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Truth, Lies, and O-Rings: Inside the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster
What they didn't want you to know "We all watched in shock and disbelief when Challenger was lost. Probably no one felt more disappointment and regret than Allan McDonald, who had warned us not to launch that day. His story tells of loss, grief, and the eventual rebuilding and recovery."--Robert "Hoot" Gibson, former Space Shuttle pilot and commander "A major contribution to a difficult episode in the history of human spaceflight."--Roger D. Launius, Division of Space History, Smithsonian Institution "McDonald tells the heartbreaking tale of how he saw his words of warning ignored, and the fateful consequences of that decision."--Donald C. Elder III, Eastern New Mexico University On a cold January morning in 1986, NASA launched the Space Shuttle Challenger , despite warnings against doing so by many individuals, including Allan McDonald. The fiery destruction of Challenger on live television moments after launch remains an indelible image in the nation’s collective memory. In Truth, Lies, and O-Rings , McDonald, a skilled engineer and executive, relives the tragedy from where he stood at Launch Control Center. As he fought to draw attention to the real reasons behind the disaster, he was the only one targeted for retribution by both NASA and his employer, Morton Thiokol, Inc., makers of the shuttle's solid rocket boosters. In this whistle-blowing yet rigorous and fair-minded book, McDonald, with the assistance of internationally distinguished aerospace historian James R. Hansen, addresses all of the factors that led to the accident, some of which were never included in NASA's Failure Team report submitted to the Presidential Commission. Truth, Lies, and O-Rings is the first look at the Challenger tragedy and its aftermath from someone who was on the inside, recognized the potential disaster, and tried to prevent it. It also addresses the early warnings of very severe debris issues from the first two post- Challenger flights, which ultimately resulted in the loss of Columbia some fifteen years later.
648 pages, Paperback
First published April 26, 2009
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 96 reviews
June 2, 2021
I have had this book on my TBR for a while now and was inspired to give it a try after watching the Challenger docu-series on Netflix. Unfortunately, historical disasters are fascinating and tend to make for interesting shows and books. I remember the day the Challenger accident happened, and I have always been interested in learning more about it.
With Truth, Lies, and O-Rings I learned A LOT about the events leading up to and following the Challenger tragedy. And, it is no accident that I capitalized A LOT; McDonald does not just give a basic, quick summary. This is an extremely detailed, often repetitive, account of EVERYTHING you could possibly ever want to know about it. I cannot stress this enough – if you only have a passing interest in this event, just want a quick summary of everything (much like what was presented in the docu-series), or this is just your first time to try and learn about this subject, I don’t recommend this book.
However, this is a great book and will give you all the details you need. If you love getting into the nitty gritty of historical events - and, I mean, really immersing yourself in the details, the facts, the people, etc. - then this is the book for you. Despite being dense with facts, McDonald does a pretty decent job of keeping it interesting and has written it in a way that is accessible to the layman.
While reading, someone commented on one of my statuses that they hoped I would give my before and after impressions of NASA when I was done reading this book. To be honest, I never gave a whole lot of thought to NASA before reading this book. To me, they were just an agency that put people in space. After reading the book, I see a bit more of how they are just another government agency with lots of bureaucracy, red tape, and pressure to deliver – sometimes at the expense of safety and common sense. Also, they really work hard to pass the blame when possible. But, they also did many positive things over the course of the events in this book – so it is not all bad. So, I would say I now know more about NASA, but I am not really surprised by its behavior as a government agency.
In summary, I recommend this book to hardcore space and historical disaster buffs who want all the details in depth and ad nauseum. I do not recommend this book to those with a passing and casual interest.
With Truth, Lies, and O-Rings I learned A LOT about the events leading up to and following the Challenger tragedy. And, it is no accident that I capitalized A LOT; McDonald does not just give a basic, quick summary. This is an extremely detailed, often repetitive, account of EVERYTHING you could possibly ever want to know about it. I cannot stress this enough – if you only have a passing interest in this event, just want a quick summary of everything (much like what was presented in the docu-series), or this is just your first time to try and learn about this subject, I don’t recommend this book.
However, this is a great book and will give you all the details you need. If you love getting into the nitty gritty of historical events - and, I mean, really immersing yourself in the details, the facts, the people, etc. - then this is the book for you. Despite being dense with facts, McDonald does a pretty decent job of keeping it interesting and has written it in a way that is accessible to the layman.
While reading, someone commented on one of my statuses that they hoped I would give my before and after impressions of NASA when I was done reading this book. To be honest, I never gave a whole lot of thought to NASA before reading this book. To me, they were just an agency that put people in space. After reading the book, I see a bit more of how they are just another government agency with lots of bureaucracy, red tape, and pressure to deliver – sometimes at the expense of safety and common sense. Also, they really work hard to pass the blame when possible. But, they also did many positive things over the course of the events in this book – so it is not all bad. So, I would say I now know more about NASA, but I am not really surprised by its behavior as a government agency.
In summary, I recommend this book to hardcore space and historical disaster buffs who want all the details in depth and ad nauseum. I do not recommend this book to those with a passing and casual interest.
February 9, 2022
DNF: 65%
I'm just so tired of listening to this guy.
Allan J. McDonald was director of the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor Project for Morton-Thiokol, the company that manufactured the solid rocket boosters for the space shuttle Challenger. He did not sign off on the Challenger launch. So, he did the right thing there. After the Challenger disaster, in which seven astronauts were killed, he testified before the Rogers Commission, making a major contribution to the uncovering of the truth - essentially, that discussions took place before the launch between Morton-Thiokol and NASA, with the former being aware of the problems with the O-Rings at cold temperatures and therefore voting against the launch, before getting pressured by NASA and ultimately making a management decision (instead of an engineering decision) to sign off on the launch and, after that went catastrophically wrong, everyone trying to cover it up. Again, McDonald did the right thing.
Problem is, he comes across as someone that really wants everyone to know, that he, Allan J. McDonald, did the right thing. That he is the hero of this story. At no point does he sound like someone that did it just because it was the right thing to do.
The result is a narration that goes back and forth between fingerpointing, being defensive as to his own involvement, or self-congratulatory, or whiny (McDonald stayed on at Morton-Thiokol for another 15 years and you can probably imagine how much fun that was).
When the problem with this book isn't the author being unlikable, it is the author being not a writer but an engineer. He goes into every little detail of, well, everything. Whether it is actually important for the Challenger disaster or not doesn't matter to him at all. I bet he was someone who wrote down, word for word, every discussion he ever had with anybody about anything. Fun guy. Problem is, he is absolutely incapable of telling a story. Yes, he once made Richard Feynman laugh by telling him a story. But Mr. McDonald, have you heard of people laughing about a joke just out of politeness? I'm sorry to break the news to you, but that's likely what happened there.
Come to think about it, maybe I'm too harsh with my judgement of McDonald. Maybe he wasn't an unlikable person, but just someone that had trouble articulating himself or understanding properly how he is perceived by others. At some point he tells about a commencement speech he was invited to hold at his Alma Mater and how they told him that these can be either funny or serious, but they shouldn't be longer than three minutes. He says he decided to go with funny and then proceeds reading his speech word for word, which I'm pretty sure took longer than three minutes and which certainly was devoid of any humor. And I mean any humor. Fun guy.
I'm sorry, but I just can't finish this book. When he was recounting how Morton-Thiokol representatives spoke before a committee and told them something like [paraphrasing] we are deeply affected by the Challenger tragedy because it was our solid rocket boosters that caused it, McDonald points out that he hadn't sent them his commencement speech (the funny one above) in which he had said the same thing, so he can't be sure about this, but maybe it is possible they came up with that themselves. Seriously? Like you had said something extraordinary there and not just a stock phrase that anybody involved in that giant fuck up would use when they finally reached the point of admitting that they were at fault.
I don't know what more to say. This is a story of idiots doing idiotic things. McDonald did the right thing. But his story should have been told by someone else.
2 stars, because the hearings were actually interesting and Feynman, Sally Ride and Neil Armstrong asked some good questions.
I'm just so tired of listening to this guy.
Allan J. McDonald was director of the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor Project for Morton-Thiokol, the company that manufactured the solid rocket boosters for the space shuttle Challenger. He did not sign off on the Challenger launch. So, he did the right thing there. After the Challenger disaster, in which seven astronauts were killed, he testified before the Rogers Commission, making a major contribution to the uncovering of the truth - essentially, that discussions took place before the launch between Morton-Thiokol and NASA, with the former being aware of the problems with the O-Rings at cold temperatures and therefore voting against the launch, before getting pressured by NASA and ultimately making a management decision (instead of an engineering decision) to sign off on the launch and, after that went catastrophically wrong, everyone trying to cover it up. Again, McDonald did the right thing.
Problem is, he comes across as someone that really wants everyone to know, that he, Allan J. McDonald, did the right thing. That he is the hero of this story. At no point does he sound like someone that did it just because it was the right thing to do.
The result is a narration that goes back and forth between fingerpointing, being defensive as to his own involvement, or self-congratulatory, or whiny (McDonald stayed on at Morton-Thiokol for another 15 years and you can probably imagine how much fun that was).
When the problem with this book isn't the author being unlikable, it is the author being not a writer but an engineer. He goes into every little detail of, well, everything. Whether it is actually important for the Challenger disaster or not doesn't matter to him at all. I bet he was someone who wrote down, word for word, every discussion he ever had with anybody about anything. Fun guy. Problem is, he is absolutely incapable of telling a story. Yes, he once made Richard Feynman laugh by telling him a story. But Mr. McDonald, have you heard of people laughing about a joke just out of politeness? I'm sorry to break the news to you, but that's likely what happened there.
Come to think about it, maybe I'm too harsh with my judgement of McDonald. Maybe he wasn't an unlikable person, but just someone that had trouble articulating himself or understanding properly how he is perceived by others. At some point he tells about a commencement speech he was invited to hold at his Alma Mater and how they told him that these can be either funny or serious, but they shouldn't be longer than three minutes. He says he decided to go with funny and then proceeds reading his speech word for word, which I'm pretty sure took longer than three minutes and which certainly was devoid of any humor. And I mean any humor. Fun guy.
I'm sorry, but I just can't finish this book. When he was recounting how Morton-Thiokol representatives spoke before a committee and told them something like [paraphrasing] we are deeply affected by the Challenger tragedy because it was our solid rocket boosters that caused it, McDonald points out that he hadn't sent them his commencement speech (the funny one above) in which he had said the same thing, so he can't be sure about this, but maybe it is possible they came up with that themselves. Seriously? Like you had said something extraordinary there and not just a stock phrase that anybody involved in that giant fuck up would use when they finally reached the point of admitting that they were at fault.
I don't know what more to say. This is a story of idiots doing idiotic things. McDonald did the right thing. But his story should have been told by someone else.
2 stars, because the hearings were actually interesting and Feynman, Sally Ride and Neil Armstrong asked some good questions.
April 14, 2024
I am not an engineer, therefore this very long listen was difficult at times, but I did manage to get the gist.
There is a LOT of repetition, and loads of self congratulation from the author - some may say that he is right to I am sure, as he is unusual for actually telling the truth about what happened!
Ultimately, the book made me very angry, particularly for the families of those who needlessly lost their lives. They should have only travelled if there were no possible problems with the craft, not because of pressure to launch.
A true tragedy.
There is a LOT of repetition, and loads of self congratulation from the author - some may say that he is right to I am sure, as he is unusual for actually telling the truth about what happened!
Ultimately, the book made me very angry, particularly for the families of those who needlessly lost their lives. They should have only travelled if there were no possible problems with the craft, not because of pressure to launch.
A true tragedy.
January 20, 2016
Depressing but fascinating. I couldn't put the book down. The amount of CYA that was done, the level of non-cooperation with the Rogers Commission by NASA MSFC and Thiokol...I'd wish it weren't true. But some of the astronauts that I've worked/interacted with, as well as the former Shuttle PM (Wayne Hale) recommended the book, so I think it is probably more true than not. More terrifying, the shuttle crews that this disaster impacted (because Challenger was not an isolated o-ring incident; it was just the worst one) were never informed of what was going on, technically, with the vehicle and rockets. And worse still, NASA didn't learn its lesson, because McDonald touches on the fact that Columbia had some of the same root causes in terms of lack of communication and lack of appropriate follow-through on issues.
In fairness, this book isn't particularly well-written. While McDonald may have been a manager at the time of Challenger, it's clear that he's mostly an engineer. He writes like one. It's a shame, because I think that if the book was better written, it might be more approachable. In particular, he uses terms that as an aerospace engineer are part of my normal lexicon, but normal people may not know...nevermind the TLAs (or FLAs).
I also learned things in this book about a person who used to work for the company that I work for (and was on the board). And learned a historical fact about the company I guess I currently work for. And I was again reminded of how inbred the aerospace industry really is.
Alas. This book was a timely read, with the 30th anniversary of that fateful day coming up in just over a week. Ad astra per aspera.
In fairness, this book isn't particularly well-written. While McDonald may have been a manager at the time of Challenger, it's clear that he's mostly an engineer. He writes like one. It's a shame, because I think that if the book was better written, it might be more approachable. In particular, he uses terms that as an aerospace engineer are part of my normal lexicon, but normal people may not know...nevermind the TLAs (or FLAs).
I also learned things in this book about a person who used to work for the company that I work for (and was on the board). And learned a historical fact about the company I guess I currently work for. And I was again reminded of how inbred the aerospace industry really is.
Alas. This book was a timely read, with the 30th anniversary of that fateful day coming up in just over a week. Ad astra per aspera.
June 3, 2009
My father worked for Morton-Thiokol at the time of the Challenger disaster. While he hasn't read this book yet, he says that this is the person he trusts to tell the truth.
It was great to hear this first-hand account and to compare it to my father's stories and my own memories. I was surprised at how much I actually understood as a child. There were a few surprises, but not many. I guess my father did a good job explaining it all.
Allan McDonald writes like you'd expect an engineer to write. There are so many details it tends to be repetitive at times, especially in the beginning. But that turned out to be beneficial as there was so much info to sort through. It helped to go over some things again.
If this story interests you, this is a fantastic book. The story was incredibly interesting and all my questions were answered thoroughly.
It was great to hear this first-hand account and to compare it to my father's stories and my own memories. I was surprised at how much I actually understood as a child. There were a few surprises, but not many. I guess my father did a good job explaining it all.
Allan McDonald writes like you'd expect an engineer to write. There are so many details it tends to be repetitive at times, especially in the beginning. But that turned out to be beneficial as there was so much info to sort through. It helped to go over some things again.
If this story interests you, this is a fantastic book. The story was incredibly interesting and all my questions were answered thoroughly.
July 3, 2017
OMG, finally got through this freaking book. It was tough to finish. I really like the information in it, but the writing was not pleasant. He repeats himself over and over, sometimes from one page to the next. He also includes SO MANY unnecessary details! I don't care that you ordered pizza while you were figuring out your speech. Hell, I don't care when or where you were figuring out your speech. Just tell me about the content. This book could have been half the length and would have been a very good read. I wanted to like it and finish it because I wanted to know the information, but it literally took me a year. I had to keep taking time off from it because I just couldn't handle it. Not to mention it feels like throughout the whole book he's just on the defense. I get that he's trying to portray his point of view, but I was so tired of his tone of righteousnous.
March 20, 2013
I think most of us know the official causes of the Challenger disaster. But this book examines the disaster through one of the engineers aside from Roger Boisjoly that raised concerns about the launch.
While some of the sections are repetitive through the book, because of the technical complexity I find it a necessary evil. Having said that, the book is remarkably easy to read and doesn't have the mish-mosh of TLAs one would expect of engineering and scientific writing. The background, the accident, the hearings, and the redesign of the Solid Rocket Boosters are covered in great detail.
While some of the sections are repetitive through the book, because of the technical complexity I find it a necessary evil. Having said that, the book is remarkably easy to read and doesn't have the mish-mosh of TLAs one would expect of engineering and scientific writing. The background, the accident, the hearings, and the redesign of the Solid Rocket Boosters are covered in great detail.
February 22, 2016
This is the first extensive account I have read of the Challenger disaster. The book seems so patently biased to me that I am left wondering how much of it I can believe and feeling that it's necessary to read another account. However, after 500 pages on Challenger, it's definitely time for a break.
The good - It's detailed. To a fault. McDonald was there for most of what happened before and after the disaster, and so the details are covered in-depth. I really feel McDonald omitted nothing significant.
The bad - It's more of an account of McDonald's experience with the Challenger than the Challenger itself. McDonald includes all kinds of random information of virtually no interest to your typical reader, such as interview requests from well-known journalists and the like.
It feels hopelessly biased. McDonald feels he is entirely innocent in the disaster and spends much of the text vindicating himself and his actions before and after the tragedy. It is a very self-centered account.
For what it's worth, I don't share McDonald's opinion that he was innocent. McDonald feels he did all he could to stop the launch, and I heartily disagree. He declared he wouldn't sign a recommendation to fly but was willing to let his boss do it. Given his position, there is no question in my mind that had he been willing to put his career on the line, he could have stopped the flight - could have and should have.
McDonald makes much of NASA's reaction to Thiokol's recommendation that 53 degrees be set as the minimum temperature for flight. I hardly blame NASA. Who comes up with a new, highly restrictive go-for-flight criteria less than 24 hours before a launch? Had Thiokol been responsible, they would have made this recommendation months or years ago. Of course NASA should have, after their initial dismay, called a complete halt until Thiokol's concerns could be understood and put to rest. Nevertheless, Thiokol's management - including McDonald - is equally at fault for eventually giving an unrestricted go-for-launch recommendation. It took mistakes my many, many people for Challenger to occur. The book made it clear there was no one responsible individual or organization.
McDonald's account is very thorough and complete and allows the reader to draw conclusions like mine above.
Overall, I found this a bit trying to read. It could have easily been trimmed by 50 or 100 pages without losing any facts about the tragedy itself. Nonetheless, it's certainly a good reference on the Challenger.
The good - It's detailed. To a fault. McDonald was there for most of what happened before and after the disaster, and so the details are covered in-depth. I really feel McDonald omitted nothing significant.
The bad - It's more of an account of McDonald's experience with the Challenger than the Challenger itself. McDonald includes all kinds of random information of virtually no interest to your typical reader, such as interview requests from well-known journalists and the like.
It feels hopelessly biased. McDonald feels he is entirely innocent in the disaster and spends much of the text vindicating himself and his actions before and after the tragedy. It is a very self-centered account.
For what it's worth, I don't share McDonald's opinion that he was innocent. McDonald feels he did all he could to stop the launch, and I heartily disagree. He declared he wouldn't sign a recommendation to fly but was willing to let his boss do it. Given his position, there is no question in my mind that had he been willing to put his career on the line, he could have stopped the flight - could have and should have.
McDonald makes much of NASA's reaction to Thiokol's recommendation that 53 degrees be set as the minimum temperature for flight. I hardly blame NASA. Who comes up with a new, highly restrictive go-for-flight criteria less than 24 hours before a launch? Had Thiokol been responsible, they would have made this recommendation months or years ago. Of course NASA should have, after their initial dismay, called a complete halt until Thiokol's concerns could be understood and put to rest. Nevertheless, Thiokol's management - including McDonald - is equally at fault for eventually giving an unrestricted go-for-launch recommendation. It took mistakes my many, many people for Challenger to occur. The book made it clear there was no one responsible individual or organization.
McDonald's account is very thorough and complete and allows the reader to draw conclusions like mine above.
Overall, I found this a bit trying to read. It could have easily been trimmed by 50 or 100 pages without losing any facts about the tragedy itself. Nonetheless, it's certainly a good reference on the Challenger.
August 21, 2015
I listened to a Freakonomics podcast about failure and it referenced this book during an interview with Allan McDonald (http://freakonomics.com/2014/06/05/fa...). It's a long one - almost 600 pages - and it took me awhile to get through it, but I enjoyed the read very much. Although the book was at times overly technical for my tastes, it was a fascinating read about the known O-ring problems in the solid rocket motor joints that precipitated the Challenger explosion, as well as the investigation into root causes and potential solutions that followed. I felt that McDonald is slightly narcissistic at times in his writing, but that didn't take much away from the content. If you have an engineering or manufacturing background and are interested in reading about how bureaucracy can sometimes create an environment that makes success challenging, I think you'll enjoy this book.
May 26, 2019
Blah blah. 6hrs into audiobook before accident occurs. Sad to say but because of that it was almost a relief when disaster happened in the book. I was so sick of hearing writers job history and each booster test and whether there was any nozzle wear.
October 14, 2024
Space Shuttle Challenger was manufactured in 1978, with the maiden flight being April 4-9, 1983. Challenger spent 62 days in space, orbited Earth nearly 1,000 times, and did 10 flights. Challenger was responsible for several firsts: the first American female astronaut in space, the first American female to spacewalk, the first African American astronaut in space, and also took up the first Canadian astronaut. Challenger launched many satellites for companies and conducted three SpaceLab missions. The final flight was on January 28, 1986. Challenger broke apart 73 seconds after liftoff, killing everyone on board. The cause of the accident was determined to be faulty boosters but was also a product of stupidity and negligence. Interestingly, you can view a part of Challenger at the Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex, but the bulk of the wreckage is buried in decommissioned missile silos. Sometimes, people find Challenger debris washed up on beaches, which is collected by NASA and taken to the silos.
This book is currently available to listen to for free on Audible Plus. It was about 15 hours long. If you are interested in the physical copy, it is over 600 pages, which is perfect if you are looking for a longer read. If you are interested in space programs or disasters, this is a good book for you. The author recounts his first-hand experiences working in the space industry, with NASA directly, and his involvement in the Challenger shuttle disaster. It took me several days to listen to this book because some of it was a little tedious at times, but I am also not a super big space nerd, which is probably why. The book was easy to understand, and the author made sure to describe and explain things for those of us who are unfamiliar with the lingo and work. There is also a Netflix series with four episodes about this, if you are interested in documentaries.
This book is currently available to listen to for free on Audible Plus. It was about 15 hours long. If you are interested in the physical copy, it is over 600 pages, which is perfect if you are looking for a longer read. If you are interested in space programs or disasters, this is a good book for you. The author recounts his first-hand experiences working in the space industry, with NASA directly, and his involvement in the Challenger shuttle disaster. It took me several days to listen to this book because some of it was a little tedious at times, but I am also not a super big space nerd, which is probably why. The book was easy to understand, and the author made sure to describe and explain things for those of us who are unfamiliar with the lingo and work. There is also a Netflix series with four episodes about this, if you are interested in documentaries.
July 29, 2021
an engineering and corporate masterpiece. even having read books & movies on the challenger disaster this contained a lot more. also covers many missions, technologies and personalities. ethical dillemmas, internal political drama, and if thats not enough theres more. the giant book has a wealth of engineering detail that some may find tedious but many like myself will find it facinating and truely un-putdownable. i know it's one sided & he bangs his own drum but alan demonstrated so much integrity and engineering purity on so many fronts and that is backed up by true life documentaries and events that are now history. we need more engineers and managers with true integrity and skill like Alan j. macdonald and fewer slimeball manipulators who become corrupt to further their own agenda.
February 8, 2020
Oh my, what a slog. This was so dry. It was so repetitive. And that's a shame, because this is one of those tragic events burned into the memories of many Americans, and I was really kind of psyched to read an expert's take on what happened. I remember watching this in my first grade classroom, and being horrified at what had just happened. Like 9/11, like JFK's assassination, like Pearl Harbor, if you were alive when it occurred, you know exactly where you were when you heard the news.
I've read in-depth books about Chernobyl and other disasters, including space program disasters, and am willing to forgive a little technobabble here and there. Highly technical stuff explained in an interesting way for the layperson can be successfully done. Unfortunately, 99% of this book was the author, an engineer who didn't sign off on Challenger's launch because of incredibly cold weather, rehashing that fact over and over and over. Much of the text is essentially transcripts from congressional and NASA hearings, with just a little color thrown in here and there; and while once in a while that can be useful, it can't be the entire narrative. This book so badly needed an editor. Al McDonald has an interesting story to tell somewhere in there, and it's a shame no one helped him cut the fat here. A good 200-250 pages could've easily been removed. This is especially evident when he reproduces newspaper and magazine articles about the disaster and his testimony, and the writing is just so much better.
It didn't really satisfy my curiosity about what caused the Challenger explosion, or put it into a larger perspective about getting things done quickly and cheaply to meet arbitrary deadlines. President Reagan famously wanted to boast in his State of the Union address that America had sent a regular citizen, teacher Christa McAuliffe, into space, and the launch date was critical. Unseasonably cold temperatures in FL that morning not only changed the celebratory nature of Reagan's speech, but took McAuliffe's and six other astronauts' lives. McDonald just kept pointing out that sometimes things fail, and all an expert like him, one of the people who built one of the parts, can do is sign off on whether the risk is worth it to achieve a successful outcome (i.e. the shuttle actually getting into orbit and returning the astronauts safely), or it isn't (their shuttle explodes in a haunting Y-shaped cloud a mere 7 seconds into lift-off).
I would say skip this book unless you're really hungry for over 500 pages of repetition and not much of it very fascinating or enlightening. I'm going to hunt for a better Challenger book in the future. Those poor seven people deserve a better format for their tragic deaths.
I've read in-depth books about Chernobyl and other disasters, including space program disasters, and am willing to forgive a little technobabble here and there. Highly technical stuff explained in an interesting way for the layperson can be successfully done. Unfortunately, 99% of this book was the author, an engineer who didn't sign off on Challenger's launch because of incredibly cold weather, rehashing that fact over and over and over. Much of the text is essentially transcripts from congressional and NASA hearings, with just a little color thrown in here and there; and while once in a while that can be useful, it can't be the entire narrative. This book so badly needed an editor. Al McDonald has an interesting story to tell somewhere in there, and it's a shame no one helped him cut the fat here. A good 200-250 pages could've easily been removed. This is especially evident when he reproduces newspaper and magazine articles about the disaster and his testimony, and the writing is just so much better.
It didn't really satisfy my curiosity about what caused the Challenger explosion, or put it into a larger perspective about getting things done quickly and cheaply to meet arbitrary deadlines. President Reagan famously wanted to boast in his State of the Union address that America had sent a regular citizen, teacher Christa McAuliffe, into space, and the launch date was critical. Unseasonably cold temperatures in FL that morning not only changed the celebratory nature of Reagan's speech, but took McAuliffe's and six other astronauts' lives. McDonald just kept pointing out that sometimes things fail, and all an expert like him, one of the people who built one of the parts, can do is sign off on whether the risk is worth it to achieve a successful outcome (i.e. the shuttle actually getting into orbit and returning the astronauts safely), or it isn't (their shuttle explodes in a haunting Y-shaped cloud a mere 7 seconds into lift-off).
I would say skip this book unless you're really hungry for over 500 pages of repetition and not much of it very fascinating or enlightening. I'm going to hunt for a better Challenger book in the future. Those poor seven people deserve a better format for their tragic deaths.
March 19, 2021
If the topic of the Challenger disaster is interesting to you this book is fantastic. But it is a deep dive. The audiobook was over 27 hours long. Its highly technical in describing the very complicated engineering involved and very detailed regarding the complicated organization of NASA and its partners.
The author is hardly unbiased, but as the only book written by someone actually involved in the entire process its fascinating to have the insider view. Most of what the author claims (NASA pressured Morton Thiokol to approve the launch, the engineers at Thiokol didn't want to do it, management did) lines up with what I've read elsewhere.
The book isn't exactly well written. It rambles a bit and is repetitive. It reads like an internet forum written over several years that the author finally hit "post" on. But if this topic is something interesting to you its worth getting through just for things like the description of this guy standing up in the middle of Presidential Commission hearing and just unloading everything he thought went wrong when everyone else seemed to be giving rehearsed statements.
The author is hardly unbiased, but as the only book written by someone actually involved in the entire process its fascinating to have the insider view. Most of what the author claims (NASA pressured Morton Thiokol to approve the launch, the engineers at Thiokol didn't want to do it, management did) lines up with what I've read elsewhere.
The book isn't exactly well written. It rambles a bit and is repetitive. It reads like an internet forum written over several years that the author finally hit "post" on. But if this topic is something interesting to you its worth getting through just for things like the description of this guy standing up in the middle of Presidential Commission hearing and just unloading everything he thought went wrong when everyone else seemed to be giving rehearsed statements.
February 5, 2022
24 Jan 2022: I'm less than an hour into the audiobook, and it is pretty off-putting already. Very self-congratulatory: thank goodness I was too smart to do what those other people did, those mistakes happened before I showed up, that sort of thing.
26 Jan 2022: Good grief, McDonald is full of self-pity. I'm not sure I'm going to finish this.
4 Feb 2022: Almost done, thank goodness. I did think this was going to be less about engineering and more about workplace ethics, and both are in the book a lot, but I suspect he wrote this so he could have the last word. There's a difference between workplace ethics and company politics. The parts about testing and engineering (though I don't understand it all) are very interesting, though.
5 Feb 2022: Finished. This is definitely a memoir and not a more impartial kind of nonfiction book. I read it to find out more about the Challenger accident, and while that is a specter hanging over everything McDonald does, the book is very definitely a Dear Diary about his life.
26 Jan 2022: Good grief, McDonald is full of self-pity. I'm not sure I'm going to finish this.
4 Feb 2022: Almost done, thank goodness. I did think this was going to be less about engineering and more about workplace ethics, and both are in the book a lot, but I suspect he wrote this so he could have the last word. There's a difference between workplace ethics and company politics. The parts about testing and engineering (though I don't understand it all) are very interesting, though.
5 Feb 2022: Finished. This is definitely a memoir and not a more impartial kind of nonfiction book. I read it to find out more about the Challenger accident, and while that is a specter hanging over everything McDonald does, the book is very definitely a Dear Diary about his life.
Want to read
April 15, 2012A testament to one of the greatest case studies on existential risk, Al McDonald's text is one of the most exceptionally documented, detailed and insightful works on the emergence of catastrophic risk produced.
As one who manages enterprise and operational risk in global financial processing, Al's work provides an invaluable illustration into the encroachment of the political into the realm of technical risk. I've yet to encounter a similar work that is so well documented and objective, yet makes you stop on every other page and realize how intentionally blind our governance systems are that they could willfully condemn the crew of the Challenger to a fiery end due to the obstinate career advancing/protecting interests of NASA and Morton Thiokol management.
Whether you're in risk, human resource management, operations, or engineering, this is a book written with exceptional humility that merits significant attention in our professional and educational circles.
As one who manages enterprise and operational risk in global financial processing, Al's work provides an invaluable illustration into the encroachment of the political into the realm of technical risk. I've yet to encounter a similar work that is so well documented and objective, yet makes you stop on every other page and realize how intentionally blind our governance systems are that they could willfully condemn the crew of the Challenger to a fiery end due to the obstinate career advancing/protecting interests of NASA and Morton Thiokol management.
Whether you're in risk, human resource management, operations, or engineering, this is a book written with exceptional humility that merits significant attention in our professional and educational circles.
May 5, 2019
This book is epic. Not just in length, but also in the amount of detail that the author has put in. I found this book very interesting but the reader should keep in mind that it is extraordinarily biased. It is a memoir, not a straightforward telling of the facts from all sides. You definitely get the perspective of McDonald’s position before, during, and after the Challenger disaster. You can also tell that he is an engineer and it reads like one is writing. There are plenty of details that could’ve been removed and you would’ve still understood what happened. Having said that, the technical details do help the reader understanding his arguments. Overall, I would still recommend reading this book. When the book focusses on the people involved and not just the technical details I found the story fascinating.
July 30, 2017
Great book. Space Shuttle and aerospace is just part of it. This book details how hard it is to speak up and do the right thing before and after an event. Must read for people in management to learn how putting money and profit first is not a wise idea when lives are involved.
April 16, 2024
This was disappointing because it's so so redundant that at least one would expect a complete version of events. Unfortunately there are serious omissions.
The book The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA makes the case that a key link in the disaster cascade was the ineptitude with which the Thiokol engineers (including McDonald presumably) tried to make their case about the impact of cold weather on O-rings. That book contains a graph made by a staffer on the Rogers Commission displaying the relevant data in a way that would have been clear to everyone and would very likely have led to scrubbing the launch and preventing the disaster. That book leaves it as a mystery though why all these rocket scientists couldn't figure out to ask for the relevant data or make a meaningful graph out of it.
McDonald is the person and this is the book that should have clarified this giant question, but it doesn't. This guy goes on and on about the Rogers Commission and the meetings about the launch decision, but even years later fails to go over this key failure, all the while portraying himself as the heroic truthteller.
I believe his rationale that he perceived his job as proving why/when it was safe to launch, NOT when it was UNsafe to launch. I can understand how it could have totally discombobulated the engineers when NASA asked them to prove it was unsafe, but it's still not a good excuse for the failure mentioned above.
One horrifying tidbit I learned from this book was that the crew was alive until they crashed back into the water.
There are many interesting details in here for someone to dig through about the performance of not only engineers and NASA administrators, but also reporters, politicians, astronauts, etc.
A bigger picture omission is the inherent needless danger of including people on space missions at all for stuff like launching satellites. See Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies
The book The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA makes the case that a key link in the disaster cascade was the ineptitude with which the Thiokol engineers (including McDonald presumably) tried to make their case about the impact of cold weather on O-rings. That book contains a graph made by a staffer on the Rogers Commission displaying the relevant data in a way that would have been clear to everyone and would very likely have led to scrubbing the launch and preventing the disaster. That book leaves it as a mystery though why all these rocket scientists couldn't figure out to ask for the relevant data or make a meaningful graph out of it.
McDonald is the person and this is the book that should have clarified this giant question, but it doesn't. This guy goes on and on about the Rogers Commission and the meetings about the launch decision, but even years later fails to go over this key failure, all the while portraying himself as the heroic truthteller.
I believe his rationale that he perceived his job as proving why/when it was safe to launch, NOT when it was UNsafe to launch. I can understand how it could have totally discombobulated the engineers when NASA asked them to prove it was unsafe, but it's still not a good excuse for the failure mentioned above.
One horrifying tidbit I learned from this book was that the crew was alive until they crashed back into the water.
There are many interesting details in here for someone to dig through about the performance of not only engineers and NASA administrators, but also reporters, politicians, astronauts, etc.
A bigger picture omission is the inherent needless danger of including people on space missions at all for stuff like launching satellites. See Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies
January 1, 2019
This is an important book, but I think there are a few things that the reader should know going in. First - this is not an unbiased account of Challenger, this is McDonald's memoir. It is written in the first person and does not include any outside points of view. He will do his best to convince you of what he believes is correct, and you can decide to believe him or not. Despite how he was treated by Morton Thiokol, he is certainly a company man.
Second, it is extremely technical. I don't think most casual readers need quite this much technical detail, including a lot of jargon that is never defined. There are some engineering diagrams included, but I could not read them. Anyone in the corporate world will probably not be surprised to find that it is filled with an alphabet soup of acronyms. There is a two-page glossary of abbreviations in the back that you might want to dog-ear as a reference while you read.
Finally, it is quite repetitive, a device which I suspect is used to counter the level of technical detail by just repeating the complicated explanations in slightly different ways. Although I am a complete layperson regarding engineering, aerospace, flight physics, etc., even I felt that issues were being repetitively over-explained after a while. This is more than a slight problem given that the book is over 550 pages long. The scope of the book is also much wider than the Challenger disaster, with a good chunk of the book covering the process of redesigning the solid rocket motor that failed on the Challenger, and Morton Thiokol's general woes as a result of the catastrophe. You will also enjoy reading what amount to lightly abridged transcripts of every single Commission and Congressional hearing McDonald participated in, or later watched tape of.
I often wished as I was reading that instead of writing this book himself, McDonald had worked with an investigative reporter who could have delivered something far more balanced and better edited than this. However, it was clear he had some things he needed to get off his chest. I wouldn't recommend this for the casual reader, but for hobbyists who want a very detailed picture of the engineering, failure, and investigation of Challenger, this would probably be a rewarding read.
Second, it is extremely technical. I don't think most casual readers need quite this much technical detail, including a lot of jargon that is never defined. There are some engineering diagrams included, but I could not read them. Anyone in the corporate world will probably not be surprised to find that it is filled with an alphabet soup of acronyms. There is a two-page glossary of abbreviations in the back that you might want to dog-ear as a reference while you read.
Finally, it is quite repetitive, a device which I suspect is used to counter the level of technical detail by just repeating the complicated explanations in slightly different ways. Although I am a complete layperson regarding engineering, aerospace, flight physics, etc., even I felt that issues were being repetitively over-explained after a while. This is more than a slight problem given that the book is over 550 pages long. The scope of the book is also much wider than the Challenger disaster, with a good chunk of the book covering the process of redesigning the solid rocket motor that failed on the Challenger, and Morton Thiokol's general woes as a result of the catastrophe. You will also enjoy reading what amount to lightly abridged transcripts of every single Commission and Congressional hearing McDonald participated in, or later watched tape of.
I often wished as I was reading that instead of writing this book himself, McDonald had worked with an investigative reporter who could have delivered something far more balanced and better edited than this. However, it was clear he had some things he needed to get off his chest. I wouldn't recommend this for the casual reader, but for hobbyists who want a very detailed picture of the engineering, failure, and investigation of Challenger, this would probably be a rewarding read.
August 14, 2019
A first-hand account of being the whistle-blower at a tragedy and almost-cover-up of global-proportions. There's some incredibly powerful "Here I stand" moments, in particular at the Rogers Commission that make for phenomenal drama. It's also a reminder that the suffering of a whistle-blower doesn't end when they are vindicated, as McDonald and other whistle-blowers' careers sometimes suffered from the fallout for years after.
McDonald seems to have written a book more "for the records" than for a general audience, because the middle half of the book really drags through a line-by-line accounting of the Rogers Commission and Senate hearings. If you want to see examples of how sophisticated guilty parties are able to obfuscate matters in court, then fine, but otherwise it's pretty dull. The adversarial nature of the Rogers Commission reminded me very much of the inquisition Oppenheimer was subjected to, as recounted in "American Prometheus", only with the good-guy bad-guy roles reversed, and with a just outcome.
In fact, the balance of pages seem dedicated to bureaucratic hair-splitting, and there ends up being a lot less engineering than I was hoping for. The last quarter does pick up, as McDonald explains the return-to-flight test program. I also enjoyed McDonald's brief encounter with some conniving Senators.
If anything, this is a fantastic perspective into how government contracting works, including all of the vagaries of perverse incentives around sole-source contracting. It's also a clear reminder of how no process and control system can prevent bad managment and shoddy ethics. NASA flipping from "prove to me we can fly" to "prove to me we shouldn't fly" is the oft-repeated refrain throughout. The book pairs really well with "Boyd", albeit missing the same protagonist characterization.
Now I really want to pick up that Sally Ride biography, as well as find a good Feynman one.
McDonald seems to have written a book more "for the records" than for a general audience, because the middle half of the book really drags through a line-by-line accounting of the Rogers Commission and Senate hearings. If you want to see examples of how sophisticated guilty parties are able to obfuscate matters in court, then fine, but otherwise it's pretty dull. The adversarial nature of the Rogers Commission reminded me very much of the inquisition Oppenheimer was subjected to, as recounted in "American Prometheus", only with the good-guy bad-guy roles reversed, and with a just outcome.
In fact, the balance of pages seem dedicated to bureaucratic hair-splitting, and there ends up being a lot less engineering than I was hoping for. The last quarter does pick up, as McDonald explains the return-to-flight test program. I also enjoyed McDonald's brief encounter with some conniving Senators.
If anything, this is a fantastic perspective into how government contracting works, including all of the vagaries of perverse incentives around sole-source contracting. It's also a clear reminder of how no process and control system can prevent bad managment and shoddy ethics. NASA flipping from "prove to me we can fly" to "prove to me we shouldn't fly" is the oft-repeated refrain throughout. The book pairs really well with "Boyd", albeit missing the same protagonist characterization.
Now I really want to pick up that Sally Ride biography, as well as find a good Feynman one.
May 22, 2022
First, you will not enjoy this book unless you are either an engineer, an aerospace enthusiast, or a safety culture professional. I am all three, and I still had difficulty with this book.
First, the book is very long and somewhat repetitive of the information that it is providing. It should have gone through one more editing review to reduce redundancies.
Second, this book spends a lot of time going through the engineering details. I think it is important that we do so for history and documentation. But if you are a casual reader, you will not make it through this.
I also had difficulty with this book in the way that it was written in first person account. I believe that Allen McDonald was a closet narcissist. A humble person would have describe the events and factually how they played a part in the events. But, to spend as much time as he did going over all of the laudatory comments that people made about him and the recognition that he got and attention that he Got, was just a little too much for me. All of the honor, glory, and awards could’ve been placed into an appendix, and the book whatever had much better. Instead we got him talking about it AND we had a biographical summary appendix.
On the positive side, this book portrays an individual with the type of character that you just do not see anymore. Rarely do you find someone who is willing to stand for their convictions; certainly not to the point that Allen McDonald did.
First, the book is very long and somewhat repetitive of the information that it is providing. It should have gone through one more editing review to reduce redundancies.
Second, this book spends a lot of time going through the engineering details. I think it is important that we do so for history and documentation. But if you are a casual reader, you will not make it through this.
I also had difficulty with this book in the way that it was written in first person account. I believe that Allen McDonald was a closet narcissist. A humble person would have describe the events and factually how they played a part in the events. But, to spend as much time as he did going over all of the laudatory comments that people made about him and the recognition that he got and attention that he Got, was just a little too much for me. All of the honor, glory, and awards could’ve been placed into an appendix, and the book whatever had much better. Instead we got him talking about it AND we had a biographical summary appendix.
On the positive side, this book portrays an individual with the type of character that you just do not see anymore. Rarely do you find someone who is willing to stand for their convictions; certainly not to the point that Allen McDonald did.
September 26, 2020
It drives me a little mad at how long this book is and how long it needs to be. The first part is filled with technical details that as this is more my field I could skim and read over them but would seriously confuse and bog down the lay reader. With that said, I do think this is a good book to read on this tragedy. Written from the perspective of the whistle blower it gives an interesting perspective and immerses the reader in the events that unfold. Unfortunately, the narrator is kind of unlikeable (and the book reads like he is still on trial for the failure of Challenger) but that is the way it goes with nonfiction. Can’t be picky about that. Okay so here is my recommendation since you made it this far, you should read this but not the whole thing. Skim part 1 (if something is confusing move on the actual details related to the accident will be brought up again and again). Read parts 2, 3, and 4. Skim part 5 and you really don’t have to read 6 and 7.... like at all.
January 4, 2022
This book ought to be required reading for engineers, or really any professional. Al McDonald’s account of what caused the accident, how it was handled, and the results, is ripe with insights into beautiful and ugly truths about human nature, bureaucracy, and business.
My favorite quote, found at the end of Chapter 33:
“I never considered myself a hero for doing my job in the best manner that I knew how and telling the truth about it. If that’s a rare virtue, I’m afraid that doesn’t bode well for the moral backbone of this country”
The book is written methodically and is highly-detailed, as you would expect an engineer to be. Explicitly laying out the sequence of events with all the correct information was likely very cathartic for McDonald. While the sheer volume of technical terminology, acronyms, and general jargon can be overwhelming at times, understanding the Challenger accident is a crucial responsibility for engineers and human beings everywhere.
My favorite quote, found at the end of Chapter 33:
“I never considered myself a hero for doing my job in the best manner that I knew how and telling the truth about it. If that’s a rare virtue, I’m afraid that doesn’t bode well for the moral backbone of this country”
The book is written methodically and is highly-detailed, as you would expect an engineer to be. Explicitly laying out the sequence of events with all the correct information was likely very cathartic for McDonald. While the sheer volume of technical terminology, acronyms, and general jargon can be overwhelming at times, understanding the Challenger accident is a crucial responsibility for engineers and human beings everywhere.
September 1, 2024
Truth, Lies, and O-Rings was a very difficult book to rate. It is an extremely detailed account of the Challenger disaster and it’s aftermath up through the redesign of the solid rocket boosters and the return to flight of the space shuttle. Perhaps too detailed. I’m an engineer and it took intense concentration to follow most of the technical descriptions. As a result, it was a slog to get through the book. I would think that a nontechnical person would get lost. Having said that, I have read many books on the Challenger disaster and am very glad that I bought and read this book. It was a tremendous effort for Allan McDonald to put this book together and I commend him for that and have the utmost respect for the man’s integrity and accomplishments during the aftermath of the explosion. I rated the book as a 3. By Goodreads standards it’s a good book. If the audience was only graduate level engineers, I would bump that up to a 4.
January 21, 2025
Rounded up from 3.5
I'm glad I read this, but I'm glad I read Challenger by Adam Higginbotham first. I am not a rocket scientist but Allan McDonald is, and some part of this were very scientific and hard for me to follow. The section from the meeting the night before through the disaster and the aftermath was very interesting. The narrative leading up to the next shuttle launch was a bit dull for this reader.
It's appalling that no one was truly held responsible for the Challenger disaster. It's pretty clear that it wouldn't have happened if Larry Mulloy had just listened to people who knew what they were talking about. Also Allan McDonald (and Roger Boisjoly) were punished for being truthful. Ah, corporate America. He was right to dislike the label of whistleblower. That's not what he was - he simply told the truth about what happened the night before the launch.
I'm glad I read this, but I'm glad I read Challenger by Adam Higginbotham first. I am not a rocket scientist but Allan McDonald is, and some part of this were very scientific and hard for me to follow. The section from the meeting the night before through the disaster and the aftermath was very interesting. The narrative leading up to the next shuttle launch was a bit dull for this reader.
It's appalling that no one was truly held responsible for the Challenger disaster. It's pretty clear that it wouldn't have happened if Larry Mulloy had just listened to people who knew what they were talking about. Also Allan McDonald (and Roger Boisjoly) were punished for being truthful. Ah, corporate America. He was right to dislike the label of whistleblower. That's not what he was - he simply told the truth about what happened the night before the launch.
February 9, 2019
Very long. Very technical (I appreciated that) Heartbreaking in that NASA got way, way too big for its britches. They (NASA) were just going to keep on killing astronauts, schedules be dammed. This tragedy was SO preventable. A generation or so later, bam, they did it again. (Columbia) How is it that when astronauts die, the people ON THE GROUND say 'Uh, oh....I guess we shouldn't have done XYZ!'
I'm for space exploration as much as the next guy, but NASA...... I'm glad they're not flying shuttles anymore. No one is dying in space for political or funding reasons, either. And 'Morton Thiokol' is not that much better than NASA. This book will make you think. This book will make you mad. This book will make you sad. Godspeed Astronauts. 5 stars.
I'm for space exploration as much as the next guy, but NASA...... I'm glad they're not flying shuttles anymore. No one is dying in space for political or funding reasons, either. And 'Morton Thiokol' is not that much better than NASA. This book will make you think. This book will make you mad. This book will make you sad. Godspeed Astronauts. 5 stars.
December 2, 2022
Hard to rate. Not the best written book in the world, some of the parts contain too many details to be of interest. However the Rogers commission hearings is a very interesting section and it absolutely blew my mind that NASA and Morton Thiokol management tried to cover up this accident which may even have succeeded if it wasn’t for Allan McDonald. Shocking amount of ignorance both in the hearings and afterwards especially from people like Larry Malloy who 15 years after the accident still thinks he did nothing wrong. Bizarre
Would still recommend if you’re up for a technical read and interested in the space shuttle program.
Audiobook
Would still recommend if you’re up for a technical read and interested in the space shuttle program.
Audiobook
March 29, 2019
Truth, Lies and O-Rings is a sad story of the negligence that brought down the Challenger space shuttle. The book is very detailed, and was written by Allan McDonald, a man who worked for the company that manufactured the O-Ring that led to the disaster. He was the director of the space shuttle motor project. He tells the story of what happened and how this tragedy did not need to happen. If you enjoy true stories that involve space exploration or stories that are tragic you will like this book.
June 9, 2022
You can definitely tell it was written by an engineer, but if you want the world's most in-depth account of one of the worst failures in the history of space exploration, this is it. If you're looking for an easy and entertaining read, I'd look elsewhere.
This book really hits close to home, I work on a similar program in Utah, and some of the people in this book have an office down the hall from me. I found this to be a great lesson on the importance of communication and the dangers of workplace politics, and I would recommend it to any engineer.
This book really hits close to home, I work on a similar program in Utah, and some of the people in this book have an office down the hall from me. I found this to be a great lesson on the importance of communication and the dangers of workplace politics, and I would recommend it to any engineer.
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