Trying to thwart ‘fortune’ by placing yourself in destitution before it can is just… well… beside the point?
Note to self: did not read the Cynic letters since they are not authentic (not written by Diogenes / Crates) and represent a more Roman impression of Cynicism (which I will cover enough in later readings)
Notes:
Introduction:
It was a commonplace of Socratic thought that one can be rich by being satisfied with little, and so achieve a measure of invulnerability to fortune. Diogenes radicalized this idea, taking it to the utmost extreme.
[Lived] like an animal in the streets, without any concern for the future
He resorted to shock tactics both in the manner of his speech and in his behaviour
It does him no discredit to say that he put on a constant performance, playing his chosen role as dog and mad Socratic.
To become a true individual and proper human being, so he thought, one must turn aside from conventional society and reject all its values, to live in accordance with nature, and nature at a very basic level; otherwise one will simply remain a member of the crowd [or slaves, or scum]
If the Cynic life was to be practicable, it was in fact necessary that its practitioners should be able to rely on the understanding and complicity of the public. For a paradox lay at the very heart of Diogenes' enterprise. Although the Cynic may have claimed to achieve complete independence by reducing his needs to a minimum and living in the streets, it was nonetheless true that by dispossessing himself in such a way, he was depriving himself of all means of support in the environment in which he was living. Cynicism was an urban phenomenon. Its practitioners would not withdraw from human society, like some later Christian ascetics, to support themselves in the countryside or wilderness by their own labour. They had to rely instead on alms from people who valued them for providing a moral example or performing a beneficial service as moral preachers. Their activities had to be perceived accordingly as having some relevance to the moral lives of ordinary people, even if few would choose to adopt the Cynic life.
Chain: Socrates-Antisthenes-Diogenes-Crates-Zeno
Diogenes thought that one should anticipate the very worst that fate can bring by plunging into a life of complete destitution. He came to believe, furthermore, that a positive value can be put on hardship, because it not only serves as a form of training which enables a person to rise above any suffering, but also makes it possible for him to find a positive pleasure in self-abnegation.
How far this takes us from the views of Antisthenes as presented in Xenophon's discourse, as a man who wanted to suppress any excessive desires for external goods to be able to concentrate on his inner wealth, and so enjoy a cultivated life of leisure centring around discussion and shared pursuits with his friends. Diogenes was a great simplifier who lost sight of an entire dimension of human life by scoring it as a tissue of illusion.
[No thorough or elaborate theoretical foundation to Cynical teachings, nor subtle or extensive moral investigation / discussion]
Action of a very simple kind was what was demanded: to plunge into a life of deprivation and hardship… to live in accordance with virtue
[Seen as the strenuous and unintellectual ‘short cut’ to virtue (vs the stoic way)]
In the case of Diogenes, however, the situation is very different, because he himself set out to communicate his message through his wit and odd behaviour, rather than through a body of argument, and the stories that came to circulate about him in the oral tradition, whether true or happily invented, were creations or reflections of his own propaganda. Terse wit and repartee were his main medium of expression.
Hegesias [a Cyrenaic] is of interest for the way in which his hedonistic premises led him into the direst pessimism; concluding that a predominance of pleasure cannot generally be assured, he came to believe that suicide can often be the best option in life, and so came to be known as 'the Death-persuader'. The Cyrenaics were sceptical in their epistemological outlook, arguing that sense-impressions provide no reliable information about anything that lies beyond our immediate sense-experience
Anecdotes and Sayings:
When asked who is rich among men, he replied, 'He who is self-sufficient.' (Gnomologium Vaticanum 180; G241)
Diogenes said that poverty aids us to philosophy of its own accord, for what philosophy attempts to persuade us by means of arguments, poverty compels us to in very deed.
(Stobaeus 4.32.11; G223)
74 Someone said that Diogenes was out of his mind.* 'It's not that I'm out of my mind,' he replied. 'It's that I don't have the same mind as you.' (Stobaeus 3.3.51; G427)
78 When someone asked him, 'Who are the noblest of men?', he replied, 'Those who despise riches, reputation, pleasure and concern for life, and are thus able ti overmaster their opposites, poverty, ill-repute, suffering, and death.' (Stobaeus 4.29.19; G302)
108 To someone who said life is bad, he said, 'Not life, but life lived badly.' (Diogenes Laertius 6.55; G310)
109 To one who said, 'I'm ill-suited to philosophy', he replied, 'Then why live at all, if you have no interest in living well?'
120 Plato defined man as a two-footed animal without wings,* and was applauded for it; so Diogenes plucked a cock and brought it into the lecture-hall, saying, 'Here's Plato's man!' As a result the definition was supplemented with the phrase having broad nails, (Diogenes Laertius 6.40; G63)
132 When Diogenes once invited Plato to share his meal in the market-place, Plato said, 'How charming your unaffectedness would be, if only it were not so affected!'*
(Gnomologium Vaticanum 445; G60)
139 He said that wealth is the vomit of fortune.
(Arsenius p. 209, 11; G220)
271 He said that education is a source of self-control for the young, a consolation for the old, a treasure for the poor, and an adornment for the rich.' (Diogenes Laertius 6.68; G380)
279 When asked how someone in office should approach public affairs, he replied, 'Just as with fire: don't get so close that you get burnt, or keep so far away that you freeze.'* (Maximus 9.26; G357)
453 Hence the reply offered by Crates to someone who asked, 'What will I gain by turning to philosophy?' 'You will be able', he said, 'to open up your purse with an easy heart, and draw out your money to give it away open-handedly, rather than as people do nowadays, turning away, and hesitating and trembling, as if their fingers were paralysed. You, by contrast, on having a full purse, will view it in such a way as to feel no distress at seeing it emptied, and will easily be able to decide to put your wealth to proper use; and when you no longer have it, you will no longer yearn for it, but will live fully contented with what is presently available to you, feeling no desire for what you do not have, and no dissatisfaction with your present circumstances.' If anyone wants to deliver himself or another person from want and need, he should not set out in search of riches. That would be as if, says Bion,* when trying to relieve a hydroptic of his thirst, one were to provide him with springs and rivers rather than attempting to cure him of his dropsy.* By drinking in quantity he would surely burst rather than be relieved of his thirst, and likewise one can never be satisfied when one is insatiably greedy, and avid for good repute, and superstitious.
475 And the philosopher Bion used to say that just as the suitors, when they found themselves unable to approach Penelope,* coupled with her maidservants instead, so likewise those who are unable to attain to philosophy wear themselves out with other studies which are of no worth.
(Plutarch, On the Education of Children 10, 7c-d; K3)
Cyrenaics:
537 Aristippos was thought to have made a very sound point when he urged people not to worry afterwards about things that have gone by, or worry in advance about those that are yet to come. For such an attitude is a sign of confidence and gives proof of a cheerful frame of mind. He recommended that one should concentrate on the present day, and indeed on the very part of it in which one is acting and thinking. For only the present, he said, truly belongs to us, and not what has passed by or what we are anticipating: for the one is gone and done with, and it is uncertain whether the other will come to be.
(Aelian, Historical Miscellany 14.6; G174)
543a When asked what he had gained from philosophy, he said, 'To be able to associate with everyone with absolute confidence.' (Diogenes Laertius 2.68; G104)
546 When asked in what respect philosophers surpass other people, he replied, 'If all the laws were repealed, we would continue to live in just the same way.' (Diogenes Laertius 2.68; G105)
566 When he was once asked how a wise man differs from one who is not, he replied, 'Send the two out naked among strangers, and then you will know?
(Diogenes Laertius 2.73; G120)
567 He said that one should accustom oneself to living on little so as to do nothing shameful for the purpose of gaining wealth.
(Gnomologium Vaticanum 29; G76)
569 He consorted with the courtesan Lais,* as Sotion relates in the second book of his Successions of the Philosophers. To those who reproached him for this, he replied, 'I possess Lais but am not possessed by her.'* For the best thing is to master pleasures without becoming subjected by them, not to abstain from them.'
619 Those who remained faithful to the teaching of Aristippos and were known as Cyrenaics professed the following doctrines. They maintained that there are two basic states, pleasure and pain, the former being a smooth motion and the latter a rough motion. No pleasure is different from any other pleasure, nor is one more pleasant than another. All living creatures find pleasure agreeable and are repelled by pain. By pleasure, it should be noted, they mean physical pleasure, which is also the ultimate end, as Panaitios* states in his book On the Philosophical Schools, and not the settled pleasure that follows from the removal of pains and is a kind of freedom from disturbance, which Epicurus accepts* and proclaims as the end. They think, furthermore, that the end is different from happiness; for our end is particular pleasure, while happiness is the sum of the various particular pleasures, among which are included those that have passed by and those that are yet to come.
623 The Cyrenaics say, then, that the affections are the criteria of truth, and that they alone are apprehensible and undeceptive, but that none of the things that produce the affections are apprehensible or undeceptive. That we feel the affection of whiteness, or of sweetness, can be stated, so they say, infallibly, truly, and firmly, without risk of refutation; but that the thing that produces the affection in us is white or sweet is impossible to affirm. For it is possible that we could feel the affection of whiteness under the effect of something that is not white, or the affection of sweetness under the effect of something that is not sweet. For just as one who is suffering from vertigo or jaundice receives a yellowish affection* from everything, or one suffering from ophthalmia* a reddish affection, or one who presses on his eye comes to see two images, or someone in a state of madness sees Thebes twice over* and imagines the sun to be double, so it is true that in all these cases, the people suffer some affection, such as of yellowness, redness, or redoublement, but it must be considered false that what produces these affections is yellow, red, or double, and we are thus obliged to conclude that we can grasp nothing beyond our own affections… so we apply common names to objects, but have our own particular sense-affections