What is a person? This fundamental question is a perennial concern of philosophers and theologians. But, Christian Smith here argues, it also lies at the center of the social scientist’s quest to interpret and explain social life. In this ambitious book, Smith presents a new model for social theory that does justice to the best of our humanistic visions of people, life, and society.Finding much current thinking on personhood to be confusing or misleading, Smith finds inspiration in critical realism and personalism. Drawing on these ideas, he constructs a theory of personhood that forges a middle path between the extremes of positivist science and relativism. Smith then builds on the work of Pierre Bourdieu, Anthony Giddens, and William Sewell to demonstrate the importance of personhood to our understanding of social structures. From there he broadens his scope to consider how we can know what is good in personal and social life and what sociology can tell us about human rights and dignity.Innovative, critical, and constructive, What Is a Person? offers an inspiring vision of a social science committed to pursuing causal explanations, interpretive understanding, and general knowledge in the service of truth and the moral good.
Christian Smith is the William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor of Sociology and Director of the Center for the Study of Religion and Society at the University of Notre Dame. Smith's research focuses primarily on religion in modernity, adolescents, American evangelicalism, and culture.
In a field packed with heavy hitters Peter Brown, Roy Bhaskar, and Peter Burke, Christian Smith's What is a Person? may be the most intellectually stimulating book I've read this year. Smith examines the philosophical and anthropological underpinnings of sociology, and much of my delight likely stems from his choice of philosophical perspectives. He fuses the critical realism of Roy Bhaskar, a strain of philosophical personalism,an anti-naturalistic phenomenological epistemology relying on Charles Taylor's concept of the "best account," and a natural-law friendly form of virtue ethics into a formidable theoretical program. From this perspective he critiques and reformulates sociological methods.
The book is divided into three parts. The first sketches Smith's definition of a person and his philosophical commitments. The second uses those commitments to critique strong social constructionism, network structuralism, and variables analysis. The third is titled "constructive development," but only the first chapter on social structures is directly related to the practice of sociology; the final two chapters turn back toward philosophical grounding.
The great strength of this book is the consistent application of the initial premises across so many domains of social science. Smith's breadth of mind allows him to weave interdisciplinary strands into a surprising, insightful tapestry. One recovers some hope that theory and practice really can influence each other, that reality and our discourse about it really intersect.
My favorite chapter is the critique of variables analysis. In it Smith demonstrates his ability to incorporate information from many sources into his philosophical program. Critical realism emerges in this chapter as a capable basis for both criticism and constructive engagement.
Smith's style is both clear and interesting. He is proficient in didactic illustrations. His logic is incisive. The book is not an easy read, but this is because of the quantity of (likely) new terms and information, not any failure of explanation on Smith's part. On the other hand, he tends to wordiness. I began to wonder if he possessed a right ring finger, for he seemed to require a concentrated effort to strike the period key rather than the comma. Still, when he goes into "list mode," it's a simple fix to skip down to the next paragraph. That same fix works for his frequent recapitulations.
What Is a Person? takes bold stands and makes daring arguments. Smith's willingness to put his premises on the line can serve only to advance the discussion of the theory of the social sciences.
"...the reason why other thinkers in other traditions -- including Nietzsche, Skinner, Foucault, and Singer -- have been able to conclude, in disagreement, against the dignity of persons is, ironically, because they as persons possessed the properties of personhood that, personalism theorizes, entails dignity -- including reflexivity, rationality, self-causality, creativity, and freedom -- and have misguidedly used those capacities to think themselves into corners that involve the denial of an aspect of reality that is integral to a larger mode of personal being on which they were fully dependent to come to their argued denials of the same. Had their conclusions been right, they probably could not have come to them in the first place, nor would they have been internally consistent in seeking to advance them as important truths that other people should embrace" (439).
I found this to be a really exceptionally good book. I am very impressed by Christian Smith. This is not a high-flying "work of genius", it is a carefully constructed, step-by-step, clear and painstaking piece of case building, which ends up presenting a plausible argument for Smith's contentions about the rightness and relevance of critical realist personalism.
In the final two sections - on The Good and Human Dignity - which are the payoff for the groundbreaking that has gone before, Smith is required to circle his key issues somewhat ponderously and repetitively, but there is a lot at stake and what his laborious approach delivers is well worth the effort.
Whew. This one was a slog, but it really gave me lots to think about. I read it because I study the educational philosophy of Charlotte Mason, which centers the idea that children are born persons, so I wanted to explore that anthropology deeply. And boy, was it deep! It could have been half the length without losing much, but I understand it is an academic work, which requires meticulous articulation.
I wrote a long review on this one that disappeared due to computer malfunction. I can't be bothered writing it again, but that is really a shame because this book is well worth engaging with. It attempts to find a balance between reductionism and strong constructivism by the means of critical realism and emergence theory. Smith does this really well and I completely agree with his emphasis on 'person' as the starting point for understanding the human being.
A consideration of the concept of personhood in the field of sociology. Smith constructs a personalist, critical-realist, and anti-foundationalist phenomological account of what it means to be a person. For Smith personhood is an emergent entity coming forth from several (30+) human capacities. The interplay of these capacities (like self-consciousness, a sense of the moral good, the use of language, etc.) form a new entity called personhood. This new entity is not dependent on the full expression of these capacities, but only in the possibility of their existence. Included in this new entity is the idea of dignity and worth. From this constructive effort Smith then goes on to show how various sociological methods are dependent on this model of personhood, but not explicit in their holding of it, deconstructing what he sees as gaps in the methods via his critical realist, personalist, and anti-foundationalist philosophy. Finally, Smith explores the concepts of structures as expressions of persons' creative uniqueness and limitations, the teleological end of persons (human flourishing through love of neighbor), and the basis of human dignity.
This is a great book. Somewhat academically dense for the uninitiated (me), it still packs a punch and teaches well. The first two chapters developed into the areas of the mind, the person, and the ontology of the person. The detail in which Smith notes the mental capacities of the person is well developed, and he holds to an emergent view of the mind/soul, but notes that he is no philosopher of mind and does not detail this (p.g. 64). He then moves into the second section detailing the pro/con of differing methods and tools of sociology concluding that while we do construct some reality (some social), we do not construct all of reality; that personal natures still exist despite the power of social networks; and the social variable analysis is powerful but again personal natures exist. He concludes in the third section on what social theory is and two norms for society: the good and dignity of persons. A good read.
"...a fascinating and ambitious meditation on the grand existential question, the answer to which determines our view of our selves, our expectations of others, and our conception of what makes a good society, arguing that much of contemporary theory and thought on personhood is incomplete, short-sighted, misguided even.
Equal parts critical and constructive, Smith confronts the basic paradox of the social sciences — their preoccupation with describing and analyzing human activities, cultures, and social structures but falling short on the core understanding of the human condition — and tackles the four fundamental flaws of social science in defining personhood."
Think Goffman describes social media well, and identity formation -- but leaves you distinctly unsettled because he leaves no room for authenticity? This is a useful critique of the branches of the school of thought that Goffman spawned. At times bitchey, but other times cleverly critical of the sociological academic establishment, definitely useful in understanding our selves especially our selves in networked structuralism of the new entrepreneurial, social economy.
A scholarly tomb that offers a rich account of what it means to be human. Christian Smith masterfully interacts and critiques the various descriptions of what it means to be human offered by different schools of sociology.