rotten and therefore never justified.