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THE PHILOSOPHY OF EXISTENTIALISM-AN EXPOSITION OF THE CHARACTER OF EXISTENTIALIST PHILOSOPHY, INCLUDING AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORIES OF JEAN-PAUL SARTRE
An exposition of the character of existentialist philosophy.
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First published January 1, 1956
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About the author
Gabriel Marcel
181 books122 followersGabriel Marcel (1889–1973) was a philosopher, drama critic, playwright and musician. He converted to Catholicism in 1929 and his philosophy was later described as “Christian Existentialism” (most famously in Jean-Paul Sartre's “Existentialism is a Humanism”) a term he initially endorsed but later repudiated. In addition to his numerous philosophical publications, he was the author of some thirty dramatic works. Marcel gave the Gifford Lectures in Aberdeen in 1949–1950, which appeared in print as the two-volume The Mystery of Being, and the William James Lectures at Harvard in 1961–1962, which were collected and published as The Existential Background of Human Dignity.
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November 5, 2013
This book was required reading for The Philosophy of Existentialism taught at Grinnell College. It's exposition of Sartre was much clearer than anything we had read by Sartre himself and Marcel's general approach to ontology, along with our reading of Kierkegaard, contributed to a growing sense that one need not be crazy or stupid to be a Christian.
March 31, 2018
The book consists of four essays. The first, “On the Ontological Mystery,” discusses Marcel’s existentialism. It’s “being” that is more than (“is what withstands” or is that which transcends) “the data of experience” and is an attempt “to reduce them step by step to elements increasingly devoid of intrinsic or significant value.” It’s a dissatisfaction with technical knowing (“there is truly an intimate dialectical correlation between the optimism of technical progress and the philosophy of despair”). In contrast, Marcel’s existentialism is the “active recognition of something permanent….ontologically.” “Supernatural life must,” Marcel summarizes, “find a hold in the natural….a philosophy of this sort is carried by an irresistible movement towards the light which it perceives from afar and of which it suffers the secret attraction.”
In the second essay, Marcel takes on Sartre’s “philosophy of non-being,” which is preoccupied with the self “as idol,…seen from the terrace of a café.” Values in Sartre’s philosophy “can never be ‘recognized’ or ‘discovered.’ Sartre uses “the word ‘good’ and ‘bad,’” Marcel observes, but Marcel then asks, “what can these words possibly mean in the context of his philosophy?” In closing this essay, Marcel is critical of those who read Sartre differently in an effort to find their own way.*
In “Testimony and Existentialism,” his third essay, Marcel writes that “Testimony is always given before transcendence.” Testimony “bears on something independent from me and objectively real; it has therefore an essentially objective end.”
I found these three essays overly abstract, neither appealing to read nor easy to understand. They come across as “a passionate longing for the unknown,” his self-description in his fourth and last essay where he also notes his attraction to Bergson whose thoughts “made it impossible for me to doubt the reality of metapsychical phenomena.”
The book does not come alive until the end of this last essay where he is direct and clear about his perspective. The line between normal and abnormal is “uncertain,” he writes, and any philosophical focus on just the former is to empty the universe “of those principles which conferred upon it meaning and life.” Then Marcel comments that “whatever its ultimate meaning, the universe into which we have been thrown cannot satisfy our reason, let us have the courage to admit it once and for all. To deny it is not only scandalous, but in some ways truly sinful; and indeed I am convinced that this is precisely the besetting sin of the philosopher, the sin of Leibnitz and, less obviously, the sin of Hegel.” Reality “cannot be ‘summed up,’” Marcel states. We cannot know reality from outside, looking in. Rather, that “undertaking had to be pursued within reality itself, to which the philosopher can never stand in the relationship of an onlooker to a picture.”
Having a belief in a supra-normal “Reality” that satisfies one’s longing for “meaning and life” is fine, but to charge that those beliefs that would deny such a world is scandalous or sinful is philosophical arrogance and the very opposite of the humility that Marcel otherwise proclaims as a virtue. Stated this way as his philosophical position, Marcel’s humility is before a transcendent presence. It is akin to that of a believer and prompts the question that Freud and others might ask about why he, Marcel, might need to see the world in this particular way. But to do this is to pursue a scientific question, which is something that, on this question, Marcel’s philosophical-theological approach does not allow.
*Marcel writes that “it is from the ranks of a misdirected and anarchical youth that he will, either directly or through his zealous intermediaries, recruit his disciples and, so often, his victims.
In the second essay, Marcel takes on Sartre’s “philosophy of non-being,” which is preoccupied with the self “as idol,…seen from the terrace of a café.” Values in Sartre’s philosophy “can never be ‘recognized’ or ‘discovered.’ Sartre uses “the word ‘good’ and ‘bad,’” Marcel observes, but Marcel then asks, “what can these words possibly mean in the context of his philosophy?” In closing this essay, Marcel is critical of those who read Sartre differently in an effort to find their own way.*
In “Testimony and Existentialism,” his third essay, Marcel writes that “Testimony is always given before transcendence.” Testimony “bears on something independent from me and objectively real; it has therefore an essentially objective end.”
I found these three essays overly abstract, neither appealing to read nor easy to understand. They come across as “a passionate longing for the unknown,” his self-description in his fourth and last essay where he also notes his attraction to Bergson whose thoughts “made it impossible for me to doubt the reality of metapsychical phenomena.”
The book does not come alive until the end of this last essay where he is direct and clear about his perspective. The line between normal and abnormal is “uncertain,” he writes, and any philosophical focus on just the former is to empty the universe “of those principles which conferred upon it meaning and life.” Then Marcel comments that “whatever its ultimate meaning, the universe into which we have been thrown cannot satisfy our reason, let us have the courage to admit it once and for all. To deny it is not only scandalous, but in some ways truly sinful; and indeed I am convinced that this is precisely the besetting sin of the philosopher, the sin of Leibnitz and, less obviously, the sin of Hegel.” Reality “cannot be ‘summed up,’” Marcel states. We cannot know reality from outside, looking in. Rather, that “undertaking had to be pursued within reality itself, to which the philosopher can never stand in the relationship of an onlooker to a picture.”
Having a belief in a supra-normal “Reality” that satisfies one’s longing for “meaning and life” is fine, but to charge that those beliefs that would deny such a world is scandalous or sinful is philosophical arrogance and the very opposite of the humility that Marcel otherwise proclaims as a virtue. Stated this way as his philosophical position, Marcel’s humility is before a transcendent presence. It is akin to that of a believer and prompts the question that Freud and others might ask about why he, Marcel, might need to see the world in this particular way. But to do this is to pursue a scientific question, which is something that, on this question, Marcel’s philosophical-theological approach does not allow.
*Marcel writes that “it is from the ranks of a misdirected and anarchical youth that he will, either directly or through his zealous intermediaries, recruit his disciples and, so often, his victims.
February 17, 2019
آنچه مارسل نمایندگی میکند، از وجوهی برتر و متعالیتر از آنچیزی است که سارتر نمایندگی میکند. نگاه مارسل - همانطور که خود بر آن تاکید دارد - لزوما متضمن اعتقاد به مسیحیت یا حتا اعتقاد الهی نیست. آنچه از مجموع این مقالات بر میآید این است که مسیر مارسل حتا اگر به پوچی برسد، به عبث و سیاهی ختم نخواهد شد، دستکم نزد خود او. این اثر البته همهچیز و همهسو را بیان نمیکند اما چارچوب کلی را خیلی خوب به مخاطب منتقل میکند.
October 15, 2024
AN EXPLANATION OF MARCEL'S PHILOSOPHY
Gabriel Honoré Marcel (1889-1973) was a French philosopher, playwright, music critic and Christian existentialist. He wrote many other books, such as 'Mystery of Being: 1. Reflection and Mystery,' 'Mystery of Being: 2. Faith and Reality,' 'Metaphysical Journal,' 'Man Against Mass Society,' 'Being and Having - An Existentialist Diary,' 'Philosophical Fragments 1909-1914,' etc.
He wrote in the Introduction, “Of the three papers which form the main part of this book, the first, written in 1933, explains the main lines of my position, which have not changed since that time. The second, written in Paris in January, 1946, is a critical survey of the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre. The third, written in February 1946, seeks to define the ‘existentialist’ doctrine which I personally hold, while making certain reservations in regard to a vocabulary which has become fashionable but which is, in many ways, open to criticism. Thus the reader is offered a kind of diptych showing the two aspects of the contemporary existentialist school in France, aspects of which are, in the main, opposed to one another, though they are in some respects complementary.”
He says in the first essay, “if we reflect on what an intuitive knowledge of being could possibly be, we see that it could never figure in a collection, a procession of simple experiences… which all have this characteristic that they can be at times absorbed and at other times isolated and, as it were, uncovered. Hence, any effort to remember such an intuition, to represent it to oneself, is inevitably fruitless… we are dealing with an assurance which underlies the entire development of thought, even of discursive thought; it can therefore be approached only by a second reflection—a reflection where I ask myself how and from what starting point I was able to proceed in my initial reflection, which itself postulated the ontological, but without knowing it.” (Pg. 25)
He continues, “the ontological need, the need of being, can deny itself… being and life do not coincide; my life, and by reflection all life, may appear to me as for ever inadequate to something which I carry in me, which in a sense I am, but which reality rejects and excludes. Despair is possible in any form, at any moment and to any degree, and this betrayal may seem counselled, if not forced, upon us, by the very structure of the world we live in. The deathly aspect of this world may, from a given standpoint, be regarded as a ceaseless incitement to denial and to suicide. It could even be said in this sense that the fact that suicide is always possible in the essential starting point of any genuine metaphysical thought.” (Pg. 26)
He argues, “To hope against all hope that a person whom I love will recover from a disease which is said to be incurable is to say: … beyond all experience, all probability, all statistics, I assert that a given order shall be re-established, that reality is on my side in willing it to be so. I do not wish; I assert; such is the prophetic tone of true hope. No doubt I shall be told: ‘In the immense majority of cases this is an illusion.’ But it is of the essence of hope to exclude the consideration of cases; moreover, it can be shown that there exists an ascending dialectic of hope, whereby hope rises to a plane which transcends the level of all possible empirical disproof---the plane of salvation as opposed to that of success in whatever form… hope and despair…. seem to me inseparable. I mean that while the structure of the world we live in permits… absolute despair, yet it is only such a world that can give rise to an unconquerable hope.” (Pg. 28)
Later, he adds, “speaking metaphysically, the only genuine hope is hope in which does not depend on ourselves, hope springing from humility and not from pride.” (Pg. 32)
He summarizes, “the soul which is at the disposal of others is consecrated and inwardly dedicated; it is protected against suicide and despair… because it knows that it is not its own, and that the most legitimate use it can make of its freedom is precisely to recognize that it does not belong to itself; this recognition is the starting point of its activity and creativeness.” (Pg. 43)
He concludes the essay, “To sum up my position… I would say that the recognition of the ontological mystery, in which I perceive as it were the central redoubt of metaphysics, is, no doubt, only possible through a sort of radiation which proceeds from revelation itself and which is perfectly well able to affect souls who are strangers to all positive religion of whatever kind; that this recognition , which takes place through certain higher modes of human experience, in no way involves the adherence to any given religion; but it enables those who have attained to it to perceive the possibility of a revelation in a way which is not open to those who have never ventured beyond the realm of the problematical and who have therefore never reached the point from which the mystery of being can be seen and recognized. Thus, a philosophy of this sort is carried by an irresistible movement towards the light which it perceives from afar and of which it suffers the secret attraction.” (Pg. 46)
In his essay on Sartre, he argues, “But perhaps we should recall… the assertion made by Sartre himself of the existence in each of us of an initial pattern which existential psychoanalysis should be able to reveal. Should we not ask what is the pattern at the origin of Sartre’s atheism? The answer can only be one of two things. Either he must admit that his atheism derives from an attitude of will or from an initial resentment (as would be the case of a man who, from the very depth of his being, willed that God should not exist); such an answer would be in keeping with his doctrine but it would destroy much of its metaphysical bearing. Or else he must take up his stand on the traditional ground of objective thought and declare that there is no God, as one might say that there are no people on Mars; but in that case he must give up the plane of existentialism and fall back on the most obsolete positions of traditional rationalism.” (Pg. 85)
In the final essay, he observes, “It is never, it cannot be ever ONE who bears witness; it is always an inevitably I, and if not myself, then another, who is yet another I. It is always an individual human being, with his proper identity… Actually, when I say, ‘I am obliged to note,’ I already leave the realm of pure observation, for I imply that I must ‘admit,’ and this brings in a reference to other people, which, as we shall see, is of the essence of testimony but is quite outside the scope of observation. I am alone with the phenomenon I observe, alone in a specific sense because I am without my identity: I am only a recording instrument, a recorder among many thousands.” (Pg. 92-93)
He continues, my testimony bears on something independent from me and objectively real; it has therefore an essentially objective end. At the same time it commits my entire being as a person who is answerable for my assertions and for myself. The tension between the inward commitment and the objective end seems to me existential in the highest degree.” (Pg. 94-95)
This is one of the most helpful books for understanding Marcel’s philosophy.
Gabriel Honoré Marcel (1889-1973) was a French philosopher, playwright, music critic and Christian existentialist. He wrote many other books, such as 'Mystery of Being: 1. Reflection and Mystery,' 'Mystery of Being: 2. Faith and Reality,' 'Metaphysical Journal,' 'Man Against Mass Society,' 'Being and Having - An Existentialist Diary,' 'Philosophical Fragments 1909-1914,' etc.
He wrote in the Introduction, “Of the three papers which form the main part of this book, the first, written in 1933, explains the main lines of my position, which have not changed since that time. The second, written in Paris in January, 1946, is a critical survey of the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre. The third, written in February 1946, seeks to define the ‘existentialist’ doctrine which I personally hold, while making certain reservations in regard to a vocabulary which has become fashionable but which is, in many ways, open to criticism. Thus the reader is offered a kind of diptych showing the two aspects of the contemporary existentialist school in France, aspects of which are, in the main, opposed to one another, though they are in some respects complementary.”
He says in the first essay, “if we reflect on what an intuitive knowledge of being could possibly be, we see that it could never figure in a collection, a procession of simple experiences… which all have this characteristic that they can be at times absorbed and at other times isolated and, as it were, uncovered. Hence, any effort to remember such an intuition, to represent it to oneself, is inevitably fruitless… we are dealing with an assurance which underlies the entire development of thought, even of discursive thought; it can therefore be approached only by a second reflection—a reflection where I ask myself how and from what starting point I was able to proceed in my initial reflection, which itself postulated the ontological, but without knowing it.” (Pg. 25)
He continues, “the ontological need, the need of being, can deny itself… being and life do not coincide; my life, and by reflection all life, may appear to me as for ever inadequate to something which I carry in me, which in a sense I am, but which reality rejects and excludes. Despair is possible in any form, at any moment and to any degree, and this betrayal may seem counselled, if not forced, upon us, by the very structure of the world we live in. The deathly aspect of this world may, from a given standpoint, be regarded as a ceaseless incitement to denial and to suicide. It could even be said in this sense that the fact that suicide is always possible in the essential starting point of any genuine metaphysical thought.” (Pg. 26)
He argues, “To hope against all hope that a person whom I love will recover from a disease which is said to be incurable is to say: … beyond all experience, all probability, all statistics, I assert that a given order shall be re-established, that reality is on my side in willing it to be so. I do not wish; I assert; such is the prophetic tone of true hope. No doubt I shall be told: ‘In the immense majority of cases this is an illusion.’ But it is of the essence of hope to exclude the consideration of cases; moreover, it can be shown that there exists an ascending dialectic of hope, whereby hope rises to a plane which transcends the level of all possible empirical disproof---the plane of salvation as opposed to that of success in whatever form… hope and despair…. seem to me inseparable. I mean that while the structure of the world we live in permits… absolute despair, yet it is only such a world that can give rise to an unconquerable hope.” (Pg. 28)
Later, he adds, “speaking metaphysically, the only genuine hope is hope in which does not depend on ourselves, hope springing from humility and not from pride.” (Pg. 32)
He summarizes, “the soul which is at the disposal of others is consecrated and inwardly dedicated; it is protected against suicide and despair… because it knows that it is not its own, and that the most legitimate use it can make of its freedom is precisely to recognize that it does not belong to itself; this recognition is the starting point of its activity and creativeness.” (Pg. 43)
He concludes the essay, “To sum up my position… I would say that the recognition of the ontological mystery, in which I perceive as it were the central redoubt of metaphysics, is, no doubt, only possible through a sort of radiation which proceeds from revelation itself and which is perfectly well able to affect souls who are strangers to all positive religion of whatever kind; that this recognition , which takes place through certain higher modes of human experience, in no way involves the adherence to any given religion; but it enables those who have attained to it to perceive the possibility of a revelation in a way which is not open to those who have never ventured beyond the realm of the problematical and who have therefore never reached the point from which the mystery of being can be seen and recognized. Thus, a philosophy of this sort is carried by an irresistible movement towards the light which it perceives from afar and of which it suffers the secret attraction.” (Pg. 46)
In his essay on Sartre, he argues, “But perhaps we should recall… the assertion made by Sartre himself of the existence in each of us of an initial pattern which existential psychoanalysis should be able to reveal. Should we not ask what is the pattern at the origin of Sartre’s atheism? The answer can only be one of two things. Either he must admit that his atheism derives from an attitude of will or from an initial resentment (as would be the case of a man who, from the very depth of his being, willed that God should not exist); such an answer would be in keeping with his doctrine but it would destroy much of its metaphysical bearing. Or else he must take up his stand on the traditional ground of objective thought and declare that there is no God, as one might say that there are no people on Mars; but in that case he must give up the plane of existentialism and fall back on the most obsolete positions of traditional rationalism.” (Pg. 85)
In the final essay, he observes, “It is never, it cannot be ever ONE who bears witness; it is always an inevitably I, and if not myself, then another, who is yet another I. It is always an individual human being, with his proper identity… Actually, when I say, ‘I am obliged to note,’ I already leave the realm of pure observation, for I imply that I must ‘admit,’ and this brings in a reference to other people, which, as we shall see, is of the essence of testimony but is quite outside the scope of observation. I am alone with the phenomenon I observe, alone in a specific sense because I am without my identity: I am only a recording instrument, a recorder among many thousands.” (Pg. 92-93)
He continues, my testimony bears on something independent from me and objectively real; it has therefore an essentially objective end. At the same time it commits my entire being as a person who is answerable for my assertions and for myself. The tension between the inward commitment and the objective end seems to me existential in the highest degree.” (Pg. 94-95)
This is one of the most helpful books for understanding Marcel’s philosophy.
January 30, 2014
Marcel finds Sartre's examples of the homosexual acknowledging his sexuality 'rather disgusting'. Need we say more?
July 22, 2023
Though the first and last part of the book was (a little bit) not for me, I updated my grade from 2.5 to 3 stars because I could write out some authors' expressions to consider. Overall Marcel analyzes the philosophy of Sartre and his writings. The book has academic language with deep meaning, which only some people can comprehend correctly. Despite that, I highlighted some expressions from part 2 of the book:
1) In the second part, Marcel quotes Sartre almost all the time: "My consciousness constitutes itself in my flesh as the annihilation of a possibility which is projected by another human consciousness as its own." The author explains this as a point of "neasiation, " translated as a denial. The example indicates the situation with a boy whose father says, " I won't let you be a dirt-track racer." By this statement, the father denies the potential of the child to be who he has internally chosen for himself. This example emphasizes people whose social function is to be "no." In this world, many people live in a world of "You should not." As Marcel explains, it becomes melancholy to think that a human destiny can be reduced by other people's statements of what we are eligible to do, making us victims and enslaved people for social opinion.
1) In the second part, Marcel quotes Sartre almost all the time: "My consciousness constitutes itself in my flesh as the annihilation of a possibility which is projected by another human consciousness as its own." The author explains this as a point of "neasiation, " translated as a denial. The example indicates the situation with a boy whose father says, " I won't let you be a dirt-track racer." By this statement, the father denies the potential of the child to be who he has internally chosen for himself. This example emphasizes people whose social function is to be "no." In this world, many people live in a world of "You should not." As Marcel explains, it becomes melancholy to think that a human destiny can be reduced by other people's statements of what we are eligible to do, making us victims and enslaved people for social opinion.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
March 28, 2018
Not the easiest read, but worth it for the last chapter, which is an autobiographical account of how the author came to be a philosopher.
July 27, 2020
Decent and interesting exposition of Marcel’s philosophy and its differences from Sartre’s version of existentialism.
August 10, 2020
Gave some good insights into Sartre's philosophy. I plan on reading his "Being and Having" next month.
Read
March 21, 2021Read for class 1976. Cost 1.95.
April 20, 2022
It's solid
June 24, 2022
Go read “On the Ontological Mystery” and “Testimony and Existentialism.”
November 9, 2024
Eh. Repetitive.
January 24, 2025
Read the chapter “On the Ontological Mystery” for existentialism. I like Marcels more optimistic view compared to Camus but Marcels religious faith contradicts some concepts in the essay
September 29, 2025
A catholic existentialist critiques Sartre's existentialism and explains how the power of grace fits into his view. I thought it was okay, although I think I probably side much more with Sartre.
June 15, 2011
I don't agree with much of Marcel's philosophy (at least what is contained in this book), but he has a way of unraveling Sartre that is, nonetheless, very interesting (not to mention brutal). There are some beautifully described and modestly enlightening nuggets in the other essays too, although some of it was confusing (which is more a reflection on my own shortcomings). Many days I found myself reading a page or two, then taking an hour just to digest a particular idea - which is actually immensely satisfying if you're the patient, pondering type. All in all this was a worthwhile read and has surely helped with my understanding of Existentialism.
January 2, 2008
"To think, to formulate, to judge, is always to betray."
Read
July 29, 2011Marcel critiques Sarte well, and provides a basis for his rationale. It seems that Marcel is suggesting a meta-narrative based on love.
May 15, 2012
An appropriate indictment of Sartre's effect on people of his time (and our time too, in all likelihood). I read this in 1997 and have never forgotten certain passages.
Want to read
June 4, 2012The author of this little tome is Marcel, NOT Sartre.
Displaying 1 - 20 of 20 reviews