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The Laboratory of the Mind: Thought Experiments in the Natural Sciences
An investigation into the philosophical implications of thought experiments in science. Brown provides a fascinating account of some of the most influential thought experiments in the history of science.
Paperback
First published July 11, 1991
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About the author
James Robert Brown
30 books8 followersDepartment of Philosophy, University of Toronto, Canada
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
December 4, 2018
[Review based on the second edition by Routledge, 2011]
I find the title of Brown's book is misleading in two ways. First, Brown does not consider thought experiments from all of the natural sciences, but instead focuses merely on physics (and, to a lesser degree, mathematics, which again is no natural science). Second, the goal of the book is not just to provide an overview or typology of thought experiments, but to argue for a Platonist interpretation of physics.
This second edition of the book comprises eight chapters, whose quality is somewhat uneven.. Chapters 1-3 collect thought experiments, primarily from physics, and provide useful ways of categorizing them. I think these are the best segment of the book, and one could be forgiven to stop reading here. Chapters 4 and 5 give a Platonist account of mathematics and physics, respectively, based on a certain - Platonic - class of thought experiments. I found Chapter 4 to be superior, not least because it mentions an apparently overlooked refutation of the continuum hypothesis based on a thought experiment (N.B. most mathematicians don't accept said proof, original to Christopher Freiling). On the other hand, Chapter 5 touches on so many issues in epistomology and philosophy of science that it is hard to follow the main line of argument.
Next, Chapter 6-8 appear somewhat arbitrary attached to the book, or at least one would have a hard time identifying the thread of argument. Chapter 6 (based on an independently published research article) presents the story of the development of the idea of inertial motion from Aristotle through Jean Buridan and Nicole Oresme through Galileo. This history is fascinating, and is chock full of thought experiments not mentioned before in the book. In contrast, Chapter 7 attempts a reconstruction of Einstein's philosophy of science. We never learn why such reconstruction is important, and in my reading, thought experiments play but a minor role here. Finally, Chapter 8 argues for a Platonic interpretation of quantum mechanics. This final chapter is written clearly, and there's a remarkably concise yet transparent explanation of EPR/Bell's inequality /Aspect's experiments. Yet, the chapter is simply too short for its own good, and the promised "Platonic interpretation" covers less than two pages - surely too short for such an endeavor.
Since this is such a fragmented book of unsteady merits, I recommend the interested reader to read Chapters 1-3, and 6. Chapters 4 and 8 can be considered optional for readers with a particular interest in mathematical Platonism and QM.
I find the title of Brown's book is misleading in two ways. First, Brown does not consider thought experiments from all of the natural sciences, but instead focuses merely on physics (and, to a lesser degree, mathematics, which again is no natural science). Second, the goal of the book is not just to provide an overview or typology of thought experiments, but to argue for a Platonist interpretation of physics.
This second edition of the book comprises eight chapters, whose quality is somewhat uneven.. Chapters 1-3 collect thought experiments, primarily from physics, and provide useful ways of categorizing them. I think these are the best segment of the book, and one could be forgiven to stop reading here. Chapters 4 and 5 give a Platonist account of mathematics and physics, respectively, based on a certain - Platonic - class of thought experiments. I found Chapter 4 to be superior, not least because it mentions an apparently overlooked refutation of the continuum hypothesis based on a thought experiment (N.B. most mathematicians don't accept said proof, original to Christopher Freiling). On the other hand, Chapter 5 touches on so many issues in epistomology and philosophy of science that it is hard to follow the main line of argument.
Next, Chapter 6-8 appear somewhat arbitrary attached to the book, or at least one would have a hard time identifying the thread of argument. Chapter 6 (based on an independently published research article) presents the story of the development of the idea of inertial motion from Aristotle through Jean Buridan and Nicole Oresme through Galileo. This history is fascinating, and is chock full of thought experiments not mentioned before in the book. In contrast, Chapter 7 attempts a reconstruction of Einstein's philosophy of science. We never learn why such reconstruction is important, and in my reading, thought experiments play but a minor role here. Finally, Chapter 8 argues for a Platonic interpretation of quantum mechanics. This final chapter is written clearly, and there's a remarkably concise yet transparent explanation of EPR/Bell's inequality /Aspect's experiments. Yet, the chapter is simply too short for its own good, and the promised "Platonic interpretation" covers less than two pages - surely too short for such an endeavor.
Since this is such a fragmented book of unsteady merits, I recommend the interested reader to read Chapters 1-3, and 6. Chapters 4 and 8 can be considered optional for readers with a particular interest in mathematical Platonism and QM.
February 2, 2014
A fascinating review of famous thought experiments, for instance including the inspiration for Einstein's theory of relativity and Schroeder's cat.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews