On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War

by Harry G. Summers Jr.

An expert war strategist analyzes how the American military resurrected itself after the setbacks of the Vietnam War to perform successfully during Operation Desert Storm.

Genres: History, Military History, Military Fiction, Middle East

302 pages, Mass Market Paperback

First published January 1, 1992

About the author

Harry G. Summers Jr. is best known as the author of an analysis of the Vietnam War, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (1982). An infantry colonel in the US Army, he had served as a squad leader in the Korean War and as a battalion and corps operations officer in the Vietnam War. Summers was also an instructor and Distinguished Fellow at the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and served on the negotiation team for the United States at the end of the Vietnam War.

Aside from his books, Summers wrote a syndicated national newspaper column on national security affairs for the Los Angeles Times and was the editor of Vietnam Magazine. He was also a frequent speaker at colleges, lectures, and debates.

During Operation Desert Storm, Summers served as a color commentator and analyst on the ongoing live network news broadcasts and for a time became a familiar face to the television viewers. In 1992, he wrote a book on the Gulf War, On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War.

Reviews

[Anusha Jayaram · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book is the second part of a series, “On Strategy” by Harry G. Summers Jr. (HGSJ). The first book is an analysis of the Vietnam War, while second book focuses on the Gulf War. I picked this book up expecting it to be an analysis of the various political, social and geographical factors that led to and that influenced the conduct of the Gulf war. The blurb at the back of the book implies as much.

However, after reading the introduction to the book by the author, I had to re-calibrate my expectations from the book. HGSJ categorically states that this book is an analysis of the *War* strategy, not the political and other factors influencing the war. So, this book attempts to be a modern “Art of War” with on-ground examples to illustrate the key takeaways.

On the whole, this book does present a few very interesting ideas on war, but gets massively repetitive. In short, the crux of this book, which spans 300+ pages, could easily be condensed into a succinct summary of no more than 10 pages without losing anything of importance.

My attention flagged while reading this book due to a few pain-factors:

(1) Repeated reference to the Vietnam War (dealt with in the first book), and comparison with the same in the context of the Gulf war. OK, now I know there are several contrasts HGSJ wishes to draw, but repeating the same points across 5 chapters is a bit much.
The most aggravating thing is that the author admits in so many words that a large part of the success of the Gulf war was due to the end of the Cold War with USSR. This allowed USA to decide on certain “all-out” measures without second guessing whether USSR would get involved in the war, which would lead to an inevitable nuclear war. Despite this admission however, he still constantly faults the decision makers of the Vietnam War for not doing enough, and for not “using enough force” in their approach.

(2) Constant repetition of already stated points in previous chapters, using almost the same language.

(3) Needless use of war-jargon and abbreviations. It is not necessary for a lay-reader like myself to know the various acronyms used by the USA in warfare. It is distracting and interrupts the flow of my reading.

(4) The United States’ priorities and ethics (or their lack) when it comes to war are appalling. One of the chapters begins with a quote from an air-force chief of staff, who claims:

“Air-power is the only answer available to our country in this circumstance. . . . [To attempt to beat Iraq on the ground risks] destroying Kuwait in order to save it. [By using air power against targets in Iraq] you would attempt to convince his population that [Saddam Hussein] and his regime cannot protect them. If there is a nation that cannot defend its people against these intimidating foreigners-protect their lines of communication, their means of production, their cities -that brings a great burden for their leaders. . . Airpower in peace and war brings a special had of psychological impact... use of such air-power results in such shattered enemy resistance that soldiers can ‘walk in and not have to fight’ a pitched battle.”

Apparently this General was asked to step down.
I assumed initially that the key concern was his advocacy for carpet bombing and the unethical targeting of civilians in war. I was mistaken however.
The key issue his country had with his quote was his implication that the air-force was superior to the army and marine corps; apparently he had made a grave mistake by portraying one of these arms as ‘superior’ to the others. A distant second (and very minor) concern was his wish to target civilians in an attempt to break the enemy’s ‘will to fight’.

(5) The implicit arrogance of the United States’ attitude toward the rest of the world inevitably seeps through these pages. Declaring that the United States is “the only country in the world which possesses the moral standing and the means to back it up.. to assemble the forces of world peace” (which translates to, “the USA has the authority and ability to get involved in wars half a world away”) is painfully ironic. The sheer number of wars fomented by the USA in so many countries near and far automatically disqualifies it from any moral authority whatsoever!

Despite these jarring notes in the book however, there were a few key takeaways. Some of them might seem so obvious they needn’t be spelt out. But the fact that wars have been waged without keeping them in mind makes them worth re-stating. The following points are the only parts of the book I found useful (purely my opinion, of course):

(1) Every war needs to have a clear objective in mind. Entering into a war without a clear objective can (and has) resulted in stalemate, unintended and far-reaching (negative) consequences.

(2) There needs to be unity of command while strategizing and executing a war. Another seemingly obvious point, but one which seems to have been disregarded in conducting the Vietnam War.
On a related note, there needs to be excellent coordination between land, air and sea troops in order to ensure the desired outcome from the war.

(3) War strategy needs to be aligned with the larger political objectives, i.e.: the country’s military forces are subordinated to the government’s political objectives.

(4) There needs to be a distinction between strategy and tactics for war. To paraphrase my understanding: strategy describes the “what” while tactics detail the “how” of the war. This concept led to an interesting discussion of various permutations and combinations. I visualized it as a 2x2 matrix with the following quadrants:
(a) Q1: “Strategic Offense + Tactical Offense” - Result: “Destruction of enemy and conquest of his territory”
(b) Q2: “Strategic Offense + Tactical Defense” - Result: “General situation favorable for victory”
(c) Q3: “Strategic Defense + Tactical Offense” - Result: "Victory on the field of battle without general results for the war”
(d) Q4: “Strategic Defense + Tactical Defense” - Result: “Complete absence of a decision”

(5) Buy-in form the civilian population is important and influences morale of the fighting troops. In this context, media plays an important role in conveying the “right” message to the public.

(6) There needs to be trust and mutual respect between the political and military arms. This ensures minimal interference in the “how” of the war by the political arm, while the military does not delve into the political objectives or decision making processes.

This really is most of it. Did I say a summary needed 10 pages? I overestimated. This book certainly did not need over 300 pages. Neither was it an easy read. Overall, this is not a book I would recommend to a friend.

[Paul · Rating 5 out of 5]

Awesome book that had several great sections for some deep thought. Was expecting a bit more on the actual Gulf War action, but as it is a strategic look at the war, it’s focus was on national decisions made during the previous 2-3 decades. The author really scored with this book. Probably best read by a senior military leader as this is not a tactical recount of the war. Best excerpts are below…

- At the very beginning of the war then President Lyndon Johnson had made a conscious decision not to mobilize the American people - to invoke the national will - for the Vietnam War for fear it would jeopardize his “Great Society” social programs. P9. PJK: This point was highlighted multiple time in the book. Not spinning up the reserves to support Vietnam certainly was a very key decision made early in the war.
- We tried to wage this war as ‘calmly’ as possible, treating it as a ‘police action’ rather than as a full scale war. P10. PJK: This was in contrast to the 1990-91 Gulf War where President Bush decided to go big.
- Americans have a long and proud tradition of irreverence toward and distrust of their military”, General Fred Weyand observed in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. P 14.
- But during the Vietnam War this basic anti militarism was aggravated by several factors. One was the decision to grant draft deferments to students. “This policy”, observed General Westmoreland… “contributed to antiwar militancy on college campuses in that young men feeling twinges of conscience because they sat out the war while others fought could appease their conscience if they convinced themselves the war was immoral.” P14. PJK: interesting assessment from GEN Westmoreland. The logic makes sense to me.
- “….The power of decision… had not been stolen. It had been surrendered.”… and many in the Congress preferred it that way. They had the luxury of being all things to all people… “I do think that we should have gone to the Congress each year for a vote up or down on the Tonkin Gulf Resolution,” said Dean Rusk… p28.
- When Army chief of staff general George H. Decker, a World War 2 combat infantryman, “stoutly stood up to president John F. Kennedy with the assurance that any good soldier can handle guerrillas,’ he was eased from office and replaced by general Earl Wheeler… p66…. President Kennedy " dropped a broad hint that future promotions of high-ranking officers would depend upon their demonstration of experience in the counter guerrilla or sub limited field.” Ironically, it was general Decker, not Kennedy, who ultimately was proved to be correct…. By the end of 1968 the Viet Cong had ceased to exist as an effective fighting force. P67. PJK: GEN Shinseki also stood up, against the SECDEF prior to the Invasion of Iraq, and was also removed… but he also was ultimately proven correct.
- “Training is the cornerstone of success”, the manual went on to say. “It is a full time job for commanders in peace time.” P143.
- Such operational level thinking – “the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns…” p157. PJK: this is a great definition.
- “The early decision to collect the reserves, while probably motivated by necessity, turned out to be a major catalyst in consolidating American public opinion firmly behind our strategy in the gulf… “ p175
- As FM 100-1 states, “It is not essential that the enemy be taken unaware, but only that he become aware too late to react effectively.” P216-217.
- German General Waldemar Erfurth… “The history of modern war shows that the chances of strategic surprise are small indeed…. A great time lag between the conception of a plan and its execution is unavoidable. This time lag must affect secrecy… strategic surprise, therefore in the 20th century is the most difficult military undertaking.” P217. PJK: even more true in the 21st century.
- In every case save one it was the American will that prevailed and the enemy will that was ultimately broken… The attacks on Pearl Harbor, on South Korea, and on Kuwait did not break American will. They energized it… and on the Tet 1968 battlefield, General Westmoreland's will prevailed as well. The Viet Cong guerrilla and the North Vietnamese Army 1968 Tet offensive turned out to be a resounding tactical and operational defeat. But at the strategic level they scored what proved to be a decisive political victory. P219. PJK: very interesting assessment.

[Michael · Rating 3 out of 5]

Summers' book is primarily concerned with celebrating Operations Desert Shield and Storm. This is hardly, as the title might lead one to believe, a "critical" analysis of the Gulf War. Instead it is the saga of how the Americans licked the "Vietnam Syndrome." As a conservative revisionist on Vietnam, the lessons Summers draws from that experience were also shared by the U.S. military establishment. That is, the failure to mobilize the American population for an all-out war with clearly defined objectives "caused" American defeat in Vietnam. Summers sees the victory in the Gulf as the consequence of having learned from our mistakes in Vietnam. For Desert Shield/Storm the reserves were called up, strategic objectives were clearly defined, and the military was given the support it needed from the civilians to win. This victory was also the first engagement in the new world order, where America's status as the one lone superpower will enable it to punish aggression and maintain international peace. Unless, of course, the Americans forget the "lessons of the Munich," which guided America's successful Cold War strategy, and retreat instead to "isolation."

[Robert · Rating 5 out of 5]

While not as well known as Summers’ preceding treatise on the Vietnam War, I would argue that this critical analysis on the Gulf War is at least as important, if not more so, in understanding how to win wars.

It is a thorough analysis, and largely comparison, of what went wrong in Vietnam versus what went right in the Gulf War through a purely Clausewtizean lens.

A must read for military strategists and political leaders.