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Aristotle on the Many Senses of Priority (The Journal of the history of philosophy monograph series) by John J. Cleary
Cleary discusses the origin, development, and use of the many senses of priority as a central thesis in Aristotle’s metaphysics.Cleary contends that one of the most revealing problems for the ambiguity of Aristotle’s relationship to Platonism is that of the ontological status of mathematical objects. In support of his claim, Cleary analyzes a curious passage from Aristotle’s Topics, where he appears to accept a schema of priorities that makes mathematical entities more substantial than sensible things.How does Aristotle try to reconcile the ordering of things dictated by sciences like mathematics and dialectic with the ordering of sense experience upon which his own physics and metaphysics are based? To find the answer, Cleary reviews three different outlines of the many senses of priority given by Aristotle himself and found in Categories 12-13, Metaphysics Delta 11, and Metaphysics Theta 8. Cleary suggests there is an implicit hierarchy for Aristotle that leads him to posit the Prime Mover at its apex as complete actuality and, therefore, as the focus for the concept of priority. Having reviewed Aristotle’s treatment of the many uses of priority, Cleary demonstrates how the concept is used in some typical arguments by Aristotle for his mature metaphysical positions.
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First published September 1, 1988
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November 25, 2008
John Cleary draws a parallel between the pros hen equivocal nature of ‘being’ and ‘priority’ in Aristotle’s thought throughout the progression from Aristotle’s early works (the Organon) through his ‘more complete and mature’ (p. 63) views in the central books of the Metaphysics. He charges contemporary scholars of not having paid enough attention to the many senses in which Aristotle uses ‘priority’ and the influence that a thorough treatment of the various uses may shed some light on the following questions that Cleary holds to be crucial to understanding Aristotle: How does Aristotle attempt to reconcile the seemingly contradictory views that he holds of the nature and goal of his metaphysical sciences; viz. that metaphysics as theology versus metaphysics as a general ontology? What is Aristotle’s treatment of divine being supposed to be illustrative of—substance or being? Unfortunately, the sometimes random assortment of textual treatments does not make explicitly clear this question until the conclusion of the book.
Cleary is right to emphasize the importance of priority in Aristotle’s work, and he sets out to illustrate the importance by focusing first on the his early logical and metaphysical works pointing to Plato’s influence on Aristotle as a probable explanation for Aristotle’s use of priority in the ways that he does. Cleary spends the majority of his time in the early part of his book paying close attention to the Topics and the Categories, with occasional reference to the Posterior Analytics—all constitutive members of Aristotle’s Organon, the works that focused on the nature of logic—and he supposes that these works are engaged in the same project as the Physics and the Metaphysics (p. 47-48); a point I will return to momentarily. In the Organon, Cleary finds Plato to be heavily influential, especially with regards to the discussions of primary and secondary substances, and what is more intelligible to us.
There next comes an abrupt shift to the heart of the Metaphysics where Cleary jumps around a bit after providing a translation of Δ 5. Here Cleary finds the clearest statement of the senses in which Aristotle uses ‘priority’ and analyzes the senses in light of his translations set out earlier. Here we find Cleary most explicitly suggesting that the project of the Metaphysics is the very same project as that found in the Categories; indeed Δ 5 is said to be an expansion of the Categories 12-13, with the critical difference that the ontological independence of mathematical entities is being questioned here.
At this point, Cleary’s gerrymandering discussion of the Metaphysics jumps up to the latter portion of Theta, where he attempts to clarify the discussion of priority in Δ, while bringing in the notion of Aristotle’s hierarchy-of-substance to illustrate, presumably, the influence of the degrees-of-being thesis that Cleary suggests is held-over from Plato (this, however, is not at all explicit, and might be meeting him more than half-way). What Cleary makes explicit is that Aristotle’s Prime Mover is prior in a sense that somehow relates to Plato’s degrees-of-being thesis, and that this is to be read as the most mature thought that Aristotle had on the nature of priority.
All of this so far, however, has been stage-setting for the argument that he makes in his final chapter: he intends to provide a novel way of looking at Aristotle’s mature metaphysical thought by placing importance on the notion of ‘priority’ and how it effects the notion of ‘biological form’ in Aristotle, and how this is a departure from Plato. It is to say that Cleary wants to take emphasis away from the theological side of metaphysics, which he seems to tacitly suppose is tied up in the Platonic want of independent existence of mathematical objects, and to show that in light of the many uses of ‘priority’ with regards to the hierarchal-structure of substance and biological form, to place primacy (so to speak) on the general ontological side of our above question. In order to get there, however, Cleary again selectively chooses to spend a lot of time looking at the Physics (specifically Book 8), as well as Book Μ of the Metaphysics. He supposes that Aristotle’s Prime Mover’s relation to the priority of circular motion in the Physics shows the departure in the mature thought of Aristotle on the nature of metaphysics from the earlier Platonic assumptions (that mathematical objects are substances) that he found explicitly in the Topics.
As I have hinted at throughout the overview above, one of the concerns that readers may have with Cleary’s work here is the order, and selection of source material with which to work. To his credit, he does point to seemingly clear passages to support his points, but he relies very heavily on references to texts that he does not provide, and bounces around between the Metaphysics and Physics as if they were one work, while at the same time seeming to suggest that within the Metaphysics are separate projects and thoughts at work (e.g. between Δ and Θ Cleary seems at times to suggest that there is a fundamental shift between the maturity of Aristotle’s thought), yet he has no qualms about implying that the Physics is a compliment to book Μ in the Metaphysics.
This brings up another concern that readers may have with Cleary’s treatment of Aristotle’s texts. Cleary explicitly claims that there is a shift in the thinking of Aristotle between the Topics, and his thinking in the Metaphysics, and he tacitly presumes that the entire cannon of Aristotle’s work (or at least those that he is concerned to treat here) are all dealing with the same worry—viz. the science of metaphysics, or at the very least, ontological considerations. Yet, there is good reason to think that Aristotle’s early works (the Organon) take on a distinct approach; it is not the object of the Organon to express the way things are except by the way the mind organizes them, i.e. from the point of logikos. On this reading, the Physics and Metaphysics are written from the point of that which is less intelligible to us, but are known in terms of themselves, or from the phusikos. Presumably Cleary is aware of this reading, and he even hints at it in his conclusion to the book, suggesting that the mature view has mathematical objects existing as substance in a logical sense only, which is, he suggests, a ‘reversal of a Platonic schema with respect to substance which Aristotle seems to have accepted… in parts of the topics’ (p. 92). Yet, if the project of the Organon was to set forth the way the mind organizes the world, and how it is intelligible, it is not a departure from his previous thought, only a different approach to understanding the world.
This is not to say that the book is without virtues, however, one of the great virtues of Cleary’s writing is also one of his greatest vices—Cleary provides his own translations of the original Greek writing from the chapters that he finds most pertinent to his overall project, and indeed he relies heavily on the original Greek often putting the Greek terms in line with the English text (sometimes without translating it). This provides a nice reference for his exegesis, and there are even times where, to his credit, Cleary contrasts his translation with Ross’, Apostle’s, and Kirwan’s translations. This may be a vice for three reasons: (i) his translation is, by his own admission, quite literal a translation (p. 53)—this raises a flag for any translation; presumably the job of the translator is to understand the text in the original language then to express that meaning in the second language, not necessarily to translate literally as that approach may miss the point too easily; (ii) his translations are sometimes at odds with all three other translators—certainly there is conceptual space for global translational error in the previous translations but it seems unlikely and this seems to lend credence to the first concern; finally (iii) that without a working knowledge of Greek, the book becomes more formidable and less helpful to anyone besides scholars of ancient philosophy, who as we have illustrated above, may have a few other concerns as well.
Furthermore, despite the amount of work that Cleary wants the degrees-of-being thesis analogy to do, he never clearly states what exactly he means by it, nor does he argue for it being a viable analogy. He seems to just assert that it is a relevant analogy, and that it will be doing a bit of work for us.
Finally, Cleary seems to want to motivate and perhaps exaggerate the difference between the biological-ontological priority of substance over the general theological considerations that are brought up in the more traditional interpretations of Aristotle’s metaphysical views, but conspicuous in absence is any direct discussion of the motivations for the theological approach—indeed virtually all of the notes referring to Aquinas are neutral with respect to the discussion of theology. All in all, the book is relatively unclear, and for all of his explication of text, he fails to make explicit key components of the arguments that he wants advance.
Cleary is right to emphasize the importance of priority in Aristotle’s work, and he sets out to illustrate the importance by focusing first on the his early logical and metaphysical works pointing to Plato’s influence on Aristotle as a probable explanation for Aristotle’s use of priority in the ways that he does. Cleary spends the majority of his time in the early part of his book paying close attention to the Topics and the Categories, with occasional reference to the Posterior Analytics—all constitutive members of Aristotle’s Organon, the works that focused on the nature of logic—and he supposes that these works are engaged in the same project as the Physics and the Metaphysics (p. 47-48); a point I will return to momentarily. In the Organon, Cleary finds Plato to be heavily influential, especially with regards to the discussions of primary and secondary substances, and what is more intelligible to us.
There next comes an abrupt shift to the heart of the Metaphysics where Cleary jumps around a bit after providing a translation of Δ 5. Here Cleary finds the clearest statement of the senses in which Aristotle uses ‘priority’ and analyzes the senses in light of his translations set out earlier. Here we find Cleary most explicitly suggesting that the project of the Metaphysics is the very same project as that found in the Categories; indeed Δ 5 is said to be an expansion of the Categories 12-13, with the critical difference that the ontological independence of mathematical entities is being questioned here.
At this point, Cleary’s gerrymandering discussion of the Metaphysics jumps up to the latter portion of Theta, where he attempts to clarify the discussion of priority in Δ, while bringing in the notion of Aristotle’s hierarchy-of-substance to illustrate, presumably, the influence of the degrees-of-being thesis that Cleary suggests is held-over from Plato (this, however, is not at all explicit, and might be meeting him more than half-way). What Cleary makes explicit is that Aristotle’s Prime Mover is prior in a sense that somehow relates to Plato’s degrees-of-being thesis, and that this is to be read as the most mature thought that Aristotle had on the nature of priority.
All of this so far, however, has been stage-setting for the argument that he makes in his final chapter: he intends to provide a novel way of looking at Aristotle’s mature metaphysical thought by placing importance on the notion of ‘priority’ and how it effects the notion of ‘biological form’ in Aristotle, and how this is a departure from Plato. It is to say that Cleary wants to take emphasis away from the theological side of metaphysics, which he seems to tacitly suppose is tied up in the Platonic want of independent existence of mathematical objects, and to show that in light of the many uses of ‘priority’ with regards to the hierarchal-structure of substance and biological form, to place primacy (so to speak) on the general ontological side of our above question. In order to get there, however, Cleary again selectively chooses to spend a lot of time looking at the Physics (specifically Book 8), as well as Book Μ of the Metaphysics. He supposes that Aristotle’s Prime Mover’s relation to the priority of circular motion in the Physics shows the departure in the mature thought of Aristotle on the nature of metaphysics from the earlier Platonic assumptions (that mathematical objects are substances) that he found explicitly in the Topics.
As I have hinted at throughout the overview above, one of the concerns that readers may have with Cleary’s work here is the order, and selection of source material with which to work. To his credit, he does point to seemingly clear passages to support his points, but he relies very heavily on references to texts that he does not provide, and bounces around between the Metaphysics and Physics as if they were one work, while at the same time seeming to suggest that within the Metaphysics are separate projects and thoughts at work (e.g. between Δ and Θ Cleary seems at times to suggest that there is a fundamental shift between the maturity of Aristotle’s thought), yet he has no qualms about implying that the Physics is a compliment to book Μ in the Metaphysics.
This brings up another concern that readers may have with Cleary’s treatment of Aristotle’s texts. Cleary explicitly claims that there is a shift in the thinking of Aristotle between the Topics, and his thinking in the Metaphysics, and he tacitly presumes that the entire cannon of Aristotle’s work (or at least those that he is concerned to treat here) are all dealing with the same worry—viz. the science of metaphysics, or at the very least, ontological considerations. Yet, there is good reason to think that Aristotle’s early works (the Organon) take on a distinct approach; it is not the object of the Organon to express the way things are except by the way the mind organizes them, i.e. from the point of logikos. On this reading, the Physics and Metaphysics are written from the point of that which is less intelligible to us, but are known in terms of themselves, or from the phusikos. Presumably Cleary is aware of this reading, and he even hints at it in his conclusion to the book, suggesting that the mature view has mathematical objects existing as substance in a logical sense only, which is, he suggests, a ‘reversal of a Platonic schema with respect to substance which Aristotle seems to have accepted… in parts of the topics’ (p. 92). Yet, if the project of the Organon was to set forth the way the mind organizes the world, and how it is intelligible, it is not a departure from his previous thought, only a different approach to understanding the world.
This is not to say that the book is without virtues, however, one of the great virtues of Cleary’s writing is also one of his greatest vices—Cleary provides his own translations of the original Greek writing from the chapters that he finds most pertinent to his overall project, and indeed he relies heavily on the original Greek often putting the Greek terms in line with the English text (sometimes without translating it). This provides a nice reference for his exegesis, and there are even times where, to his credit, Cleary contrasts his translation with Ross’, Apostle’s, and Kirwan’s translations. This may be a vice for three reasons: (i) his translation is, by his own admission, quite literal a translation (p. 53)—this raises a flag for any translation; presumably the job of the translator is to understand the text in the original language then to express that meaning in the second language, not necessarily to translate literally as that approach may miss the point too easily; (ii) his translations are sometimes at odds with all three other translators—certainly there is conceptual space for global translational error in the previous translations but it seems unlikely and this seems to lend credence to the first concern; finally (iii) that without a working knowledge of Greek, the book becomes more formidable and less helpful to anyone besides scholars of ancient philosophy, who as we have illustrated above, may have a few other concerns as well.
Furthermore, despite the amount of work that Cleary wants the degrees-of-being thesis analogy to do, he never clearly states what exactly he means by it, nor does he argue for it being a viable analogy. He seems to just assert that it is a relevant analogy, and that it will be doing a bit of work for us.
Finally, Cleary seems to want to motivate and perhaps exaggerate the difference between the biological-ontological priority of substance over the general theological considerations that are brought up in the more traditional interpretations of Aristotle’s metaphysical views, but conspicuous in absence is any direct discussion of the motivations for the theological approach—indeed virtually all of the notes referring to Aquinas are neutral with respect to the discussion of theology. All in all, the book is relatively unclear, and for all of his explication of text, he fails to make explicit key components of the arguments that he wants advance.
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