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384 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2012
When Juin selected Général Joseph de Monsabert to lead the new assault, he responded: ‘Storm Belvedere? Who’s dreamed up that one? Have they looked at it? You’d have to first cross two rivers, the Rapido and the Secco, then smash through the Gustav Line in the valley, and finally, all the time attacking the Bosche, climb more than 2,000 feet over a bare rock pile, itself heavily fortified, that can be fired on from Cifalco and the rest of the summits round that. It’s pure wishful thinking! It’s a crazy gamble!’The Battles for the town of Cassino and the controversial bombing of the Monastery are covered in excellent detail. There's an excellent discussion of the way the original requirements for the bombing mission were amended and watered down; it's an interesting "what if" to consider the effects of the unleashing of even a small portion of a blockbuster armed Bomber Command against the German positions, rather than the fortress creating tickling actually inflicted.
Unfortunately, the exact purpose of Anzio was open to interpretation. Alexander at 15th Army Group (under pressure from Churchill) had issued a directive to Clark on 3 January which read that his Fifth Army was ‘to carry out an assault landing [in the] vicinity of Rome with the object of cutting the enemy lines of communication and threatening the rear of German 14 Corps’. Clear and simple; or was it? Clark immediately interpreted this with a different emphasis, recording: ‘I intend to attack in greatest possible strength in the Liri valley several days in advance of Shingle with the object of drawing maximum number of enemy reserves to that front and fixing them there. In that way and in that way only can the Shingle force exercise a decisive influence in the operation to capture Rome.’ The altered emphasis towards Rome was important – though Alexander let this pass – for Clark knew that once D-Day was under way, whatever his Fifth Army achieved in Italy would no longer be front-page news: all were aware that the deciding event in the European war would be a landing and offensive against the main German stronghold in the west. With the nose of a politician, Clark therefore hoped to be in Rome before his friend Eisenhower invaded Normandy as a way of achieving some prominence before Operation Overlord began. So as early as 2 January in Clark’s mind (if in no one else’s), the operation to dislodge the Germans on the Gustav Line by threatening their rear had morphed into an attempt to seize Rome.