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Soviet-American Relations #1
Soviet-American Relations, Vol. 1: Russia Leaves the War, 1917-1920
“Mr. Kennan has developed a true scholar’s integrity; and he writes with delightful elegance. . . . The book is a pleasure to read, [even] apart from the importance of its theme.” ―A.J.P. Taylor The troubled days in Russia during World War I, from the Bolshevik seizure of power in November 1917 to Russia’s final departure from the war after the Treaty of Brest Litovsk in March 1918, are the setting of this absorbing historical narrative by one of the most distinguished diplomats and historians of our time.
576 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1956
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552 people want to read
About the author
George F. Kennan
127 books118 followersFrom Wikipedia:
George Frost Kennan (February 16, 1904 – March 17, 2005) was an American advisor, diplomat, political scientist, and historian, best known as "the father of containment" and as a key figure in the emergence of the Cold War. He later wrote standard histories of the relations between Russia and the Western powers.
In the late 1940s, his writings inspired the Truman Doctrine and the U.S. foreign policy of "containing" the Soviet Union, thrusting him into a lifelong role as a leading authority on the Cold War. His "Long Telegram" from Moscow in 1946, and the subsequent 1947 article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" argued that the Soviet regime was inherently expansionist and that its influence had to be "contained" in areas of vital strategic importance to the United States. These texts quickly emerged as foundational texts of the Cold War, expressing the Truman administration's new anti-Soviet Union policy. Kennan also played a leading role in the development of definitive Cold War programs and institutions, most notably the Marshall Plan.
Shortly after the diploma had been enshrined as official U.S. policy, Kennan began to criticize the policies that he had seemingly helped launch. By mid-1948, he was convinced that the situation in Western Europe had improved to the point where negotiations could be initiated with Moscow. The suggestion did not resonate within the Truman administration, and Kennan's influence was increasingly marginalized—particularly after Dean Acheson was appointed Secretary of State in 1949. As U.S. Cold War strategy assumed a more aggressive and militaristic tone, Kennan bemoaned what he called a misinterpretation of his thinking.
In 1950, Kennan left the Department of State, except for two brief ambassadorial stints in Moscow and Yugoslavia, and became a leading realist critic of U.S. foreign policy. He continued to be a leading thinker in international affairs as a faculty member of the Institute for Advanced Study from 1956 until his death at age 101 in March 2005.
George Frost Kennan (February 16, 1904 – March 17, 2005) was an American advisor, diplomat, political scientist, and historian, best known as "the father of containment" and as a key figure in the emergence of the Cold War. He later wrote standard histories of the relations between Russia and the Western powers.
In the late 1940s, his writings inspired the Truman Doctrine and the U.S. foreign policy of "containing" the Soviet Union, thrusting him into a lifelong role as a leading authority on the Cold War. His "Long Telegram" from Moscow in 1946, and the subsequent 1947 article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" argued that the Soviet regime was inherently expansionist and that its influence had to be "contained" in areas of vital strategic importance to the United States. These texts quickly emerged as foundational texts of the Cold War, expressing the Truman administration's new anti-Soviet Union policy. Kennan also played a leading role in the development of definitive Cold War programs and institutions, most notably the Marshall Plan.
Shortly after the diploma had been enshrined as official U.S. policy, Kennan began to criticize the policies that he had seemingly helped launch. By mid-1948, he was convinced that the situation in Western Europe had improved to the point where negotiations could be initiated with Moscow. The suggestion did not resonate within the Truman administration, and Kennan's influence was increasingly marginalized—particularly after Dean Acheson was appointed Secretary of State in 1949. As U.S. Cold War strategy assumed a more aggressive and militaristic tone, Kennan bemoaned what he called a misinterpretation of his thinking.
In 1950, Kennan left the Department of State, except for two brief ambassadorial stints in Moscow and Yugoslavia, and became a leading realist critic of U.S. foreign policy. He continued to be a leading thinker in international affairs as a faculty member of the Institute for Advanced Study from 1956 until his death at age 101 in March 2005.
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Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
May 9, 2020
George F. Kennan’s book covers the short period between the Revolution of 1917 and Russia’s withdrawal from WWI battleground. The author presents an insightful account of Soviet-American early relations in regard to the policies developed by prominent US politicians such as Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Woodrow Wilson, David R. Francis, and others.
Kennan argues that the USA didn’t have a historical analogy to what happened in Russia after the fall of the monarchy. For the States, overturning a monarch meant the establishment of a democratic government, and, in 1917, they hastened to add Russia to the list of democratic countries. This appears to be one of the reasons for Woodrow Wilson’s decision to enter WWI – to make it look as if he is supporting the combined democratic forces. However, Russia proved a far way from being a democratic country.
George Kennan traces the initial problem of “contacting” the Soviet government, which was the result of many misconceptions, lack of understanding between US diplomats, and the interfering interests of other nations. The narrative also focuses on Edgar Sisson, the head of the US Public Information Committee in Russia, and Raymond Robbins, who led the American Red Cross Mission there. Probably not trusting David R. Francis, the official US ambassador in Petrograd, Wilson sent Robins as an independent deputy. Robins outdid himself in his attempts to influence US policy in favor of the bolsheviks.
“Russia Leaves The War” doesn’t deal with any grand events in post-revolution Russia, but Kennan’s analysis of Lenin and Trotsky’s ideology and the reactions it evokes from the USA and the European powers are insightful and compelling.
After leaving the war in 1917, Russia had nothing but demoralized troops, deserting the army due to Bolshevik propaganda, and an inept Provisional Government. Seizing the power, the Bolsheviks aimed for negotiating peace with Germany, but refused to cede any former Russian territories. The cutting of Ukraine was a blow too heavy for Trostky, and he refused to sign Brest-Litovsk. However, as the Germans exploited their military advantage over Russia, Lenin had no other choice but to sign any available peace treaty.
George Kennan’s book is a tough, heavily detailed read with figures rather unknown for the general public playing the major roles. Nevertheless, it’s an informative, thoroughly written account of the thorny beginning of Soviet-American relations.
Kennan argues that the USA didn’t have a historical analogy to what happened in Russia after the fall of the monarchy. For the States, overturning a monarch meant the establishment of a democratic government, and, in 1917, they hastened to add Russia to the list of democratic countries. This appears to be one of the reasons for Woodrow Wilson’s decision to enter WWI – to make it look as if he is supporting the combined democratic forces. However, Russia proved a far way from being a democratic country.
George Kennan traces the initial problem of “contacting” the Soviet government, which was the result of many misconceptions, lack of understanding between US diplomats, and the interfering interests of other nations. The narrative also focuses on Edgar Sisson, the head of the US Public Information Committee in Russia, and Raymond Robbins, who led the American Red Cross Mission there. Probably not trusting David R. Francis, the official US ambassador in Petrograd, Wilson sent Robins as an independent deputy. Robins outdid himself in his attempts to influence US policy in favor of the bolsheviks.
“Russia Leaves The War” doesn’t deal with any grand events in post-revolution Russia, but Kennan’s analysis of Lenin and Trotsky’s ideology and the reactions it evokes from the USA and the European powers are insightful and compelling.
After leaving the war in 1917, Russia had nothing but demoralized troops, deserting the army due to Bolshevik propaganda, and an inept Provisional Government. Seizing the power, the Bolsheviks aimed for negotiating peace with Germany, but refused to cede any former Russian territories. The cutting of Ukraine was a blow too heavy for Trostky, and he refused to sign Brest-Litovsk. However, as the Germans exploited their military advantage over Russia, Lenin had no other choice but to sign any available peace treaty.
George Kennan’s book is a tough, heavily detailed read with figures rather unknown for the general public playing the major roles. Nevertheless, it’s an informative, thoroughly written account of the thorny beginning of Soviet-American relations.
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February 20, 2022E183.8 R9 K4
Memorial and Historical Society Libraries
Memorial and Historical Society Libraries
December 19, 2016
Kennan worked for the US Foreign Service in Germany, Eastern Europe, and the USSR, was fluent in German and Russian, and possessed a keen intellect. Having spent decades in diplomatic service, he was an expert in the workings, the protocols, and the mechanics of international relations.
Kennan was uniquely qualified, then, to research and write this book. (At the time it was to be the first of a trilogy but only two were written. "The Decision to Intervene" is the second.) Because of his experience, he knew where to look for source documents. Because of his facility of language he did not have to rely on translators. And his analysis is incisive.
The book is really about what happens to a handful of Americans working in Petrograd during the Bolshevik revolution and the following five months. Only historians know who these people were - these are not major historical figures. Certainly, major historical figures play big parts in the book, but they're in supporting roles. This book is really about one (or two, or three, depending on how you count) of the biggest failures of diplomacy. It's a story of intrigue, but also of missed opportunities and missed communication. It's about national goals and personal desires.
I loved the depth of detail in the book. It covers short enough of a time frame and few enough characters to make it a book about people as well as a book about big events. There are loads of fun little gems, too. One was about which railroad coach was more prestigious, the "Red" or the "Blue"? A silly question when fleeing Petrograd in the teeth of a renewed German offensive, but important to the Chinese diplomats: they didn't want the Japanese to get better treatment. Another was about the fate of a century of American embassy records which were missing for 17 years until they were found in the stables of the Norwegian embassy.
This book won the Pulitzer Prize, Bancroft Prize, Francis Parkman Prize, and the National Book Award.
Kennan was uniquely qualified, then, to research and write this book. (At the time it was to be the first of a trilogy but only two were written. "The Decision to Intervene" is the second.) Because of his experience, he knew where to look for source documents. Because of his facility of language he did not have to rely on translators. And his analysis is incisive.
The book is really about what happens to a handful of Americans working in Petrograd during the Bolshevik revolution and the following five months. Only historians know who these people were - these are not major historical figures. Certainly, major historical figures play big parts in the book, but they're in supporting roles. This book is really about one (or two, or three, depending on how you count) of the biggest failures of diplomacy. It's a story of intrigue, but also of missed opportunities and missed communication. It's about national goals and personal desires.
I loved the depth of detail in the book. It covers short enough of a time frame and few enough characters to make it a book about people as well as a book about big events. There are loads of fun little gems, too. One was about which railroad coach was more prestigious, the "Red" or the "Blue"? A silly question when fleeing Petrograd in the teeth of a renewed German offensive, but important to the Chinese diplomats: they didn't want the Japanese to get better treatment. Another was about the fate of a century of American embassy records which were missing for 17 years until they were found in the stables of the Norwegian embassy.
This book won the Pulitzer Prize, Bancroft Prize, Francis Parkman Prize, and the National Book Award.
November 19, 2018
A brilliant analysis, beautifully written, of the United States government's first encounter with the Bolsheviks and how missteps and misunderstandings set the tone of US Soviet relations for the next several decades.
The US diplomats on the scene and the political leaders back in Washington could not envision the Bolsheviks surviving long in power. They were like nothing their experience prepared them to deal with. The Bolsheviks, being true believers, felt that world proletarian revolution was about to break out at any moment, so they really saw no need to work honestly with current governments. Neither of these mindsets were a solid foundation upon which to build a mutually beneficial working relationship.
This well researched book gives amazing detailed insights into the individuals involved and the historical events swirling around them. I highly recommend this book.
The US diplomats on the scene and the political leaders back in Washington could not envision the Bolsheviks surviving long in power. They were like nothing their experience prepared them to deal with. The Bolsheviks, being true believers, felt that world proletarian revolution was about to break out at any moment, so they really saw no need to work honestly with current governments. Neither of these mindsets were a solid foundation upon which to build a mutually beneficial working relationship.
This well researched book gives amazing detailed insights into the individuals involved and the historical events swirling around them. I highly recommend this book.
October 24, 2024
Far too much detail for a narrow subject
March 23, 2009
I picked this gem up at a library sale, and must say - George Kennan IS a genius. A very powerful read, and full of empathy for the motivations and views of all the multitude of parties, figures and actors in the turbulent time. Mr. Kennan does have the diplomat's great gift of understanding how things look from the other side.
This volume covers in incredible depth, every small development in Russia and how it affected relations with Western Europe and America from the period of the fall of the Czar to just before the Allied landings inside Russia. The emphasis is on how Russia eventually turned to peace with the Germans (no matter how harsh) as the best alternative. American and Western influence in Russia was often a case of backing the wrong horses, and sending very mixed signals.
This is a serious book, and an advanced read - not for the faint hearted. But it contains immense and little remembered details about how the US and Soviet relations started out, often on the wrong foot. A cautionary tale for any president that relies too much on special envoys, and does not keep his whole team in the loop!
This volume covers in incredible depth, every small development in Russia and how it affected relations with Western Europe and America from the period of the fall of the Czar to just before the Allied landings inside Russia. The emphasis is on how Russia eventually turned to peace with the Germans (no matter how harsh) as the best alternative. American and Western influence in Russia was often a case of backing the wrong horses, and sending very mixed signals.
This is a serious book, and an advanced read - not for the faint hearted. But it contains immense and little remembered details about how the US and Soviet relations started out, often on the wrong foot. A cautionary tale for any president that relies too much on special envoys, and does not keep his whole team in the loop!
March 17, 2012
لو كانَ الكاتب أكثر حيادية و موضوعية لكُنت شهدت بامتياز الكتاب ..لكنه متحيز بشكل كبير لسياسة بلدهِ الرأسمالية
لكِن بلا شك الكتاب مصدر رائع للمعلومات عن تلك العلاقة المُتأزمة و الثرية معلوماتياً بين الاتحاد السوفيتي و الولايات المتحدة
لكِن بلا شك الكتاب مصدر رائع للمعلومات عن تلك العلاقة المُتأزمة و الثرية معلوماتياً بين الاتحاد السوفيتي و الولايات المتحدة
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May 5, 2010كل مرة اكتفى بقراءة الفهرس
February 28, 2012
بداية للتعرف عن الثورة البلشيفية..
September 5, 2024
Old fashioned with tons of details. Essentially a historical drama. Wasn't that interesting.
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews