The way an army thinks about and understands warfare has a tremendous impact on its organization, training, and operations. The central ideas of that understanding form a nation's way of warfare that influences decisions on and off the battlefield. From the disasters of the War of 1812, Winfield Scott ensured that America adopted a series of ideas formed in the crucible of the Wars of the French Revolution and epitomized by Napoleon. Reflecting American cultural changes, these French ideas dominated American warfare on the battlefields of the Mexican-American War, the American Civil War, the Spanish-American War, and World War I. America remained committed to these ideas until cultural pressures and the successes of German Blitzkrieg from 1939 - 1940 led George C. Marshall to orchestrate the adoption of a different understanding of warfare. Michael A. Bonura examines concrete battlefield tactics, army regulations, and theoretical works on war as they were presented in American army education manuals, professional journals, and the popular press, to demonstrate that as a cultural construction, warfare and ways of warfare can be transnational and influence other nations.
I am writing from the point of view of a scholar fond of facts, endless references, and encyclopedic indexes. Therefore, my ratings do not reflect a universal opinion about a book. This book is a must-have to those interested in the Napoleonic era and US history. It will be too focused and specialized for general readers.
Bonura introduces his context as an application of the Kuhn model of paradigm shift from French ways of warfare to the German model but he almost entirely drops these references between the introduction and the conclusion. Additionally, he devotes a chapter to defining the French way of warfare in its developments from De Saxe through Napoleon but never does the same for the German model. In short, I have an idea of what the French paradigm is but not the German paradigm. This is almost a laughable critique however because his conceptualization of a French Paradigm versus a German Paradigm seems to ignore almost 150 years of development. In short, everything from the Revolutionary War through WWI is used to justify a French model (adaptive battlefield formations as well as strict regimentalization and seperation of combat arms; deep envelopments as well as frontal assaults at San Juan Hill). He even goes so far as to say the the French and the Germans had virtually the same doctrine in 1914. I objected to his assumption that America was a sponge which merely absorbed the combat model promulgated by Europe but he addressed this in his short conclusion; that the US refined many of the techniques and models it originally adopted from foreign partners, sometimes so much so that the US was more proficient than its continental counterparts (post-Civil War). This book is perhaps useful to juxtapose the development of US Army education centers with the dominant texts used at the time but Bonura's vague definitions of the French versus German Paradigms makes his context and conclusion almost unuasble.
This is book is very easy to read from start to finish. It's thesis is quite clear: From the War of 1812 to WWII, the american way of warfare was based on the French combat method, which was a 1) dedication to offense, 2) non-specialized infantry, 3) a linear, non-contiguous battlefield, 4) all auxillary arms supported the infantry in battle, 5) non-dogmatic tactics, and 6) the importance of the initiative. My two critiques are that the topic is oversimplified and that the thesis is repeated too often. Although these points are critical, admittedly, it does lead to a simple, easy narrative to read and understand.