Reduction, Explanation, and Realism

by David Charles (Editor)

What is reduction? Must all discussions of the mind, value, color, biological organisms, and persons aim to reduce these to objects and properties that can be studied by more basic, physical science? Conversely, does failure to achieve a reduction undermine the legitimacy of higher levels of description or explanation? Though reduction has long been a favorite method of analysis in all areas of philosophy, in recent years philosophers have attempted to avoid these traditional alternatives by developing an account of higher-level phenomena which shows them to be grounded in, but not reducible to, basic physical objects and properties. The contributors to this volume examine the motivations for such anti-reductionist views, and assess their coherence and success, in a number of different fields, including moral and mental philosophy, psychology, organic biology, and the social sciences.

488 pages, Paperback

First published August 27, 1992

Reviews

[Don Tontiplaphol]

I just happened upon this book as I was looking for other books in the university library. One of the editors, David Charles, is a philosopher whom I greatly admire; he's one of the core of the ``Oxford Aristotelians.'' As I delve more deeply into it, I find it to be something like the basis of my putative dissertation. So that's a good thing. But maybe not: my interests keep sliding into the philosophy of social science, and more away from the core of political (i.e., normative) theory. I hope it doesn't doom my prospects.