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The Lingering Conflict: Israel, the Arabs, and the Middle East, 1948-2011
" In The Lingering Conflict Itamar Rabinovich, a former chief negotiator for Israel, provides unique and authoritative insight into the prospects for genuine peace in the Middle East. His presentation includes a detailed insider account of the peace processes of 1992–96 and a frank dissection of the more dispiriting record since then. Rabinovich's firsthand experiences as a negotiator and as Israel's ambassador to the United States provide a valuable perspective from which to view the major players involved. Fresh analysis of ongoing situations in the region and the author's authoritative take on key figures such as Ehud Barak and Benjamin Netanyahu shed new light on the long and tumultuous history of Arab-Israeli relations. His book is a shrewd assessment of the past and current state of affairs in the Middle East, as well as a sober look at the prospects for a peaceful future. While Rabinovich explains the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians—a classic dispute between two national movements claiming the same land— The Lingering Conflict also considers the broader political, cultural, and increasingly religious conflict between the Jewish state and Arab nationalism. He approaches the troubled region in an international context, offering provocative analysis of America's evolving role and evaluation of its diplomatic performance. This book builds on the author's previous seminal work on geopolitics in the Middle East, particularly Waging Peace . As Rabinovich brings the Arab-Israeli conflict up to date, he widens the scope of his earlier insights into efforts to achieve normal, peaceful relations. And, of course, he takes full account of recent social and political tumult in the Middle East, discussing the Arab Spring uprisings—and the subsequent retaliation by dictators such as Syria's al-Asad and Libya's Qaddafi—in the context of Arab-Israeli relations. "
308 pages, Hardcover
First published November 11, 2011
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August 21, 2018
Are We There Yet?
First class primer on recent Mideast diplomacy that objectively outlines the views, motivations and red lines of each of the players. The first chapter is an outstanding but brief summary of the period from 1948-90, however the main focus of the book is from the Oslo Accords onwards. Chapters 2-6 encapsulate the nature of negotiations using the time frames of different Israeli administrations: Rabin/Peres, Netanyahu (1st administration), Barack, Sharon and finally Olmert. The final 3 chapters cover Netanyahu's 2nd term in early 2009 to the events of the Arab Spring up until the end of 2011. A central theme is the difficulty in pursuing different "tracks". On one hand you have the desire for a comprehensive settlement on all fronts, however this proves to be difficult due to competitive factors as no Arab leader appears to be in sync. One should also not underestimate the value placed on prestige - Israel has often preferred and incremental approach as collectively none of the Arab players wishes to be seen as achieving less than any of his rivals. Additionally the ability of the Israelis to absorb simultaneous concessions is limited.
Rabinovich takes us through the salient difficulties. With Syria you had a single person who makes all the decisions, either Hafiz Assad or, after his death in 2000, his son, Bashar. For the Asads resolving the territorial dispute is neither pressing nor existential, rather it levers Syria onto the international pan-Arab stage. Lebanon is the opposite - it's in constantly in flux. The Israel's see Hiz b'Allah as separate from Lebanon itself and acting as a proxy for Syria and Iran. Together Syria, Iran, Hiz b'Allah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad form an "axis of resistance" in opposition to the more moderate and conservative Arab States such as Jordan, Egypt (prior to the succession of the Muslim Brotherhood) and Saudi Arabia. Jordan has the special problem that a west bank state could also destabilize the Hashemite monarchy; though it gives some lip service to Palestinian nationalism it is also sympathetic to Israel's security concerns as it too would have problems with a militant and revolutionary state next door. King Hussein, having dealt with Black September in 1970, was perhaps more aware of this than his son.
The analysis of the Palestinians is equally fascinating as Rabinovich considers West Bank, Gaza and Israel's own Arab population. From '48-67 the Palestinians by and large were under the magic spell of Nasser and as such their nationalism was that of the Arab Nation as a whole - excepting those favoring the Hashemites. Rabinovich skips over the attempts of the 1970s and '80s to build relationships with municipal leaders to deal with Oslo and Arafat, the man who could not say "yes". Pretty much everyone recognized that Arafat and the PA was corrupt, however he was able to adroitly shore up his position using the classic strategy pointing out that the alternative (Hamas and Islamic Jihad) would be even worse.
Netanyahu's policy reset some of the concessions offered by some of his predecessors which Palestinian negotiators tried to pocket without final agreement nor yielding concessions of their own. A similar situation had occurred in 2000 on the Syrian track (see pp95) - Asad had met Barak's offer of withdrawal for peace and normalization by countering with an Israeli withdrawal and non-belligerency along with a Syrian right to move troops into the recovered territory. Instead of offering more to achieve the first goal, Barak responded with less, commensurate with what Asad was offering, which surprised the American intermediaries who viewed it as backtracking rather than a normal negotiating position.
The basic problem is that the parties have always had different goals. For the Israelis normalization has meant acceptance of Israel as a full member in the regional community of nations combined with trade and diplomatic relations, with the key condition that negotiations would bring a final end to the conflict. The Arabs in turn aimed at a lesser goal of non-belligerency with option of further concessions later on. Some hoped the result would lead to a reduced Israel on the same footing as Lebanon, more Arabized and decolonized of Jewish influences. (pp253) Rabinovich does mention an interesting set of proposals made in 1976 by Egyptian Muhammed Sid-Ahmed (pp276) to move Arab population centres into desert regions to make better use of agricultural lands and for the creation of factories and refineries along border regions. The hoped for side effect would be that military conflict acrosss these borders would become desirable. This would be done by marrying Israeli technical expertise with Arab resources - a situation similar to today's QIZ manufacturing zones in Jordan.
Given the number of books on the conflict there would appear to be a wide audience for this material though it should be of special interest to students of international relations. The style is highly readable, reasonably concise, very analytic, up to date and polemic free. I also recommend the author's book The Road Not Taken: Early Arab-Israeli Negotiations for coverage of diplomatic efforts from 1948-53. Both are well worth reading.
First class primer on recent Mideast diplomacy that objectively outlines the views, motivations and red lines of each of the players. The first chapter is an outstanding but brief summary of the period from 1948-90, however the main focus of the book is from the Oslo Accords onwards. Chapters 2-6 encapsulate the nature of negotiations using the time frames of different Israeli administrations: Rabin/Peres, Netanyahu (1st administration), Barack, Sharon and finally Olmert. The final 3 chapters cover Netanyahu's 2nd term in early 2009 to the events of the Arab Spring up until the end of 2011. A central theme is the difficulty in pursuing different "tracks". On one hand you have the desire for a comprehensive settlement on all fronts, however this proves to be difficult due to competitive factors as no Arab leader appears to be in sync. One should also not underestimate the value placed on prestige - Israel has often preferred and incremental approach as collectively none of the Arab players wishes to be seen as achieving less than any of his rivals. Additionally the ability of the Israelis to absorb simultaneous concessions is limited.
Rabinovich takes us through the salient difficulties. With Syria you had a single person who makes all the decisions, either Hafiz Assad or, after his death in 2000, his son, Bashar. For the Asads resolving the territorial dispute is neither pressing nor existential, rather it levers Syria onto the international pan-Arab stage. Lebanon is the opposite - it's in constantly in flux. The Israel's see Hiz b'Allah as separate from Lebanon itself and acting as a proxy for Syria and Iran. Together Syria, Iran, Hiz b'Allah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad form an "axis of resistance" in opposition to the more moderate and conservative Arab States such as Jordan, Egypt (prior to the succession of the Muslim Brotherhood) and Saudi Arabia. Jordan has the special problem that a west bank state could also destabilize the Hashemite monarchy; though it gives some lip service to Palestinian nationalism it is also sympathetic to Israel's security concerns as it too would have problems with a militant and revolutionary state next door. King Hussein, having dealt with Black September in 1970, was perhaps more aware of this than his son.
The analysis of the Palestinians is equally fascinating as Rabinovich considers West Bank, Gaza and Israel's own Arab population. From '48-67 the Palestinians by and large were under the magic spell of Nasser and as such their nationalism was that of the Arab Nation as a whole - excepting those favoring the Hashemites. Rabinovich skips over the attempts of the 1970s and '80s to build relationships with municipal leaders to deal with Oslo and Arafat, the man who could not say "yes". Pretty much everyone recognized that Arafat and the PA was corrupt, however he was able to adroitly shore up his position using the classic strategy pointing out that the alternative (Hamas and Islamic Jihad) would be even worse.
Netanyahu's policy reset some of the concessions offered by some of his predecessors which Palestinian negotiators tried to pocket without final agreement nor yielding concessions of their own. A similar situation had occurred in 2000 on the Syrian track (see pp95) - Asad had met Barak's offer of withdrawal for peace and normalization by countering with an Israeli withdrawal and non-belligerency along with a Syrian right to move troops into the recovered territory. Instead of offering more to achieve the first goal, Barak responded with less, commensurate with what Asad was offering, which surprised the American intermediaries who viewed it as backtracking rather than a normal negotiating position.
The basic problem is that the parties have always had different goals. For the Israelis normalization has meant acceptance of Israel as a full member in the regional community of nations combined with trade and diplomatic relations, with the key condition that negotiations would bring a final end to the conflict. The Arabs in turn aimed at a lesser goal of non-belligerency with option of further concessions later on. Some hoped the result would lead to a reduced Israel on the same footing as Lebanon, more Arabized and decolonized of Jewish influences. (pp253) Rabinovich does mention an interesting set of proposals made in 1976 by Egyptian Muhammed Sid-Ahmed (pp276) to move Arab population centres into desert regions to make better use of agricultural lands and for the creation of factories and refineries along border regions. The hoped for side effect would be that military conflict acrosss these borders would become desirable. This would be done by marrying Israeli technical expertise with Arab resources - a situation similar to today's QIZ manufacturing zones in Jordan.
Given the number of books on the conflict there would appear to be a wide audience for this material though it should be of special interest to students of international relations. The style is highly readable, reasonably concise, very analytic, up to date and polemic free. I also recommend the author's book The Road Not Taken: Early Arab-Israeli Negotiations for coverage of diplomatic efforts from 1948-53. Both are well worth reading.
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