This is a small anthology published for popular audiences, apparently in the 60s; the cover advertises hot takes on paranoia, masochism and depression, but in reality this is a mostly clinical, scientific volume, or at least an attempt at such. However, this volume mostly records the conclusions of Freud's attempts at the mapping of the psychotopography; nowhere are included case studies (even examples are rare and far between), nor the 'hard-minded' work of demonstrating the existence-as-such of the psychological entities in discussion. One can only wonder at the readers of the volume during its publication, expecting edifying explanations of the human mind and instead receiving a bureacratic-like, ad-hoc array of preconscious and unconscious phenomenon, brute facts ascribed to the 'ego', 'id', and 'super-ego' (about the latter of which very little substantial is said), and above all the anatomies of the mechanisms that apparently result -- regression, neurosis, sublimation. For reasons unknown, Oedipus appears only a few times, although the mother-father matrix is employed throughout as a presupposable (somehow) truism. From the best of my abilities to tell, this volume seems to signify mostly an attempt of Freud to 'scientize' his theories, although in a way satisfactory to few: he seems to begin with pre-assumed judgments about associations between 'unconscious' and 'conscious' acts, and then seeks to demarcate precisely the nature of the relations between.
To a less scrupulous eye, this would have all the airs of 'serious' scientific work, but it remains the case (as with many of the quasi-scientific writers of the 1890s-1920s epoch) that he proceeds no differently than would a scholastic, presupposing the black-box behaviorist truths (which are never justified rigorously, if at all) and then proceeding to spend time speculating about possible theories, of causation among the various psycho-entities. In classic cases like paranoiac cathexis, thinly concealed repression, etc, this proceeds plausibly, as he is able to generate plausible (but nevertheless unjustified) explanations; in cases such as the 'melancholia' essay he cannot find one but never is in doubt there is one, and in cases like the masochism essay he is seemingly forced to simply assert that obvious contradictions to his schema are simply unconscious verifications thereof. This culminates all very humorously with the negation essay, where denial of something asserted by the Freudian schema is always actually an affirmation -- how easy this makes the life of the psychoanalyst! The Freudian objects that this anathema against self-trust proceeds from the nature of the unconscious, but all the same this follows the same disingenuous method of taking a few facts obvious to pre-psychological eyes (eg, hyper-cathexis implies a web of personal associations) and then using them to justify a network of assertions about mysterious entities which are only ever justified in a circular way. Somewhere in the Lacanian algebra is a defense against this sort of claim, celebrating the psychoanalytic circularity in terms of "metastructures", but even those dubieties don't appear event nascently here (by the way, has there ever been a philosophical employment of the concept of 'metastructure' that doesn't invariably fall either to a fortiori arguments, or else insane schizophrenic amplifications, ten years later -- continental OR analytic?).
A friend once argued to me that Freud, despite being so often wrong, was valuable for providing a basic framework for later sciences to improve upon; even without importing the Deleuzean attitude of anti-psychoanalsis, one can start to wonder about the value of psychological frameworks such as these, given not only the therapeutic effect of impressing these frameworks onto individuals' self-conception but, moreover, also the more immediately acidic nature of academic theories, which do not seem different in shape to Freud's -- theories derived from single case studies or idiosyncratic justifications, awkwardly and forcibly loosened to acquiesce new cases until the point where rigorous study of evidence is less important than pencil-pusher sophistry to preserve frameworks. Is it any wonder that even as few as five years ago, fewer than half of psychological case studies could be replicated at all? If one is serious about avoiding these errors (and I am not sure if anyone involved has the motivation to be), then this probably cannot be denounced as hard-line as possible. For the rest of us, this is another alchemical tract, read only to study the culture diseased enough to believe it -- how many such cultures are there ?