Groundless Grounds: A Study of Wittgenstein and Heidegger

by Lee Braver

An in-depth comparison of Wittgenstein and Heidegger shows how the views of both philosophers emerge from a fundamental attempt to dispense with the transcendent.

Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger are two of the most important -- and two of the most difficult--philosophers of the twentieth century, indelibly influencing the course of continental and analytic philosophy, respectively. In Groundless Grounds, Lee Braver argues that the views of both thinkers emerge from a fundamental attempt to create a philosophy that has dispensed with everything transcendent so that we may be satisfied with the human. Examining the central topics of their thought in detail, Braver finds that Wittgenstein and Heidegger construct a philosophy based on original finitude -- finitude without the contrast of the infinite.

In Braver's elegant analysis, these two difficult bodies of work offer mutual illumination rather than compounded obscurity. Moreover, bringing the most influential thinkers in continental and analytic philosophy into dialogue with each other may enable broader conversations between these two divergent branches of philosophy.

Braver's meticulously researched and strongly argued account shows that both Wittgenstein and Heidegger strive to construct a new conception of reason, free of the illusions of the past and appropriate to the kind of beings that we are. Readers interested in either philosopher, or concerned more generally with the history of twentieth-century philosophy as well as questions of the nature of reason, will find Groundless Grounds of interest.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction

354 pages, Hardcover

First published February 3, 2012

About the author

Lee Braver is Professor of Philosophy at the University of South Florida and the author of Groundless Grounds: A Study of Wittgenstein and Heidegger (MIT Press) and A Thing of This World: A History of Continental Anti-Realism.

Reviews

[Leanne · Rating 5 out of 5]

We tend to think of the two philosophers as representing opposing camps in philosophy-- the continental and the analytic. The two had much in common, in terms of their lives and the arches in their thinking (they were born within months of each other, in German speaking countries--they both would study under a mentor whom they would renounce an then later both thinkers would renounce their own early thought. While they each only mentioned the other one time and while we think of them as polar opposites in thinking; in fact, they had very similar projects. More and more philosophers are moving beyond the "Wittgenstein as analytical philosopher" trope and are looking at his latter work to try and get a better understanding of what he was doing in the end. Heidegger is already well understood, if you can even make a statement like that. Personally, I came to Heidegger early in my life and only arrived at Wittgenstein late in the game. But I can say that the more I read about latter Wittgenstein the more he bowled me over in his Heideggerianisms.

This book is an early attempt to address the similarities in their philosophical projects. I heard that a new book on the same topic just came out--definitely want to read it. This book was challenging but written with some wit and charm as well--which helped... I have to admit that for me to write a real review, I would need to re-read the book again carefully. It was challenging!

From review by, Gary E. Aylesworth, Eastern Illinois University

"His general thesis is that, despite their differences, Wittgenstein and Heidegger both insist upon our radical finitude as human beings, and that there is an unsurpassable limit to the reasons we give as to why things are the way they are. In other words, reason as a ground-giving activity cannot ground itself, but arises out of our situation in a world that is always already "there" before the question of grounds or reasons can arise in the first place. In developing this thesis, Braver hopes to begin a dialogue between so-called analytic and continental philosophers and to inaugurate a re-appropriation of the philosophical tradition on the basis of mutual understanding. That is to say, he believes his study can lead "analysts" and "continentalists" to agree on what philosophy is, on what it has been, and on what it ought to become. Given the institutional divisions within professional philosophy, in place for two or more generations, this is no small ambition, and it is unlikely to meet with a friendly reception from all quarters (see Richard Rorty). https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/groundless-g...

[Clay Kallam · Rating 5 out of 5]

Imagine a cloud as it moves across a windy sky.

Its form changes, though slowly, and it is clearly different when it drifts out of our vision than it was when we first saw it.

It isn’t tethered to anything, it isn’t anchored, but it is shaped by unseen forces. And it is clearly the same cloud at the end of its visible journey as it was when it began.

Change the word “cloud” to “consciousness” or “justice” or any of a variety of terms, and you have one of themes of Lee Braver’s outstanding “Groundless Grounds: A Study of Wittgenstein and Heidegger” (The MIT Press, $38, 239 pages). Braver, by linking arguably the two most important 20th century philosophers, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger, says that trying to “ground” ideas and concepts in something rock solid, in something with the apparently solidity of the earth beneath our feet, is a fruitless effort.

Instead, he uses underlying themes from Wittgenstein and Heidegger – who have radically different viewpoints in many areas of their thought – to echo Willard Van Orman Quine, another prominent 20th century philosopher, that we have essentially created the terms and concepts of language in our own minds, and that we cannot step outside our language, terms and concepts to truly analyze their roots.

So as the cloud floats along, subject to gravity, temperature, sun and wind, it is its own entity, with no direct connection to anything solid. It shifts and changes, according to outside pressures and internal operations, and defies precise definition, especially on its periphery. It cannot be defined from inside the cloud, or even properly perceived. Phenomena can’t be comprehended from their center, but the periphery, unsettled as it is, is no better.

Periphery and its contrast with the center is another concern of Braver’s, echoing Jacques Derrida but with a different emphasis -- in this case, the way we think.

Both Heidegger and Wittgenstein make this point: Most of the time, we do not "think" in the traditional sense of the word; most of the time, we are in the flow of one activity or another.

Philosophers have always tried to ground consciousness and thought in rationality, in logic, in that essentially human ability to solve problems through the use of a particular kind of process.

In contrast, Braver connects Heidegger and Wittgenstein with what might be called “the flow” -- a mental state of working on a piece of art, or writing a story, or surfing, or playing basketball, or having a conversation, or playing music. During that flow, we aren't "thinking" in any rational sense, even though traditional philosophy wants our reason to be active all the time. Clearly, though, it isn't. Even in conversation, we don't "think" about what words to say -- we just say them.

I will extrapolate here (but that’s what good books make you do: push beyond their edges), and tack on some ideas from Derrida. When we get to the edge of an activity, when the flow isn't smooth, we have to make decisions. Animals lacking a big brain and language will rely on instinct or intuition when the flow sputters. Humans, however, can then apply a new level of analysis, logical thinking, but the logical thinking comes last, not first.

The idea, then, is that logical thinking doesn't underly everything we do, and thus shouldn't be the standard by which we measure all our thoughts and actions. Rather, it is only applied on the periphery, when the flow we are defined by and primarily exist in is disrupted.

That flow is all about context and relationships, and another point made in the book is that when we pull something out of context, its meaning is lost. We can, for example, grasp what truth and justice are in particular contexts, but if we try to remove those two terms from their contexts and relationships in a particular flow, then they cannot really be defined. (This is what Socrates emphasized, and it is the wellspring of scepticism.)

To go back to the cloud, if we tried to pull it out of the sky, it would dissipate and disappear. We cannot remove it from its environment without destroying it, just as we cannot remove ourselves from the central flow of our thoughts and activities without destroying them with a fruitless search for definition and clarity.

“Groundless Grounds” opens our eyes to these concepts and more, and in a not-too-technical, readable way. It isn’t an easy read, granted, but it’s a compelling one – and the best philosophy book I’ve read in years.

[Paul H. · Rating 4 out of 5]

Man this is crazy -- I was casting around for a dissertation topic in 2010 and almost picked this structure/book (I ended up going with Heidegger and Rosenzweig instead), that legitimately would have been awkward. Very good stuff, in any event; reminded me of Staten's book on Wittgenstein and Derrida.

[Ike Sharpless · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book was awesome, really helped me deepen my understanding of Wittgenstein and makes me want to go back and read the early Heidegger properly, if only for more context - seems like it may have been okay to read only his late work after all.

May however be a bit much if you've never encountered either author first.

[Rhys · Rating 5 out of 5]

Braver is what might be likened to a referee in a cage match between analytic and continental philosophy; the universal translator on a Starship; a Friar Laurence bringing together the House of Capulet and the House of Montague (except for the unfortunate poison thing).

In other words, his exploration of philosophy in Groundless Grounds is captivating.

Lee Braver says: "By setting the limits to all possible language, logic implicitly contains a mystical sketch of the world as a limited whole, allowing Wittgenstein to have his ineffable cake and eff it too." Nice line!

[Ali Reda · Rating 3 out of 5]

Heidegger said, in the end, "only a God can save us". So it is very hard to accept the book's claim that "Nietzsche writes that even after God has been killed and buried, it will take centuries to finish scrubbing his shadows from our minds, cutting out the vestigial concepts of earlier times. I take this to be one of the great projects of the last two centuries and one that still lies before us, and I will try to show in this book that the works of Wittgenstein and Heidegger offer some of the richest resources we can draw upon to think about it". And even we assume this under Heidegger's ontotheology (although the book ignores all the mystical elements in Heidegger's philosophy of being), it is completely incorrect in Wittgenstein's first philosophy.

That's why I think the book succeeded in showing the connections between Wittgenstein's later philosophy and Heidegger's early philosophy, but it failed in incorporating Wittgenstein's early philosophy and the mystical core of Heidegger's later Philosophy, because the common point between them is silence; "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence" [God] and "who of us today would want to imagine that his attempts to think are at home on the path of silence?" [Being]. A silence that has no place in this book because it refers to something metaphysically transcendental, which is the manifestation of the real Groundless Ground.

Although the book starts with a nearly accurate reading of Wittgenstein's first philosophy by saying: "The new logic takes for Wittgenstein the place of Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics in Kant’s system, simultaneously revealing the nature of sensible language (Thought) and intimating transcendent subjects such as ethics or aesthetics by ejecting them from the domain of expression (Pure Reason). And, again like Kant, what lies on the far side of the boundary far outweighs the statements of contingent facts within", it moved quickly to give an incorrect reading that mixes between secular naturalism and Schopenhauerian immanence by saying: "For Wittgenstein and Heidegger alike, the key to the riddle of life lies in the correct understanding of the self". And this self for Wittgenstein is the transcendent true self in the Schopenhauerian sense, and not the empirical one, so "We identify instead with a world-soul (NB 49, 85) which, in one sense, is transcendent in virtue of the fact that it is not an item within the world, or in space and time at all (NB 74, 86) early Wittgenstein follows Schopenhauer in valuing the stilling of desires as the road to happiness and our true self".

But Wittgenstein really says in these remarks: "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. There really is only one world soul, which I for preference call my soul and as which alone I conceive what I call the souls of others [psycho-physical parallelism]. The above remark gives the key for deciding the way in which solipsism is a truth ... I am my world ... Is this the solution of the puzzle why men have always believed that there was one spirit common to the whole world? And in that case it would, of course, also be common to lifeless things too. This is the way I have travelled: Idealism singles men out from the world as unique, solipsism singles me alone out, and at last I see that I too belong with the rest of the world. In this way idealism leads to realism if it is strictly thought out. And in this sense I can also speak of a will that is common to the whole world. But this will is in a higher sense my will. As my idea is the world, in the same way my will is the world-will". Meaning that I see only one soul in my world.

Another example, "what Heidegger seeks to ignite, Wittgenstein stamps out. While both critique traditional philosophical theories, for Heidegger “the task is to see the riddle,” to let being’s questionable mystery endlessly provoke us; for Wittgenstein, both early and late, (the solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem)". But Wittgenstein isn't trying here to "to demystify phenomena we are tempted to wonder at and seek philosophical explanations for", because "Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is", but this mystical question can't be put in words, "There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical", so "For an answer which cannot be expressed the question too cannot be expressed".

And What Wittgenstein really says in regards of the riddle of life is that "The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time ... outside the world ... outside life ... The meaning of life, i.e. the meaning of the world, we can call God". And since value is also outside the world, ethics is transcendental. So for Wittgenstein, there is no transcendent true self in the Schopenhauerian sense, nor is ethics negative only, because this is a guy who cherished Tolstoy's gospel in brief, the same guy who described his religious ideas as 100% Hebraic, the same guy who on his death bed wrote: "How God judges people is something we cannot imagine at all. God may say to me: "I am judging you out of your own mouth. You have shuddered with disgust at your own actions when you have seen them in other people".

[Andrew · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a highly intelligent and well-written argument relating and knitting together some fundamental aspects of Heidegger's and Wittgenstein's ideas. In particular, it makes clear their objections to some ideas taken for granted, such as the long-held belief that everything has a reason for being (which itself has no reason).

[Cheng Wen Cheong · Rating 4 out of 5]

A extremely lucid comparison of the two philosophers and the trajectories of their works. Tightly structured and consistent.

[Searnold · Rating 5 out of 5]

In the revelatory light of Heidegger's "Black Notebooks", what is one to make of Braver's study of Wittgenstein and Heidegger? Is it possible, for example, to follow Nietzsche's observation (cited by Wolin in his work "Heidegger in Ruins") to build with or upon the shards and rubble of Heidegger's philosophy? Or to put it in more vulgar terms, is it possible to separate the pepper from the pile of fly specks of Heidegger's embrace of National Socialism?

If one holds one's nose, Braver's work offers a good example of how this can be done.

As mentioned in a another posting, I also read this work as a way, in fact it turned out to be the best way of making sense of Heidegger's philosophy. My motivation was to be prepared to read "White Noise". But my main attraction to Braver's book was/is Wittgenstein. I particularly enjoyed and learned from Braver's many references to Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations", "On Certainty" and "Culture and Value" as these works are ever near my reach, I re-read many of the references. Additionally, the Wittgensteinian side-by-side -and-find -connections method of examination proved very helpful in finding my way to the "folly"- a feature of English gardens: here it is a the newly constructed but long abandoned moss-covered outhouse- hidden in the tangled growth of bull thistle and horse weed of Heidegger's coded language.

[Taleb Jaberi · Rating 4 out of 5]

"Wittgenstein mixed these logical concerns with the mysticism and ethics of Schopenhauer
within a broadly Kantian framework." p.4

[Daniel Edgardo · Rating 5 out of 5]

A highly recommended book, very clear and engaging without sacrificing any rigour or weight in comparing and bringing together Wittgenstein and Heidegger's thought, so necessary for our lives.