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Osprey Campaign #244
The Falklands 1982: Ground operations in the South Atlantic
On the night of 1-2 April 1982, the Argentinian Junta led by Gen. Leopoldo Galtieri made its move against the Falkland Islands. On 3 April British Prime Minister Mrs. Margaret Thatcher faced an appalled and furious House of Commons to announce that Argentine armed forces had landed on British sovereign territory; had captured the men of Royal Marine detachment NP8901; had run up the Argentine flag at Government House; and had declared the islands and their population to be Argentine. An immediate response was required and a task force was rapidly assembled to head into the South Atlantic and retake the islands. From this point until the Argentine surrender on 14 June, the British forces fought what was in many ways a 19th-century style colonial campaign at the end of extended supply lines some 8,000 miles from home. This volume will detail the major stages of the land campaign to retake the islands, focusing on the San Carlos landings, the battle for Darwin and Goose Green, and the final battles for Mt Longdon, Tumbledown and Wireless Ridge, the mountains that surrounded the island's capital, Stanley.
96 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2012
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
July 11, 2018
Meget solid! Utrolig interessant bok om et tema (en krig) folk vet for lite om. Spesielt treffer den godt når det er «lite» informasjon ellers om krigen.
December 6, 2024
A Very Good Picture of How and Why the Land War Progressed the Way it Did
Any review of this book would have to start out by stating that it is part of Osprey Publishing's "Campaign" series. As such, it is only 92 pages in length. Illustrations of one type or another (i.e., maps, contemporaneous photographs, photographs that clearly show the topology of many of the battlefields, etc.) take up, very roughly, a third or so of the length. Hence if one is looking for an academic treatise of the book, this is not it. There are many other full-length books on the subject (many of which are cited in this book's bibliography) that a reader can reference if that is what they are looking for. The jest of this book is to provide a short overview how the ground military campaign progressed and why it turned out the way it did. In this the book succeeds, despite its short length.
The book has many positives. One is that the author, G Freemont Barnes, is a professor at Sandhurst (the British equivalent of the US's West Point). Hence he has an excellent handle on military issues and this shines throughout the book. The author definitely knows his military stuff. Secondly, the book has many good maps, showing strategic and tactical movement, as well as photographs illustrating the topology of the battlefield, as well as leading personalities and troops in the environment they had to function in.
Thirdly, and most importantly, the book provides a very good picture of how the ground war progressed from both the operational and tactical perspective and WHY it turned out the way it did. Important factors contributing to British success included the use of elite troops, who had superior training, physical fitness, fighting skill and morale, over the Argentine troops who were of a much lower quality caliber. If Argentina had sent better troops the odds of success would have been higher (i.e., elite troops as opposed to mostly conscripts). It's a shame that the book does not discuss why this was not done. Plus, the Argentinian force was, in aggregate, poorly equipped for the environment it would be operating in.
In addition, Argentine ability to supply their troops, especially in outlying areas, greatly reduced morale and played an important role in their ability to fight. The British also used superior strategy in that they landed in areas where there were no Argentine troops (i.e., uncontested landing) and then going from there. They also had superior tactics on the battlefield itself as well as, in general, superior intelligence on the enemy (i.e., on their location and strength, etc.). The Argentinians also poorly placed many of their troops geographically.
The book, unfortunately, also has a few negative aspects that need to be mentioned. One is that it is very British Centric. There is little from the Argentine perspective. This is clear from the fact in the entire one-page bibliography there is only one single source from that side. There are no Spanish language sources cited. Another important weakness, related to above point, ls what strategy the Argentinian junta was following at a high level. Was it hoping to only use its occupying military as a bargaining chip for negotiations (and hence was not expecting to fight)? Was it hoping to win sovereignty by military defeating any British invasion? How, exactly, were the Argentines planning on accomplishing their goals? Mr. Barnes, unfortunately, makes no attempt to answer these very important questions. One last weakness is one that characterizes all Osprey "Campaign" series books - the lack of footnotes.
Despite these important weaknesses, the book provides a very good picture of how the land war progressed and why it turned out the way it did. Three and a half stars.
Any review of this book would have to start out by stating that it is part of Osprey Publishing's "Campaign" series. As such, it is only 92 pages in length. Illustrations of one type or another (i.e., maps, contemporaneous photographs, photographs that clearly show the topology of many of the battlefields, etc.) take up, very roughly, a third or so of the length. Hence if one is looking for an academic treatise of the book, this is not it. There are many other full-length books on the subject (many of which are cited in this book's bibliography) that a reader can reference if that is what they are looking for. The jest of this book is to provide a short overview how the ground military campaign progressed and why it turned out the way it did. In this the book succeeds, despite its short length.
The book has many positives. One is that the author, G Freemont Barnes, is a professor at Sandhurst (the British equivalent of the US's West Point). Hence he has an excellent handle on military issues and this shines throughout the book. The author definitely knows his military stuff. Secondly, the book has many good maps, showing strategic and tactical movement, as well as photographs illustrating the topology of the battlefield, as well as leading personalities and troops in the environment they had to function in.
Thirdly, and most importantly, the book provides a very good picture of how the ground war progressed from both the operational and tactical perspective and WHY it turned out the way it did. Important factors contributing to British success included the use of elite troops, who had superior training, physical fitness, fighting skill and morale, over the Argentine troops who were of a much lower quality caliber. If Argentina had sent better troops the odds of success would have been higher (i.e., elite troops as opposed to mostly conscripts). It's a shame that the book does not discuss why this was not done. Plus, the Argentinian force was, in aggregate, poorly equipped for the environment it would be operating in.
In addition, Argentine ability to supply their troops, especially in outlying areas, greatly reduced morale and played an important role in their ability to fight. The British also used superior strategy in that they landed in areas where there were no Argentine troops (i.e., uncontested landing) and then going from there. They also had superior tactics on the battlefield itself as well as, in general, superior intelligence on the enemy (i.e., on their location and strength, etc.). The Argentinians also poorly placed many of their troops geographically.
The book, unfortunately, also has a few negative aspects that need to be mentioned. One is that it is very British Centric. There is little from the Argentine perspective. This is clear from the fact in the entire one-page bibliography there is only one single source from that side. There are no Spanish language sources cited. Another important weakness, related to above point, ls what strategy the Argentinian junta was following at a high level. Was it hoping to only use its occupying military as a bargaining chip for negotiations (and hence was not expecting to fight)? Was it hoping to win sovereignty by military defeating any British invasion? How, exactly, were the Argentines planning on accomplishing their goals? Mr. Barnes, unfortunately, makes no attempt to answer these very important questions. One last weakness is one that characterizes all Osprey "Campaign" series books - the lack of footnotes.
Despite these important weaknesses, the book provides a very good picture of how the land war progressed and why it turned out the way it did. Three and a half stars.
November 24, 2020
Good introduction to the land campaign. This sort of book is meant to give visual context and present maps and pictures. The maps in this book are great and can be used as a reference when reading about the Falklands War in other sources. There are wartime photographs and modern photographs showing the battlefield today.
The author is Sandhurst professor Gregory Fremont-Barnes, which means the narrative will be British-heavy with only occasional glances at the Argentineans and very little on their own strategy - they are mostly just the OPFOR for the British. The author covers the ground fighting in considerable tactical detail, down to platoon level, and there are maps for each action. The narrative is enriched by personal-accounts and high-quality colored plates. The section on opposing commanders focus on generals, even though the Falklands War was a textbook small unit war, being won by junior officers and NCOs, not generals.
The Argentineans were clearly not prepared for war even though they had adequate quantities of matérial and troops. Their defeat was an intellectual one. Much was made by the fact the British only used professional troops while the Argentineans used conscripts, but those were only 25% of the troops deployed in the Falklands - the Argentine military suffered from poor institutional practices and their lack of professionalism really shows.
The Argentine logistical system failed at the most rudimentary level and bordered on criminal negligence; the responsibles should be court-martialed. "In short, at best the Argentine logistics system suffered from poor foresight and, at worst, shocking mismanegement." The poor Argentinean soldier was left to feel cold, hunger, mistreatment by their officers and was forced to steal in order to survive. And all that way before the first British soldier landed.
The Argentine Military Junta was only trying to borrow more time due to its catastrophic failures in running the country. In 1978, Buenos Aires bullied Pinochet's Chile but the certainty of war, including continental alliances, made the Argies back down. The invasion of the Falklands was met with enthusiastic popular support, and the Junta didn't expect the British to fight back and when war became inevitable, the generals decided not to back down. Problem was: they weren't real military professionals, unlike their British counterparts.
The author states, correctly, that what decided victor from vanquished was the quality of their institucional practices. The land war was won by small unit tactics, "the British soldier and Marine could march faster, entrench himself more effectively and shoot more accuratelly than his Argentine counterpart." After landing, the British didn't lose a single land battle. But not everything was a sea of roses and the author glosses over some issues. After the loss of the helicopters due to an Argentinean airstrike against the Atlantic Conveyor, the British troops had to march, and their non-elite forces did not keep the pace with the Royal Marines and Paras. On the combat level, the Paras showed remarkable lack of imagination and assaulted the Argentine positions head-on, without the maneuvering skill showed by the Royal Marines. This got the Paras bogged down in two occasions, Goose Green and Mount Longdon.
The Royal Marines, on the other hand, had better training, better footwear and fought better than the British Paras, owing much to their Artic training in Norway; and suffering less casualties. The Royals text-book silent approaching tactics repaid their sweat with less blood. The Argentinean Marines also had better training than their army counterparts (and far better in this case). In Mount Tumbledown the 5th battalion of the IMARA did everything the army units didn't (but should), fighting hard, hand-to-hand, with good cohesion, resisting well after sunrise, counterattacking and even after the Scots were at the top of them, they contested the ridge in 11 hours of infantry fighting. To add insult to injury, the marines are marked as "ordinary" infantry in this book's maps, which is nothing short of insulting. The Paras have their wings on the maps. The marines should have an anchor to mark them as amphibious troops!
The strongest point of this book is the battle accounts, with a lot of talk about élan and bayonets bloodied in night hand-to-hand fighting. One interesting microcosmos of infantry fighting is when one of the Paras remarks they didn't care about the Argentinean dead - they just looked like "dummies" to them. In Wireless Ridge both sides engaged armored fighting vehicles for the first and only time, and the British properly employed combined arms tactics for maximum effect. Small unit tactics won the war and the vivid narrative makes justice to that.
Unfortunatelly, all bibliography listed is in English with no effort towards the Argentinean side of the hill. It should have been shown how the Argentineans left Stanley (it was a mess) and placed military equipment next to protected buildings that should be exempt from military activity. The Argentinean press was heavily censored and only presented fabricated news of imaginary victories and the general population believed they were winning the war. The news of the Argentine surrender at Stanley was received as a shock and the population rioted violently in the streets. Some of that could have made the cut. I also missed some coverage of Special Forces but you can only do so much in 92 pages.
Overrall, a great introduction to the land war, even if British-centric as Fremont-Barnes always is, and excellent visual guide (especially the maps). A must have for everyone interested in infantry combat and modern war.
The author is Sandhurst professor Gregory Fremont-Barnes, which means the narrative will be British-heavy with only occasional glances at the Argentineans and very little on their own strategy - they are mostly just the OPFOR for the British. The author covers the ground fighting in considerable tactical detail, down to platoon level, and there are maps for each action. The narrative is enriched by personal-accounts and high-quality colored plates. The section on opposing commanders focus on generals, even though the Falklands War was a textbook small unit war, being won by junior officers and NCOs, not generals.
The Argentineans were clearly not prepared for war even though they had adequate quantities of matérial and troops. Their defeat was an intellectual one. Much was made by the fact the British only used professional troops while the Argentineans used conscripts, but those were only 25% of the troops deployed in the Falklands - the Argentine military suffered from poor institutional practices and their lack of professionalism really shows.
The Argentine logistical system failed at the most rudimentary level and bordered on criminal negligence; the responsibles should be court-martialed. "In short, at best the Argentine logistics system suffered from poor foresight and, at worst, shocking mismanegement." The poor Argentinean soldier was left to feel cold, hunger, mistreatment by their officers and was forced to steal in order to survive. And all that way before the first British soldier landed.
The Argentine Military Junta was only trying to borrow more time due to its catastrophic failures in running the country. In 1978, Buenos Aires bullied Pinochet's Chile but the certainty of war, including continental alliances, made the Argies back down. The invasion of the Falklands was met with enthusiastic popular support, and the Junta didn't expect the British to fight back and when war became inevitable, the generals decided not to back down. Problem was: they weren't real military professionals, unlike their British counterparts.
The author states, correctly, that what decided victor from vanquished was the quality of their institucional practices. The land war was won by small unit tactics, "the British soldier and Marine could march faster, entrench himself more effectively and shoot more accuratelly than his Argentine counterpart." After landing, the British didn't lose a single land battle. But not everything was a sea of roses and the author glosses over some issues. After the loss of the helicopters due to an Argentinean airstrike against the Atlantic Conveyor, the British troops had to march, and their non-elite forces did not keep the pace with the Royal Marines and Paras. On the combat level, the Paras showed remarkable lack of imagination and assaulted the Argentine positions head-on, without the maneuvering skill showed by the Royal Marines. This got the Paras bogged down in two occasions, Goose Green and Mount Longdon.
The Royal Marines, on the other hand, had better training, better footwear and fought better than the British Paras, owing much to their Artic training in Norway; and suffering less casualties. The Royals text-book silent approaching tactics repaid their sweat with less blood. The Argentinean Marines also had better training than their army counterparts (and far better in this case). In Mount Tumbledown the 5th battalion of the IMARA did everything the army units didn't (but should), fighting hard, hand-to-hand, with good cohesion, resisting well after sunrise, counterattacking and even after the Scots were at the top of them, they contested the ridge in 11 hours of infantry fighting. To add insult to injury, the marines are marked as "ordinary" infantry in this book's maps, which is nothing short of insulting. The Paras have their wings on the maps. The marines should have an anchor to mark them as amphibious troops!
The strongest point of this book is the battle accounts, with a lot of talk about élan and bayonets bloodied in night hand-to-hand fighting. One interesting microcosmos of infantry fighting is when one of the Paras remarks they didn't care about the Argentinean dead - they just looked like "dummies" to them. In Wireless Ridge both sides engaged armored fighting vehicles for the first and only time, and the British properly employed combined arms tactics for maximum effect. Small unit tactics won the war and the vivid narrative makes justice to that.
Unfortunatelly, all bibliography listed is in English with no effort towards the Argentinean side of the hill. It should have been shown how the Argentineans left Stanley (it was a mess) and placed military equipment next to protected buildings that should be exempt from military activity. The Argentinean press was heavily censored and only presented fabricated news of imaginary victories and the general population believed they were winning the war. The news of the Argentine surrender at Stanley was received as a shock and the population rioted violently in the streets. Some of that could have made the cut. I also missed some coverage of Special Forces but you can only do so much in 92 pages.
Overrall, a great introduction to the land war, even if British-centric as Fremont-Barnes always is, and excellent visual guide (especially the maps). A must have for everyone interested in infantry combat and modern war.
March 21, 2017
Very interesting and detailed
I enjoyed learning about this conflict's land-based operations, aspects of which surprised me (e.g. that hand-to-hand combat occurred). The frustrations with the book, all minor, all relate merely to the Kindle-version experience itself, not the content proper, mainly the difficulties in reading the maps, the low-resolution quality of the few photographs, and the difficulties in going back to the maps for reference. Images of the vehicles and helicopters mentioned would have been very helpful. I had to look all of them up on Wikipedia to be able to picture them, understand how many troops they carried, etc.
I enjoyed learning about this conflict's land-based operations, aspects of which surprised me (e.g. that hand-to-hand combat occurred). The frustrations with the book, all minor, all relate merely to the Kindle-version experience itself, not the content proper, mainly the difficulties in reading the maps, the low-resolution quality of the few photographs, and the difficulties in going back to the maps for reference. Images of the vehicles and helicopters mentioned would have been very helpful. I had to look all of them up on Wikipedia to be able to picture them, understand how many troops they carried, etc.
March 12, 2025
I have one entire shelf full of these books and this is one of the best. OF course it was a relatively short conflict the but the movements and strategy are well laid out and the illustrations fantastic. The critic of each side at the end is outstanding. Highly recommend. Outstanding book!!!
April 8, 2018
Good short coverage of ground operations (only ground ops) with decent maps and graphics. Pretty heavy British slant to the writing.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews