Alan Trachtenberg’s The Incorporation of America argues that the rise of corporatization— the hierarchical, managed structure of the corporate world—in the Gilded Age fundamentally restructured American culture in ways that were deeply antipodean to the nation’s cultural past causing cultural conflict on a number of fronts. The book begins by looking at a number of myths that arose in the wake of the rise of business. In the first chapter, Trachtenberg explores the myth of the West as “an emblem of national coherence” in a “time of disunity.” In this interpretation, The Dawes Act was an attempt to incorporate Native Americans, who did not fit into the myth of the West. This myth served to obscure the reality of the West as a feeding ground for corporate industrial expansion.
In the second chapter, Trachtenberg examines the rise of mechanization, which, when combined with the myth of the West, came to represent progress. The pace of technological innovation contributed to the sense of helplessness, uncertainty, and disquieting flux caused by the cyclical economy, primarily its downturn in the 1870s. Americans sought to come to grips with mechanization through organizing, but also through fiction and folklore. Myths about the virtue of productivity and progress and metaphorical relations with mechanization obscured the evils of the reality of rapid mechanization and incorporation, including such un-American features as increased social stratification and decreased individual autonomy. For Trachtenberg, the railroad, which established time zones without legislation, is the perfect example of the power of the combination of incorporation and mechanization. Incorporation also institutionalized knowledge and fragmented it through specialization. Yet, this was obscured by the myth of Edison, who, in reality, was not a throwback to Benjamin Franklin but the beginnings of modern industrial research. The end result was significant changes in the distribution of knowledge and mechanized mode of thought.
Chapter 3 interprets the struggle between labor and capital in these years as a cultural conflict and the result of fundamentally different views of the meaning of America and “American values.” The onset of consolidated wealth through incorporation and its attendant and unprecedented social stratification created opposing, class-specific conceptions of those values. Most importantly, in this fight over values, the state came down on the side of capital to the point of inflicting violence on its own citizens. This conflict gave rise to the idea of the collective voice; the corporation spoke as a voice which evaded liability in contrast with the unions, whose culture developed as a conscious alternative to the culture of competitive individualism, of acquisitiveness and segregation.
Chapter 4 explores the role of the city in further entrenching American incorporation. As the city grew, it began to swallow up the countryside, that repository of individualism and virtue, which became a “market colony” of the city, the seat of corporate cultural imperialism. The home, the workplace, and the marketplace became incorporated into the urban network designed for production and consumption. This design included strict class segregation and constant visibility of the symbols of the new corporate order, most notably, the department store. The department store and the urban marketplace in general, with the help of advertising, which sought to obfuscate the relationship between production and consumption. As the most visible social expression of the relations between capital and labor, the great city came to embody the reciprocal (Marxian) relations between production and consumption in their most acute form. Consumption emerged as the hidden purpose of cities.
In chapter 5, Trachtenberg explores the corporate class’s attempt to impose downward its cultural hegemony. Believing high culture could be mass-produced and refashioned for the middle class as the “official American version of reality,” it was seen as a means of control. At the same time, populism arose as a reaction to the corporate control of politics, but it was swallowed up in the deep swaths cut by ethnic and religious diversity. Again, Trachtenberg sees political conflict in this period as a struggle over the soul of the American Self. Chapter 6 explores the Realism movement in painting and literature and chapter 7 examines the cultural symbolism of the White City at the 1893 World’s Fair in Chicago.
This is an impressive work in many ways. First, not only is its conception of culture broad, so is its application. Trachtenberg examines everything from politics and business to painting and literature, from dime store novels to the World’s Fair, from urban planning to advertising. The book’s scope is, quite simply, impressive, as is Trachtenberg’s analysis. He shows how incorporation was a structural cultural phenomenon. Furthermore, he shows how despite its attempts at consolidation, it fostered cultural conflict in various political, economic, and cultural arenas, most fundamentally between labor and capital. Trachtenberg also illustrates how the broader uncertainty and upheaval of social, political, and economic relations manifested itself in popular culture. Finally, it demonstrates how incorporation and the rise of corporate culture changed the way Americans viewed themselves, their country, and their world.
But, in the end, this is a book about the death of the original American ideology. Though the political death of Jeffersonian republicanism, which was built on individualism, widespread property-holding, equality, and suspicion of concentrated wealth and unproductivity, had occurred decades earlier, its, perhaps more important, cultural death occurred in the Gilded Age at the hands of incorporation. This is both ironic and tragic in two ways. First, as Secretary of State in the early 1790s, Jefferson fought against the nation’s first significant act of incorporation, the first Bank of the United States, but then acquiesced to renewing its charter during his presidency. Second, in 1800, Jefferson had emerged the victor in the winner-take-all-sweepstakes that was a struggle over the identity and future vision of America with Federalist corporatist, Alexander Hamilton. But more than a half century after their deaths, the battle over the American identity and future would be fought again and this time Jefferson would lose by proxy. The first time around, Jefferson’s populism proved the key to his success, but the second time around it simply was not enough. This contrast draws out how by the end of the nineteenth century corporate culture displaced the republican culture of the founding and of Lincoln, perhaps the last major political figure representative of the Jeffersonian tradition, whose own Republican Party assisted in its downfall.