Red Star Over Iraq: Iraqi Communism Before Saddam

by Johan Franzén

Recent outbreaks of sectarian and ethnic violence have thrown Iraq's stability into doubt, suggesting the country's politics are a farce and its political parties are nothing more than the protectors of ethnosectarian interests. Because of the artificiality of the Iraqi state and its absence of deep-seated political institutions, skeptics fear the country is destined to revert to primordialism, yet Iraq's present situation is largely the result of Saddam Hussein's infamous rule over the past three decades, exacerbated by the deprivations of international sanctions. Johan Franzén underscores the role of these destabilizing factors, arguing that before Hussein's ascent to power, diverse parties representing a variety of ideological platforms characterized Iraqi government. The largest and most important of these groups was the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), the only true cross-sectarian party in Iraqi history drawing support from all of Iraq's communities. From its inception in 1934 to its demise at the hands of Hussein in 1979, the ICP continuously resisted various regimes and spread communist ideology throughout Iraq. At times the party achieved considerable success, though it ultimately failed to seize absolute power. Red Star Over Iraq analyzes this rich history to project a different picture of a future Iraq.

Genres: Nonfiction, History, Middle East, Politics

288 pages, Hardcover

First published April 1, 2011

Reviews

[Shireen Rummana · Rating 5 out of 5]

Johan Franzen's book provides a rich and in-depth look at the Iraqi Communist Party, beginning with its roots in Iraqi Marxist reading groups in the 1920s, and changes to the country's education system that allowed for a mass popular radicalization of students who moved towards socialism and other political ideologies around the same time. The ICP itself was formed in the 1930s, and within fifteen years it carried considerable weight in the country. Franzen describes how the party was transformed by its early leader Fahad into a Leninist party organized into branches, districts, locals, and cells, and with democratic centralist discipline, though Fahad's rule may have been more centralist than democratic (http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/201...).
In the 1940s and '50s, the party had huge influence in Iraq, and in the revolutions of 1948 and 1958 the ICP was able to pull hundreds of thousands of people into the street, putting mass pressure on those in power, its leadership leading the movement in the streets. This allowed the 1948 Wathbah ("the Leap" uprising) to demand those in power take the issue of Palestine seriously--though when they did it was still feeble and more rhetoric than strategic and well-thought-out confrontation of Israel--and pull more of Iraq to radical conclusions about the Iraqi elite and their claims to embody nationalist principles. In 1958, the ICP "had the whole party on its feet and out on the streets of Baghdad" (81), safeguarding the Free Officers' takeover of the government and preventing a counterrevolution by the old regime, now the overthrown monarchy. Impressively, the party was able to recover when faced with repression in the late '40s, including the imprisonment and then execution of Fahad. Its actions in '48 and '58 related to so many Iraqis that it continued to grow in size, and its organizational structure only helped it grow and continue to function despite a brief period of loss of leadership. But the ICP continuously chose not to take power into its own hands. Initially, it seems to make sense that they believed in people's struggle from below putting pressure on whatever regime was in power, but soon it becomes clear that the party is willing to make drastic and deadly concessions with the regimes that follow--Qasim's, the Arefs', and even the Baath Party itself. According to Franzen, the decision not to take state power lay in their conviction that the regime had to pass through a specific stage of communist cooperation with a "national bourgeoisie", which led to their cooperation with each of the aforementioned regimes even as they carried out severe repression against the ICP. Franzen argues that this is due to their rigid interpretation of Leninist theories that Third World countries must forge national fronts with so-called "national bourgeoisies"--and that the ICP's downfall essentially came because of its adherence to what it considered the Marxist-Leninist path. In fact, he claims that the party would attempt to stretch reality to fit its assessments into Moscow's dictates and directions. He clearly disagrees with other scholars who claim that the party flip-flopped, arguing instead that it was ideologically consistent and in fact too rigid to realistically analyze the actual reality on the ground.
Franzen also illustrates how the party came under the influence of Arab nationalism, which made it difficult for the ICP to coherently and consistently explain the Kurdish question and even the question of Palestine. Instead of stressing internationalist working-class solidarity, their analyses asserted that Arab, Palestinian, and Kurdish nationalisms were progressive due to their opposition to imperialism. This failed to deal with the question of Kurdish oppression at the hands of Arab states, and led to other ideological contradictions.
For me, Franzen's book brings up even more questions about the ICP, the relationship between its leadership and base, and the decisions it made throughout its later years. Franzen's discussion of the relationship between leadership and lower-level members is hinted at in his brief discussion of the organization of the party under Fahad, and then with the two internal coups, especially the internal coup in the 1960s. But perhaps since the book's sources seem to mostly rely on those of the upper leadership in the party, I am left wanting to know more about the dynamics between leadership and general members. Franzen mentions that the student groups affiliated with the ICP were far more radical, but he does not cover what actions they spearheaded or the debates or discussions they took part in. It seems that only a small group retained most of the control and leadership throughout the ICP's various periods. Were individuals trained as in a cadre-building organization? After Fahad's "iron rule," did the general membership have the power to influence from the ground and keep the party democratic? How did the general membership respond to so many of the decisions that worked to interpret and carry out Moscow's command? What might things have looked like had the communist party taken power in 1958, or later had it taken advantage of its strength rather than allowing the Baath Party to rule? As in, did the democratic elements of the party mean that it could have led a promising alternative for Iraq while in state power?
Franzen mentions that the Free Officers and the Baath Party copied the ICP's organizational framework, and Qasim's regime also looked to the ICP and relied on it for its backing. How did the Baath Party become so much stronger when the ICP started out much stronger than it, and with a mass base? Why was the ICP's full potential not realized, besides it not taking state power? Franzen claims that too often the ICP's attempts to strictly follow what they believed were Leninist principles held them back, prevented them from taking power, led to them being overly apologetic and releasing self-criticisms. But what did their ideological training and local organizing look like at a closer level?

I also found this interview with Franzen to be useful as it describes the fact that in the party's earlier period, most works on Marxism were inaccessible to party members; in its last decades they were translated and studied by party leadership, and more explanations that clarified several questions I had while reading:
http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/201...

[Mesut Bostancı · Rating 4 out of 5]

Apparently there is more than one book detailing the history of Iraq's Communist Party. This book chooses to focus on the strategic and tactical positions taken by the ICP over its long history. By focusing on ideology and theory as envisioned and implemented by the party, this book is quite successful in portraying an intellectual history rather Than just a political history of the party. As the author argues, Iraq's Communist Party was the largest political force to never take power in the middle east. Its story is a helpful focus point for understanding the importance of ideology in mid 20th century Iraqi politics, as well as its decline with the seizure by Saddam Hussein of total power in 1979.

[Will Thompson · Rating 5 out of 5]

No one else covers Iraqi communism with such depth.

[Steven R]

A fascinating if deeply depressing history about a part of the world I know not enough about. Makes clear the impacts of bad theory (stagism) on strategy and survival.