Truth and Objectivity

by Crispin Wright

Crispin Wright offers an original perspective on the place of “realism” in philosophical inquiry. He proposes a radically new framework for discussing the claims of the realists and the anti-realists. This framework rejects the classical “deflationary” conception of truth yet allows both disputants to respect the intuition that judgments, whose status they contest, are at least semantically fitted for truth and may often justifiably be regarded as true. In the course of his argument, Wright offers original critical discussions of many central concerns of philosophers interested in realism, including the “deflationary” conception of truth, internal realist truth, scientific realism and the theoreticity of observation, and the role of moral states of affairs in explanations of moral beliefs.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction

Paperback

First published January 1, 1992

Reviews

[Erin · Rating 3 out of 5]

I liked a fair amount of ideas presented in the book, but the writing style/organization killed it for me a bit. Interesting stuff, though, and worth reading.

[Nat]

Analytic philosophy in the trenches: impressively gnarly distinction-mongering and subtlety, painted in many more shades than just Scylla and Charybdis.

[saml · Rating 3 out of 5]

why does the book look like that. anyway fun read! it's like an attempt to get to the starting line for realism-antirealism debates, which of course is impossible without already taking something of a side, though wright is remarkably subtle and non-partisan about it all. difficult but not symbol-mongering. i'm not sure superassertibility makes much sense though