In this book, the author, Mr. Reid, reviews the history of Britain’s involvement in the Middle East, bookended by World War I and Israel’s Independence War. Over this time period, the following events happened:
• The Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers in the war against the Entente Powers.
• British forces from India overran Mesopotamia, albeit with some initial failures.
• Britain and France signed the Sykes-Picot agreement in which France was promised a zone of influence in Syria that extended to Mosul in return for their lack of opposition to British conquests in the Middle East.
• Britain engaged in communication with the Saud and Hashemite clans, promising them kingdoms in return for their support for British military operations against Ottoman territory.
• Britain issued the Balfour declaration, making support for a Jewish homeland official government policy.
• British forces and their Arab allies separated the modern states of Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and Iraq from the Ottoman Empire and ended Ottoman influence over the Arabian Peninsula.
• After the Central Powers sued for peace, the victors assembled to negotiate the terms to be imposed on the defeated powers and to resolve the tangled mess of competing promises made in return for support in the war, with Britain taking a minimalist position on its commitments and the French and Arabs taking a maximalist position.
• The French were given Syria, which at the time included Lebanon, as a zone of influence. They had given up their claim to Mosul in hopes of more gains elsewhere. Given their past involvement in the Levant as far back as the Crusades, they wanted control of Palestine.
• The house of Saud managed to resolve its rivalry with the Hashemites by means of overwhelming force and laid claimed to what is now Saudi Arabia.
• Britain was given mandates over Mesopotamia and Palestine by the League of Nations.
• Britain formed Iraq from three Mesopotamian provinces (a Sunni Arab area, a Shiite Arab area and a Kurd area) and installed Faisal, a Hashemite, as king over it.
• Britain separated the Transjordan from Palestine and installed Abdullah, another Hashemite, as king over it.
• Britain oversaw Jewish immigration into Palestine, with a strong uptick after German Chancellor Hitler imposed anti-Jewish laws. As the Jewish population of Palestine increased and Jews purchased more and more land, Arab opposition to the Jews increased, as well, sometimes erupting in violence and prompting the Jews to form their own self-defense forces that engaged in reprisals. In an effort to contain the unrest, Britain began to restrict Jewish immigration, prompting the Jews to increasingly see the British as the enemy.
• Bankrupt from World War II and unable to contain the Jewish and Arab unrest, Britain decided to hand Palestine over to the United Nations and make it their problem. The U.N. chose to pursue a policy of partition in which the Jews would control part of Palestine, the Arabs would control another part, and the U.N. would control the holy sites in Jerusalem and Bethlehem.
• When the British withdrew from Palestine, several Arab armies advanced on Palestine to pursue a war of annihilation against the Jews. When the dust settled, the Jews had defeated the Arabs, retained almost all the Jewish areas and controlled much of the Arab areas of Palestine. The modern state of Israel had been born.
Britain has received a lot of criticism over the years for its actions, some of it focusing on decision quality and some of it accusing the British government of duplicity regarding the promises made to the French and Arabs. For example, the French felt that Sykes-Picot entitled them to Palestine, and the Arabs felt that Sykes-Picot and the Balfour Declaration undercut the promises made to them. Regarding the perceived duplicity, the resultant tensions had consequences, one of the greatest of which being a rupture between Britain and France that undermined the united front that was needed to contain the rise of NSDAP Germany. However, Mr. Reid also pointed out that Middle East policy was being formulated in London, Cairo and India all at the same time by government agents with rivalries and competing priorities, government agents who didn’t always communicate with each other. Before the advent of modern communications technology, British protectorates such as India and Egypt had their own governments that operated independently of London. There was no other way to make the prompt decisions necessary to maintain order in a distant territory. This factor, along with the exigencies of war, contributed to the conflicting promises. I am reminded of a scene from the movie Apollo 13. The CO2 scrubbers for the different modules had been designed by different outfits, and their filters differed in geometry, such that they were not interchangeable. When the Mission Director, Gene Krantz, was informed of this, he commented in frustration, “Tell me this isn’t a government project.” Well, tell me that the British conquest of the Middle East wasn’t a government project. That said, Mr. Reid noted and criticized some instances of what he considered duplicity, especially Britain’s efforts not to honor its Sykes-Picot commitments to France.
Regarding Mr. Reid’s evaluation of British decision quality and the results of British policy in the Middle East, I saw an effort to be a fair judge. When events don’t end well, people often conclude uncritically that someone did something wrong. That is always an option that should be considered, but there are often factors beyond the control of those being critiqued. Furthermore, while it is appropriate to consider potential outcomes of a decision, not all outcomes can be anticipated. Consider the following issues the British faced:
1. At the time the British were in communication with Arab leaders the Arab nationalist movement had yet to form. The Arabs weren’t inclined to pursue a common identity. On account of this, the British weren’t expecting the Arabs to want self-rule. For the most part, the Arab nationalist movement was inspired by President Wilson’s idea of self-determination, and even he was surprised at the number of nationalist movements it spawned.
2. The three regions from which Iraq was formed had nothing to unify them, and King Faisal, whom the British placed over Iraq, wasn’t a great choice, especially given that he had no ties to Iraq or its people. However, the British didn’t have other good options, either. There was no other candidate leader. Without an Arab leader for the mandate, they could have turned the land over to French control. Imagine the prospect of Vichy France controlling the oil fields of Mesopotamia during World War II. Or, they could have returned it to Turkey for an encore of the corrupt management previously practiced by the Turks. None of the alternatives could reasonably be expected to produce a good outcome. Britain’s choice may well have been worst one, except for all the others.
3. At the time Britain accepted the mandate over Palestine, it was expected that the Jews and Arabs would peacefully coexist, as they had done in Palestine for centuries. The British failed to anticipate that the Arabs would feel threatened by a growing Jewish population and that the Jews would ultimately want to control the land. Mr. Reid brought up this issue but let it slide. As noted above, the Arabs and Jews had coexisted peacefully for centuries. However, I have mixed feelings about the failure to anticipate trouble because the increasing numbers of colonists in the North America in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had prompted armed resistance by the American Indians. Why wouldn’t immigration prompt some opposition among the indigenous population of Palestine? I think promoting a Jewish homeland in Palestine was the right thing to do, but the British failure to anticipate issues impresses me as a case of historical amnesia.
On the whole, I thought Mr. Reid was thorough and fair, and I enjoyed learning some of the history behind the perennial disfunction in the Middle East.