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Greenhill's Alternate Decisions
Third Reich Victorious: The Alternate Decisions of World War II
This collection of alternate history scenarios looks at what would have happened if, for example, the Germans had captured the whole of the BEF at Dunkirk, the RAF had been defeated in the Battle of Britain, or if Rommel had been triumphant - in short, how the Germans could have won the war, and what the consequences would have been.
256 pages, Hardcover
First published January 9, 2012
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March 5, 2026
I finished this book this Monday evening, and I closed it with that peculiar sensation only alternate history produces — the unsettling awareness that what happened feels no longer inevitable. The book does not merely ask ‘what if?’ It asks, quietly and repeatedly, ‘how close were we to something else?’ And in doing so, it destabilizes the comfort of hindsight.
This book is not a novel but a curated collection of speculative essays by various historians and military analysts. It is sober in tone, clinical even. There are no melodramatic speeches, no swastika flags fluttering over Manhattan in purple prose.
Instead, there are memoranda, strategic calculations, revised orders of battle, altered decisions at key junctures. The horror lies precisely in that restraint.
Perhaps what unsettled me most is the book’s method: it refuses fantasy. It does not imagine alien technologies or superweapons beyond plausibility. Instead, it takes known crossroads — Dunkirk, Operation Sea Lion, the invasion of the Soviet Union, Pearl Harbor, the Battle of Midway — and nudges them slightly. A delayed order here. A bolder commitment there. A different interpretation of intelligence. History, in this book, is a mechanism balanced on fragile hinges.
And once you see those hinges, you cannot unsee them.
The first essay, exploring the consequences had Hitler destroyed the British Expeditionary Force at Dunkirk rather than allowing its evacuation, reads almost like a bureaucratic postmortem of a world that never was. The survival of Britain — something we treat as heroic inevitability — begins to look contingent. If those 300,000 troops had been captured or annihilated, would Churchill have retained political authority? Would the British public have endured?
The essay does not shout “Britain falls!” It carefully models morale, logistics, political pressure. It is chilling precisely because it feels administratively plausible.
I found myself pausing often — not because the prose demanded aesthetic reflection, but because the implications demanded moral one.
Alternate history about Nazi victory carries a particular weight. We are not playing with neutral pieces on a chessboard. We are contemplating a regime whose genocidal program was already underway.
To imagine its triumph is to extend suffering in the mind. And yet, Tsouras and his contributors approach this territory with disciplined detachment. The Holocaust is not sensationalized; rather, its continuation becomes part of the grim calculus of success.
In one of the more disturbing essays, the focus shifts to the Mediterranean and North Africa. Had Germany committed greater resources to Rommel’s campaigns, had Spain entered the war, had Gibraltar fallen — Britain’s imperial lifelines might have been severed.
Reading this as an Indian, I could not help but sense a secondary layer. A Nazi-dominated Europe with a weakened Britain would have reshaped the trajectory of empire and decolonization entirely. Would Indian independence have come sooner, later, differently? Would Japanese advances in Asia have been emboldened further? The book does not explore this in depth, but its implications ripple outward beyond Europe.
The section on Operation Barbarossa is particularly stark. And what glorious questions!!!
1. What if Germany had concentrated on Moscow instead of diverting south?
2. What if winter preparations had been adequate?
3. What if Stalin had collapsed politically under pressure?
We are accustomed to narrating Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union as hubristic folly. But the essay reveals how narrow the margins were in 1941. The Wehrmacht came terrifyingly close to crippling the Soviet state before industrial mobilization and winter resilience reversed the tide.
Reading this in 2026 — with Europe once again conscious of Russian military power — adds a strange temporal layering. The Soviet Union that survived 1941 shaped the Cold War.
The Russia that exists today is in some sense its descendant. A German victory in 1941 would not simply have changed the map; it would have erased entire ideological architectures of the twentieth century.
The Pacific essays are equally disquieting. The hypothetical Japanese victory at Midway, or a more coordinated Axis grand strategy, reframes the war as something less morally predetermined and more structurally unstable.
American industrial supremacy ultimately overwhelmed the Axis, yes. But industrial mobilization itself required time. What if the early years had gone worse? What if political will had fractured under heavier losses?
The book’s greatest strength is its disciplined plausibility. It does not indulge in baroque fantasies of Nazi space programs or occult weaponry. Instead, it keeps returning to human decisions — to moments when ego, miscalculation, delay, or arrogance altered outcomes. The subtext is almost existential: history is neither destiny nor chaos; it is accumulated choice.
And here my response became more personal.
We grow up with a moral narrative of World War II. The Allies, flawed but righteous, defeat an unmistakable evil. The arc bends toward justice. Tsouras’s volume quietly corrodes that arc. It does not deny Allied eventual superiority; rather, it demonstrates how fragile that superiority initially was.
This fragility is deeply unsettling.
Because if victory was contingent, then moral triumph was contingent. And if moral triumph was contingent, then the survival of liberal democracy in the twentieth century was not guaranteed by virtue alone. It was secured by logistics, weather, code-breaking, fuel shortages, and errors on the part of tyrants.
That realization strips history of teleology. It removes the comforting sense that “of course” the Nazis would fail. There is no “of course.” There is only a sequence of knife-edge decisions.
From a stylistic standpoint, the book is uneven — as edited collections often are.
Some essays are vivid and narratively engaging; others read like staff college papers. But perhaps that dryness is appropriate. The bureaucratic tone mirrors the bureaucratic nature of modern war. Catastrophe emerges from memoranda.
One essay that lingered with me reimagines a successful German invasion of Britain. Operation Sea Lion is often dismissed as implausible, but the contributor models a scenario in which Luftwaffe strategy shifts more decisively toward RAF airfields, naval coordination improves marginally, and weather cooperates.
The resulting invasion does not produce instant Nazi domination; rather, it creates prolonged chaos, political fracture, and the possibility of negotiated settlement.
What haunts me is not the image of swastikas over London. It is the image of compromise.
Would Britain have negotiated under sufficient pressure? Would segments of its political class have rationalized accommodation? History offers examples of elites adjusting to new masters. The essay suggests that even mature democracies can bend under sustained strain.
And that observation feels alarmingly contemporary.
As someone who has read extensively in philosophy and existential inquiry — who recently immersed himself in questions about why the world exists at all — I find alternate history to be a kind of metaphysical exercise.
It destabilizes necessity. It exposes contingency as the ground of being. In ‘Third Reich Victorious’, contingency is not abstract; it is weaponized.
The book is also a study in Hitler’s limitations. Ironically, many Axis defeats resulted not from Allied brilliance but from Hitler’s interference. His refusal to allow tactical retreats, his obsession with symbolic targets, his distrust of generals — these become the negative space of the essays. When contributors remove or moderate those flaws, the Reich’s prospects improve alarmingly.
The implication is chilling: incompetence saved the world.
This thought unsettled me more than any dramatic battlefield reversal.
There is, too, a subtle irony embedded throughout the volume. The Axis powers often needed only modest improvements in coordination to produce drastically different outcomes. A more patient Japan. A more strategically focused Germany. A Spain willing to join the war. A Turkey tipping one way instead of another. The geopolitical chessboard trembles with possibility.
And yet, the book never quite becomes sensational. Tsouras’s editorial restraint prevents it from sliding into lurid counterfactual triumphalism.
The essays remain analytical, sometimes even detached to a fault. The horror is implicit, not dramatized.
As I closed the final chapter, I found myself reflecting less on the Third Reich and more on the nature of historical narrative itself. We construct inevitability after the fact. We narrate outcomes as destiny. But this book insists that destiny is retrospective storytelling.
Had the Reich prevailed in any of these scenarios, historians of that world would have constructed their own inevitabilities. They would have spoken of Anglo-American decadence, Soviet fragility, and Japanese naval genius. They would have identified structural forces that made Axis victory “probable.” Narrative is always written from the survivor’s vantage point.
This postmodern awareness — that history is a story stabilized by power — gives the book an additional philosophical dimension. It is not merely about Nazi victory; it is about the fragility of truth-claims regarding the past.
And yet, there is an ethical boundary here. We must not aestheticize alternate Nazi triumph. We must not treat genocide as narrative garnish. The book generally avoids that trap, though at times I wished for a deeper acknowledgment of the human cost embedded in each scenario. The essays focus on military and political consequences; the continuation of mass extermination is often implicit rather than explored.
Perhaps that restraint is intentional. To explore fully what a victorious Reich would have meant for Europe’s Jews, for Slavs, for dissidents, would require a different kind of book — one more emotionally harrowing. Tsouras’s volume remains primarily strategic.
From a structural perspective, the book benefits from its episodic format. One can read each essay independently, entering different timelines like alternate corridors in a museum of unrealized futures. Yet there is cumulative effect. By the end, one senses how many points of divergence existed.
It also made me reflect on the seductive nature of “what if” thinking. There is intellectual pleasure in counterfactual modeling. It feels like solving a puzzle.
But when the subject is totalitarian victory, that pleasure is shadowed by moral discomfort. I found myself oscillating between analytical fascination and emotional resistance.
And perhaps that oscillation is the book’s quiet achievement.
It forces the reader to inhabit uncertainty.
In a century that witnessed both the mechanization of death and the eventual triumph of democratic blocs, we are tempted to believe in moral arcs. ‘Third Reich Victorious’ denies the arc. It shows instead a labyrinth.
When I consider the broader landscape of alternate history fiction — from Philip K. Dick’s ‘The Man in the High Castle’ to more recent speculative works — Tsouras’s book stands apart in tone. It is not imaginative in the literary sense; it is imaginative in the strategic sense. Its imagination is disciplined.
That discipline makes it credible. And credibility is terrifying.
If I were to criticize the book, it would be for its occasional dryness and for the unevenness inherent in multiple contributors. Some essays feel like expanded conference papers rather than fully realized alternate histories. But perhaps that dryness is part of its aesthetic — the bureaucratic calm before imagined catastrophe.
As someone living in a world where authoritarian movements once again test democratic resilience, the book feels less like escapist speculation and more like warning.
Democracies survived the 1940s not because they were morally pure, but because they mobilized effectively and because their enemies erred. There is no guarantee that such errors will always recur.
Closing the book last evening, I felt less triumphal about Allied victory and more humbled by its fragility.
History could have been otherwise.
That is the thesis, the method, and the lingering aftertaste of ‘Third Reich Victorious’. It is not a comforting read. It does not provide catharsis. Instead, it leaves you with a sharpened awareness of contingency.
And perhaps that awareness is its true purpose.
To remind us that what we call the past was once a series of undecided moments.
To remind us that survival is not destiny.
To remind us that history’s hinge can swing either way.
When I turned off the light, I did not feel entertained. I felt unsettled.
And that, in the realm of alternate history, may be the highest compliment one can give.
Give it a go. Greeat food for thought.
This book is not a novel but a curated collection of speculative essays by various historians and military analysts. It is sober in tone, clinical even. There are no melodramatic speeches, no swastika flags fluttering over Manhattan in purple prose.
Instead, there are memoranda, strategic calculations, revised orders of battle, altered decisions at key junctures. The horror lies precisely in that restraint.
Perhaps what unsettled me most is the book’s method: it refuses fantasy. It does not imagine alien technologies or superweapons beyond plausibility. Instead, it takes known crossroads — Dunkirk, Operation Sea Lion, the invasion of the Soviet Union, Pearl Harbor, the Battle of Midway — and nudges them slightly. A delayed order here. A bolder commitment there. A different interpretation of intelligence. History, in this book, is a mechanism balanced on fragile hinges.
And once you see those hinges, you cannot unsee them.
The first essay, exploring the consequences had Hitler destroyed the British Expeditionary Force at Dunkirk rather than allowing its evacuation, reads almost like a bureaucratic postmortem of a world that never was. The survival of Britain — something we treat as heroic inevitability — begins to look contingent. If those 300,000 troops had been captured or annihilated, would Churchill have retained political authority? Would the British public have endured?
The essay does not shout “Britain falls!” It carefully models morale, logistics, political pressure. It is chilling precisely because it feels administratively plausible.
I found myself pausing often — not because the prose demanded aesthetic reflection, but because the implications demanded moral one.
Alternate history about Nazi victory carries a particular weight. We are not playing with neutral pieces on a chessboard. We are contemplating a regime whose genocidal program was already underway.
To imagine its triumph is to extend suffering in the mind. And yet, Tsouras and his contributors approach this territory with disciplined detachment. The Holocaust is not sensationalized; rather, its continuation becomes part of the grim calculus of success.
In one of the more disturbing essays, the focus shifts to the Mediterranean and North Africa. Had Germany committed greater resources to Rommel’s campaigns, had Spain entered the war, had Gibraltar fallen — Britain’s imperial lifelines might have been severed.
Reading this as an Indian, I could not help but sense a secondary layer. A Nazi-dominated Europe with a weakened Britain would have reshaped the trajectory of empire and decolonization entirely. Would Indian independence have come sooner, later, differently? Would Japanese advances in Asia have been emboldened further? The book does not explore this in depth, but its implications ripple outward beyond Europe.
The section on Operation Barbarossa is particularly stark. And what glorious questions!!!
1. What if Germany had concentrated on Moscow instead of diverting south?
2. What if winter preparations had been adequate?
3. What if Stalin had collapsed politically under pressure?
We are accustomed to narrating Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union as hubristic folly. But the essay reveals how narrow the margins were in 1941. The Wehrmacht came terrifyingly close to crippling the Soviet state before industrial mobilization and winter resilience reversed the tide.
Reading this in 2026 — with Europe once again conscious of Russian military power — adds a strange temporal layering. The Soviet Union that survived 1941 shaped the Cold War.
The Russia that exists today is in some sense its descendant. A German victory in 1941 would not simply have changed the map; it would have erased entire ideological architectures of the twentieth century.
The Pacific essays are equally disquieting. The hypothetical Japanese victory at Midway, or a more coordinated Axis grand strategy, reframes the war as something less morally predetermined and more structurally unstable.
American industrial supremacy ultimately overwhelmed the Axis, yes. But industrial mobilization itself required time. What if the early years had gone worse? What if political will had fractured under heavier losses?
The book’s greatest strength is its disciplined plausibility. It does not indulge in baroque fantasies of Nazi space programs or occult weaponry. Instead, it keeps returning to human decisions — to moments when ego, miscalculation, delay, or arrogance altered outcomes. The subtext is almost existential: history is neither destiny nor chaos; it is accumulated choice.
And here my response became more personal.
We grow up with a moral narrative of World War II. The Allies, flawed but righteous, defeat an unmistakable evil. The arc bends toward justice. Tsouras’s volume quietly corrodes that arc. It does not deny Allied eventual superiority; rather, it demonstrates how fragile that superiority initially was.
This fragility is deeply unsettling.
Because if victory was contingent, then moral triumph was contingent. And if moral triumph was contingent, then the survival of liberal democracy in the twentieth century was not guaranteed by virtue alone. It was secured by logistics, weather, code-breaking, fuel shortages, and errors on the part of tyrants.
That realization strips history of teleology. It removes the comforting sense that “of course” the Nazis would fail. There is no “of course.” There is only a sequence of knife-edge decisions.
From a stylistic standpoint, the book is uneven — as edited collections often are.
Some essays are vivid and narratively engaging; others read like staff college papers. But perhaps that dryness is appropriate. The bureaucratic tone mirrors the bureaucratic nature of modern war. Catastrophe emerges from memoranda.
One essay that lingered with me reimagines a successful German invasion of Britain. Operation Sea Lion is often dismissed as implausible, but the contributor models a scenario in which Luftwaffe strategy shifts more decisively toward RAF airfields, naval coordination improves marginally, and weather cooperates.
The resulting invasion does not produce instant Nazi domination; rather, it creates prolonged chaos, political fracture, and the possibility of negotiated settlement.
What haunts me is not the image of swastikas over London. It is the image of compromise.
Would Britain have negotiated under sufficient pressure? Would segments of its political class have rationalized accommodation? History offers examples of elites adjusting to new masters. The essay suggests that even mature democracies can bend under sustained strain.
And that observation feels alarmingly contemporary.
As someone who has read extensively in philosophy and existential inquiry — who recently immersed himself in questions about why the world exists at all — I find alternate history to be a kind of metaphysical exercise.
It destabilizes necessity. It exposes contingency as the ground of being. In ‘Third Reich Victorious’, contingency is not abstract; it is weaponized.
The book is also a study in Hitler’s limitations. Ironically, many Axis defeats resulted not from Allied brilliance but from Hitler’s interference. His refusal to allow tactical retreats, his obsession with symbolic targets, his distrust of generals — these become the negative space of the essays. When contributors remove or moderate those flaws, the Reich’s prospects improve alarmingly.
The implication is chilling: incompetence saved the world.
This thought unsettled me more than any dramatic battlefield reversal.
There is, too, a subtle irony embedded throughout the volume. The Axis powers often needed only modest improvements in coordination to produce drastically different outcomes. A more patient Japan. A more strategically focused Germany. A Spain willing to join the war. A Turkey tipping one way instead of another. The geopolitical chessboard trembles with possibility.
And yet, the book never quite becomes sensational. Tsouras’s editorial restraint prevents it from sliding into lurid counterfactual triumphalism.
The essays remain analytical, sometimes even detached to a fault. The horror is implicit, not dramatized.
As I closed the final chapter, I found myself reflecting less on the Third Reich and more on the nature of historical narrative itself. We construct inevitability after the fact. We narrate outcomes as destiny. But this book insists that destiny is retrospective storytelling.
Had the Reich prevailed in any of these scenarios, historians of that world would have constructed their own inevitabilities. They would have spoken of Anglo-American decadence, Soviet fragility, and Japanese naval genius. They would have identified structural forces that made Axis victory “probable.” Narrative is always written from the survivor’s vantage point.
This postmodern awareness — that history is a story stabilized by power — gives the book an additional philosophical dimension. It is not merely about Nazi victory; it is about the fragility of truth-claims regarding the past.
And yet, there is an ethical boundary here. We must not aestheticize alternate Nazi triumph. We must not treat genocide as narrative garnish. The book generally avoids that trap, though at times I wished for a deeper acknowledgment of the human cost embedded in each scenario. The essays focus on military and political consequences; the continuation of mass extermination is often implicit rather than explored.
Perhaps that restraint is intentional. To explore fully what a victorious Reich would have meant for Europe’s Jews, for Slavs, for dissidents, would require a different kind of book — one more emotionally harrowing. Tsouras’s volume remains primarily strategic.
From a structural perspective, the book benefits from its episodic format. One can read each essay independently, entering different timelines like alternate corridors in a museum of unrealized futures. Yet there is cumulative effect. By the end, one senses how many points of divergence existed.
It also made me reflect on the seductive nature of “what if” thinking. There is intellectual pleasure in counterfactual modeling. It feels like solving a puzzle.
But when the subject is totalitarian victory, that pleasure is shadowed by moral discomfort. I found myself oscillating between analytical fascination and emotional resistance.
And perhaps that oscillation is the book’s quiet achievement.
It forces the reader to inhabit uncertainty.
In a century that witnessed both the mechanization of death and the eventual triumph of democratic blocs, we are tempted to believe in moral arcs. ‘Third Reich Victorious’ denies the arc. It shows instead a labyrinth.
When I consider the broader landscape of alternate history fiction — from Philip K. Dick’s ‘The Man in the High Castle’ to more recent speculative works — Tsouras’s book stands apart in tone. It is not imaginative in the literary sense; it is imaginative in the strategic sense. Its imagination is disciplined.
That discipline makes it credible. And credibility is terrifying.
If I were to criticize the book, it would be for its occasional dryness and for the unevenness inherent in multiple contributors. Some essays feel like expanded conference papers rather than fully realized alternate histories. But perhaps that dryness is part of its aesthetic — the bureaucratic calm before imagined catastrophe.
As someone living in a world where authoritarian movements once again test democratic resilience, the book feels less like escapist speculation and more like warning.
Democracies survived the 1940s not because they were morally pure, but because they mobilized effectively and because their enemies erred. There is no guarantee that such errors will always recur.
Closing the book last evening, I felt less triumphal about Allied victory and more humbled by its fragility.
History could have been otherwise.
That is the thesis, the method, and the lingering aftertaste of ‘Third Reich Victorious’. It is not a comforting read. It does not provide catharsis. Instead, it leaves you with a sharpened awareness of contingency.
And perhaps that awareness is its true purpose.
To remind us that what we call the past was once a series of undecided moments.
To remind us that survival is not destiny.
To remind us that history’s hinge can swing either way.
When I turned off the light, I did not feel entertained. I felt unsettled.
And that, in the realm of alternate history, may be the highest compliment one can give.
Give it a go. Greeat food for thought.
February 9, 2012
This collection of ten counterfactuals generally satisfies, but is best appreciated by the most serious students of the military arts. The authors are predominantly military historians and analysts, and they're playing to their bench. The real trick is spotting the point of divergence in each case. I think the standout essay is the 9th, where the Germans develop an atomic bomb first, and wherein Werner Heisenberg's internal conflicts take center stage. The least plausible is the 1st, where a young Hitler is molded into a non-anti-Semitic naval officer who comes into the 1930s with sufficient tools to defeat England.
November 8, 2019
Very much a mixed bag of alternative histories. Some, such as Hitler becoming a naval advocate after an impossible rise to (navy)officership in World War One are laughable. The scenario in which Hitler gets the bomb, uses it and then the plucky Allies continue to wage war as if nothing happened is ridiculous. Halifax as Prime Minister negotiating a bad peace, despite the author having Churchill being shot during a failed coup in Parliament, is sobering. However, the real value is in the very well thought out articles on what might have happened if the Germans had adopted Rommels’ proposed ( defense in depth) strategy in the East in 1944, not fought at Kursk (as they very almost did not) and most lucidly, what would have happened if the Luftwaffe had Me262s in numbers in 1943 ( which almost happened) and stalemated the Allied bomber offensive. Answer- maintaining control over Germany’s skies in 1943-45 prolongs the war by more than a year and the bomb gets dropped on Berlin. Many of the articles remind me of SPI/ Avalon Hill games written out as history.
April 30, 2009
The title is not altogether correct - some of these alternate WWII decisions do not lead to a German victory, but only to temporary setbacks for the Allies, but perhaps that is nitpicking. We are treated to a good selection of what-ifs by different authors, from "Hitler joins the German navy in 1914" to "Germany gets The Bomb first". Some are very well written, others are very dry; some are plausible, others less so. A couple of mind-numbingly detailed accounts earn this book three stars, though some of the individual entries would well warrant four or maybe even five.
January 18, 2008
An enjoyable look at the possible decisions that could have changed what happened. The mix of authors allow different styles, some very textbook dry. You should already be interested in the subject matter to approach this book.
June 8, 2011
I felt "Third Reich Victorious" was a bit uneven. For a book focused on exploring historically plausible scenarios of German victory some of the ideas were just a bit too far fetched. I thought the best examinations of how history could have taken a different turn were the ones based on tactical turning-points in battlefield situations as opposed to ones where Hitler had a major shift in his strategic thinking. Still, "Third Reich Victorious" was a fascinating book full of food for thought how history could have been so dramatically different.
September 9, 2009
Interesting. Sometimes hard not to get bogged down in details. Not for a person unfamiliar with WWII battles and personel. Passing that, 10 different alternative courses the war could have taken that would have led to a very differet outcome.
August 13, 2011
Fun romp as far as it went.
May 31, 2012
Tsouras at work again with some alternate history
http://www.weberseite.at/buecher/thir...
http://www.weberseite.at/buecher/thir...
August 29, 2013
very interesting scenarios about World War II.
December 27, 2013
More good Tsouras stuff.
May 30, 2014
It was ok. A couple Chapters were pretty cool What ifs and a few seemed toooo impossible.
August 13, 2020
Ridiculous Fantasies
I had hoped for and expected a book which would be based on realistic historical possibilities that might have affected the outcome of WW2. Instead of the “stimulating and entirely plausible insight” the blurb promises, I read an unrealistic, uninteresting and entirely implausible series of scenarios that just left me annoyed and feeling cheated. I kept reading in the hope the next one would be better, show some true historical scholarship and have at least some solid basis in fact, but nothing improved. Instead I just felt that I had wasted three hours that could have been a lot better spent.
One consistent theme throughout all of the scenarios is the genius of Hitler and all of his generals, the amazing prescience of the German leaders (almost as if they had access to hindsight – oh, wait!), the astonishing ability of the German intelligence service to do what it never could in reality - get accurate information about its enemies and their intentions and act correctly on it and the willingness of Hitler to abandon many of his central doctrines to win.
For example, in the first essay Hitler joins the German navy on a whim and immediately has an epiphany that gives him clear insight into the strategic importance of having a strong fleet, and thus history is changed as he devotes Germany’s resources to defeating the Royal Navy the moment he gains power. Apparently he is happy to abandon all his central ambitions (or obsessions) about achieving German hegemony in Europe (which has now been achieved economically instead of by war) and expanding German domination eastwards. When Russia attacks in 1941 he gives up territory in a strategic withdrawal to avoid the Russian blow, yet not once in reality was he prepared to consider doing that, costing thousands of German soldiers their lives in the process.
Several of the authors seem to have the traditional Rommel obsession, the supposedly genius tactician and strategist who was only ever defeated by superior numbers. Rommel was considered by the German military to not be among the first rank of their commanders, which is the reason he was the one they could spare to send to the sideshow (as they saw it) in North Africa when the main battle front was Russia. He was chosen by Hitler to be propagandised by the German press and his reputation was also further inflated by British commanders who wanted to save their own reputations by claiming it was genius that was beating them instead of mainly their own ineptitude and lack of ability. If Rommel had had true strategic competence he would have insisted on Malta being captured before undertaking any serious campaign in North Africa, as Kesselring urged on several occasions, but Rommel never did. On the occasions he came under real pressure; the British Arras counter attack in 1940 (when he initially panicked and started screaming for help), the Desert War and Normandy in 1944, Rommel failed.
I could go on; every scenario is flawed in some way, often in several. It seems to me each author was given a subject with a desired outcome and then allowed to come up with any reason they could dream up, however ludicrous and improbable, to get that outcome to happen. I had hoped for some subtlety and plausibility in their accounts, a small but significant change to history that might have affected events. For example, removing the need for the Germans to invade Jugoslavia in 1941, or the German military logistical organisation being able to supply the forces in Russia beyond September 1941 (which historically they warned Hitler they could not, but he went ahead anyway, blindly overconfident). (Conversely, what might have happened if the British had held Maleme airfield and Crete had not been captured by the Germans?)
Of course, this book is fiction. It could not be anything else, but if it was good fiction it would make you prepared to suspend disbelief and enjoy the story. None of the scenarios had me doing that because they were just too ridiculously far-fetched. I don’t recommend it to those interested in history or in fantasy either.
I had hoped for and expected a book which would be based on realistic historical possibilities that might have affected the outcome of WW2. Instead of the “stimulating and entirely plausible insight” the blurb promises, I read an unrealistic, uninteresting and entirely implausible series of scenarios that just left me annoyed and feeling cheated. I kept reading in the hope the next one would be better, show some true historical scholarship and have at least some solid basis in fact, but nothing improved. Instead I just felt that I had wasted three hours that could have been a lot better spent.
One consistent theme throughout all of the scenarios is the genius of Hitler and all of his generals, the amazing prescience of the German leaders (almost as if they had access to hindsight – oh, wait!), the astonishing ability of the German intelligence service to do what it never could in reality - get accurate information about its enemies and their intentions and act correctly on it and the willingness of Hitler to abandon many of his central doctrines to win.
For example, in the first essay Hitler joins the German navy on a whim and immediately has an epiphany that gives him clear insight into the strategic importance of having a strong fleet, and thus history is changed as he devotes Germany’s resources to defeating the Royal Navy the moment he gains power. Apparently he is happy to abandon all his central ambitions (or obsessions) about achieving German hegemony in Europe (which has now been achieved economically instead of by war) and expanding German domination eastwards. When Russia attacks in 1941 he gives up territory in a strategic withdrawal to avoid the Russian blow, yet not once in reality was he prepared to consider doing that, costing thousands of German soldiers their lives in the process.
Several of the authors seem to have the traditional Rommel obsession, the supposedly genius tactician and strategist who was only ever defeated by superior numbers. Rommel was considered by the German military to not be among the first rank of their commanders, which is the reason he was the one they could spare to send to the sideshow (as they saw it) in North Africa when the main battle front was Russia. He was chosen by Hitler to be propagandised by the German press and his reputation was also further inflated by British commanders who wanted to save their own reputations by claiming it was genius that was beating them instead of mainly their own ineptitude and lack of ability. If Rommel had had true strategic competence he would have insisted on Malta being captured before undertaking any serious campaign in North Africa, as Kesselring urged on several occasions, but Rommel never did. On the occasions he came under real pressure; the British Arras counter attack in 1940 (when he initially panicked and started screaming for help), the Desert War and Normandy in 1944, Rommel failed.
I could go on; every scenario is flawed in some way, often in several. It seems to me each author was given a subject with a desired outcome and then allowed to come up with any reason they could dream up, however ludicrous and improbable, to get that outcome to happen. I had hoped for some subtlety and plausibility in their accounts, a small but significant change to history that might have affected events. For example, removing the need for the Germans to invade Jugoslavia in 1941, or the German military logistical organisation being able to supply the forces in Russia beyond September 1941 (which historically they warned Hitler they could not, but he went ahead anyway, blindly overconfident). (Conversely, what might have happened if the British had held Maleme airfield and Crete had not been captured by the Germans?)
Of course, this book is fiction. It could not be anything else, but if it was good fiction it would make you prepared to suspend disbelief and enjoy the story. None of the scenarios had me doing that because they were just too ridiculously far-fetched. I don’t recommend it to those interested in history or in fantasy either.
September 20, 2018
Third Reich Victorious: Alternate Decisions of World War II edited by Peter G Tsouras is a companion book to Rising Sun Victorious: An Alternate History of the Pacific War.
In this volume military historians have written a series of essays on ways that the European theater of WWII could have gone differently allowing Germany to win.
The essays are not stories per se, but rather historical essays that recount a historical event, in this case military campaigns. While I liked the style, the writings are very dry. I would say this book is an acquired taste. It would probably appeal to those that are steeped in readings of this sort that they may read when researching what really did occur on the battlefield.
As I mentioned in my review of the first book in this series, the essays don’t simply tell of the Allies immediately surrendering after a battle is won by Germany. Rather they try and show how the Allies would have reacted to the changing circumstances. The end result isn’t a case of just winning and losing, but rather the extent by which the Axis could have won.
I gave this volume one less star. I’m not sure if it’s just that this set was a bit more distant in pulling me in, or that reading it so close to the first just wore me down due to its scholarly style.
But if the subject interests you, and you are already well versed on what actually did occur, then this is a book that can fire your imagination of a world scorched by war.
In this volume military historians have written a series of essays on ways that the European theater of WWII could have gone differently allowing Germany to win.
The essays are not stories per se, but rather historical essays that recount a historical event, in this case military campaigns. While I liked the style, the writings are very dry. I would say this book is an acquired taste. It would probably appeal to those that are steeped in readings of this sort that they may read when researching what really did occur on the battlefield.
As I mentioned in my review of the first book in this series, the essays don’t simply tell of the Allies immediately surrendering after a battle is won by Germany. Rather they try and show how the Allies would have reacted to the changing circumstances. The end result isn’t a case of just winning and losing, but rather the extent by which the Axis could have won.
I gave this volume one less star. I’m not sure if it’s just that this set was a bit more distant in pulling me in, or that reading it so close to the first just wore me down due to its scholarly style.
But if the subject interests you, and you are already well versed on what actually did occur, then this is a book that can fire your imagination of a world scorched by war.
September 9, 2018
If you are looking for an interesting story, look elsewhere These 10 alternate history tales are military studies of events that did not occur. If you are a historian who is very interested in World War II, then this is an excellent read. For the majority, don't bother. That said, I did enjoy a few of the alternatives. In one, there is much creativity making Adolph Hitler a sailor in World War I.
May 17, 2021
I was just glad it was over.
#1/not all of these stories are Germany wins. They are simply Germany makes it slightly longer. *spoiler* Germany nukes the allies, but the noble allies fight on. Allies nuke Germany and they surrender immediately.
If you love Rommel you love this book. He may have been sort of moral but he was not super man, he would have been chewed up on the Eastern front.
Finally the book is way too technical. Inventing units that never were and moving them around gets confusing. Every story relies on the development of the me262 . overall you have read every one of these scenarios before, they are nothing new and done in a boring way. Not recommended.
#1/not all of these stories are Germany wins. They are simply Germany makes it slightly longer. *spoiler* Germany nukes the allies, but the noble allies fight on. Allies nuke Germany and they surrender immediately.
If you love Rommel you love this book. He may have been sort of moral but he was not super man, he would have been chewed up on the Eastern front.
Finally the book is way too technical. Inventing units that never were and moving them around gets confusing. Every story relies on the development of the me262 . overall you have read every one of these scenarios before, they are nothing new and done in a boring way. Not recommended.
December 27, 2019
Good Alternate History
Plausible scenarios and intelligent analysis of World War Two. Overall a great book for those who enjoy playing ‘what if.’ Good narrator on audible
Plausible scenarios and intelligent analysis of World War Two. Overall a great book for those who enjoy playing ‘what if.’ Good narrator on audible
July 28, 2021
The last three chapters redeemed this pedantic muddle from a single start to two
November 11, 2021
Very interesting alternative history novel.
December 25, 2024
Read this as a kid for the first time. Still entertaining, but Germany had no chance in the end. Would recommend to anyone wanting a "what if" type of read.
February 1, 2025
Many of these alternative scenarios are interesting. It is so good to see that the allies won that terrible war.
August 13, 2020
Ridiculous Fantasies
I had hoped for and expected a book which would be based on realistic historical possibilities that might have affected the outcome of WW2. Instead of the “stimulating and entirely plausible insight” the blurb promises, I read an unrealistic, uninteresting and entirely implausible series of scenarios that just left me annoyed and feeling cheated. I kept reading in the hope the next one would be better, show some true historical scholarship and have at least some solid basis in fact, but nothing improved. Instead I just felt that I had wasted three hours that could have been a lot better spent.
One consistent theme throughout all of the scenarios is the genius of Hitler and all of his generals, the amazing prescience of the German leaders (almost as if they had access to hindsight – oh, wait!), the astonishing ability of the German intelligence service to do what it never could in reality - get accurate information about its enemies and their intentions and act correctly on it and the willingness of Hitler to abandon many of his central doctrines to win.
For example, in the first essay Hitler joins the German navy on a whim and immediately has an epiphany that gives him clear insight into the strategic importance of having a strong fleet, and thus history is changed as he devotes Germany’s resources to defeating the Royal Navy the moment he gains power. Apparently he is happy to abandon all his central ambitions (or obsessions) about achieving German hegemony in Europe (which has now been achieved economically instead of by war) and expanding German domination eastwards. When Russia attacks in 1941 he gives up territory in a strategic withdrawal to avoid the Russian blow, yet not once in reality was he prepared to consider doing that, costing thousands of German soldiers their lives in the process.
Several of the authors seem to have the traditional Rommel obsession, the supposedly genius tactician and strategist who was only ever defeated by superior numbers. Rommel was considered by the German military to not be among the first rank of their commanders, which is the reason he was the one they could spare to send to the sideshow (as they saw it) in North Africa when the main battle front was Russia. He was chosen by Hitler to be propagandised by the German press and his reputation was also further inflated by British commanders who wanted to save their own reputations by claiming it was genius that was beating them instead of mainly their own ineptitude and lack of ability. If Rommel had had true strategic competence he would have insisted on Malta being captured before undertaking any serious campaign in North Africa, as Kesselring urged on several occasions, but Rommel never did. On the occasions he came under real pressure; the British Arras counter attack in 1940 (when he initially panicked and started screaming for help), the Desert War and Normandy in 1944, Rommel failed.
I could go on; every scenario is flawed in some way, often in several. It seems to me each author was given a subject with a desired outcome and then allowed to come up with any reason they could dream up, however ludicrous and improbable, to get that outcome to happen. I had hoped for some subtlety and plausibility in their accounts, a small but significant change to history that might have affected events. For example, removing the need for the Germans to invade Jugoslavia in 1941, or the German military logistical organisation being able to supply the forces in Russia beyond September 1941 (which historically they warned Hitler they could not, but he went ahead anyway, blindly overconfident). (Conversely, what might have happened if the British had held Maleme airfield and Crete had not been captured by the Germans?)
Of course, this book is fiction. It could not be anything else, but if it was good fiction it would make you prepared to suspend disbelief and enjoy the story. None of the scenarios had me doing that because they were just too ridiculously far-fetched. I don’t recommend it to those interested in history or in fantasy either
I had hoped for and expected a book which would be based on realistic historical possibilities that might have affected the outcome of WW2. Instead of the “stimulating and entirely plausible insight” the blurb promises, I read an unrealistic, uninteresting and entirely implausible series of scenarios that just left me annoyed and feeling cheated. I kept reading in the hope the next one would be better, show some true historical scholarship and have at least some solid basis in fact, but nothing improved. Instead I just felt that I had wasted three hours that could have been a lot better spent.
One consistent theme throughout all of the scenarios is the genius of Hitler and all of his generals, the amazing prescience of the German leaders (almost as if they had access to hindsight – oh, wait!), the astonishing ability of the German intelligence service to do what it never could in reality - get accurate information about its enemies and their intentions and act correctly on it and the willingness of Hitler to abandon many of his central doctrines to win.
For example, in the first essay Hitler joins the German navy on a whim and immediately has an epiphany that gives him clear insight into the strategic importance of having a strong fleet, and thus history is changed as he devotes Germany’s resources to defeating the Royal Navy the moment he gains power. Apparently he is happy to abandon all his central ambitions (or obsessions) about achieving German hegemony in Europe (which has now been achieved economically instead of by war) and expanding German domination eastwards. When Russia attacks in 1941 he gives up territory in a strategic withdrawal to avoid the Russian blow, yet not once in reality was he prepared to consider doing that, costing thousands of German soldiers their lives in the process.
Several of the authors seem to have the traditional Rommel obsession, the supposedly genius tactician and strategist who was only ever defeated by superior numbers. Rommel was considered by the German military to not be among the first rank of their commanders, which is the reason he was the one they could spare to send to the sideshow (as they saw it) in North Africa when the main battle front was Russia. He was chosen by Hitler to be propagandised by the German press and his reputation was also further inflated by British commanders who wanted to save their own reputations by claiming it was genius that was beating them instead of mainly their own ineptitude and lack of ability. If Rommel had had true strategic competence he would have insisted on Malta being captured before undertaking any serious campaign in North Africa, as Kesselring urged on several occasions, but Rommel never did. On the occasions he came under real pressure; the British Arras counter attack in 1940 (when he initially panicked and started screaming for help), the Desert War and Normandy in 1944, Rommel failed.
I could go on; every scenario is flawed in some way, often in several. It seems to me each author was given a subject with a desired outcome and then allowed to come up with any reason they could dream up, however ludicrous and improbable, to get that outcome to happen. I had hoped for some subtlety and plausibility in their accounts, a small but significant change to history that might have affected events. For example, removing the need for the Germans to invade Jugoslavia in 1941, or the German military logistical organisation being able to supply the forces in Russia beyond September 1941 (which historically they warned Hitler they could not, but he went ahead anyway, blindly overconfident). (Conversely, what might have happened if the British had held Maleme airfield and Crete had not been captured by the Germans?)
Of course, this book is fiction. It could not be anything else, but if it was good fiction it would make you prepared to suspend disbelief and enjoy the story. None of the scenarios had me doing that because they were just too ridiculously far-fetched. I don’t recommend it to those interested in history or in fantasy either
August 11, 2015
Based on plausible alternate events
Alternate histories of the results of battles and wars can be very good or bad. They are good if they are based on facts before veering off into a lane of a plausible difference. Furthermore, while that difference can be based on some action taken by a military or political leader, it cannot include any actions by some single or small group of supersoldiers. People knowledgeable of the history must also read the alternate and have no reason to dispute the premise that it could have happened, albeit unlikely.
Of course, the simplest scenario whereby Hitler emerged victorious in World War II was the early development of nuclear weapons by Germany. That is one of the ten scenarios and even though it was a predictable inclusion it was well done. However, it is not the best of these scenarios.
The most plausible scenario is the one where the smallest number of men made the greatest difference, in the Battle of Britain. The Germans made some fundamental mistakes in their air attacks that could have led to RAF fighter command being overwhelmed, leading to German overwhelming air superiority in southern England. If that had happened, then Germany could have successfully invaded England if Hitler had any understanding of sea power.
I enjoyed reading these stories, while they deviate from what actually happened, they all retain enough reality so that you think, “That could have happened.” This is a great book and I am now interested in tracking down Tsouras’ other alternate history collections.
This review also appears on Amazon
Alternate histories of the results of battles and wars can be very good or bad. They are good if they are based on facts before veering off into a lane of a plausible difference. Furthermore, while that difference can be based on some action taken by a military or political leader, it cannot include any actions by some single or small group of supersoldiers. People knowledgeable of the history must also read the alternate and have no reason to dispute the premise that it could have happened, albeit unlikely.
Of course, the simplest scenario whereby Hitler emerged victorious in World War II was the early development of nuclear weapons by Germany. That is one of the ten scenarios and even though it was a predictable inclusion it was well done. However, it is not the best of these scenarios.
The most plausible scenario is the one where the smallest number of men made the greatest difference, in the Battle of Britain. The Germans made some fundamental mistakes in their air attacks that could have led to RAF fighter command being overwhelmed, leading to German overwhelming air superiority in southern England. If that had happened, then Germany could have successfully invaded England if Hitler had any understanding of sea power.
I enjoyed reading these stories, while they deviate from what actually happened, they all retain enough reality so that you think, “That could have happened.” This is a great book and I am now interested in tracking down Tsouras’ other alternate history collections.
This review also appears on Amazon
October 24, 2015
This is a book that muses on how WWII history might have been changed, with Germany being the victor. What if Hitler hated Brits instead of Jews? What if Turkey had come into the war on the Axis side? And so on. I rate it three stars because you have to have a whole lot of very detailed knowledge of the military campaigns to fully appreciate the subtleties of what they are suggesting. I have a more general knowledge of the war, thus couldn't appreciate a lot of what was said.
July 24, 2017
A very thought-provoking book, full of alternative scenarios and might-have-been-s concerning Third Reich.
10 changes in history that could have changed flow of WWII. I was quite surprised that not all of those led to unconditional victory of Hitler. No, they were much more elaborate, and definitely not pure fantasy, but based on real life, history of those times and known facts.
I would recommend it to every enthusiast about WWII, it is worth the read.
10 changes in history that could have changed flow of WWII. I was quite surprised that not all of those led to unconditional victory of Hitler. No, they were much more elaborate, and definitely not pure fantasy, but based on real life, history of those times and known facts.
I would recommend it to every enthusiast about WWII, it is worth the read.
February 9, 2021
Like all other alterative history books, one has to have a strong suspense of desbelief to accept what is being told. All scenarios have things going extremly well for Germany with some details but not overall depth wich harms the overall book.
In any case, its a fun book with interesting "what ifs"?
In any case, its a fun book with interesting "what ifs"?
June 8, 2015
Seven out of ten good scary realistic sounding scenarios for alternative endings to WWII.
January 23, 2016
A fascinating, and quite chilling, look at how things might have been different. Somewhat dry at times, but fans of counterfactual history will enjoy it.
March 7, 2019
Andy's review
Enjoyed this e-book immensely. All the scenarios were very plausible, and indeed Chapter 9 I found quite sobering. Glad I downloaded this.
Enjoyed this e-book immensely. All the scenarios were very plausible, and indeed Chapter 9 I found quite sobering. Glad I downloaded this.
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