From the Abode of Islam to the Turkish Vatan: The Making of a National Homeland in Turkey

by Behlül (Behlul) Özkan (Ozkan)

How does a people move from tribal and religiously based understandings of society to a concept of the modern nation-state? This book examines the complex and pivotal case of Turkey. Tracing the shifting valences of "vatan" (Arabic for "birthplace" or "homeland") from the Ottoman period--when it signified a certain territorial integrity and imperial ideology--through its acquisition of religious undertones and its evolution alongside the concept of "millet" (nation), Behlul Ozkan engages readers in the fascinating ontology of Turkey's protean imagining of its nationhood and the construction of a modern national-territorial consciousness.

Genres: History, Middle East, Islam, Nonfiction, Politics

283 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2010

Reviews

[Crooked · Rating 5 out of 5]

4.5*

An ambitious but excellent book in which Findley updates and corrects the first generation of 'Ottoman-to-Turkish modernity studies', epitomised by Bernard Lewis's book. Findley's work is considerably more theoretically sophisticated and goes beyond elite politics in a way that explains 21st Century trends far better than previous works.

It is an unashamedly academic book, not really designed for pop history readers. It gives little time to narrative and, while it is well-written, it's not descriptive, saving most of its room for analysis and relating back to the overarching hypotheses. This is great, of course, as that is what the book sets out to be, but would-be readers should be aware of that before picking it up.

The underlying hypothesis is that Turkey's transition into modernity is best explained through two dialectical processes: one between secularism and Islam(ism), and the second between subjectivisation and rationalisation.

Let's take them one at a time. Unlike Lewis's famous work (and the rest of the old but sadly still popular 'modernisation theory' literature), Findley doesn't see some teleological historical transition from pre-modern modes of belief (e.g., Islamism) to secular scientific materialism. Modernity is not portrayed as a wholly secular phenomenon, and Findley shows well-particularly in the late Ottoman period-how the Ottomanist perception of modernity was influenced by both secular and Islamic traditions. Ottoman modernity was not just transplanted from the west, but both Islamists and Muslim political/philosophical/social elites, whose entire worldviews were embedded within Islam, saw it as something completely compatible with the latter. These traditions were not one and the same, but nor were they two separate and competing trends, and the two interacted and synthesised in complex ways as the late Ottoman Empire was integrated into the European-dominated capitalist world-system and as it achieved semi-acceptance into the Concert of Europe. When we get to the early Republican era the whole 'dialectic' seems to become weaker. Ataturk was not a religious man. Some historians argue he was flat out atheist, and certainly he didn't care much for religion. The Turkish state did not seek to eliminate Islam from Turkish society, but to control and pacify it to further the new state's legitimacy and to prevent outright armed rebellion beyond those Islamist uprisings that already did happen (e.g., Sheikh Said Rebellion and one other that I can't remember the name of). From here until perhaps the 1980s (but most definitely until Erdogan's premiership) secularism was very much in charge, and Islam was seen at best as something to be controlled and instrumentalised, and at worst Islam and Islamism were seen as threats to the culture and power of the new political-economic elites. Where Islamist movements did exist-and were covered by Findley-they were politically (but not necessarily culturally) marginalised and played little part in the development of the Turkish state. Perhaps this changes somewhat with Ozal, but a new form of Islamist modernity (rather than just 'Muslim modernity' as with Ozal) doesn't really take hold until Erdogan. The book was written in 2007, though, so most of this is missed simply because of the stage of Erdogan's career the book was completed at. If anything, the events since the book's publication have improved the hypothesis even if the whole dialectic becomes so unbalanced that it tips over for 70 years or so.

The second is heavily inspired by Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities*. I'm pretty sure most of that book's citations are just using the good title, but Findley actually follows the core argument. To Anderson, modern nationalism arose from capitalism. Capitalism created the productive conditions for mass literacy, mass literacy. These changes in turn created the conditions for 'print capitalism' wherein non-elites had access to newspapers, books, journals, and such. The standardisation of time, date, and particularly language created a greater common sense of shared identity, allowed for the emergence of a coherent national mythology, and created new networks of solidarity and connection that traversed a greater geographic area than before. All of this led to what Findley calls 'subjectivisation' (not the more Foucaldian term 'subjectivation'): a sort of 'constitution of one's own moral being', the individual's self-development and self-actualisation of their own identity and belief-system outside that which society has set for them. This occurs through print capitalism and through the spread of education and literacy as well as through the increased cross-group interactions occurring through urbanisation, rural dislocation, and migrant labour. Rationalisation, by contrast, entails trends contradictory to subjectivisation. It involves, inevitably, a level of centralisation and standardisation. It involves the throwing away of the old traditions with new materialist, 'objective', 'rational' ways and reasons of being. It necessitates the state imposing a vision of society and identity upon their subjects, who in turn toss and thrash against it. Rationalisation creates the conditions for subjectivisation, and the two exist inexorably in tension. As Weber famously wrote, rationalisation is what traps humans into the 'iron cage' of rule-based, standardised, 'rational' control-but it was never that simple. As in Turkey as elsewhere, rationalisation created the conditions for its own dissenters. Communists, Turkish ultra-nationalists, Islamist modernists, Kurdish nationalists, feminists, LGBT+ activists, putschists: all strained against the legacy weaved from Selim to Ataturk, creating a messy and complex society thereafter-though one whose particular context tended to resolve these conflicts through military intrusion and autocracy (for various reasons that the book lays out well). This part of the hypothesis is dealt with cleverly and its sophistication adds a huge amount to the more focused on tension in Turkish modernity between secularism and Islamism.

An interesting and novel aspect of the book is that it dedicates a fair bit of time to period literature at the end of each section. I see a couple of the reviewers disliked this, but I think it was neat, if perhaps imperfectly executed at times. I think Findley kind of overhypes the insights gained from them, but it was still good. He doesn't just rattle out the synopsis of the book as one reviewer on this page wrote and the themes and background are clearly related back to the hypotheses of the book and the author's analysis of the period. I don't think one can really miss it. I think sometimes the books choice wasn't perfect, but I don't know enough about Turkish literature to suggest any alternatives, so I cannot criticise it too much. My favourite was the Time Regulation institute, but I doubt I'll ever read the book itself as Findley makes clear that it's best appreciated through the Turkish language. The literary analysis does add some life to things, though I wonder if the same thing could've been achieved in a clearer way through non-elite memoirs or diaries instead-surely these exist plentifully? I guess it wouldn't have as much flavour, but this is hardly a 'flavourful' book anyway.

In conclusion, then, this is a very strong book. Its contributions are sophisticated, well supported, and advance past the old 'modernisation theory' era of Bernard Lewis by a long shot. This is a must-read. There are a couple of areas where the author is clearly a bit weaker (I don't agree with one of the other reviewers that he clearly favours Ottoman over Turkish history), e.g., his understanding of Kurdish politics and issues. His analysis of Erdogan is clearly wrong with the benefit of hindsight. Should he and could he have known better? I don't know, I'll have to read more mid-to-late 2000s works on Turkey to know what others were saying. Nevertheless, its flaws are minor and don't detract from the overall hypothesis and understanding of the research question that Findley succeeds in answering with great intelligence.

Definitely read!

[Cyrus Carter · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent overview of the histories leading to the current social factions and paradoxes in modern Turkey. Although Mr. Findlay's work is quite dense at the beginning, he wraps story upon story that hold us through over 200 years of history. One of the two best books on modern Turkey, the other being 'The Crescent and the Star'.

[Mohammad · Rating 5 out of 5]

This seems to be, in many ways, Dr. Findley's masterpiece. The themes he raises especially towards the beginning of the book is relevant for much of the Middle East, not just Turkey. Findley is an all-star scholar!

[Paul · Rating 5 out of 5]

In the vein of Bernard Lewis’ The Emergence of Modern Turkey and Niyazi Berkes’ The Development of Secularism in Turkey, Carter Findley’s Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity attempts to chronicle the history of the late Ottoman Empire and Republican Turkey through the paradigm of the state and society’s interaction with “modernity” and the rise of European hegemony. His work, however, diverges from its predecessors in two important regards. First of all, if not outright denying the “decline” thesis, the author nuances the explanation of the Ottoman Empire’s waning fortunes by moving beyond a simple conception of the state as being somehow inadequate to meet the challenges of an evolving world. Instead, he argues that the perception of decline stems from an incomplete representation of the empire that focuses solely on the external structures and developments that were disintegrating in the face of emerging circumstances. Findley complicates this view by highlighting internal developments that, while insufficient to keep the state together, resurfaced in Republican Turkey and continued to negotiate the unique elements of Anatolia’s population with visions of modernity. This, therefore, is his second major intervention, as he denies the conceptualization of modernity as a teleological, unidimensional process. Instead, “modernity” can take numerous paths and, in the late Ottoman Empire and Turkey, took a form that blended two major reformist “currents”: liberal secularization and conservative Islamism. It is the tale of these two trends that the author attempts to narrate in his book.

Findley’s introduction outlines the genesis of his book (including a brief historiographical review), as well as his objectives, conceptual framework, and methodology. Proceeding chronologically, the seven regular chapters each highlight a particular era within late Ottoman/Turkish history and attempt to demonstrate the evolution, convergences, and divergences of his two currents. These, however, are usually raised explicitly only in the opening of each chapter and never dealt with in a heavy-handed manner. Each chapter unfolds in a predictable fashion: following some introductory statements that connect the broader developments of the period to his two currents, the author outlines the political history of the era and delineates the developments that relate to high politics and the perspective and the agency of the elites and the state. He then proceeds to discuss economic conditions, quantitatively and qualitatively, before delving into societal matters and attempting to outline the developments as they were negotiated at the popular level; this section usually includes a demographic outline, as well as an analysis of the quality of life experienced by the masses. Finally, he concludes nearly every chapter with an examination of two important literary figures of the period, each of whom represents one of the ideological currents and whose work draws together all of the considerations raised in the chapter as they are negotiated into the lived experience of modernity.

Chapter one examines the period between the turn of the 19th century and Mahmud II’s death in 1839, although, like the works that came before it, it also contextualizes the reform movement by discussing developments in the 1700s. The period’s end point is determined by the proclamation of the Edict of Gülhane, which was, in Findley’s opinion, the first convergence of the two currents and “set goals for an Islamically grounded advance into modernity”. This was a direct result of a series of crises that ““led some Ottomans to seek greater knowledge of the outside world and others to reexamine the fundamental values of Islam”, the former of which impacted the elites primarily, while the latter trend was more influential with the rest of society. An elucidation of the Tanzimat period, up to Abdulhamid II’s reign, follows and is framed as a period of change that stems from the Sublime Porte rather than the palace. Contrasting the empire’s external stagnation and military failures to its internal reform, the author chronicles the key ideas of the Tanzimat, which were “civil bureaucratic hegemony; elite formation; legislation; governmental expansion; changes in intercommunal relations; and transformations of the political process”. These changes helped created new ethnic, religious, and class “subjectivities” (i.e. self-awareness of individual and collective identity) that had not existed previously and that branched off into multifarious experiences with and conceptualizations of modernity that reflected a new breadth of negotiations with the concept.

Findley’s study of the Ottoman Empire concludes with a chapter each on the reign of Abdulhamid II and the Young Turk period. In the former era, he argues, distinctions between the two currents began to sharpen as the sovereign’s policies and European cultural penetration helped develop individuals’ understandings of their newfound identities. Addressing the key elements of Abdulhamid II’s reign, “centralization, his Islamic emphases, reformist accomplishments, foreign policy, and the tension between rationalization and autocracy”, the author postulates that divisions began to occur around those who benefited from the state’s policies and those that did not. The ruler’s decisions also led to a system were people became more loyal to ideas than they did to particular individuals. For the Young Turks, meanwhile, the author frames his discussion around the question of whether their intervention was a revolution or a form of conservatism, since they were dedicated to the preservation of the empire. Here he seeks to emphasize the continuity between the empire and the republic and the overall continuing process of individuals (and society as a whole) negotiating modernity under dynamic circumstances. One of his highlighted authors for this section, Ziya Gökalp, is a particularly illuminating example of Findley’s overarching thesis, as Gökalp’s ideas championed a unified vision of “Turkishness, Islam, and modernity” that reflect, perhaps relatively crudely, Findley’s concept of multiple modernities across converging and diverging currents.

The author’s study of Turkey begins with a discussion of the early republican period, which is coterminous with the end of single-party rule in 1950. The key idea here is Kemalism, which had a divisive effect on emerging and developing identities since it, like the policies of Abdulhamid II, divided individuals based on the impact it had on them and helped crystalize discourses of difference at both the political and societal levels. Kemalism, therefore, was a new ideology with which Findley’s two major currents, as well as existing subjectivities, had to deal. The next chapter deals with a period of political chaos between 1950 and 1980 as the nation was, for the first time, able to translate all of these identities into organized parties. This fractured the political scene and also rebounded back onto society, as the movement of discourse to this level engendered increased levels of class formation and new forms of individual subjectivization. The final regular chapter examines Turkey’s three most recent decades (as of the time of the book’s 2010 publication) and chronicles the impact of globalism on subjectivity formation, awareness of ethnicity and, of course, the ways in which the two currents negotiated all of these developments.

Findley’s conclusion offers limited recapitulation and instead engages the work of Orhan Pamuk as a lens into contemporary Turkish society. Overall, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity is an excellent update to the history of the late Ottoman Empire and Republican Turkey that nuances previous understandings of the period while remaining comprehensible and informative to non-specialists. While some level of depth in the issues is sacrificed with the intent of covering a wide array of topics over a large time span, the result never comes off as superficial. In his introduction, the author states that his work began as a synthesis but evolved into an original argument about modernity that is not intended to overwhelm or overshadow the general survey. This book accomplishes exactly that; scholars familiar with the historiography of this period will be able to tell easily where many of the ideas and perspectives come from without having to look at the footnotes, yet Findley brings them together in a way that will prove valuable even for area specialists. Regardless of one’s background, I believe that few would be disappointed to see this text become a standard in survey courses of this period or region.

[Mesut Bostancı · Rating 1 out of 5]

Carter starts out the book saying he thought about how to be the intellectual successor of Bernard Lewis in this book and I couldn't take it seriously from there, especially after just coming after Çağlar Keyder's magisterial State and Class in Turkey. You can just tell from the weight of a history book, right out of the gate, that it's going to be a piece of dad-history reactionary garbage. Tries to be cool with the kids by pairing each chapter with an exemplary novel, helpful synopsis but does not tie them to the historical context at all.

[Tuğçe Samsun · Rating 3 out of 5]

Even though I really appreciated the effort the author put into this book, it is irrefutable that the book consists of some snapshots of modern Turkish history without pointing out main discussions in the early republic era. In addition, it is crystal clear that the author shows little enthusiasm for modern Turkish history comparing to that of the Ottoman Empire.

[Hakan Basgun · Rating 3 out of 5]

dönemleri içinde bulunduğu dönemin edebi eserleriyle yorumlaması bakımından çok beğendim. bu eserlerden bir kısmını okumuştum diğerlerini de okuma listeme aldım
kitap bazı yerlerde kendini çok tekrar ediyor ve biraz uzun birkaç kere bu bölümü daha önce okudum mu düşüncesine kapıldım

[Anas Taleb · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good overview of turkey’s modern development although I didn’t like the parts at the end of the chapters where he focused on literary works ( I didn’t find that significant to the time period he was describing)

[Koray · Rating 5 out of 5]

bir inkilap tarihi dersinden daha fazlası

[Jessica DeWitt · Rating 2 out of 5]

My rating is largely based on the level of enjoyment that I experienced while reading the book, which is basically none. This low-level of enjoyment is mainly caused by the fact that I know very little about the region and thus found much of the book hard to follow and also because I just have little interest in the subject; after reading this book, I'm still searching for the book that will pique my interest in the Middle East. The parts of the book, mainly those dealing with culture and literature, that I found the most interesting were weakened by Findley's insistence on providing laborious summaries of books from each time period. The summaries read like bad book review turned in by a first year student that didn't read the assignment and thus turned in a long-winded summary rather than an actual critique of the work. Just when I thought these tedious summaries were over, I turned to the conclusion and sure enough, there's yet another book summary. Ugh.

That being said, this book has an enormous amount of information in it which would prove useful for anyone who is an expert or is working on an assignment on the history of Turkey. The book is also well-organized. Each chapter is basically set-up the same and there are plenty of subheadings, which inform the reader exactly what info they are supposed to be getting from each section.

[Harold · Rating 1 out of 5]

I read this book because I was heading off for a vacation in Turkey and wanted to know something before I got there. It was not a good choice -- the book, not Turkey, which was both beautiful and fascinating. The book was obviously written by an academic, and is fit for someone who already knows a great deal about Turkish history and culture. Not me. Read this book only if are already deeply immersed in Turkish history and culture, and want another point of view.

[Marion Kipiani · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great book which gives a good overview of political, economic, social developments over the period covered. Not always an easy read though. I especially liked that the author is using literary works to point out salient developments and concerns of the period. Recommended reading.

[Jason S · Rating 3 out of 5]

A comprehensive account of Ottoman and Turkish history since 1789. The cultural history aspects of the book (literature analysis) seemed a bit forced, but an authoritative look at the political, diplomatic, economic, and social history.