Thinking About The Unthinkable

by Herman Kahn

Thinking About The Unthinkable

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Military Fiction

Paperback

First published January 1, 1962

Reviews

[Themba · Rating 5 out of 5]

The threat of thermonuclear war was much more salient when this was published in the mid-1980s. This is unsurprising, given the Cold War’s ongoing status. Originally published in the early 1960s (the author was the inspiration for the infamous “Dr. Strangelove), this “refresh” picks apart a multitude of misconceptions, misunderstandings, and distortions around a concept that many continue to deem “unthinkable” despite the growth in the total amount of nuclear warheads (US has 3,800, Russia 1,500, China 300), the number of countries with nuclear weapons (nine), and still the number of countries who aspire to their development (e.g. Iran and God knows who else). Kahn argues that, despite quixotic discourse and agitation (e.g. Catholic bishops’ 1982 pastoral letter discouraging the use of nuclear arms), nuclear weapons are here to stay and as opposed to occupying precious dialogue and activity with the futile exercise of eradicating nuclear weapons (even if this is done, who’s to say they cannot or will not be remade?) we should rather focus intently on managing them as safely and effectively as possible. How do we more effectively manage nuclear weapons? By committing to a no-first use policy, by developing safer weapons management systems (for ICBMs, SLBMs, ballistic missile defense systems, etc.), and deterring their usage (there are a multitude of approaches toward this).

Kahn starts by dispelling several myths (he lists 12 “nonissues” and 12 “almost nonissues” that contribute to unnecessary consternation and, worse, undermine the effectiveness of America’s thermonuclear defense policy). The main notions of which he disabuses the less enlightened of us are 1) nuclear warfare need not lead to an Armageddon scenario and 2) successful military operations employing the use of nuclear warheads CAN be carried out (in other words, as opposed to the concept of inevitable mutually assured destruction AKA MAD in their use he’s positing that a state could use nukes in context of a conventional war AND win). He also spends some time tackling the significant and understandable (yet naive and quite possibly dangerous) moral qualms around the use of nuclear weapons. The idea that ANY development, possession, or posturing with or of nuclear weapons is immoral has persisted for decades and been at the heart of antinuclear movements. Kahn raises important points around this, I think the simplest of which is that because we cannot definitively verify the presence or absence of nuclear warheads for ANY country, for the United States to simply give up its nuclear stockpile would be far more ethically questionable than possessing them for the sake of deterrence and defense.

Naturally, the book is centered on the Cold War and therefore juxtaposes US and Russia (*ahem*, the Soviet Union) along the lines of development (at this juncture, the Soviets had the edge), propaganda (the Soviets seemed to have the upper hand here as well…on the point of nukes, specifically…particularly relative to their domestic populace), policy (Soviets were very cautious), and other factors (US is the overall stronger economy, twice the Soviet GNP).

Kahn is a quintessential think tank man, throwing around a number of interesting hypotheticals. He posits three “Gedanken” (“thought” experiments) to illustrate US-Soviet nuclear outbreak scenarios in a more practical way. These help to teach that a nuclear war wouldn’t necessarily be as simple as the US hitting a button and Russia hitting a button and both countries (and the rest of the planet!) being blown to bits. These queries introduce factors like “acceptable level” calculations (how many would we be willing to lose as a consequence of launching a strike and how does that influence our decision to strike a retaliation?). Kahn posits that if the Soviets destroyed five major NATO capitals and then threatened the US with total annihilation in response to any planned nuclear reprisals, the US probably would not retaliate. Think about that. Would you? Kahn says if you would, you are insane. Why would you jeopardize the entirety (or even a large percentage) of the US? For prestige? Or because “well, that’s what you do”? His point here is that there are limits to usage of nuclear weapons that hinge on the probability and potential extremity of retaliation. Moreover, thermonuclear policy operates within context of national defense, which means protecting the population to the best of your ability. Hence, you make the decision not necessarily that’s most militarily aggressive, but that which is best for defense. These are sometimes different things. “Lex talionis” (or an eye for an eye) is not necessarily the wisest policy in thermonuclear war. But the key takeaway here is that despite committing to no-first use, it’s imperative to have robust first strike capability so that your adversary knows and fears your strength and is dissuaded from such brazen acts in the first place (Kahn is extremely nuanced here, I know I am not giving this last point justice).

Kahn also poses three forms of deterrence (Type I being the deterrence of a massive direct attack, Type II being deterrence against provocations and posturings, and Type III tit-for-tat deterrence against limited military or non-military actions) and even features an interesting thought experiment on how Soviet thermonuclear policy might differ if, say, Napoleon Bonaparte or Alexander the Great or even Hitler were at the helm (this illustrates relative caution of the Soviet regime compared to megalomaniacal leaders of history). He should have thrown Shaka or even Dingane in there for good measure.

Among other interesting ideas, he makes it clear that nuclear war could proceed in stages (you could have a first strike, retaliation, counterretaliation, etc.) and that it need not even be the case that vast swaths of warring nations’ populations perish in thermonuclear conflict, as it’s generally understood that cities would only be appropriate to attack if sufficiently evacuated and nuclear weapons would most appropriately geared toward destroying production and manufacturing facilities or command, control, and communications systems (although some civilians would inevitably perish with such targets, you DO NOT target civilians). Surely, there’s no guarantee of a “clean” nuclear war (of course this is no guarantee for any war) but he adds that even in the even of a massive loss of life human civilization would likely survive (Russia and China, for example, lost tens of millions through wars and famines in the 20th century yet today they are robust states). Chilling but true (and not a cause for complacency).

Herman Kahn also goes into thorough detail on mobilization for nuclear war, arms control, civil defense, and seizing the moral, political, and strategic high ground in such an affair. Spends a lot of time talking about conventional warfare through a historical lens and susses the continuities and discontinuities between conventional warfare and the nuclear paradigm.

Extremely abstract and detailed and hard to do justice in a review. Unless you love CFR or RAND Corporation white papers, probably not the most exciting book but nonetheless illuminating on a subject for which there is still a surprising amount of ignorance and misunderstanding in the general public. Kahn is brilliant, he even presaged the emergence of a multipolar global paradigm in the coming decades (US is still hegemonic but we are declining) which he says would be positive for balancing nuclear tensions. He also presaged the ongoing conflicts with the US and Russia (at least you can argue this, maybe I am reading too much into what’s likely predictable).

It is safe to say that along with his “On Thermonuclear War” this volume is indispensable for anyone seeking to understand nuclear war. I will say, one thing that gives me a bit of pause (although surely he’s an extremely careful and logical thinker and does allow for the possibility) is that he seems to somewhat suggest that neither the US nor Russia nor perhaps any other nuclear state will wind up with a madman with his finger on the button because the stakes are so remarkably high and the checks, even on potentates, are powerful enough. I’ll conclude by saying I am less sure of this.

[Dave · Rating 4 out of 5]

It's a fascinating book, particularly looking back at the predictions the author made for the future. He was pretty correct that the Soviets wouldn't be able to keep up with Reagan's rearmament and the problems that were coming for the Soviets.

It's a very thought provoking book. Of course you should have plans other than war will be the end of the world. There are scenarios where that doesn't happen. But the book really does suffer with being written before the theory of nuclear winter. It would be interesting to see how that affected Kahn"s thinking.

Kahn wast spot on about western Europe needing to improve conventional forces. There's the discussion of how few people would launch a strike against the Soviets if they destroyed five European cities and a strike would result in huge US losses. With Trump in the White House selling out Ukraine, it is clear that there should be a significant reorientation of European defence policy in the 21st century. It's only taken 40+years to realise it.

[Howard · Rating 4 out of 5]

I loved it! Very much a piece of history from the era of the Cuban missile crisis and the end of atmospheric atomic testing by the U.S. & Soviet Union. The discussion of possible and/or likely military and political strategy in the coming decades is most enlightening from a historical perspective. We seem to be in one of the possible futures Kahn described, in which the obvious peril comes from aggrieved nations seeking atomic weapons to upend a world order they deem grossly unfair to them. In 1962 China was expected to agitate among "non-white" nations (Arab, Asian, African) who would be less restrained in their use of atomic weapons than the U.S. & Soviet Union proved to be after World War II. Kahn actually seemed to anticipate the dominance of "identity politics" on a global scale. Fascinating book if you can find a vintage edition. (I have not seen Kahn's updated 1980s edition.)

[Brendan Illis · Rating 4 out of 5]

A worthy update to the original "Thinking About the Unthinkable", significantly more accessible to the general public than "On Thermonuclear War". Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, many of Kahn's concepts and strategic models are still useful today.

[Dewey Norton · Rating 4 out of 5]

Back in the days when I worried about a nuclear war, this was the most well reasoned analysis I could find. A scary book.