The Social Origins of Egyptian Expansionism during the Muhammad 'Ali Period

by Fred H. Lawson

Why do countries capture and occupy lands beyond their own borders? Fred Lawson contends that, in the Arab world, expansionist policy has little to do with the temperament of the individual leaders and even less with the activities of the great powers. Instead, he argues that the character and intensity of a country's domestic political conflicts directly determine foreign policies.

215 pages, Hardcover

First published March 1, 1992

Reviews

[Paul · Rating 4 out of 5]

Although it is sometimes easy to get lost in the details of Fred Lawson’s The Social Origins of Egyptian Expansionism During the Muhammad ‘Ali Period, his main argument is stated clearly: a nation’s decision to engage military expansionist policies is a reaction to a specific set of domestic political conflicts. During the reign of Muhammad Ali in particular, “the peculiar way in which political conflicts among Egypt’s most powerful social forces played themselves out […] left the members of the country’s ruling coalition with no choice but to use military expansion as a way of maintaining their collective predominance over domestic society.” Using Ali’s Egypt as a case study, therefore, the author expands upon this basic theory with a detailed Marxist analysis of Egypt’s economic, social, and political situation in the first three decades of the 19th century to test the validity of his thesis.

In his introduction, after stating his objectives, Lawson proceeds to delineate and then dismiss previous explanations for Ali’s expansionist policies. He first argues that the most common arguments, that it was the ruler’s personal attributes, strategic calculations of foreign interests, or economic needs that drove military expansionist policies, are insufficient because there needs to be a structural element in order to facilitate these drives. Yet, he declares, a purely structural emphasis also proves insufficient because the theories, as they currently stand, cannot be applied to explain Egypt’s situation. The author focuses instead on a hybrid of these ideas, namely that there must be an “opportunity” (the structural component) and “willingness” (the personal portion) in order for a ruler to pursue military expansionism, but he expands “willingness” to include social forces as a whole, declaring them necessary for the promulgation of such policies.

Lawson’s first chapter elucidates a three-tiered process: accumulation crises within the local economy, the ability of subordinate forces to challenge hegemonic powers, and an expansionist response to quell domestic unrest and reconcile the split between ruling factions that is caused by crises. After a detailed, jargon-laden description of what accumulation crises are and how they come to be according to Marxist theory, the author argues that such a crisis emerged in Egypt around the time of Muhammad Ali’s appointment as governor. He then notes that crises themselves are not sufficient to stir the type of domestic unrest necessary to catalyze an expansionist reaction, but they require a well-organized opposition, pressures on state finances (which hinder their ability to mobilize a military force or engage other simple solutions), and strategic links between urban and rural centers, as well as a degree of disunity among the ruling group that can be exploited. When discontent does arise, hegemonic powers must decide upon which strategy to use, with expansionism allowing them to quell the internal threat with violence, open up new resources in conquered territories, have an excuse to restructure institutions, and consolidate their economic and political bases.

Lawson’s next three chapters provide detailed explanations as to why Ali embarked upon the Hijaz, Aegean, and Syrian campaigns, all of which have to do with challenges to the coalition of the state and rich international trading merchants known as the tujjar. In the first case, a long series of economic developments, including the rise of agricultural raiders, a displaced military elite, strained state coffers, and the declining profits of those urban artisans and tujjar who were outside of the coalition and traded in the Red Sea, culminated in Ali’s decision to lead an expedition. Such a venture allowed the government recruit the agricultural raiders and send them off to (a potentially profitable) war rather than suppressing them through mercenaries, empowered the military elite, gave the bureaucracy an excuse to centralize and reform and the government one to raise duties to increase state revenues, and reduced the economic hardships of the tujjar by denying the British an excuse to be involved with the Wahhabis near the Red Sea, as well as reducing the profit-damaging piracy of the latter. This solution was only temporary, however, as Ali’s centralization measures alienated rural notables and urban artisans, both of whom sought to ally with the increasing number of large landholders in the rural areas, while industrialization disrupted the profits of the state-connected tujjar. The Aegean campaign, therefore, was a measure intended to engage conscription to reduce rural unrest, produce trade vessels that would boost the power of the tujjar connected to the state, and encourage factories that would employ skilled urban professionals and produce weapons that could be used to defend against revolts.

Finally, a crisis had risen again by the 1830s, this time based upon growing links to Europe due to the rise of cash crops, which led to more challenges from the urban artisans and large landholders. Banditry became a frequent occurrence and declining tax revenues, as well as increasingly repressive centralization measures, strained the relationships between the state and its coalition. As European agents became more involved in trade, meanwhile, the tujjar lost much of their power and, with it, their ability to keep the urban artisans in check. Once again, military expansion emerged as the solution, as the Syrian invasion conscripted those involved in rural unrest (and reorganized the support base of smaller, local power-holders, thus salvaging that relationship), captured land for agricultural food production to dampen protests against Egypt’s cash crop focus, and allowed access to raw materials for the development of industry, which would benefit both the tujjar and the urban artisans.

Lawson’s lengthy conclusion recapitulates his arguments and discussion clearly, albeit briefly, and then, relying upon his main theory, attempts to explain why contemporary Tunisia and Iraq did not follow expansionist policies similar to Ali. For those without the proper historical context, and particularly those unfamiliar with the economic and political theories utilized, this section can be a little unclear, even as the author admits that they are underdeveloped ideas for further research. He ends by attempting to apply his theory to Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Overall, The Social Origins of Egyptian Expansionism During the Muhammad ‘Ali Period is an interesting perspective on the expansionist policies of its eponymous ruler, but one that gets burdened by technical jargon and economic theory that is less accessible to non-specialists. Furthermore, it would have been interesting to know how “aware” the leadership would have been of all of these potential impacts, since his thesis seems to rely upon Ali and his cohort having substantial knowledge and foresight regarding the impact of such campaigns. Having said that, it is much more detailed and solidly written that a review can do justice to, and the main arguments remain clear even when the details grow murky, leading me to recommend it to anyone interested in a new perspective on the economic or social history of the Muhammad Ali period.