What do you think?
Rate this book
A Genius For War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945
Non Fiction Historical
362 pages, Hardcover, Slipcased
First published May 1, 1977
87 people are currently reading
323 people want to read
About the author
Trevor N. Dupuy
118 books26 followersTrevor Dupuy attended West Point, graduating in the class of 1938. During World War II he commanded a U.S. Army artillery battalion, a Chinese artillery group, and an artillery detachment from the British 36th Infantry Division. He was always proud of the fact that he had more combat time in Burma than any other American, and received decorations for service or valour from the U.S., British, and Chinese governments. After the war Dupuy served in the United States Department of Defense Operations Division[1] from 1945 to 1947, and as military assistant to the Under Secretary of the Army from 1947 to 1948. He was a member of the original Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) staff in Paris under Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower and Matthew Ridgway from 1950 to 1952.
It is as a military historian and a theorist that Trevor Dupuy would make a lasting mark on the world. He is perhaps best known for his massive book The Encyclopedia Of Military History (co-written, like many of his books, with his father R. Ernest Dupuy). Starting from the beginning of history and going up the present day the book tries to cover all the major (and minor) military conflicts in world history. Usually each entry (arranged chronologically and by region) gives little more than the names of the commanders and (often) very rough estimates for the size of the forces involved in the campaigns. Dupuy was not afraid of expressing an opinion and he classified some of his subjects as Great Captains (such as Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Julius Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, Frederick II of Prussia and Napoleon). Like most Western reference works it spends far more time dealing with wars in Europe and the United States than the rest of the world, but it does at least try to cover the entire world. The Encyclopedia Of Military History has been revised (and updated) several times, most recently in 1993. It can be found in the reference section of most American libraries.
It is as a military historian and a theorist that Trevor Dupuy would make a lasting mark on the world. He is perhaps best known for his massive book The Encyclopedia Of Military History (co-written, like many of his books, with his father R. Ernest Dupuy). Starting from the beginning of history and going up the present day the book tries to cover all the major (and minor) military conflicts in world history. Usually each entry (arranged chronologically and by region) gives little more than the names of the commanders and (often) very rough estimates for the size of the forces involved in the campaigns. Dupuy was not afraid of expressing an opinion and he classified some of his subjects as Great Captains (such as Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Julius Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, Frederick II of Prussia and Napoleon). Like most Western reference works it spends far more time dealing with wars in Europe and the United States than the rest of the world, but it does at least try to cover the entire world. The Encyclopedia Of Military History has been revised (and updated) several times, most recently in 1993. It can be found in the reference section of most American libraries.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews
January 15, 2014
I enjoyed this one due to the fact that it covered much more than I expected, especially the years between WWI and WWII. I found it interesting to compare the German General Staff to our nowadays Joint Staff. I see some similarities and some differences. I am still a junior officer and have an outside look to our Joint Staff, but find the parallels very interesting indeed. I know from my background that many countries modeled their military officer corps after the German General Staff.
I would recommend reading some on Prussian, WWI, and WWII history before tackling this book. The author assumes you have that information and can make the connections. He picks out particular individuals within the General Staff and makes a very good analysis of the contributions to the German Wars. Be very familiar with WWI German strategies and especially the WWII German drives through the Ardennes and the Russian Front.
Altogether a very good book for the professional military officer and those who love history.
I would recommend reading some on Prussian, WWI, and WWII history before tackling this book. The author assumes you have that information and can make the connections. He picks out particular individuals within the General Staff and makes a very good analysis of the contributions to the German Wars. Be very familiar with WWI German strategies and especially the WWII German drives through the Ardennes and the Russian Front.
Altogether a very good book for the professional military officer and those who love history.
June 3, 2009
Writing any history of the German army is about as easy as walking through a minefield without getting blown up. Authors can too easily go astray by focusing too much on WWII, castigating the German army as an unwitting tool of warmonger Adolph Hitler or praising it as an army of gallant warriors that fought superbly against daunting odds. T.N. Dupuy walks a find line through this minefield in his work , "A Genius For War: The German army and general staff, 1807-1945." He sometimes strays off the path towards the "gallant warrior" pole of analysis, while still explaining why this was so.
Dupuy wrote a good institutional history that the reader must peruse with a grain of salty skepticism. He keeps his focus on the General Staff's formative years in the 19th century, giving the World Wars their due without letting them consume his narrative. Battles and campaigns act as waypoints in the story's course that illustrate the General Staff's progress.
The Prussian, and later German, general staff was a force for institutionalized excellence that was supposed to provide a sound foundation for the Army, one that could withstand the rule of an average or stupid monarch and still win battles, and in turn, wars. This approach was born of necessity. The Prussian Army's slavish devotion to Frederick the Great's way of making war could not duplicate his genius, resulting in humiliating defeat at the hands of Napoleon in 1806-7. Only by shaping a meritocratic institution that studied battle and practiced excellence could Prussia's military reformers hope to rebuild an army that could beat Napoleon.
This approach did not bear fruit until the German Wars of Unification (1864, 1866 and 1870-1), when Denmark, Austria and France were defeated in quick succession by a highly trained generalship (headed by Helmuth von Moltke) that stressed flexibility, leadership, sound judgment and quick decision making on the spot. Von Moltke did not have to take the field to lead the army, but rather the army's depth of leadership was dependable enough for Moltke to delegate the actual fighting to the generals on the spot while he figured out where the arrows should go on the bigger map. Once Germany succeeded, others imitated.
Dupuy is not blind to the General Staff's faults. He traces the institution's office politics for 150 years, which did not always result in the best people getting the right assignments. While Scharnhorst and his fellow reformers wanted to see an army that answered to the Prussian/German people, the king/emperor always wanted an army that answered to him. So from the beginning, the General Staff (and in turn the army) rested on this faulty foundation. As a faction of government aligned with the monarchy, it would later become an unwitting tool in the hands of a less scrupulous head of state. Patriotism either led to blind loyalty or dangerous dissent during the Nazi period. Neither served Germany well.
While Dupuy stresses the General Staff's excellence in campaign and battle, he glosses over its limitations. Being too well schooled at fighting wars, the General Staff had a poorer grasp of grand strategy, where a nation's economic inputs and diplomatic understanding come into play at charting the course during a war.
Hindenburg and Ludendorff commanded Germany during the latter half of WWI, but did not fully understand national limits nor the political effects of their decisions. They took too much from the economy for the military, thus causing Germans to suffer further shortages and privations that undermined their political will to support the war. Unrestricted U-boat warfare dragged the United States into the war, just as Germany was successfully booting Russia out of it, producing no appreciable strategic gain. Even the final 1918 offensives were more throws of the dice, with no planning on how to exploit success after winning battles.
These same faults would come into play in WWII, when Hitler pretty much effaced the General Staff from war planning. Even if he had not, the body lacked the expertise to question the policies of the Nazi tyrant beyond military matters, and even here Hitler believed he knew best.
Even though Germany lost two world wars, Dupuy persists in his admiration of the German system of warfighting, offering statistical proof that in many battles it took anywhere from 1.5 to 3 enemy soldiers to best each German. Sometimes the German Army would win at odds as great as seven to one against them. While Dupuy goes into detail on how they won, he glosses over why they lost. Being outnumbered by alliances in two world wars had something to do with it. Explaining how Germany got to be so badly outnumbered is not Dupuy's job.
Dupuy wrote a good institutional history that the reader must peruse with a grain of salty skepticism. He keeps his focus on the General Staff's formative years in the 19th century, giving the World Wars their due without letting them consume his narrative. Battles and campaigns act as waypoints in the story's course that illustrate the General Staff's progress.
The Prussian, and later German, general staff was a force for institutionalized excellence that was supposed to provide a sound foundation for the Army, one that could withstand the rule of an average or stupid monarch and still win battles, and in turn, wars. This approach was born of necessity. The Prussian Army's slavish devotion to Frederick the Great's way of making war could not duplicate his genius, resulting in humiliating defeat at the hands of Napoleon in 1806-7. Only by shaping a meritocratic institution that studied battle and practiced excellence could Prussia's military reformers hope to rebuild an army that could beat Napoleon.
This approach did not bear fruit until the German Wars of Unification (1864, 1866 and 1870-1), when Denmark, Austria and France were defeated in quick succession by a highly trained generalship (headed by Helmuth von Moltke) that stressed flexibility, leadership, sound judgment and quick decision making on the spot. Von Moltke did not have to take the field to lead the army, but rather the army's depth of leadership was dependable enough for Moltke to delegate the actual fighting to the generals on the spot while he figured out where the arrows should go on the bigger map. Once Germany succeeded, others imitated.
Dupuy is not blind to the General Staff's faults. He traces the institution's office politics for 150 years, which did not always result in the best people getting the right assignments. While Scharnhorst and his fellow reformers wanted to see an army that answered to the Prussian/German people, the king/emperor always wanted an army that answered to him. So from the beginning, the General Staff (and in turn the army) rested on this faulty foundation. As a faction of government aligned with the monarchy, it would later become an unwitting tool in the hands of a less scrupulous head of state. Patriotism either led to blind loyalty or dangerous dissent during the Nazi period. Neither served Germany well.
While Dupuy stresses the General Staff's excellence in campaign and battle, he glosses over its limitations. Being too well schooled at fighting wars, the General Staff had a poorer grasp of grand strategy, where a nation's economic inputs and diplomatic understanding come into play at charting the course during a war.
Hindenburg and Ludendorff commanded Germany during the latter half of WWI, but did not fully understand national limits nor the political effects of their decisions. They took too much from the economy for the military, thus causing Germans to suffer further shortages and privations that undermined their political will to support the war. Unrestricted U-boat warfare dragged the United States into the war, just as Germany was successfully booting Russia out of it, producing no appreciable strategic gain. Even the final 1918 offensives were more throws of the dice, with no planning on how to exploit success after winning battles.
These same faults would come into play in WWII, when Hitler pretty much effaced the General Staff from war planning. Even if he had not, the body lacked the expertise to question the policies of the Nazi tyrant beyond military matters, and even here Hitler believed he knew best.
Even though Germany lost two world wars, Dupuy persists in his admiration of the German system of warfighting, offering statistical proof that in many battles it took anywhere from 1.5 to 3 enemy soldiers to best each German. Sometimes the German Army would win at odds as great as seven to one against them. While Dupuy goes into detail on how they won, he glosses over why they lost. Being outnumbered by alliances in two world wars had something to do with it. Explaining how Germany got to be so badly outnumbered is not Dupuy's job.
February 6, 2020
I LIKE THIS BOOK.
January 18, 2024
Very good overview of this topic. Significant history pre-1933, which is wanting elsewhere. Used to dislike this author, but found this particular book quite easy to read and easier still to follow the evolution of this institution. Perhaps should have read before Kitchen’s “Military History of Germany” but still complements that tome.
Highly recommended.
Highly recommended.
November 6, 2024
Necessary read to understand the intricacies of the Prussian German general staff. Even if today research shows clearly that the memories of the German general officers were untruthful, the book gives an excellent description and analysis of the birth and the functioning of the staff over a 150 years of European history.
January 12, 2021
Look at the history of the German general staff from 1807 to 1945. The author posits that it was the excellence of the German general staff system, which institutionalized excellent, that led to the battlefield success of the German army.
December 2, 2021
Very good and informative
A very good perspective on the General Staff and the reasons for Germany's military capabilities. A good overview of German (political and military) history as well. A very enjoyable read.
A very good perspective on the General Staff and the reasons for Germany's military capabilities. A good overview of German (political and military) history as well. A very enjoyable read.
October 9, 2017
One would think that the author of a book on the German general staff would have taken the time to explain exactly how the group was organized, but no.
September 19, 2011
Author Trevor Dupuy was a US Army Col. who had served in Burma as an artillery offcier during the Second World War. After the war he became a very prolific author of military history and, also, he began work on a statistical survey of divisional sized engagements during the fighting in the Italian theater between the Western Allies (US/British/Canadians/Free French/Free Poles) and the Wehrmacht/Waffen-SS. What he found was disturbing.
Even with overwhelming air superiority, and whether or not they actually won the battle or not, the Germans had a favorable kill ratio of roughly 1.2-1.3 to 1 in every single engagement. Dupuy went on to study all other sectors of the massive conflict including what he could then (the work was done primarily in the 60's and 70's) of the fighting against the Soviet Union. What he found was that in almost every engagement against the Western Allies the Germans had a favorable kill ratio up till the Spring of 1945 and in every engagement in the 'Eastern Front' the German forces had a very favorable kill ratio in excess of 7-1 in some battles but usually running 4 or 5-1 in the Germans favor. And the Germans achieved this, almost always, at a position of being outnumbered and outgunned and almost devoid of air support.
Dupuy's vision was to use this survey to help remold the US Army after it's harsh experiences in Vietnam; in effect to make the US Army learn from the masters of war of the past. In further studying the combat effectiveness of the German military Dupuy found that WWI had the same relative numbers as the Second. Dupuy wanted to know why.
What he discovered was an institutional excellence inherit in the German military that dated back to the creation of the General Staff during the years when Prussia was occupied by Napoleons forces.
The General Staff was an institution that compartmentalized and developed theories, ideas and practical uses of any new idea, technology or method that came along. It provided an avenue of intellectual education for the young officer and it was a sure fire gateway to career success in the Prussian/German military. During wartime the contributions of the General Staff (with its emphasis on war contingency planning, logistical planning [granted always a weak suit for the German military] and the persistent study of military history) were invaluable. In fact, the quintessential treatise on the art of war in the West; 'On War' was written by Carl Maria Von Clausewitz, a General Staff officer.
Dupuy shows during the course of the book that it was this legacy of institutionalized excellence that, more than anything (including the hare brained idea that somehow the Germans are culturally or biologically superior warriors, an idea Dupuy shoots down quite quickly by showing their many faults as well) added to the legacy of military competence on the behalf of the German armed forces.
From Scharnhorst all the way to the bitter end of the Second World War Dupuy shows the impact and evolution of the German General Staff. It's interesting to note that much like the modern University system (invented in Germany), the General Staff system was also created in Germany. After the overwhelming victory (though costly) over France in 1870, the rest of the world began to copy the German General Staff. Ironically, the US was the last to copy this system on the grounds that somehow an overly profesional military force was against the precepts of a social democracy. Also ironically it was the US Army that consistently scored the highest against the Germans during both World Wars on the statistical survey (yes, a definite swelling to national pride)and it was the US that would most closely emulate the German General Staff system in the modern age...albeit Dupuy was ignored when his study first came out.
Now the US Military emulates in many ways the methodology and training standards of the German military. Even if our own officers are not held to the same intellectual standards as those of the Germans then (and even now), the US Army has learned much of value by studying the German model. Armies exist to protect a nation, whether its political interests, economic interests or increasingly its cultural interests even in today's 'liberalized' world (more of a fantasy really, the world still has yet to change)a well trained, professional army is still the greatest guarantor of security and even a projector of enough implied force to create a peace.
I highly recommend this book, even if some of its research is dated, its main conclusions ares till valid and it is an excellent read. Five stars.
Even with overwhelming air superiority, and whether or not they actually won the battle or not, the Germans had a favorable kill ratio of roughly 1.2-1.3 to 1 in every single engagement. Dupuy went on to study all other sectors of the massive conflict including what he could then (the work was done primarily in the 60's and 70's) of the fighting against the Soviet Union. What he found was that in almost every engagement against the Western Allies the Germans had a favorable kill ratio up till the Spring of 1945 and in every engagement in the 'Eastern Front' the German forces had a very favorable kill ratio in excess of 7-1 in some battles but usually running 4 or 5-1 in the Germans favor. And the Germans achieved this, almost always, at a position of being outnumbered and outgunned and almost devoid of air support.
Dupuy's vision was to use this survey to help remold the US Army after it's harsh experiences in Vietnam; in effect to make the US Army learn from the masters of war of the past. In further studying the combat effectiveness of the German military Dupuy found that WWI had the same relative numbers as the Second. Dupuy wanted to know why.
What he discovered was an institutional excellence inherit in the German military that dated back to the creation of the General Staff during the years when Prussia was occupied by Napoleons forces.
The General Staff was an institution that compartmentalized and developed theories, ideas and practical uses of any new idea, technology or method that came along. It provided an avenue of intellectual education for the young officer and it was a sure fire gateway to career success in the Prussian/German military. During wartime the contributions of the General Staff (with its emphasis on war contingency planning, logistical planning [granted always a weak suit for the German military] and the persistent study of military history) were invaluable. In fact, the quintessential treatise on the art of war in the West; 'On War' was written by Carl Maria Von Clausewitz, a General Staff officer.
Dupuy shows during the course of the book that it was this legacy of institutionalized excellence that, more than anything (including the hare brained idea that somehow the Germans are culturally or biologically superior warriors, an idea Dupuy shoots down quite quickly by showing their many faults as well) added to the legacy of military competence on the behalf of the German armed forces.
From Scharnhorst all the way to the bitter end of the Second World War Dupuy shows the impact and evolution of the German General Staff. It's interesting to note that much like the modern University system (invented in Germany), the General Staff system was also created in Germany. After the overwhelming victory (though costly) over France in 1870, the rest of the world began to copy the German General Staff. Ironically, the US was the last to copy this system on the grounds that somehow an overly profesional military force was against the precepts of a social democracy. Also ironically it was the US Army that consistently scored the highest against the Germans during both World Wars on the statistical survey (yes, a definite swelling to national pride)and it was the US that would most closely emulate the German General Staff system in the modern age...albeit Dupuy was ignored when his study first came out.
Now the US Military emulates in many ways the methodology and training standards of the German military. Even if our own officers are not held to the same intellectual standards as those of the Germans then (and even now), the US Army has learned much of value by studying the German model. Armies exist to protect a nation, whether its political interests, economic interests or increasingly its cultural interests even in today's 'liberalized' world (more of a fantasy really, the world still has yet to change)a well trained, professional army is still the greatest guarantor of security and even a projector of enough implied force to create a peace.
I highly recommend this book, even if some of its research is dated, its main conclusions ares till valid and it is an excellent read. Five stars.
February 14, 2008
Like the Confederate army, the German army was one of the best military organizations in history tragically serving the worst of bad causes. Aside from the evils of the governments they served, though, it is worth examining and analyzing how they were so much more effective than the other armies they fought that the only way they were beaten ( and thank God they were beaten) was by overwhelming superiority of numbers on the other sides. That's what this book does.
A very solid and comprehensive portrait of the German army reforms of late 1800s that turned the Prussian, then the German army from one held in contempt by other countries to one the rest of Europe feared and tried to imitate. They did it by developing the best command and control system (organizationally, rather than in terms of technology) anyone has come up with yet.
For anyone who wants a deeper understanding of how armies win or lose wars than we get from looking at hardware or the personalities of individual leaders, and for some lessons in organizational excellence and effectiveness that can be used in settings other than the military, this is a great primer.
A very solid and comprehensive portrait of the German army reforms of late 1800s that turned the Prussian, then the German army from one held in contempt by other countries to one the rest of Europe feared and tried to imitate. They did it by developing the best command and control system (organizationally, rather than in terms of technology) anyone has come up with yet.
For anyone who wants a deeper understanding of how armies win or lose wars than we get from looking at hardware or the personalities of individual leaders, and for some lessons in organizational excellence and effectiveness that can be used in settings other than the military, this is a great primer.
September 9, 2015
despite it being a "war book" it is one I would recommend everyone read. it goes in to great detail about how organizations are led, and what should be looked for in leaders at all levels.
June 21, 2016
An in-depth read
I had read before that the German soldier in World War 2 had an average kill better than the allies but this book delves into why that came to be.
I had read before that the German soldier in World War 2 had an average kill better than the allies but this book delves into why that came to be.
November 11, 2023
Read@2023..
Well argued, but maybe singing too much praises for German army
Well argued, but maybe singing too much praises for German army
Read
February 18, 2018Great Book on the Prussian-German Genaral Staff
Best book disputing Prussian-German militarism and the institution of the Great General Staff. He describes how the general staff came into being after the Prussian army was destroyed and humiliated by Napoleon.
He traces it in every phase until Hitler destroyed it in WW2 so he could personally command the army.
Brilliant and enlightening read!
Best book disputing Prussian-German militarism and the institution of the Great General Staff. He describes how the general staff came into being after the Prussian army was destroyed and humiliated by Napoleon.
He traces it in every phase until Hitler destroyed it in WW2 so he could personally command the army.
Brilliant and enlightening read!
Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews