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Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001
A New York Times Notable Book
At a time when the Middle East has come closer to achieving peace than ever before, eminent Israeli historian Benny Morris explodes the myths cherished by both sides to present an epic history of Zionist-Arab relations over the past 120 years.
Tracing the roots of political Zionism back to the pogroms of Russia and the Dreyfus Affair, Morris describes the gradual influx of Jewish settlers into Palestine and the impact they had on the Arab population. Following the Holocaust, the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948 resulted in the establishment of the State of Israel, but it also shattered Palestinian Arab society and gave rise to a massive refugee problem. Morris offers distinctive accounts of each of the subsequent Israeli-Arab wars and details the sporadic peace efforts in between, culminating in the peace process initiated by the Rabin Government. In a new afterword to the Vintage edition, he examines Ehud Barak’s leadership, the death of President Assad of Syria, and Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, and the recent renewed conflict with the Palestinians. Studded with illuminating portraits of the major protagonists, Righteous Victims provides an authoritative record of the middle east and its continuing struggle toward peace.
At a time when the Middle East has come closer to achieving peace than ever before, eminent Israeli historian Benny Morris explodes the myths cherished by both sides to present an epic history of Zionist-Arab relations over the past 120 years.
Tracing the roots of political Zionism back to the pogroms of Russia and the Dreyfus Affair, Morris describes the gradual influx of Jewish settlers into Palestine and the impact they had on the Arab population. Following the Holocaust, the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948 resulted in the establishment of the State of Israel, but it also shattered Palestinian Arab society and gave rise to a massive refugee problem. Morris offers distinctive accounts of each of the subsequent Israeli-Arab wars and details the sporadic peace efforts in between, culminating in the peace process initiated by the Rabin Government. In a new afterword to the Vintage edition, he examines Ehud Barak’s leadership, the death of President Assad of Syria, and Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, and the recent renewed conflict with the Palestinians. Studded with illuminating portraits of the major protagonists, Righteous Victims provides an authoritative record of the middle east and its continuing struggle toward peace.
800 pages, Paperback
First published September 1, 1999
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About the author
Benny Morris
29 books208 followersBenny Morris is professor of history in the Middle East Studies department of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev in the city of Be'er Sheva, Israel. He is a key member of the group of Israeli historians known as the "New Historians".
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February 15, 2024
"That was the situation. That is what Zionism faced. A Jewish state would not have come into being without the uprooting of 700,000 Palestinians. Therefore it was necessary to uproot them. There was no choice but to expel that population. It was necessary to cleanse the hinterland and cleanse the border areas and cleanse the main roads. It was necessary to cleanse the villages from which our convoys and our settlements were fired on.” - Benny Morris, Haaretz Interview, 2004
Sigh… The Israeli-Arab conflict. The tragedy of two competing visions colliding with each other in a storied land. One whose moral and historical complexity defies simple answers and singular judgements. Like many others who take an interest in this topic, I have had to grapple with this complexity; trying as best I can to remain fair-minded and view things from both perspectives. Due to background and worldview, my natural inclination is, and remains, to sympathize with Palestinians. Knowing this, I have consciously exerted an effort to understand the Jewish side of things; and thus I chose to read this volume by an Israeli Zionist historian first, and only later did I move on to Finkelstein and Pappe’s works. Morris is undoubtedly the most objective scholar on the conflict; one whose emotional and political inclinations evidently lie with the Zionist movement, but is intellectually honest enough to present reality as it occurred, with commendable balance, proportion and objectivity.
As recent genetic studies have demonstrated, Palestinians and Jews share substantial common ancestry, with both groups tracing a line of descent to the ancient inhabitants of Canaan; although with some admixture from non-Canaanite populations in the intervening years. But the historical trajectory of the past 2,000 years meant that Palestinians and Jews no longer saw themselves as belonging to the same people. Ashkenazi Jews were culturally and genetically Europeanized, while Palestinians were religiously and linguistically converted to Arab and Islamic/Christian traditions.
As Morris perceptively notes in his book, the root of the conflict lies not in some ancient hatred between Muslims and Jews; or in the meddling of foreign powers; but simply two competing and mutually contradictory visions for a land claimed by two different ethnicities. The Arabs wished to maintain their ownership of the land, and retain its Arabic and Islamic character. The Zionist movement wished to revive the ancient Hebraic state and provide a refuge for the scattered diaspora, who historically did and were facing persecution and anti-semitism in Europe and the MENA region. (Some Jewish scholars like Rabbi Yaakov Shapiro have contended that Zionism was created to supplant Judaism by secular Jews who rejected the faith; but Morris doesn’t touch on this, so we’ll leave that aside for now.)
Since this conflict centers around land and people, most enlightening for me was a factual description of demographics and land-ownership statistics, which is crucial to a big-picture understanding of the trajectory of the conflict. As Morris outlines in the book; A) by 1881, on the eve of the start of the Zionist Jewish influx, Palestine’s population was 457,000—about 400,000 of them Muslims, 13,000–20,000 Jews, and 42,000 Christians (mostly Greek Orthodox). In addition, there were several thousand more Jews who were permanent residents of Palestine but not Ottoman citizens. B) in 1914 Palestine had 657,000 Muslim inhabitants (including 7,000 Druze), 81,000 Christians, and 60,000 Jews. C) By 1939, there were 1,070,000 Arabs (950,000 of them Muslims) and 460,000 Jews in Palestine. The Arabs declined from more than 97 percent in 1881, to 82 percent of the population in 1931, to less than 70 percent in 1939.
The Arabs, not wishing to see their numbers decline further, protested to British authorities vehemently to disallow more Jewish immigration; which they viewed as a contributing to their displacement and dispossession. Morris quotes Ben-Gurion stating: “Were I an Arab … I would rise up against immigration liable sometime in the future to hand the country … over to Jewish rule. What Arab cannot do his math and understand that immigration at the rate of 60,000 a year means a Jewish state in all Palestine?” And most illuminating was Ben-Gurion’s aide and Israel’s first foreign minister, Shertok, speaking bluntly on the intractability of the two visions:
The clash of the competing visions came to a head in 1947-8, when, following a wave of sympathy for Jewish suffering during the Holocaust, and American strong-arm lobbying of UN member nations, Resolution 181 was passed recommending an allocation of 55 percent of the land to a Jewish state, and 45 percent to a Palestinian state. As Morris describes:
The Zionists rejoiced in the realization of a homeland for Jewish people; one they felt they deserved after 2,000 years of statelessness and persecution. The Arabs had an abundance of territory from Morocco in the West to Iraq in the East; why couldn’t Jews carve out a tiny sliver among this ocean for themselves? Did the Holocaust not prove the Zionists right in their fear of annihilation? Where else could Jewish people have formed a nation for themselves? Most of the world was already settled and occupied, and Palestine was the land of their ancestors, one which they were forcibly and unjustly kicked out of 2,000 years ago by the Romans. It was only natural they would return and revive their ancient nation.
But Palestinians failed to see why they had to sacrifice for the sake of Jewish ambitions. They played little role in causing hardship for Jews during the Holocaust. Ninety-three percent of the land legally belonged to them; and their ancestors had lived in the land for millennia. But as Morris detailed in both this volume and The Palestinian Refugee Problem; there was a near-unanimous consensus among Zionist leadership on the necessity and desirability of a “population transfer”. The Zionists correctly discerned that a Jewish state could not come into existence without forcible expulsion of a large section of the Arab population. Morris quotes Ben-Gurion: “Complete transfer without compulsion—and ruthless compulsion at that—is hardly imaginable.”
And that is the tragedy of the conflict. The Zionist Jews in 1948 were placed between a rock and a hard place. They had just witnessed their people decimated by 60% within a span of 5-6 years. They had been correct all along in discerning the need for a state to preserve the Jewish peoples. They could no longer sit helplessly by and tolerate the persecution of their peoples. So they did what they had to do - which is to expel and expropriate. Morris was forthright enough to acknowledge and describe this process in painstaking detail, which earned him applause from left-wing Israelis and Palestinian advocates. But in subsequent interviews it became clear that Morris didn’t necessarily share in the views of the former. Having immersed himself in the historical context which Zionist leaders found themselves in; he came to sympathize with the choices they made; if anything arguing they had been too soft and weak-willed.
I can never bring myself to state that forcible expulsion of Arabs was morally justified; or that the birth of Israel was anything but a zero-sum scenario where Palestinians had to pay the price. But rationally I have reconciled myself with the founding and existence of Israel. It was indeed necessary to establish a state to preserve the Jewish peoples; a people who have contributed much to mankind; possessed with a unique acumen for economic and scholastic activities; and have demonstrated a capability for building a prosperous society. But it’s also an imperative that Palestinians be treated fairly and allowed to maintain a foothold in Palestine; which they have a right to as much as anyone else. Settler societies, being acknowledged by everyone (but themselves) as the aggressors, have a moral obligation toward conquered peoples. The Americans and Australians have moved to rectify the situation in relation to native Americans and Aboriginal. There is a sizable subset of Israeli society which wishes to follow suit; but they are marginalized by the overwhelming majority which sees no obligation, and in fact continues to expand settlements, in a quest to annex more Palestinian land to Israel. Alas, the issue of peace and state solutions is a whole other topic requiring a lengthy treatment on its own. One I shall leave for another day.
Sigh… The Israeli-Arab conflict. The tragedy of two competing visions colliding with each other in a storied land. One whose moral and historical complexity defies simple answers and singular judgements. Like many others who take an interest in this topic, I have had to grapple with this complexity; trying as best I can to remain fair-minded and view things from both perspectives. Due to background and worldview, my natural inclination is, and remains, to sympathize with Palestinians. Knowing this, I have consciously exerted an effort to understand the Jewish side of things; and thus I chose to read this volume by an Israeli Zionist historian first, and only later did I move on to Finkelstein and Pappe’s works. Morris is undoubtedly the most objective scholar on the conflict; one whose emotional and political inclinations evidently lie with the Zionist movement, but is intellectually honest enough to present reality as it occurred, with commendable balance, proportion and objectivity.
As recent genetic studies have demonstrated, Palestinians and Jews share substantial common ancestry, with both groups tracing a line of descent to the ancient inhabitants of Canaan; although with some admixture from non-Canaanite populations in the intervening years. But the historical trajectory of the past 2,000 years meant that Palestinians and Jews no longer saw themselves as belonging to the same people. Ashkenazi Jews were culturally and genetically Europeanized, while Palestinians were religiously and linguistically converted to Arab and Islamic/Christian traditions.
As Morris perceptively notes in his book, the root of the conflict lies not in some ancient hatred between Muslims and Jews; or in the meddling of foreign powers; but simply two competing and mutually contradictory visions for a land claimed by two different ethnicities. The Arabs wished to maintain their ownership of the land, and retain its Arabic and Islamic character. The Zionist movement wished to revive the ancient Hebraic state and provide a refuge for the scattered diaspora, who historically did and were facing persecution and anti-semitism in Europe and the MENA region. (Some Jewish scholars like Rabbi Yaakov Shapiro have contended that Zionism was created to supplant Judaism by secular Jews who rejected the faith; but Morris doesn’t touch on this, so we’ll leave that aside for now.)
Since this conflict centers around land and people, most enlightening for me was a factual description of demographics and land-ownership statistics, which is crucial to a big-picture understanding of the trajectory of the conflict. As Morris outlines in the book; A) by 1881, on the eve of the start of the Zionist Jewish influx, Palestine’s population was 457,000—about 400,000 of them Muslims, 13,000–20,000 Jews, and 42,000 Christians (mostly Greek Orthodox). In addition, there were several thousand more Jews who were permanent residents of Palestine but not Ottoman citizens. B) in 1914 Palestine had 657,000 Muslim inhabitants (including 7,000 Druze), 81,000 Christians, and 60,000 Jews. C) By 1939, there were 1,070,000 Arabs (950,000 of them Muslims) and 460,000 Jews in Palestine. The Arabs declined from more than 97 percent in 1881, to 82 percent of the population in 1931, to less than 70 percent in 1939.
The Arabs, not wishing to see their numbers decline further, protested to British authorities vehemently to disallow more Jewish immigration; which they viewed as a contributing to their displacement and dispossession. Morris quotes Ben-Gurion stating: “Were I an Arab … I would rise up against immigration liable sometime in the future to hand the country … over to Jewish rule. What Arab cannot do his math and understand that immigration at the rate of 60,000 a year means a Jewish state in all Palestine?” And most illuminating was Ben-Gurion’s aide and Israel’s first foreign minister, Shertok, speaking bluntly on the intractability of the two visions:
“We have forgotten that we have not come to an empty land to inherit it, but we have come to conquer a country from a people inhabiting it, that governs it by virtue of its language and savage culture.… Recently, there has been appearing in our newspapers the clarification about “the mutual misunderstanding” between us and the Arabs, about “common interests” [and] about “the possibility of unity and peace between the two fraternal peoples.” … [But] we must not allow ourselves to be deluded by such illusive hopes … for if we cease to look upon our land, the Land of Israel, as ours alone and we allow a partner into our estate—all content and meaning will be lost to our enterprise.125”
The clash of the competing visions came to a head in 1947-8, when, following a wave of sympathy for Jewish suffering during the Holocaust, and American strong-arm lobbying of UN member nations, Resolution 181 was passed recommending an allocation of 55 percent of the land to a Jewish state, and 45 percent to a Palestinian state. As Morris describes:
The Zionists and their supporters rejoiced; the Arabs walked out of the hall after declaring the resolution invalid. They could not fathom, a Palestinian historian was later to write, why 37 percent of the population had been given 55 percent of the land (of which they owned only 7 percent). And “the Palestinians failed to see why they should be made to pay for the Holocaust … they failed to see why it was not fair for the Jews to be a minority in a unitary Palestinian state, while it was fair for almost half of the Palestinian population—the indigenous majority on its own ancestral soil—to be converted overnight into a minority under alien rule.”125
The Zionists rejoiced in the realization of a homeland for Jewish people; one they felt they deserved after 2,000 years of statelessness and persecution. The Arabs had an abundance of territory from Morocco in the West to Iraq in the East; why couldn’t Jews carve out a tiny sliver among this ocean for themselves? Did the Holocaust not prove the Zionists right in their fear of annihilation? Where else could Jewish people have formed a nation for themselves? Most of the world was already settled and occupied, and Palestine was the land of their ancestors, one which they were forcibly and unjustly kicked out of 2,000 years ago by the Romans. It was only natural they would return and revive their ancient nation.
But Palestinians failed to see why they had to sacrifice for the sake of Jewish ambitions. They played little role in causing hardship for Jews during the Holocaust. Ninety-three percent of the land legally belonged to them; and their ancestors had lived in the land for millennia. But as Morris detailed in both this volume and The Palestinian Refugee Problem; there was a near-unanimous consensus among Zionist leadership on the necessity and desirability of a “population transfer”. The Zionists correctly discerned that a Jewish state could not come into existence without forcible expulsion of a large section of the Arab population. Morris quotes Ben-Gurion: “Complete transfer without compulsion—and ruthless compulsion at that—is hardly imaginable.”
And that is the tragedy of the conflict. The Zionist Jews in 1948 were placed between a rock and a hard place. They had just witnessed their people decimated by 60% within a span of 5-6 years. They had been correct all along in discerning the need for a state to preserve the Jewish peoples. They could no longer sit helplessly by and tolerate the persecution of their peoples. So they did what they had to do - which is to expel and expropriate. Morris was forthright enough to acknowledge and describe this process in painstaking detail, which earned him applause from left-wing Israelis and Palestinian advocates. But in subsequent interviews it became clear that Morris didn’t necessarily share in the views of the former. Having immersed himself in the historical context which Zionist leaders found themselves in; he came to sympathize with the choices they made; if anything arguing they had been too soft and weak-willed.
I can never bring myself to state that forcible expulsion of Arabs was morally justified; or that the birth of Israel was anything but a zero-sum scenario where Palestinians had to pay the price. But rationally I have reconciled myself with the founding and existence of Israel. It was indeed necessary to establish a state to preserve the Jewish peoples; a people who have contributed much to mankind; possessed with a unique acumen for economic and scholastic activities; and have demonstrated a capability for building a prosperous society. But it’s also an imperative that Palestinians be treated fairly and allowed to maintain a foothold in Palestine; which they have a right to as much as anyone else. Settler societies, being acknowledged by everyone (but themselves) as the aggressors, have a moral obligation toward conquered peoples. The Americans and Australians have moved to rectify the situation in relation to native Americans and Aboriginal. There is a sizable subset of Israeli society which wishes to follow suit; but they are marginalized by the overwhelming majority which sees no obligation, and in fact continues to expand settlements, in a quest to annex more Palestinian land to Israel. Alas, the issue of peace and state solutions is a whole other topic requiring a lengthy treatment on its own. One I shall leave for another day.
September 14, 2014
This is a must read, a reference for anyone who wants a comprehensive understanding of Zionism and its effect on the Middle East.
Benny Morris is one of the Israeli "new historians" who punctured the mythology built by Zionists of the creation of Israel. He has been followed by others who take particular aspects of Zionism and Israel as their subject, but Morris set the tone with this book. Starting with the first Jewish immigrants to Palestine from Russia in the 1880's, all of the trials and triumphs of Zionism are covered, along with the steady losses of the indigenous Arabs, with empathy for both.
Curiously, his additions to the book after its first publication, that take into account what has happened since the year 2000, fall short of the main work. Perhaps this is proof that time must pass before one can hope to look objectively at events. Morris falls into the same narrative that is heard from Israel's apologists - that Arafat passed up a deal when he refused the offer of land for peace from Ehud Barack. Morris terms this the best deal the Palestinians have ever been offered by Israel. While that is true, it only emphasizes what tiny concessions by Israel have been offered. The West Bank makes up 22% of the area of Palestine before Israel was established and Barack's offer was not even of all of the West Bank.
But this is a relatively minor drawback to the book as a whole. The story it tells is of might makes right. There are epic accounts of battle and maps are provided so that the action can be followed. The decisive impact of the holocaust on the creation of Israel is fully covered. Personalities are well presented with no favoritism shown to Israelis, particularly notable in the case of Ariel Sharon. References make up a fifth of the book, so the reader has a wealth of sources for further reading. The summation Morris makes at the end is excellent. If you are short on time, you could do worse than to sit down at a library for 45 minutes and read only the summation.
There is no end in sight to the troubles involving Israel. It continues to swallow more territory at the expense of the Palestinians while the United States continues to pour in money to a country that doesn't need it, while issuing only empty statements regarding the continuing oppression (and recently in Gaza, slaughter) of the Palestinians. It's a shameful "special relationship" for America and all American citizens should educate themselves on what they are financing...it certainly has nothing to do with liberty and justice for all. Morris' book is the best single work I have found to learn about how the situation has come to be.
Benny Morris is one of the Israeli "new historians" who punctured the mythology built by Zionists of the creation of Israel. He has been followed by others who take particular aspects of Zionism and Israel as their subject, but Morris set the tone with this book. Starting with the first Jewish immigrants to Palestine from Russia in the 1880's, all of the trials and triumphs of Zionism are covered, along with the steady losses of the indigenous Arabs, with empathy for both.
Curiously, his additions to the book after its first publication, that take into account what has happened since the year 2000, fall short of the main work. Perhaps this is proof that time must pass before one can hope to look objectively at events. Morris falls into the same narrative that is heard from Israel's apologists - that Arafat passed up a deal when he refused the offer of land for peace from Ehud Barack. Morris terms this the best deal the Palestinians have ever been offered by Israel. While that is true, it only emphasizes what tiny concessions by Israel have been offered. The West Bank makes up 22% of the area of Palestine before Israel was established and Barack's offer was not even of all of the West Bank.
But this is a relatively minor drawback to the book as a whole. The story it tells is of might makes right. There are epic accounts of battle and maps are provided so that the action can be followed. The decisive impact of the holocaust on the creation of Israel is fully covered. Personalities are well presented with no favoritism shown to Israelis, particularly notable in the case of Ariel Sharon. References make up a fifth of the book, so the reader has a wealth of sources for further reading. The summation Morris makes at the end is excellent. If you are short on time, you could do worse than to sit down at a library for 45 minutes and read only the summation.
There is no end in sight to the troubles involving Israel. It continues to swallow more territory at the expense of the Palestinians while the United States continues to pour in money to a country that doesn't need it, while issuing only empty statements regarding the continuing oppression (and recently in Gaza, slaughter) of the Palestinians. It's a shameful "special relationship" for America and all American citizens should educate themselves on what they are financing...it certainly has nothing to do with liberty and justice for all. Morris' book is the best single work I have found to learn about how the situation has come to be.
July 15, 2014
So obviously on my quest for facts I am going to come across all sorts of interesting things. This wasn't one of them. Still wondering if I should even bother attempting reading more of his books.
Maybe I'm not a fan of his writing, or his sometimes too narrow views on things, or not really placing responsibility where it should be placed? Or maybe I'm not a fan of the fact that he has said some pretty heinous things (in interviews) about Arabs, Muslims, Palestinians. (That they are barbarians, should be caged like animals, etc)
I kinda totally agree with what this Israeli historian has to say about Mr.Morris
But Morris has abandoned his historian’s mantle and donned the armor of a Jewish chauvinist who wants the Land of Israel completely cleansed from Arabs. Never has any secular public Jewish figure expressed these feelings so clearly and blatantly as Professor Morris did. And in order to be completely lucid on this point he drew an analogy between Israel and North America: “Even the great American democracy could not have been created without the annihilation of the Indians. There are cases in which the overall, final good justifies harsh and cruel acts that are committed in the course of history.” I do not know today any American historian or social scientist that agrees that the annihilation of the indigenous population of the continent was a necessary condition for the American nation or the constitution of American democracy. And these are facts and not “political correctness” as Morris loves to call any arguments he cannot deny.
Yup... probably not going to be reading more books by a guy who thinks violent genocide is a-ok for something he thinks is the greater good.
(From this article(that I HIGHLY recommend) here)
Maybe I'm not a fan of his writing, or his sometimes too narrow views on things, or not really placing responsibility where it should be placed? Or maybe I'm not a fan of the fact that he has said some pretty heinous things (in interviews) about Arabs, Muslims, Palestinians. (That they are barbarians, should be caged like animals, etc)
I kinda totally agree with what this Israeli historian has to say about Mr.Morris
But Morris has abandoned his historian’s mantle and donned the armor of a Jewish chauvinist who wants the Land of Israel completely cleansed from Arabs. Never has any secular public Jewish figure expressed these feelings so clearly and blatantly as Professor Morris did. And in order to be completely lucid on this point he drew an analogy between Israel and North America: “Even the great American democracy could not have been created without the annihilation of the Indians. There are cases in which the overall, final good justifies harsh and cruel acts that are committed in the course of history.” I do not know today any American historian or social scientist that agrees that the annihilation of the indigenous population of the continent was a necessary condition for the American nation or the constitution of American democracy. And these are facts and not “political correctness” as Morris loves to call any arguments he cannot deny.
Yup... probably not going to be reading more books by a guy who thinks violent genocide is a-ok for something he thinks is the greater good.
(From this article(that I HIGHLY recommend) here)
April 23, 2013
This book is very, very, long and highly detailed. Although the writing is readable, the level of detail exceeds even my obsessed curiosity about Israeli history and politics.
But I would still give it four stars for the research alone, except that I felt the book was lacking in scholarly objectivity. As I mentioned in an update, calling Golda Meir "the ever-self-righteous prime minister" does not impress me as an impartial statement. Worse, though, are the multiple inflammatory allegations of Israeli misdeeds and abuses of power with only the sparsest of footnotes. With all the research and footnoting everywhere else in the book, shouldn't there be footnotes supporting such damning accusations?
But I would still give it four stars for the research alone, except that I felt the book was lacking in scholarly objectivity. As I mentioned in an update, calling Golda Meir "the ever-self-righteous prime minister" does not impress me as an impartial statement. Worse, though, are the multiple inflammatory allegations of Israeli misdeeds and abuses of power with only the sparsest of footnotes. With all the research and footnoting everywhere else in the book, shouldn't there be footnotes supporting such damning accusations?
December 20, 2023
Dealing with a subject where it is very difficult to find books that are both historically competent and devoid of highly distorting biases and apologetics, Morris’ book stands out as quite an achievement. Highly analytical, detailed, historically nuanced, willing to expose the lies and atrocities — as well as the survival needs — of BOTH sides…, and yet written in a prose that is lucid, lively (because intelligent), and never turgid, you will not find a better starting point (or advanced work) than this.
Highly recommended
Highly recommended
March 18, 2013
The book provides a detailed account of more than a hundred years of conflict. Although Morris relies heavily on English and Hebrew sources (as he does not speak Arabic and had no access to most Arab archives), he creates a balanced narrative throughout the book (with the exception of the last chapter). He puts the blame on both sides and, as the book's title hints, portrays the population of both peoples as victims of the mistakes of their own leadership and historical tragedy.
Towards the end of the book, however, Morris suddenly changes course and adopts the official Israeli version about the second Intifada, ie the Israeli Prime Minister Barak was generously willing to give up most of the territory occupied in 1967 whereas the Palestinians, led by Arafat, got cold feet and initiated the Intifada. Ergo, Morris suggests, the Palestinian side is not interested in peace while the Israeli side has gone far and beyond.
This ending is disappointing, as the book was written shortly after the Intifada broke out, as the events were unfolding. Morris had no historical perspective when he wrote this chapter. Moreover, other pieces of literature, for example Danny Dor's book on the bias of the Israeli media, Intifada Hits the Headlines: How the Israeli Press Misreported the Outbreak of the Second Palestinian Uprising, reject this one-sided notion of good Israelis vs bad Palestinians, and suggest that Morris should have cut the span of his book a few years earlier.
It is not surprising he did not do that though. It seems to symbolise Morris' transformation from a (controversial) "new historian" into the heart of the Israeli mainstream establishment.
Nonetheless, apart from the last chapter and the conclusions Morris reaches because of it, the book is a must-read for whoever wants to learn on the Israeli-Arab conflict.
Towards the end of the book, however, Morris suddenly changes course and adopts the official Israeli version about the second Intifada, ie the Israeli Prime Minister Barak was generously willing to give up most of the territory occupied in 1967 whereas the Palestinians, led by Arafat, got cold feet and initiated the Intifada. Ergo, Morris suggests, the Palestinian side is not interested in peace while the Israeli side has gone far and beyond.
This ending is disappointing, as the book was written shortly after the Intifada broke out, as the events were unfolding. Morris had no historical perspective when he wrote this chapter. Moreover, other pieces of literature, for example Danny Dor's book on the bias of the Israeli media, Intifada Hits the Headlines: How the Israeli Press Misreported the Outbreak of the Second Palestinian Uprising, reject this one-sided notion of good Israelis vs bad Palestinians, and suggest that Morris should have cut the span of his book a few years earlier.
It is not surprising he did not do that though. It seems to symbolise Morris' transformation from a (controversial) "new historian" into the heart of the Israeli mainstream establishment.
Nonetheless, apart from the last chapter and the conclusions Morris reaches because of it, the book is a must-read for whoever wants to learn on the Israeli-Arab conflict.
March 8, 2010
Writer Alon Hilu has chosen to discuss Benny Morris's Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001 as one of the top five on his subject - Israel and Palestine in Art, saying that:
"Benny Morris is an historian who took it upon himself to check what really happened here in early Zionism. He describes, for example, what happened in 1948. Usually with Israel we tell ourselves that in the 48 War the Palestinians ran away and didn’t want to come back. And he showed that in some cases the situation was quite different."
The full interview is available here: http://www.five-books.com/books/interviews/alon-hilu
"Benny Morris is an historian who took it upon himself to check what really happened here in early Zionism. He describes, for example, what happened in 1948. Usually with Israel we tell ourselves that in the 48 War the Palestinians ran away and didn’t want to come back. And he showed that in some cases the situation was quite different."
The full interview is available here: http://www.five-books.com/books/interviews/alon-hilu
October 1, 2024
First of all, let me say that the kindle edition is a 2-star mess. It's riddled with typos and formatting errors. It's also "buggy." On multiple occasions, I had to restart my kindle device to get it to unfreeze – nothing wrong with my device, it has only ever acted up with this particular book.
I didn't want my review to reflect the horrid kindle edition. Rather, I want my review to reflect the book itself. I've read many books on the history of the modern state of Israel, the history of Zionism, the history of the Arab-Israeli Wars, etc. This book, I believe, offers the most complete portrayal of the history of Israel of them all – and from both Israeli and Arab/Palestinian perspectives.
It is neither a Jeremiad against Israel, nor is it a polemic against the Palestinians. It is a fair and balanced account that shows the good and the bad of both sides in this protracted struggle. Even if you have already formed an opinion on who is "right" in this struggle, this is a worthwhile read. I highly recommend it!
I didn't want my review to reflect the horrid kindle edition. Rather, I want my review to reflect the book itself. I've read many books on the history of the modern state of Israel, the history of Zionism, the history of the Arab-Israeli Wars, etc. This book, I believe, offers the most complete portrayal of the history of Israel of them all – and from both Israeli and Arab/Palestinian perspectives.
It is neither a Jeremiad against Israel, nor is it a polemic against the Palestinians. It is a fair and balanced account that shows the good and the bad of both sides in this protracted struggle. Even if you have already formed an opinion on who is "right" in this struggle, this is a worthwhile read. I highly recommend it!
June 12, 2014
A great book on the history of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. Explores through historical background of the Jewish immigration and the role of Russia in generating and sustaining the conflict and hatred, especially after World War II. It is remarkable to see how the Soviet Union (and thereafter Russia) has benefited from the conflict and manipulated Arab countries (and later: Iran) into meaningless struggle by hardening their positions and encouraging Arab leaders and hardliners not to make a compromise.
Also, what makes this book special is its unbiased and fair views, despite the author being an Israeli professor. It was less biased than many of the similar books I've read on the conflict that were written by non-Israeli authors (e.g. O' Jerusalem). It vividly demonstrates the non-democratic nature of Israeli government and their expansionist behavior as well as their brutality and ideological apartheid.
Also, what makes this book special is its unbiased and fair views, despite the author being an Israeli professor. It was less biased than many of the similar books I've read on the conflict that were written by non-Israeli authors (e.g. O' Jerusalem). It vividly demonstrates the non-democratic nature of Israeli government and their expansionist behavior as well as their brutality and ideological apartheid.
Read
February 7, 2017There are few who have such a mastery of the historical materials and manage to maintain their objectivity as Benny Morris does in his books on the Israel-Arab conflict, and his "Righteous Victims" is no exception. Well-written and meticulously researched, Professor Morris always keeps his eye on the prize: a warts-and-all record of this conflict, highlighting the achievements and crimes of both sides, and all the while portraying how the Middle East and the conflict itself has evolved over its century-plus course. While the Jews seemed outnumbered (and they were), they had the advantage of better leadership, a superior organization and a near-fanatical dedication to their goals, none of which one can say about the Palestinians. The series of wars between the Arab states and Israel were, somewhat illogically, steps on the path to peace or, at least, non-conflict, as with Syria. Any serious student of this conflict and the modern Middle East needs to read this book, along with others by Morris. First rate.
June 26, 2025
Morris is an Israeli Jew. I think he wants most of all to report what actually happened, rather than to pass moral judgment on it (though he makes moral judgments sometimes, in passing as it were). This is a very thick book, with an amazing command of detail, but with maybe more detail about wars and negotiations than is necessary to his point. The final chapter "Conclusions," might be all that's required for most reader. Morris strives for objectivity, and as near as I can tell achieves it. It is forthright about duplicities and atrocities committed by both sides, without exaggerating either. It is grom and depressing reading. Ironically, it ends on a high note in 1999, with the Peace Process crunching slowly along and limited Palestinian self-government coming into being. Since publishing this book, Morris has become more of a Zionist, saying that only the expulsion or subjection of the Palestinians can bring peace and security to Israel.
So this is how it went down, according to Morris. The Zionist movement started in the late 19th century, largely in reaction to pogroms in Russia in the 1880s and to the Dreyfus Affair in France. It seemed that even after the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, Jews were still not safe in Europe. So Theodor Herzl and others conceived the idea of a new homeland for Jews. So the Zionists gathered their resources, went to Palestine, and created their settlements. They had no thought of integrating into the existing population or learning their ways; they scarcely thought about them except to buy their products, services, and land. Often they treated them with contempt. The indigenous population suffered in turn from an ancient traditional contempt for Jews. It unsettled them to see these European Jews show up with more money and better organization than they had and set up separate communities. There was resentment when Jews bought agricultural land and then evicted the Arab tenant farmers living on it. Palestine was governed by the Ottoman Turks, who had laws restricting this immigration, but the Ottoman government was corrupt and inefficient and the laws were often flouted. This encouraged a growing anti-Ottoman Arab nationalism. Some Zionists privately conceded that their project might require relocating the native Arab population, but they figured they had lots of Arab areas to go to, and the Jews had no Jewish areas, so it was an acceptable tradeoff. They generally foresaw an eventual political takeover of Palestine, regardless of the wishes of the current inhabitants.
During WWI the British issued the Balfour Declaration, which stated that Jews should have a "homeland" (not necessarily an independent country) in Palestine after the Ottomans were ejected. Some Brits were sympathetic to Zionism; others were antisemitic (maybe some just wanted Jews to leave Europe). The Declaration was meant to attract Jewish support in America, and also to encourage a friendly state on the route to India. Faisal, the leader of the Arab revolt against the Ottomans (and later king of Iraq under the British mandate), had misgivings, but he eventually went along with it to keep the British happy and fighting on his side. In 1919 he signed as agreement that there would be both Arab and Jewish states in the Middle East, with the expectation that Jewish immigration and development would help the Arabs, and that the rights of Arab Palestinians would be respected.
Open Arab-Jewish hostility developed immediately after the war and quickly turned violent. The British Mandatory government favored the Zionists, based on the Balfour declaration. The British Army favored the Arabs, whom they had fought alongside during the war. Neither Jews nor Arabs were interested in reconciling. The Jews organized self-defense militias, including Haganah and the IZL (Irgun). In the 1930s, with the spread of fascism, Jewish immigration increased by a factor of 10-15. Land prices quadrupled. There was economic development for the Arabs, but that led to dislocation. There was better education too, but that led to radicalization. In 1936 there were riots, killings, and tit-for-tat reprisals. In 1937 an Arab revolt against British rule broke out; it was not very well organized because the Arab culture was still based on clan and tribe. Family feuds got in the way. Mutually hostile bands carried out attacks on British, Jews, and moderate Arabs. There were random bombings of civilian targets by both Arabs and Jews. Palestinian civil society was gravely damaged. Moderate Arabs were driven into rebellion. A commission in 1937 recommended partition and an exchange of populations, but Britain rejected it. Many Zionists wanted to remove the Arabs but were willing to compensate them; they took for granted the moral superiority of their claim to the land and did not understand why the Arabs were unwilling to move to another part of the Arab world. As war with Germany approached the British tried to placate the Arabs more, hoping to protect the route to India. They tried to limit Jewish immigration, to little effect. The British managed to suppress the Arab revolt by 1939, using occasionally very brutal methods (which Morris seems to think are the only methods that work against an insurgency).
During WWII, the Arabs tended to support Germany, but not very actively. The Jews supported Britain until victory seemed inevitable. In 1942 statehood was made the explicit Zionist goal. In 1944 a guerilla war against the British was started by Jewish extremists. After the war, the Brits tried to limit Jewish immigration, in deference to Arab feelings. But of course there was an overwhelming desire among the surviving European Jews to seek their own homeland. This led to a three-way murderous insurgency, extremist Jewish groups vs. extremist Arab groups vs. Brits, with terror bombings and road ambushes. Exhausted, the Brits tossed the problem to the UN and declared they were leaving. In a rare early flowering of compromise and statesmanship, the UN approved a partition plan by a 2/3 vote in the General Assembly, including the USSR. The plan would give the Jews a bigger share of the territory than their numbers, but much of that territory was sparsely settled and supposed fit for new Jewish immigrants. Jerusalem and environs would be a separate zone under a UN administration. The main Jewish organizations reluctantly accepted the plan (they really wanted all of Palestine). The Arab countries all denounced it; they had taken over leadership of the Palestinian cause after the native leadership had been scattered by the 1937-39 uprising. Open warfare broke out as the Brits left, including some cruel atrocities by the extremist groups IZL (Irgun) and especially LHI (the Stern Gang); these drove some Arabs to abandon Palestine, but also further hardened Arab attitudes. In 1948 the last Brits left and Ben Gurion declared Israeli independence. On the same day Israel was invaded by Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, with small contributions from Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. However, the Arab armies were poorly organized, trained, and led. The Israelis were well-organized and had been carefully preparing for this moment for years; many had experience fighting for the Allies and they had assembled a respectable stock of weapons. The Arab armies were stopped and pushed back; the Egyptian army was cut off and surrounded by the Israelis, who withdrew only under pressure from the US. Many of the Palestinian intelligentsia left early in the fighting, expecting to return after hostilities. The villagers who remained often fled their homes when the fighting approached. Hagenah terrorism created a "psychosis of flight." Many Arab villages were either destroyed or abandoned. There is no evidence of an explicit Israeli policy of expulsion, but battlefield commanders all knew that every Arab displaced was a step closer to a Jewish homeland, and some were reckless about scaring civilians off and quick to use military necessity to justify destroying Arab structures. After peace was restored the displaced persons were not allowed to return. Often their homes were bulldozed and their lands given to immigrant Jews.
After the War of Independence, the Arab countries continued to show public hostility to Israel, in order to preserve face. They also sent out secret peace feelers, but Israel refused to consider giving up any territory and the outreach came to nothing. Israel used lethal force to prevent Arabs from infiltrating back across their borers, sometimes with superfluous brutality. Israel also attempted to deter infiltration through excessive and murderous retaliatory raids into Arab territory, which were covered up with lies. After Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956, Israel, France, and Britain concocted a plan to destroy the Egyptian army and seize the canal (for France and Britain) and the Suez (for Israel). The US and the USSR objected strenuously to this attempt and it failed miserably, except for some Israeli military successes. The result was the decline of British and French influence in the area, the increase of American and Soviet influence, a decline in infiltration and border raids, UN peacekeepers in Sinai, and Arab radicalization.
Outspoken Arab hostility to Israel continued. There were constant threats, cross-border raids, and harassment. In 1967, Egypt deployed massive forces to the border and prepared to attack, in loose co-ordination with Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon. Israel struck first, and in one day destroyed the Arab air forces, mostly on the ground. Ground offensives then smashed the Arab armies and captured the Golan Heights, the West Bank, Gaza, and Sinai. The Egyptian army collapsed with unexpected speed. Once again, the Arab armies were poorly organized, trained, and led. The US and UN forced and end to the war, but the humiliation of the Arab states was complete.
Israel annexed East Jerusalem and vicinity. Arab families were evicted from the old Jewish Quarter. Religious messianism, secular nationalism, and "paroxysms of jingoism" propelled expansion into the rest of the West Bank. Settlements started immediately, ignoring government rules and policies. It started in empty or previously Jewish areas and expanded to areas with dense Arab populations. The settlers' goal was to force eventual annexation. There was no plan and no cabinet decision behind this, but government sentiment was divided, and they did not have the fortitude to remove illegal settlements. Instead, they protected them and provided them with water and electricity. The Israeli government took over the 50% of the land in the West Bank that was government-owned. More land was expropriated for security reasons, then used for settlement. In 1977 there were 4,000 settlers in the West Bank, in 1981 there were 16,000, and by the mid-1990s there were 150,000. In the Golan, the IDF bulldozed abandoned villages and settlers moved in. Emigration from Gaza and the West Bank was encouraged, though this policy was denied publicly.
The occupation of the West Bank was brutal and oppressive. The economy was integrated into Israel's, but industrialization was discouraged. In effect the area was used colonially, as a source for labor. Any anti-Israel or -Jewish literature was censored. Torture was used to get confessions; officials lied to cover it up. "With very little effort or expenditure, the [Israelis] managed to corrupt large sectors of Palestinian society and to create an atmosphere of animosity, suspicion, and fear" (p. 343). The occupation reignited Palestinian nationalism, which had been quiescent during 1956-67. The general Arab reaction was shame and a desire for vengeance.
Egypt commenced a "war of Attrition": commando raids and artillery bombardments across the Suez Canal. Soviet air and air defense troops were introduced, disguised as Egyptians. Eventually there was an armistice, but then Egypt built up strong air defense forces near the canal, in brazen violation of the agreement.
In Gaza, terrorist activity was ruthlessly suppressed, including the murder of captured suspects.
In the West Bank, there was terrorist raiding across the Jordan River. The PLO coalesced with Fatah; PFLP, DFLP, and other organizations (some Marxist) were also involved. The PLO built a state-with-a-state in Jordan and Lebanon, but were expelled from the former by the royal government in 1971. With support from the USSR, the DDR, and radical Arab states, the PLO engaged in a program of international terrorism and aircraft hijacking aimed at Jews, Western powers, and moderate Arab states.
Egypt was actually open to negotiations after 1967, but could make no progress. They decided on war to restore honor. Syria joined the plot, and there was support from many other Arab states. The plan was to break through the Israeli defensive line, defend themselves with antitank missiles, and never go beyond the cover of SAMs. Thanks to a thorough deception program, complete surprise was achieved. An Israeli counterattack was smothered with missiles. However, a follow-on armored thrust was bloodily beaten off. An Israeli drive in the last days of the war crossed the Canal in the opposite direction and cut off the Egyptian Third Army in Suez. Meanwhile, in the Golan massively outnumbered Israelis held on by a hair. Their counterattacks met strong resistance, unlike 1967. The initial Arab successes restored some Arab face and made some negotiation possible. Sadat made his dramatic and epochal trip to Jerusalem in 1979, which was followed by the tough Camp David negotiations that resulted Egyptian recognition of Israel and in a peace treaty between the two states. Egypt would occupy the east bank of the canal, there would be a 2– to 4-mile buffer between the forces patrolled by UN troops, and Israel would gradually withdraw from Sinai. This involved some air bases, and also some settlements (some of which had to be cleared out with water cannon). The agreement included generalities about West Banki autonomy. A buffer was also established in the Golan. Sadat and Begin both received the Nobel Peace Prize. The peace agreement was more popular in Israel than in the Arab states.
When the staged withdrawal from Sinai was completed in 1982, Israel turned its attention to southern Lebanon, where the PLO (expelled from Jordan in 1971) with Syrian help had established a state within a state and launched intermittent attacks into Israel. Israel invaded southern Lebanon with the stated goal of pushing the PLO 40 km back from the border, but also hoping to expel Syria from the area. Some Israelis aspired to annex Lebanon up to the Litani River, expel the Shiites there, and ally with a Maronite rump Lebanon north of the river. An extremely well-prepared air defense suppression campaign destroyed a dense Syrian missile network, but ground resistance was stronger than expected and progress slower. The defenders were poorly coordinated and taken by surprise, but many small units fought with fanatical determination. Israel agreed to a ceasefire insisted on by the UN, the US, and the USSR, but kept advancing slowly and incrementally until they surrounded Beirut and forced the PLO to decamp to Tunis. Suicide bombers became a very effective tactic against the occupiers; Mossad also organized car bombings in the besieged city. Israelis withdrew from Lebanon in 1985, except for a five-mile-wide security zone at the border.
In 1987 a popular uprising called the Intifada started in the West Bank and Gaza, encouraged and directed by the PLO. It eschewed firearms; using instead riots, stoning, strikes, withholding taxes, and general non-cooperation with the occupation. It was a reaction to the humiliation of the occupation and to the restriction of economic development. In 1988 Jordan renounced its claim to the West Bank and the PLO officially renounced terrorism, recognized Israel, and declared for a two-state solution. In 1989 massive immigration into Israel from the USSR started. The Intifada diminished with the start of the Oslo peace talks in 1991 and ended with the signing of the first Oslo peace accord in 1993.
In 1990-91, the PLO, Jordan, and Syria sided with Iraq in the First Iraq War, resulting in a weakened PLO and Palestinians expelled from Kuwait. Israel allowed more settlements in the West Bank, despite American pleading. Soviet forces withdrew from the area. US-promoted Israel-PLO peace talks started in 1991, initially secretly. Hamas denounced them, leading to Hamas-PLO fighting. Hezbollah started rocketing Israel from southern Lebanon.
In 1993 Israel and the PLO officially recognized each other's "right to exist"; Israel recognized the PLO as the "representative of the Palestinian people." Islamic extremists continued terrorist attacks.
In 1994 a Jewish settler massacred 29 Muslim worshippers in Hebron. The PLO (corrupt, inefficient, and impoverished) took control of Gaza and an area around Jericho. It could not control the terrorism that was based in its areas. Israel continued to expand settlement. A peace treaty was signed between Israel and Jordan.
In 1995 the Oslo II accords divided the West Bank "temporarily" into Palestinian Authority, Israeli, and jointly administered areas. Rabin was assassinated by a pro-settlements activist. A Muslim terrorist offensive in the runup to an Israeli election secured victory for Likud and the "incompetent and mendacious" Netanyahu.
In 1997 Israel withdrew from Hebron, but the agreed further withdrawals were not carried out.
In 1998 more negotiations in Maryland set a schedule for further Israeli withdrawals and other peace measures. Netanyahu could not get a majority either to implement or to denounce them.
Israeli elections in 1999 resulted in the election of Labour and Barak, furthering the peace process.
So that's the status when the book ends, with cautious optimism about a continued peace process leading to a stable two-state solution. To summarize the impression given of the antagonists: The Jews are intransigent, fanatical, self-centered, underhanded, two-faced, well-organized, competent, and contemptuous of the Arabs' legitimate right to land their ancestors have lived on for centuries. Zionism has been "unmarked by feelings of generosity toward its enemies" (p. 668). The Arabs, on the other hand, are intransigent, fanatical, treacherous, murderous, fractious, disorganized, and incompetent (but learning).
So this is how it went down, according to Morris. The Zionist movement started in the late 19th century, largely in reaction to pogroms in Russia in the 1880s and to the Dreyfus Affair in France. It seemed that even after the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, Jews were still not safe in Europe. So Theodor Herzl and others conceived the idea of a new homeland for Jews. So the Zionists gathered their resources, went to Palestine, and created their settlements. They had no thought of integrating into the existing population or learning their ways; they scarcely thought about them except to buy their products, services, and land. Often they treated them with contempt. The indigenous population suffered in turn from an ancient traditional contempt for Jews. It unsettled them to see these European Jews show up with more money and better organization than they had and set up separate communities. There was resentment when Jews bought agricultural land and then evicted the Arab tenant farmers living on it. Palestine was governed by the Ottoman Turks, who had laws restricting this immigration, but the Ottoman government was corrupt and inefficient and the laws were often flouted. This encouraged a growing anti-Ottoman Arab nationalism. Some Zionists privately conceded that their project might require relocating the native Arab population, but they figured they had lots of Arab areas to go to, and the Jews had no Jewish areas, so it was an acceptable tradeoff. They generally foresaw an eventual political takeover of Palestine, regardless of the wishes of the current inhabitants.
During WWI the British issued the Balfour Declaration, which stated that Jews should have a "homeland" (not necessarily an independent country) in Palestine after the Ottomans were ejected. Some Brits were sympathetic to Zionism; others were antisemitic (maybe some just wanted Jews to leave Europe). The Declaration was meant to attract Jewish support in America, and also to encourage a friendly state on the route to India. Faisal, the leader of the Arab revolt against the Ottomans (and later king of Iraq under the British mandate), had misgivings, but he eventually went along with it to keep the British happy and fighting on his side. In 1919 he signed as agreement that there would be both Arab and Jewish states in the Middle East, with the expectation that Jewish immigration and development would help the Arabs, and that the rights of Arab Palestinians would be respected.
Open Arab-Jewish hostility developed immediately after the war and quickly turned violent. The British Mandatory government favored the Zionists, based on the Balfour declaration. The British Army favored the Arabs, whom they had fought alongside during the war. Neither Jews nor Arabs were interested in reconciling. The Jews organized self-defense militias, including Haganah and the IZL (Irgun). In the 1930s, with the spread of fascism, Jewish immigration increased by a factor of 10-15. Land prices quadrupled. There was economic development for the Arabs, but that led to dislocation. There was better education too, but that led to radicalization. In 1936 there were riots, killings, and tit-for-tat reprisals. In 1937 an Arab revolt against British rule broke out; it was not very well organized because the Arab culture was still based on clan and tribe. Family feuds got in the way. Mutually hostile bands carried out attacks on British, Jews, and moderate Arabs. There were random bombings of civilian targets by both Arabs and Jews. Palestinian civil society was gravely damaged. Moderate Arabs were driven into rebellion. A commission in 1937 recommended partition and an exchange of populations, but Britain rejected it. Many Zionists wanted to remove the Arabs but were willing to compensate them; they took for granted the moral superiority of their claim to the land and did not understand why the Arabs were unwilling to move to another part of the Arab world. As war with Germany approached the British tried to placate the Arabs more, hoping to protect the route to India. They tried to limit Jewish immigration, to little effect. The British managed to suppress the Arab revolt by 1939, using occasionally very brutal methods (which Morris seems to think are the only methods that work against an insurgency).
During WWII, the Arabs tended to support Germany, but not very actively. The Jews supported Britain until victory seemed inevitable. In 1942 statehood was made the explicit Zionist goal. In 1944 a guerilla war against the British was started by Jewish extremists. After the war, the Brits tried to limit Jewish immigration, in deference to Arab feelings. But of course there was an overwhelming desire among the surviving European Jews to seek their own homeland. This led to a three-way murderous insurgency, extremist Jewish groups vs. extremist Arab groups vs. Brits, with terror bombings and road ambushes. Exhausted, the Brits tossed the problem to the UN and declared they were leaving. In a rare early flowering of compromise and statesmanship, the UN approved a partition plan by a 2/3 vote in the General Assembly, including the USSR. The plan would give the Jews a bigger share of the territory than their numbers, but much of that territory was sparsely settled and supposed fit for new Jewish immigrants. Jerusalem and environs would be a separate zone under a UN administration. The main Jewish organizations reluctantly accepted the plan (they really wanted all of Palestine). The Arab countries all denounced it; they had taken over leadership of the Palestinian cause after the native leadership had been scattered by the 1937-39 uprising. Open warfare broke out as the Brits left, including some cruel atrocities by the extremist groups IZL (Irgun) and especially LHI (the Stern Gang); these drove some Arabs to abandon Palestine, but also further hardened Arab attitudes. In 1948 the last Brits left and Ben Gurion declared Israeli independence. On the same day Israel was invaded by Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, with small contributions from Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. However, the Arab armies were poorly organized, trained, and led. The Israelis were well-organized and had been carefully preparing for this moment for years; many had experience fighting for the Allies and they had assembled a respectable stock of weapons. The Arab armies were stopped and pushed back; the Egyptian army was cut off and surrounded by the Israelis, who withdrew only under pressure from the US. Many of the Palestinian intelligentsia left early in the fighting, expecting to return after hostilities. The villagers who remained often fled their homes when the fighting approached. Hagenah terrorism created a "psychosis of flight." Many Arab villages were either destroyed or abandoned. There is no evidence of an explicit Israeli policy of expulsion, but battlefield commanders all knew that every Arab displaced was a step closer to a Jewish homeland, and some were reckless about scaring civilians off and quick to use military necessity to justify destroying Arab structures. After peace was restored the displaced persons were not allowed to return. Often their homes were bulldozed and their lands given to immigrant Jews.
After the War of Independence, the Arab countries continued to show public hostility to Israel, in order to preserve face. They also sent out secret peace feelers, but Israel refused to consider giving up any territory and the outreach came to nothing. Israel used lethal force to prevent Arabs from infiltrating back across their borers, sometimes with superfluous brutality. Israel also attempted to deter infiltration through excessive and murderous retaliatory raids into Arab territory, which were covered up with lies. After Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956, Israel, France, and Britain concocted a plan to destroy the Egyptian army and seize the canal (for France and Britain) and the Suez (for Israel). The US and the USSR objected strenuously to this attempt and it failed miserably, except for some Israeli military successes. The result was the decline of British and French influence in the area, the increase of American and Soviet influence, a decline in infiltration and border raids, UN peacekeepers in Sinai, and Arab radicalization.
Outspoken Arab hostility to Israel continued. There were constant threats, cross-border raids, and harassment. In 1967, Egypt deployed massive forces to the border and prepared to attack, in loose co-ordination with Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon. Israel struck first, and in one day destroyed the Arab air forces, mostly on the ground. Ground offensives then smashed the Arab armies and captured the Golan Heights, the West Bank, Gaza, and Sinai. The Egyptian army collapsed with unexpected speed. Once again, the Arab armies were poorly organized, trained, and led. The US and UN forced and end to the war, but the humiliation of the Arab states was complete.
Israel annexed East Jerusalem and vicinity. Arab families were evicted from the old Jewish Quarter. Religious messianism, secular nationalism, and "paroxysms of jingoism" propelled expansion into the rest of the West Bank. Settlements started immediately, ignoring government rules and policies. It started in empty or previously Jewish areas and expanded to areas with dense Arab populations. The settlers' goal was to force eventual annexation. There was no plan and no cabinet decision behind this, but government sentiment was divided, and they did not have the fortitude to remove illegal settlements. Instead, they protected them and provided them with water and electricity. The Israeli government took over the 50% of the land in the West Bank that was government-owned. More land was expropriated for security reasons, then used for settlement. In 1977 there were 4,000 settlers in the West Bank, in 1981 there were 16,000, and by the mid-1990s there were 150,000. In the Golan, the IDF bulldozed abandoned villages and settlers moved in. Emigration from Gaza and the West Bank was encouraged, though this policy was denied publicly.
The occupation of the West Bank was brutal and oppressive. The economy was integrated into Israel's, but industrialization was discouraged. In effect the area was used colonially, as a source for labor. Any anti-Israel or -Jewish literature was censored. Torture was used to get confessions; officials lied to cover it up. "With very little effort or expenditure, the [Israelis] managed to corrupt large sectors of Palestinian society and to create an atmosphere of animosity, suspicion, and fear" (p. 343). The occupation reignited Palestinian nationalism, which had been quiescent during 1956-67. The general Arab reaction was shame and a desire for vengeance.
Egypt commenced a "war of Attrition": commando raids and artillery bombardments across the Suez Canal. Soviet air and air defense troops were introduced, disguised as Egyptians. Eventually there was an armistice, but then Egypt built up strong air defense forces near the canal, in brazen violation of the agreement.
In Gaza, terrorist activity was ruthlessly suppressed, including the murder of captured suspects.
In the West Bank, there was terrorist raiding across the Jordan River. The PLO coalesced with Fatah; PFLP, DFLP, and other organizations (some Marxist) were also involved. The PLO built a state-with-a-state in Jordan and Lebanon, but were expelled from the former by the royal government in 1971. With support from the USSR, the DDR, and radical Arab states, the PLO engaged in a program of international terrorism and aircraft hijacking aimed at Jews, Western powers, and moderate Arab states.
Egypt was actually open to negotiations after 1967, but could make no progress. They decided on war to restore honor. Syria joined the plot, and there was support from many other Arab states. The plan was to break through the Israeli defensive line, defend themselves with antitank missiles, and never go beyond the cover of SAMs. Thanks to a thorough deception program, complete surprise was achieved. An Israeli counterattack was smothered with missiles. However, a follow-on armored thrust was bloodily beaten off. An Israeli drive in the last days of the war crossed the Canal in the opposite direction and cut off the Egyptian Third Army in Suez. Meanwhile, in the Golan massively outnumbered Israelis held on by a hair. Their counterattacks met strong resistance, unlike 1967. The initial Arab successes restored some Arab face and made some negotiation possible. Sadat made his dramatic and epochal trip to Jerusalem in 1979, which was followed by the tough Camp David negotiations that resulted Egyptian recognition of Israel and in a peace treaty between the two states. Egypt would occupy the east bank of the canal, there would be a 2– to 4-mile buffer between the forces patrolled by UN troops, and Israel would gradually withdraw from Sinai. This involved some air bases, and also some settlements (some of which had to be cleared out with water cannon). The agreement included generalities about West Banki autonomy. A buffer was also established in the Golan. Sadat and Begin both received the Nobel Peace Prize. The peace agreement was more popular in Israel than in the Arab states.
When the staged withdrawal from Sinai was completed in 1982, Israel turned its attention to southern Lebanon, where the PLO (expelled from Jordan in 1971) with Syrian help had established a state within a state and launched intermittent attacks into Israel. Israel invaded southern Lebanon with the stated goal of pushing the PLO 40 km back from the border, but also hoping to expel Syria from the area. Some Israelis aspired to annex Lebanon up to the Litani River, expel the Shiites there, and ally with a Maronite rump Lebanon north of the river. An extremely well-prepared air defense suppression campaign destroyed a dense Syrian missile network, but ground resistance was stronger than expected and progress slower. The defenders were poorly coordinated and taken by surprise, but many small units fought with fanatical determination. Israel agreed to a ceasefire insisted on by the UN, the US, and the USSR, but kept advancing slowly and incrementally until they surrounded Beirut and forced the PLO to decamp to Tunis. Suicide bombers became a very effective tactic against the occupiers; Mossad also organized car bombings in the besieged city. Israelis withdrew from Lebanon in 1985, except for a five-mile-wide security zone at the border.
In 1987 a popular uprising called the Intifada started in the West Bank and Gaza, encouraged and directed by the PLO. It eschewed firearms; using instead riots, stoning, strikes, withholding taxes, and general non-cooperation with the occupation. It was a reaction to the humiliation of the occupation and to the restriction of economic development. In 1988 Jordan renounced its claim to the West Bank and the PLO officially renounced terrorism, recognized Israel, and declared for a two-state solution. In 1989 massive immigration into Israel from the USSR started. The Intifada diminished with the start of the Oslo peace talks in 1991 and ended with the signing of the first Oslo peace accord in 1993.
In 1990-91, the PLO, Jordan, and Syria sided with Iraq in the First Iraq War, resulting in a weakened PLO and Palestinians expelled from Kuwait. Israel allowed more settlements in the West Bank, despite American pleading. Soviet forces withdrew from the area. US-promoted Israel-PLO peace talks started in 1991, initially secretly. Hamas denounced them, leading to Hamas-PLO fighting. Hezbollah started rocketing Israel from southern Lebanon.
In 1993 Israel and the PLO officially recognized each other's "right to exist"; Israel recognized the PLO as the "representative of the Palestinian people." Islamic extremists continued terrorist attacks.
In 1994 a Jewish settler massacred 29 Muslim worshippers in Hebron. The PLO (corrupt, inefficient, and impoverished) took control of Gaza and an area around Jericho. It could not control the terrorism that was based in its areas. Israel continued to expand settlement. A peace treaty was signed between Israel and Jordan.
In 1995 the Oslo II accords divided the West Bank "temporarily" into Palestinian Authority, Israeli, and jointly administered areas. Rabin was assassinated by a pro-settlements activist. A Muslim terrorist offensive in the runup to an Israeli election secured victory for Likud and the "incompetent and mendacious" Netanyahu.
In 1997 Israel withdrew from Hebron, but the agreed further withdrawals were not carried out.
In 1998 more negotiations in Maryland set a schedule for further Israeli withdrawals and other peace measures. Netanyahu could not get a majority either to implement or to denounce them.
Israeli elections in 1999 resulted in the election of Labour and Barak, furthering the peace process.
So that's the status when the book ends, with cautious optimism about a continued peace process leading to a stable two-state solution. To summarize the impression given of the antagonists: The Jews are intransigent, fanatical, self-centered, underhanded, two-faced, well-organized, competent, and contemptuous of the Arabs' legitimate right to land their ancestors have lived on for centuries. Zionism has been "unmarked by feelings of generosity toward its enemies" (p. 668). The Arabs, on the other hand, are intransigent, fanatical, treacherous, murderous, fractious, disorganized, and incompetent (but learning).
July 23, 2017
I typically don't read history books but figured my ignorant self should get to know something about the Israel-Palestine conflict. I did some research and most people said Benny was pretty neutral when it came to an unbiased writing of the topic. I have to say, I was not disappointed.
Benny has done his research, that's for sure, and even though all accounts of history have some bias to them, I felt this one had very little (it was hard to tell if he ever sympathized with one side or the other.) He does make some comments and makes a few statements that are obviously his personal views of a situation without any citations throughout the book, but it's his book and probably deserves to give his two cents after all the research. Anyway, it's easy to spot his opinions when he makes them, which are few and far between.
This is a very long and detailed account, however, it is very well organized into chunks of topics which seemed to flow easily. Again, as someone who has very little knowledge of politics and historic events, I felt this was easily understood and very informative without being over simplified.
Benny has done his research, that's for sure, and even though all accounts of history have some bias to them, I felt this one had very little (it was hard to tell if he ever sympathized with one side or the other.) He does make some comments and makes a few statements that are obviously his personal views of a situation without any citations throughout the book, but it's his book and probably deserves to give his two cents after all the research. Anyway, it's easy to spot his opinions when he makes them, which are few and far between.
This is a very long and detailed account, however, it is very well organized into chunks of topics which seemed to flow easily. Again, as someone who has very little knowledge of politics and historic events, I felt this was easily understood and very informative without being over simplified.
August 3, 2024
Humanity is undoubtedly doomed if we've reached a point where individuals in the 21st century can, with a clear conscience, justify and defend the heinous acts of racist colonial brutality and apartheid. The mere fact that there are those who not only tolerate but also endorse such inhumane atrocities, despite the lessons of history and the progress we claim to have made, especially of the so called “enlightened West”, signals a pathetic display of hypocrisy and profound moral decay. This willingness to excuse or overlook such grievous injustices reveals a disturbing lack of empathy and ethical clarity, casting a dark shadow over our collective future. It suggests that we have not only failed to learn from our past but are also willing to perpetuate the same cycles of subjugation, oppression and violence. And If this is the state of our moral compass, then it is difficult to see a hopeful path forward for humanity.
June 30, 2021
It is difficult to write a history book about a conflict that has not ended and is still going on.
Therefore, I would divide it into two parts, which are divided by the Oslo peace talks.
The first part - historical, I highly recommend for anyone who wants to study more deeply the issue of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The only drawback is the absence of Arabic sources, which - given their accessibility - is not objectively the fault of the author.
The second part, with an overlap into the present, loses the value of historical work. It is rather an unfinished political science reflection of the never-ending events after the peace negotiations. (First Government B.N., Gaza, Intifada etc.)
Therefore, I would divide it into two parts, which are divided by the Oslo peace talks.
The first part - historical, I highly recommend for anyone who wants to study more deeply the issue of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The only drawback is the absence of Arabic sources, which - given their accessibility - is not objectively the fault of the author.
The second part, with an overlap into the present, loses the value of historical work. It is rather an unfinished political science reflection of the never-ending events after the peace negotiations. (First Government B.N., Gaza, Intifada etc.)
Read
September 28, 2015This is an Israeli-historian based view of the history of the conflicts surrounding the Palestine region, and the Israeli conflict. It's great to balance this against the Iron Cage book suggested below, to get a balanced view of both sides.
August 4, 2025
A DETAILED HISTORY (BY A ‘NEW HISTORIAN’) OF THE CONFLICTS
Benny Morris is an Israeli historian and journalist, who was a professor of history at Ben-Gurion University, and worked as a correspondent for The Jerusalem Post for 12 years. He is one of the so-called ‘New Historians’ of Israeli historiography.
He wrote in the Preface to this 2001 book, “The conflict between Arabs and Zionists is more than a hundred years old. Almost from the start the subject has been treated with emphatic partisanship by commentators and historians from both sides… This book focuses on what, to my mind, are the central components of the conflict in the political and military spheres… The book is based largely on secondary works and is a synthesis of existing research on the various subjects and periods covered. A history of this subject based mainly on primary sources is, I suspect beyond the abilities of a single scholar. There are simply too many archives, files, and documents. Nonetheless, parts of the present book---the coverage of the 1948 war and the decade after it and of certain episodes that occurred during the 1930s and the 1982-1985 Lebanon War---are based in large measure on primary sources. Otherwise I have relied on what I regard as the principal scholarly works on given subjects and periods in producing this narrative.” (Pg. xiii)
He continues, “There is a built-in imbalance in scholarly treatments of the conflict… The Zionist side tends to be illuminated more thoroughly and with greater precision than the Arab side… In part this stems from the fact that Zionist and Israeli archives … are relatively well organized and have been open to researchers for many years. By and large, the documents contained in them were written by Zionists. This has … affected the historiography based on these documents. There has been no such access on the Arab side. There are no comparable Palestinian archives, and whatever exists … has been and remains closed to researchers… Hence the ‘Arab side’… has also had to be illuminated on the basis of Zionist-Israeli and Western documentation.” (Pg. xiv)
He records, “In public, [Theodor] Herzl made no explicit reference to the fate of the indigenous Arab population of Palestine, but he was aware of its existence and the problem it represented… in his utopian novel ‘Altneuland’ … set in the Palestine of 1923 [the] Jews had brought only progress and prosperity to the country’s natives, and this was the basis of comity and cooperation. Arabs could become equal citizens in the Jewish commonwealth.” (Pg. 21)
In the 1910s, “a distinct Palestinian local patriotism or proto-nationalism began to emerge. This tendency or orientation----it hardly qualified as a movement---gradually groped its way forward, largely in reaction to the burgeoning Zionist presence… Perhaps even more important to the development of a distinct ‘Palestinian’ identity were common religious structures, observance, and festivities, both Christian and Muslim.” (Pg. 34)
After the War, “the fate of the Levant was to be determined by the Great Powers rather than the Jews or the Arabs… [Zionist Nahum Sokolow] asked that the territory be placed under British mandate, under League of Nations supervision. The Home was to gradually evolve into ‘an autonomous Commonwealth,’ without prejudicing the rights of the existing non-Jewish population of the country. A Jewish government would be established once the Jews formed a majority, which would transpire through steady, large-scale immigration.” (Pg. 81)
In the 1930s, “Arab fears were aggravated by the new phenomenon of illegal immigrants, whose numbers were wrongly rumored to be even greater than those of the legal arrivals. The economic repercussions for the Arabs were severe. Employment had to be found for more and more Jews…. The changes that Palestinian Arab society underwent during the 1930s—urbanization, small-scale industrialization, and unemployment---also bred radicalization, with the traditional, conservative elite threatened and even ousted from leadership by younger men, often from lower social circles.” (Pg. 122)
He notes, “Britain’s need to appease the Arabs seemed to grow day by day… The White Paper put severe limitations on Jewish land purchasing, completely forbidding it in most districts, and proposed an independent Palestinian state with majority rule within ten years, Arab-Jewish relations permitting. At this point the Palestinians made a major blunder… Having failed in the revolt and nonetheless having been offered major political concessions, the AHC [Arab Higher Committee] turned around and rejected them, under pressure from the rebels, whose slogan remains, ‘The English to the sea and the Jews to the graves.’ … the White Paper was a grave shock to the Jews. Britain had turned its back on the idea of a National Home and had surrendered to Arab violence and intimidation at a time when European Jewry was being persecuted and battered.” (Pg. 158)
During WWII, “there was a surge of sympathy for the Jews, precipitated by the information gradually leaking out of Europe since mid-1941, and culminating in a formal announcement in December 1942, that Hitler was engaged in mass murder of the Jews. The news of the Holocaust seemed to render irrefutable the need for a Palestinian sanctuary… Hundreds of thousands of Jewish survivors refused to remain anywhere near the killing fields, the Western European countries and the United States were unwilling to take them in, and the Zionists wanted them in Palestine.” (Pg. 170)
Of the UN vote establishing Israel, he comments, “thirty-three states had voted yes, thirteen no, and ten had abstained. Partition has passed, but not very comfortably… The nays had consisted of the Arab and Muslim states, Cuba, and India… The Zionists and their supporters rejoiced; the Arabs walked out of the hall after declaring the resolution invalid. They could not fathom… why 37 percent of the population had been given 55 percent of the land (of which they owned only 7 percent).” (Pg. 186)
He points out, “Deir Yassin is remembered not as a military operation, but rather for the atrocities committed… during and immediately after the drawn-out battle… The Jewish Agency and the Haganah leadership immediately condemned the massacre. Deir Yassin became the one Jewish atrocity that it was permissible to wrote about---and to condemn.” (Pg. 208)
After the 1948 War of Independence, “Israel said it would take back ‘100,000’ [refugees] … if the Arab states agreed to resettle the rest in their own lands and conclude a peace agreement…The offer was seen by the Arabs as far too little, and most of the Arab states insisted that Israel take back all of the refugees. Egypt was unwilling to hand over the Gaza Strip---its sole territorial gain of the war---even though that would have relieved Cairo of the burden of a large, impoverished and subversive population. During the following years the refugees themselves rejected efforts to resettle them in the Arab states. They wanted to ‘go home,’ and the Arab states… did little to absorb them, seeing in them and their misery a useful tool against Israel… so the problem remained to plague the Middle East, and indeed the world.” (Pg. 258)
The Six-Day War of 1967 “did wonders for the state’s international standing, almost overnight converting it from a miniscule backwater into a focus of the world’s attention. Israel was now seen by the West… as a regional superpower and a desirable ally among a bevy of fickle, weak Arab states.” (Pg. 329)
But after the October 1973 war, “the war had given Israel a stinging slap in the face. The 1948, 1956, and 1967 wars had conditioned them to stunning victories over the Arabs… 1973 proved to be something else altogether. Many Israelis were now persuaded that the territories could not be held indefinitely by force and that continued occupation would necessarily lead to further bouts of painful warfare.” (Pg. 437)
After the 1977-1979 agreement with Egypt, “all in all, the Israeli-Egyptian peace held, and through the 1980s and early 1990s served as a beacon to the rest of the Arab world, attracting moderates and offering a viable alternative to continued, endless hostilities… the world gradually gravitated toward the Egyptian model, abandoning the rejectionism that had over the decades achieved very little for the Palestinians or anyone else.” (Pg. 493)
Of the Intifada, he comments, “How was Israel to respond? Almost everything was tried: shooting to kill, shooting to injure, beatings, mass arrests, torture, trials, administrative detention, and economic sanctions… As a democracy bound by respect for the rule of law … there were measures that Israel could not undertake… the government debated whether military measures would indeed halt the intifada. How could a sophisticated modern army fight an essentially unarmed popular revolt? Had the Palestinians found a way to neutralize Israel’s vastly superior military strength…?” (Pg. 587)
He summarizes, “Almost from the start the Arab equated Zionism with expansionism… From the start these Arabs---while certainly not a distinct ‘people’ before 1920---resented the influx… of infidel settlers who might bring some material benefit to the region but simultaneously were dispossessing tenant-farmers and posing a vague threat to its Arab and Muslim mores and character… Paradoxically it was in large part the thrust and threat of Zionism that generated this consciousness of… a distinct Palestinian Arab identity and nationalism.” (Pg. 677-678)
He concludes, “What emerges from all this is that, over the long haul, the Israeli-Arab wars have had a definite moderating role on the various parties… in the long run, the only language that either side has understood in this conflict is force: Only the successive displays of persuasive force have made both peoples sit up and contemplate a future of coexistence without violence.” (Pg. 692-693)
This book will interest many who are studying the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts.
Benny Morris is an Israeli historian and journalist, who was a professor of history at Ben-Gurion University, and worked as a correspondent for The Jerusalem Post for 12 years. He is one of the so-called ‘New Historians’ of Israeli historiography.
He wrote in the Preface to this 2001 book, “The conflict between Arabs and Zionists is more than a hundred years old. Almost from the start the subject has been treated with emphatic partisanship by commentators and historians from both sides… This book focuses on what, to my mind, are the central components of the conflict in the political and military spheres… The book is based largely on secondary works and is a synthesis of existing research on the various subjects and periods covered. A history of this subject based mainly on primary sources is, I suspect beyond the abilities of a single scholar. There are simply too many archives, files, and documents. Nonetheless, parts of the present book---the coverage of the 1948 war and the decade after it and of certain episodes that occurred during the 1930s and the 1982-1985 Lebanon War---are based in large measure on primary sources. Otherwise I have relied on what I regard as the principal scholarly works on given subjects and periods in producing this narrative.” (Pg. xiii)
He continues, “There is a built-in imbalance in scholarly treatments of the conflict… The Zionist side tends to be illuminated more thoroughly and with greater precision than the Arab side… In part this stems from the fact that Zionist and Israeli archives … are relatively well organized and have been open to researchers for many years. By and large, the documents contained in them were written by Zionists. This has … affected the historiography based on these documents. There has been no such access on the Arab side. There are no comparable Palestinian archives, and whatever exists … has been and remains closed to researchers… Hence the ‘Arab side’… has also had to be illuminated on the basis of Zionist-Israeli and Western documentation.” (Pg. xiv)
He records, “In public, [Theodor] Herzl made no explicit reference to the fate of the indigenous Arab population of Palestine, but he was aware of its existence and the problem it represented… in his utopian novel ‘Altneuland’ … set in the Palestine of 1923 [the] Jews had brought only progress and prosperity to the country’s natives, and this was the basis of comity and cooperation. Arabs could become equal citizens in the Jewish commonwealth.” (Pg. 21)
In the 1910s, “a distinct Palestinian local patriotism or proto-nationalism began to emerge. This tendency or orientation----it hardly qualified as a movement---gradually groped its way forward, largely in reaction to the burgeoning Zionist presence… Perhaps even more important to the development of a distinct ‘Palestinian’ identity were common religious structures, observance, and festivities, both Christian and Muslim.” (Pg. 34)
After the War, “the fate of the Levant was to be determined by the Great Powers rather than the Jews or the Arabs… [Zionist Nahum Sokolow] asked that the territory be placed under British mandate, under League of Nations supervision. The Home was to gradually evolve into ‘an autonomous Commonwealth,’ without prejudicing the rights of the existing non-Jewish population of the country. A Jewish government would be established once the Jews formed a majority, which would transpire through steady, large-scale immigration.” (Pg. 81)
In the 1930s, “Arab fears were aggravated by the new phenomenon of illegal immigrants, whose numbers were wrongly rumored to be even greater than those of the legal arrivals. The economic repercussions for the Arabs were severe. Employment had to be found for more and more Jews…. The changes that Palestinian Arab society underwent during the 1930s—urbanization, small-scale industrialization, and unemployment---also bred radicalization, with the traditional, conservative elite threatened and even ousted from leadership by younger men, often from lower social circles.” (Pg. 122)
He notes, “Britain’s need to appease the Arabs seemed to grow day by day… The White Paper put severe limitations on Jewish land purchasing, completely forbidding it in most districts, and proposed an independent Palestinian state with majority rule within ten years, Arab-Jewish relations permitting. At this point the Palestinians made a major blunder… Having failed in the revolt and nonetheless having been offered major political concessions, the AHC [Arab Higher Committee] turned around and rejected them, under pressure from the rebels, whose slogan remains, ‘The English to the sea and the Jews to the graves.’ … the White Paper was a grave shock to the Jews. Britain had turned its back on the idea of a National Home and had surrendered to Arab violence and intimidation at a time when European Jewry was being persecuted and battered.” (Pg. 158)
During WWII, “there was a surge of sympathy for the Jews, precipitated by the information gradually leaking out of Europe since mid-1941, and culminating in a formal announcement in December 1942, that Hitler was engaged in mass murder of the Jews. The news of the Holocaust seemed to render irrefutable the need for a Palestinian sanctuary… Hundreds of thousands of Jewish survivors refused to remain anywhere near the killing fields, the Western European countries and the United States were unwilling to take them in, and the Zionists wanted them in Palestine.” (Pg. 170)
Of the UN vote establishing Israel, he comments, “thirty-three states had voted yes, thirteen no, and ten had abstained. Partition has passed, but not very comfortably… The nays had consisted of the Arab and Muslim states, Cuba, and India… The Zionists and their supporters rejoiced; the Arabs walked out of the hall after declaring the resolution invalid. They could not fathom… why 37 percent of the population had been given 55 percent of the land (of which they owned only 7 percent).” (Pg. 186)
He points out, “Deir Yassin is remembered not as a military operation, but rather for the atrocities committed… during and immediately after the drawn-out battle… The Jewish Agency and the Haganah leadership immediately condemned the massacre. Deir Yassin became the one Jewish atrocity that it was permissible to wrote about---and to condemn.” (Pg. 208)
After the 1948 War of Independence, “Israel said it would take back ‘100,000’ [refugees] … if the Arab states agreed to resettle the rest in their own lands and conclude a peace agreement…The offer was seen by the Arabs as far too little, and most of the Arab states insisted that Israel take back all of the refugees. Egypt was unwilling to hand over the Gaza Strip---its sole territorial gain of the war---even though that would have relieved Cairo of the burden of a large, impoverished and subversive population. During the following years the refugees themselves rejected efforts to resettle them in the Arab states. They wanted to ‘go home,’ and the Arab states… did little to absorb them, seeing in them and their misery a useful tool against Israel… so the problem remained to plague the Middle East, and indeed the world.” (Pg. 258)
The Six-Day War of 1967 “did wonders for the state’s international standing, almost overnight converting it from a miniscule backwater into a focus of the world’s attention. Israel was now seen by the West… as a regional superpower and a desirable ally among a bevy of fickle, weak Arab states.” (Pg. 329)
But after the October 1973 war, “the war had given Israel a stinging slap in the face. The 1948, 1956, and 1967 wars had conditioned them to stunning victories over the Arabs… 1973 proved to be something else altogether. Many Israelis were now persuaded that the territories could not be held indefinitely by force and that continued occupation would necessarily lead to further bouts of painful warfare.” (Pg. 437)
After the 1977-1979 agreement with Egypt, “all in all, the Israeli-Egyptian peace held, and through the 1980s and early 1990s served as a beacon to the rest of the Arab world, attracting moderates and offering a viable alternative to continued, endless hostilities… the world gradually gravitated toward the Egyptian model, abandoning the rejectionism that had over the decades achieved very little for the Palestinians or anyone else.” (Pg. 493)
Of the Intifada, he comments, “How was Israel to respond? Almost everything was tried: shooting to kill, shooting to injure, beatings, mass arrests, torture, trials, administrative detention, and economic sanctions… As a democracy bound by respect for the rule of law … there were measures that Israel could not undertake… the government debated whether military measures would indeed halt the intifada. How could a sophisticated modern army fight an essentially unarmed popular revolt? Had the Palestinians found a way to neutralize Israel’s vastly superior military strength…?” (Pg. 587)
He summarizes, “Almost from the start the Arab equated Zionism with expansionism… From the start these Arabs---while certainly not a distinct ‘people’ before 1920---resented the influx… of infidel settlers who might bring some material benefit to the region but simultaneously were dispossessing tenant-farmers and posing a vague threat to its Arab and Muslim mores and character… Paradoxically it was in large part the thrust and threat of Zionism that generated this consciousness of… a distinct Palestinian Arab identity and nationalism.” (Pg. 677-678)
He concludes, “What emerges from all this is that, over the long haul, the Israeli-Arab wars have had a definite moderating role on the various parties… in the long run, the only language that either side has understood in this conflict is force: Only the successive displays of persuasive force have made both peoples sit up and contemplate a future of coexistence without violence.” (Pg. 692-693)
This book will interest many who are studying the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts.
January 13, 2022
Very balanced book and a good one for anyone interested in the modern history of Israel's foreign policy, although it loses steam after it leaves the Zionist settlement period and subsequent Independence war.
However, for anyone wanting to learn more about Israeli domestic policy, there is nothing in the book for you. Information on economic development, infra=structure, demography, political shenanigans and the such stop as soon as Israel is independent, with the exception of a small section on the occupied Palestinian territories.
However, for anyone wanting to learn more about Israeli domestic policy, there is nothing in the book for you. Information on economic development, infra=structure, demography, political shenanigans and the such stop as soon as Israel is independent, with the exception of a small section on the occupied Palestinian territories.
Read
April 16, 2025Required reading for anyone who wishes to understand the conflict
August 19, 2024
Fundamentally changed the way I view the world
January 21, 2021
'Righteous Victims' is a dry history, a reference book for people writing research papers or mining for background knowledge of one the most intractable conflicts of our time. I didn't particularly enjoy reading it (see "dry history,") but I'm glad I did.
The experience of reading this book brings to mind the Fun Scale Kelly Cordes introduced in a posting on the REI Co-Op Journal (https://www.rei.com/blog/climb/fun-scale). Type 1 Fun describes activities that are fun while you're doing them, like riding a bike into town for an ice cream cone. Type 2 Fun describes activities that are miserable while in progress, but fun in retrospect; riding a bike up a mountain may qualify as Type 2 Fun. Type 3 Fun describes activities that are plain miserable, even in retrospect: riding up a mountain in 35° rain, while wearing the wrong gear, for example. Applied to reading, Type 1 Reading may describe (for me) mysteries or science fiction novels. Type 2 Reading may describe books I think of as self-assigned homework, works through which I may have to grind but always appreciate in retrospect. Type 3 Reading? Well that's just reading bad books of any stripe.
With that in mind, I rate 'Righteous Victims' as a solid Type 2 Read. As I said, it's dry. It assumes a certain familiarity with Levantine geography. It tells a "this happened, then that happened" story without actually putting the reader in the conference rooms, ships, villages, or military convoys in which the Zionist-Arab conflict has played out. It's the kind of book you read to gather knowledge, not to while away a leisurely hour. It's also the kind of book you'd like everyone to read, because so many of us have formed our opinions (and our allegiances) regarding this conflict with only a tiny part of the story to hand.
So, hey, I'm telling you to consider having a little Type 2 Fun. Eat your vegetables. Learn something. In retrospect, you'll be glad you did.
Recommended for: Jewish people. Muslim people. People with an interest in Levantine history and politics.
The experience of reading this book brings to mind the Fun Scale Kelly Cordes introduced in a posting on the REI Co-Op Journal (https://www.rei.com/blog/climb/fun-scale). Type 1 Fun describes activities that are fun while you're doing them, like riding a bike into town for an ice cream cone. Type 2 Fun describes activities that are miserable while in progress, but fun in retrospect; riding a bike up a mountain may qualify as Type 2 Fun. Type 3 Fun describes activities that are plain miserable, even in retrospect: riding up a mountain in 35° rain, while wearing the wrong gear, for example. Applied to reading, Type 1 Reading may describe (for me) mysteries or science fiction novels. Type 2 Reading may describe books I think of as self-assigned homework, works through which I may have to grind but always appreciate in retrospect. Type 3 Reading? Well that's just reading bad books of any stripe.
With that in mind, I rate 'Righteous Victims' as a solid Type 2 Read. As I said, it's dry. It assumes a certain familiarity with Levantine geography. It tells a "this happened, then that happened" story without actually putting the reader in the conference rooms, ships, villages, or military convoys in which the Zionist-Arab conflict has played out. It's the kind of book you read to gather knowledge, not to while away a leisurely hour. It's also the kind of book you'd like everyone to read, because so many of us have formed our opinions (and our allegiances) regarding this conflict with only a tiny part of the story to hand.
So, hey, I'm telling you to consider having a little Type 2 Fun. Eat your vegetables. Learn something. In retrospect, you'll be glad you did.
Recommended for: Jewish people. Muslim people. People with an interest in Levantine history and politics.
July 23, 2024
Being very pro-Palestinian in general, I did not expect to appreciate this book near as much as I did. While Benny Morris and I disagree on virtually every characterization and conclusion about the conflict as a whole, his historical acumen and attention to detail is the finest of any book I've read on the topic so far. I understand why he is a highly respected historian, and to be fair, he did not shy away from criticism of many people that other Israeli historians revere and do not take an objective look at.
I do feel that a couple of major sections were lacking in detail. Specifically, 1947-48 and the Palestinian revolts are biased to a pretty large degree. Morris fails to describe Plan Dalet(other than mentioning it by name), skips over the reality of many massacres and forced expulsions( in Acre, Haifa, Ein al-Zeitun, etc. etc.) while simply claiming that some people were moved by force. In the 1930s, he purposefully mentions very little of the boycotts and the different goals being fought for by the Palestinians.
However, his sections on the Camp David accords, the reality of the Gazan and West Bank occupations, and internal Israeli politics are especially interesting. Characterizations and conclusions about Israeli politics are severely lacking in the books I have read so far, and it added a much needed dimension to the history. All in all, it was a good read, and one that I would recommend to more pro-Palestinian people, for a good, unextremist history of the conflict from a Zionist perspective.
7.4/10
I do feel that a couple of major sections were lacking in detail. Specifically, 1947-48 and the Palestinian revolts are biased to a pretty large degree. Morris fails to describe Plan Dalet(other than mentioning it by name), skips over the reality of many massacres and forced expulsions( in Acre, Haifa, Ein al-Zeitun, etc. etc.) while simply claiming that some people were moved by force. In the 1930s, he purposefully mentions very little of the boycotts and the different goals being fought for by the Palestinians.
However, his sections on the Camp David accords, the reality of the Gazan and West Bank occupations, and internal Israeli politics are especially interesting. Characterizations and conclusions about Israeli politics are severely lacking in the books I have read so far, and it added a much needed dimension to the history. All in all, it was a good read, and one that I would recommend to more pro-Palestinian people, for a good, unextremist history of the conflict from a Zionist perspective.
7.4/10
July 18, 2021
Short: Great book on Israel / Palestine history, build from sources of both sides, thus as objective as it's possible to be.
Long:
This book made me take a new look at some topics, to give you two -
- That in history there isn't "good guys" and "bad guys", in every conflict, given enough time, both sides will have their good, bad and ugly times. Of course, newspapers and Tv channels can't afford the same level of information as 800 page book can, so they summarize it all to "Side A good, Side B bad, it's their fault." So if you want to read about this conflict and history and get more in depth view, this is good place to start.
- Amount of information it takes to predict future events - for each meeting you need to know some history of president / prime minister leading it, his advisors moods and opinions, how close are elections, what is situation in coalition / opposition, what terror acts have been done recently, also what are chances that someone will perform act of terror just to hasten / delay negotiations etc. And then same amount of intel about the other side. And mediators.
There were many more facts and "Aha" moments, of course. These two just stayed in mind as most prominent ones.
For history enthusiast as myself this is great read, recommend!
Long:
This book made me take a new look at some topics, to give you two -
- That in history there isn't "good guys" and "bad guys", in every conflict, given enough time, both sides will have their good, bad and ugly times. Of course, newspapers and Tv channels can't afford the same level of information as 800 page book can, so they summarize it all to "Side A good, Side B bad, it's their fault." So if you want to read about this conflict and history and get more in depth view, this is good place to start.
- Amount of information it takes to predict future events - for each meeting you need to know some history of president / prime minister leading it, his advisors moods and opinions, how close are elections, what is situation in coalition / opposition, what terror acts have been done recently, also what are chances that someone will perform act of terror just to hasten / delay negotiations etc. And then same amount of intel about the other side. And mediators.
There were many more facts and "Aha" moments, of course. These two just stayed in mind as most prominent ones.
For history enthusiast as myself this is great read, recommend!
March 18, 2025
This book was at once less and more than I had hoped. I wish there had been more on the time before 1881, as I know the conflict goes back much further than that. Jews have lived in the region for 5,000 years and Islam has had a presence since about 700 AD.
Meanwhile, I found the early part of the book provided almost too much detail on the late 1800s and I found myself skimming. This reminded me of the time I started a five volume series on the 100 Years War, but was satiated after one volume.
Professor Benny Morris is certainly very balanced in his handling of the conflict, reminding us that the formation of Israel was a British/French colonial process of carving out a Jewish homeland in the Middle East, accelerated by the post WWI collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Jewish emigration from Russia and huge international sympathy after the Second World War.
Meanwhile, I found the early part of the book provided almost too much detail on the late 1800s and I found myself skimming. This reminded me of the time I started a five volume series on the 100 Years War, but was satiated after one volume.
Professor Benny Morris is certainly very balanced in his handling of the conflict, reminding us that the formation of Israel was a British/French colonial process of carving out a Jewish homeland in the Middle East, accelerated by the post WWI collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Jewish emigration from Russia and huge international sympathy after the Second World War.
January 30, 2025
I did it , I completed this behemoth of a book. Still got a lot of questions, about the politics of the country about the shifts that allowed for such different leadership to take over, about how the Palestinian leadership came to power and gained power in the way it did. Reading about the intifada was horrifying, like a cycle of violence rolling down hill gaining momentum growing in size and little being done to stop it. Don’t exactly know how to fit this book in the context of the war now. Leaves me with a strong hope that things will get better, and a great fear that things will only get worse.
November 25, 2014
A very detailed, thorough, war-centered and zionism-based history of the conflict. The author being an Israeli who doesn't reads Arabic, it should be expected and understandable that the Zionist narrative predominates. Nevertheless, it's a great resource for understanding the political and military development of the conflict. Especially detailed are weapons, armies and warfare data. Gets a 5 for the consistent and solid research, although it has to be balanced with another sources of the Palestinian narrative.
March 31, 2012
A really in depth look at the Zionist movement, the formation of Israel and the Arab-Israeli wars. His lack of Arab sources made me quesiton his research a little but his over all point to valid. The Palestinians and Israelis are fighting an endless war about land, one that neither side is willing to compromise on, and is unlikely to resolve itselft until the Israelis are willing to give up all of the West Bank and Gaza and remove all Jewish settlers.
December 20, 2024
Una buona lettura per comprendere ed avere un quadro generale di uno dei conflitti di più lunga durata e sanguinosi della nostra era. Sebbene il saggio termini la sua digressione fino agli eventi del 2001, ci sono tantissimi elementi che permettono di comprendere le attuali dinamiche ed radicate cause dei conflitti e dell’odio reciproco tra israeliani e palestinesi (la questione dei coloni, le Intifade, la violenza settaria, gli equilibri politici interni ad Israele e le varie milizie armate operanti nei territori palestinesi).
Lo stile è scorrevole, sebbene il testo si presenti molto dettagliato. Le dinamiche politiche e diplomatiche sono ampiamente spiegate, sebbene trovo che la mancanza di un quadro dedicato ad ognuno dei protagonisti più importanti delle vicende sia un vero peccato (ad esempio Peres, Arafat, Abu Abbas, Golda Meir). Le dinamiche militari sono altrettanto approfonditamente descritte, sebbene alle volte l’autore indugi a mio dire in un eccesso di dettagli circa le manovre militari. Similmente, le azioni terroristiche e gli eccidi compiuti da entrambe le parti sono rendicontati in maniera fredda e statistica, facendo perdere il senso alle volte di come queste abbiano influenzato pesantemente gli equilibri politici.
Unica pecca del libro è lo sbilanciamento tra il il livello di dettaglio degli eventi precedenti alla guerra dello Yom Kippur e la maniera un po’ sbrigativa -a mio dire-degli eventi successivi a questa, come la guerra del Libano e il processo di pace.
Il mio capitolo preferito è sicuramente quello dedicato agli accordi di Camp David, dove l’autore ha fornito un meraviglioso ritratto delle negoziazioni e dei protagonisti, restituendo fedelmente il senso di tensione frustrazione della negoziazione.
In conclusione, Vittime è una lettura impegnativa ma soddisfacente e, nonostante qualche pecca, lo consiglio caldamente a chiunque voglia costruirsi un’opinione in maniera consapevole ed informata.
Lo stile è scorrevole, sebbene il testo si presenti molto dettagliato. Le dinamiche politiche e diplomatiche sono ampiamente spiegate, sebbene trovo che la mancanza di un quadro dedicato ad ognuno dei protagonisti più importanti delle vicende sia un vero peccato (ad esempio Peres, Arafat, Abu Abbas, Golda Meir). Le dinamiche militari sono altrettanto approfonditamente descritte, sebbene alle volte l’autore indugi a mio dire in un eccesso di dettagli circa le manovre militari. Similmente, le azioni terroristiche e gli eccidi compiuti da entrambe le parti sono rendicontati in maniera fredda e statistica, facendo perdere il senso alle volte di come queste abbiano influenzato pesantemente gli equilibri politici.
Unica pecca del libro è lo sbilanciamento tra il il livello di dettaglio degli eventi precedenti alla guerra dello Yom Kippur e la maniera un po’ sbrigativa -a mio dire-degli eventi successivi a questa, come la guerra del Libano e il processo di pace.
Il mio capitolo preferito è sicuramente quello dedicato agli accordi di Camp David, dove l’autore ha fornito un meraviglioso ritratto delle negoziazioni e dei protagonisti, restituendo fedelmente il senso di tensione frustrazione della negoziazione.
In conclusione, Vittime è una lettura impegnativa ma soddisfacente e, nonostante qualche pecca, lo consiglio caldamente a chiunque voglia costruirsi un’opinione in maniera consapevole ed informata.
August 9, 2024
Righteous Victims is about everything you could ever want from a good book on history and after reading it, it honestly made me sad that there's such a dearth of this kind of book in the medium. Righteous Victims is told about a single country from beginning to current; it is incredibly well-sourced and its prose is almost never uninteresting or unintelligible despite the somewhat formal and academic vocabular. I think a good judge of how unbiased this retelling of such a contentious historical topic is the fact that if you tell either side you read Benny Morris they'll lampoon you as reading propaganda from the other side and then never be able to offer a substantive critique of why exactly what Dr. Morris said was wrong.
This book isn't perfect, however. It's pretty clear what areas of Dr. Morris doesn't really mind to talk about especially after listened to some of his talks. He doesn't really care much about international law, which makes itself known in the book as one of the last mentions of a violation of international law being in 1949. Any mention of war crimes committed by either side Morris only calls war crimes when his arm is twisted behind his back. The other point I wish he would have elaborated on were post-1948 treaties, resolutions, and agreements. Prior to 1948 he meticulously described the details and outcomes of almost every mandate from Constantinople, every treaty from the British, and every agreement between peoples. This meticulousness is somewhat lacking in the later parts of the book. The chapter about Sadat and Begin making peace was mucked up by talking at length about each little quibble each side and finally at the end summarizing what had actually been agreed to in give or take a page.
That said, this book was an incredibly enjoyable read and I'd recommend it to anyone interested in the subject.
This book isn't perfect, however. It's pretty clear what areas of Dr. Morris doesn't really mind to talk about especially after listened to some of his talks. He doesn't really care much about international law, which makes itself known in the book as one of the last mentions of a violation of international law being in 1949. Any mention of war crimes committed by either side Morris only calls war crimes when his arm is twisted behind his back. The other point I wish he would have elaborated on were post-1948 treaties, resolutions, and agreements. Prior to 1948 he meticulously described the details and outcomes of almost every mandate from Constantinople, every treaty from the British, and every agreement between peoples. This meticulousness is somewhat lacking in the later parts of the book. The chapter about Sadat and Begin making peace was mucked up by talking at length about each little quibble each side and finally at the end summarizing what had actually been agreed to in give or take a page.
That said, this book was an incredibly enjoyable read and I'd recommend it to anyone interested in the subject.
October 7, 2025
This took nearly a month to read making it the longest I’ve spent reading a book this year. Righteous Victims is in many ways a masterwork of historical documentation. This conflict, of which I will not take a public stance, is incredibly diverse in its scope, leadership, and factions. Benny Morris has throughout his career been both a champion of academic scholarship and a conservative reactionary that goes against his own written word. It is undeniable that the sheer number of citations and first hand accounts give large credence towards the information recorded, and to give credit where credit is due I feel that Morris notifies readers of his personal bias when it does present itself. The scope of the book is also impressive considering you cover in high detail nearly 120 years of comprehensive history.
The only negatives I can lay at the feet of this book is that it is a dry read. I can’t really blame the author or the content, I found it very interesting but it’s an incredibly difficult book to recommend. If you love reading about this region and the factions within it this is an excellent book. If you are on the fence the first chapter will let you know if this is the book for you. I’m waffling a lot writing this review because I am so conflicted. While not an enjoyable read I really have to admit I learned a lot. I may read it again in the future. There are things I inevitably missed or did not pay the most attention to. I think something this heavy and assertive must be read multiple times. Read it if you have interest!
The only negatives I can lay at the feet of this book is that it is a dry read. I can’t really blame the author or the content, I found it very interesting but it’s an incredibly difficult book to recommend. If you love reading about this region and the factions within it this is an excellent book. If you are on the fence the first chapter will let you know if this is the book for you. I’m waffling a lot writing this review because I am so conflicted. While not an enjoyable read I really have to admit I learned a lot. I may read it again in the future. There are things I inevitably missed or did not pay the most attention to. I think something this heavy and assertive must be read multiple times. Read it if you have interest!
January 18, 2025
If you are on the fence about the Israel/Palestine question, this book is a must read. If you’ve already made up your mind, you will find yourself shaking your head most of the time reading this book.
Benny Morris has done his research. At first, this book read like every lesson on the history of Zionism that I read in high school. But once in a while, Benny begins to speak critically of some of Israel’s decisions.
Benny is a New Historian; but unlike the others, he is a Zionist. He is highly critical of Israel and many of its actions, but he’s still a huge supporter of Israel. Many Zionists I know fall into that category one way or another. The old adage goes that every Israeli thinks they can do a better job running the country than the prime minister can.
Final note: if you’re looking for an agenda-free history of Israel or Palestine, you won’t find one. This book is perhaps the best account of the history of Israel I’ve read that is on the side of the Zionists. But by no means is it agenda free.
Benny Morris has done his research. At first, this book read like every lesson on the history of Zionism that I read in high school. But once in a while, Benny begins to speak critically of some of Israel’s decisions.
Benny is a New Historian; but unlike the others, he is a Zionist. He is highly critical of Israel and many of its actions, but he’s still a huge supporter of Israel. Many Zionists I know fall into that category one way or another. The old adage goes that every Israeli thinks they can do a better job running the country than the prime minister can.
Final note: if you’re looking for an agenda-free history of Israel or Palestine, you won’t find one. This book is perhaps the best account of the history of Israel I’ve read that is on the side of the Zionists. But by no means is it agenda free.
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