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Hitler's Italian Allies: Royal Armed Forces, Fascist Regime, and the War of 1940-1943
This book explains why the Italian armed forces and Fascist regime were so remarkably ineffectual at an activity-war-that was central to their existence. Italy's economic fragility, Mussolini's strategic-ideological fantasies, and Hitler's failure in the wider war made Italy's ruin inevitable, but did not determine its peculiarly undignified character. Hitler's Italian Allies demonstrates the extent to which Italian military culture-a concept with applications far beyond Fascist Italy-made humiliation inescapable. It offers a striking portrait of a military and industrial establishment largely unable to imagine modern war and of a regime that failed miserably in mobilizing the nation's resources. Above all, it explains why the armed forces, despite the distinguished performance of a few elite units, dissolved prematurely and almost without resistance-in stark contrast to the grim fight to the last cartridge of Hitler's army and the fanatical faithfulness unto death of the troops of Imperial Japan.
207 pages, Hardcover
First published October 30, 2000
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
October 26, 2018
This book is a comprehensive review of all the factors that contributed towards the Italian armed forces being for the most part "hollow legions" from WW1 thru WW2. It's a quick read and makes persuasive points. The author includes copious amounts of footnotes lest anyone think he's just painting with broad strokes.
The only reason this isn't a 5-star book is that I found the author tended to indulge in very long, as if trying to squeeze in everything to minimize the sentence count, sentences such as this one I just wrote. Otherwise, great insights and a very worthwhile read.
The only reason this isn't a 5-star book is that I found the author tended to indulge in very long, as if trying to squeeze in everything to minimize the sentence count, sentences such as this one I just wrote. Otherwise, great insights and a very worthwhile read.
July 20, 2012
It's moderately frightening how little literature in English there is about the Italian state in World War Two. This is a slim volume and presumably merely hits the high points, but it is well worth reading if you have the slightest interest in the topic.
November 5, 2019
As early as 1914 Mussolini had noted that “Either war, or let’s end this commedia of [claiming to be] a great power.” “Only war could produce the genuine national integration missed during Italy’s territorial unification...”. Yet the Italians were inept at warfare.
Knox sets out to understand why the Italian Armed forces and the Fascist regime were so remarkably ineffectual at war.
Knox crams a little over 200 pages with rich detail cataloguing the sources of Italian failure. The sheer number of factors that contributed to Italian military ineptness are so interwoven that, as Knox points out, ‘separating them analytically is a thankless task.’ While this is true, more could have been done to group them to help the reader's comprehension.
Knox structures his analysis around five chapters: society and industry; men and machines; strategy; operation; and tactics.
Within these he also outlines four distinguishing characteristics of Italian strategy in 1940-43 and reasons for Italian failure: Strategic myopia, strategic dissipation of effort, strategic passivity, and Italy’s inadequate logistical base for war.
Knox’s arguments on Italy’s strategic myopia are challenging to follow and spread throughout the book. Knox argues that ‘effectiveness in war ultimately depends upon the culture, command style, and professional ethos of its armed forces.’ As a result Fascist Italy’s military failure was first and foremost a failure of Italian military culture in each of the three branches of the Italian military.
He also outlines how, for each branch of the service, military effectiveness was significantly compromised by (1) an imperviousness to modernity; (2) the absence of military culture and traditions; and (3) the limited education and technical skills of Italian society’s peasant base.
By June 1940 the terms of war had changed [from WW1] beyond the ability of Italy’s military institutions to follow either materially or culturally.’ These deficiencies in military culture prevented the armed forces from imagining, much less preparing for modern war and contributed to ‘the humiliating inadequacy of Italian military performance in 1940-43’.
The Regio Esercito made virtually no attempt to select its reserve officers for military aptitude. Fear of regional mutinies dictated the recruitment of each regiment from several different regions, but they each spoke a different dialect. In any case the army had a “widespread assumption that in battle, intuition and individual valour counted for more than training.’ An internal review found that troops ‘tended to act only in response to direct orders, were poorly acquainted with their individual weapons … and were prone to “extreme emotional reactions to threats, real or assumed, to their flanks or rear”. ‘Commanders habitually oversupervised their subordinates; ‘Mutual mistrust, clique rivalries, and personal feuds divided the higher officer corps.
Italy’s weapons and weapons systems were also ineffective - the least effective, least numerous and most overpriced produced by a major combatant in the Second World War.
A single individual at Ansaldo designed all Italian tanks and armoured cars between 1933 and 1943. But this resulted in armour on the L3 that was easily perforated by machine-gun fire and on the M13/1940 that ‘shattered like glass’.
The Regia Aeronautica’s pilots had limited experience with night flying, instrument flying or blind navigation. Even by 1940 only 30% had reached a level of training that Regia Aeronautica deemed adequate. For those pilots that could fly, their engines were at risk of failing in flight because one of the suppliers of aircraft engines, Piaggio, falsified test results. Others failed because they lacked sand filters for use in the Libyan desert. And the planes the pilots flew were antiquated: the Italians were still producing the biplane FIAT CR42 as late as 1943. And produced “perhaps the worst monoplane fighter of the Second World War” the open-cockpit G50.
When attacking shipping, Regia Aeronautica lacked the heavy armor-piercing bombs needed to make an impression on the British Mediterranean fleet. And the bombs they did have had bomb casings that split open or fuses which proved unreliable. When these did work, lack of interservice communication often resulted in Regia Aeronautica bombing their own fleet as well as the British.
Regia Marina had some world-class battleships and heavy cruisers ‘except for…the accuracy and reliability of their main guns.’ Light cruisers sometimes disintegrated when hit and lacked protection against heavy weather. Destroyers tended to swamp in heavy seas. Ansaldo sold the navy ‘armor-plate with falsified proof test results’. The Regia Marina had not prepared for night combat which mean that Supermarina was repeatedly impelled to order then homeward in late afternoon.’ As a result, Regia Marina was reduced to search-and evade rather than search-and-destroy.
The one weapon Regia Marina excelled in, the maiale midget submarine, was not supported initially by Supermarina. Knox highlights that had the maiali been operationally ready in June 1940, Italy could have launched the devastating initial blow that the Germans [expected and the] British and French…feared, but never came.’
This strategic myopia, and its impact on each branch of the military, was compounded by the dissipation of effort that resulted from Fascist Italy’s political leadership. Strategically instead of focusing on defeating the Allies in Egypt and the Mediterranean, Mussolini ordered attacks on alpine France, sent air units to join the battle of Britain, attacked British Somaliland rather than Sudan, launched an unsuccessful invasion of Greece and then Yugoslavia, offered to send submarines for the Battle of the Atlantic, and sent units to fight alongside the Germans in the Soviet Union. Dissipation of effort also occurred tactically, as units would advance on broad fronts rather than concentrate, reinforced failure not success, and suffered defeat in detail.
The strategic myopia and dissipation of effort were exacerbated by an unwillingness of the military leadership to take decisive action - strategic passivity. At no time either before or during the war of 1940-43 did the service staffs or chiefs of general staff produce an agreed and coherent overall strategic concept. Knox argues that ‘Mussolini’s ideological ambition [triggered by the fall of France, propelled into war] a society, regime, and armed forces that lacked the technological insight and organizational skills to compete even with their defeated neighbours.’ The chief of the general staff, Badoglio, repeatedly and decisively vetoed all offensive planning. The naval leadership sought to preserve the fleet as an end in itself by disguising it as a diplomatic bargaining counter.
Even had Italy been able to concentrate its efforts and act decisively, its inadequate logistical base for war made execution of its strategy effectively impossible.
Italy joined the war ‘without the logistical doctrine, organization, or preparations required to fight effectively either a short Mediterranean war or a long one.’ Knox provides numerous examples to support this: Italian ports ‘lacked the skilled and disciplined labor force’ and the army and navy ‘maintained separate “embarkation and disembarkation offices.’ The logistical fiasco that attended Mussolini’s almost bloodless seizure of Albania in April 1939 showed that existing arrangements failed even in the absence of any enemy.’ Different calibre ammunition for its weapons, the lack of compensated vehicle compasses essential in the desert – despite thirty year of Italian military experience in Libya; the rejection by the navy staff of the new technology of radar.
As it embarked on war Italy was thirty to fifty years behind Germany in becoming an industrial society. Two-fifths of the Italian population was either illiterate or semi-literate. And the Italian budget was depleted after funding Fascist wars in Ethiopia and Spain. It had less equipment to transport its troops and even fewer people who knew how to use and maintain it. As Knox concludes parochialism, fragile military traditions, shortages of key technical skills; energy and raw material dependence; the regime’s inability to mobilize effectively what resources existed; the incompetence and venality of industry; the deficiencies in military culture that prevented the armed forces from imagining, much less preparing for modern war; strategic myopia, dissipation of effort, passivity, logistical ineffectiveness, and dependence; and the armed forces’ greater or lesser degrees of operational and tactical incapacity made military defeat almost inevitable.
While all of these factors contributed, they were not limited to Italy. France shared Italy’s strategic myopia; Britain dissipated its efforts across at various times Norway, Greece, the Middle East, East Africa, Asia, the Atlantic, and of course the defence of Britain. The Soviet Union also had a less educated population, but managed to produce the best tank of the war the T-34. While it is true that Italy alone seemed to conflate all of these challenges, a greater discussion of what these countries did to overcome these challenges, and what Italy failed to do, would have added to Knox’s narrative.
But that is not to take away from the explanation Knox has set out of why Italy’s defeat was inevitable. As Churchill quipped on Italy joining the Axis "It's only fair. We had to have them in the last war."
Knox sets out to understand why the Italian Armed forces and the Fascist regime were so remarkably ineffectual at war.
Knox crams a little over 200 pages with rich detail cataloguing the sources of Italian failure. The sheer number of factors that contributed to Italian military ineptness are so interwoven that, as Knox points out, ‘separating them analytically is a thankless task.’ While this is true, more could have been done to group them to help the reader's comprehension.
Knox structures his analysis around five chapters: society and industry; men and machines; strategy; operation; and tactics.
Within these he also outlines four distinguishing characteristics of Italian strategy in 1940-43 and reasons for Italian failure: Strategic myopia, strategic dissipation of effort, strategic passivity, and Italy’s inadequate logistical base for war.
Knox’s arguments on Italy’s strategic myopia are challenging to follow and spread throughout the book. Knox argues that ‘effectiveness in war ultimately depends upon the culture, command style, and professional ethos of its armed forces.’ As a result Fascist Italy’s military failure was first and foremost a failure of Italian military culture in each of the three branches of the Italian military.
He also outlines how, for each branch of the service, military effectiveness was significantly compromised by (1) an imperviousness to modernity; (2) the absence of military culture and traditions; and (3) the limited education and technical skills of Italian society’s peasant base.
By June 1940 the terms of war had changed [from WW1] beyond the ability of Italy’s military institutions to follow either materially or culturally.’ These deficiencies in military culture prevented the armed forces from imagining, much less preparing for modern war and contributed to ‘the humiliating inadequacy of Italian military performance in 1940-43’.
The Regio Esercito made virtually no attempt to select its reserve officers for military aptitude. Fear of regional mutinies dictated the recruitment of each regiment from several different regions, but they each spoke a different dialect. In any case the army had a “widespread assumption that in battle, intuition and individual valour counted for more than training.’ An internal review found that troops ‘tended to act only in response to direct orders, were poorly acquainted with their individual weapons … and were prone to “extreme emotional reactions to threats, real or assumed, to their flanks or rear”. ‘Commanders habitually oversupervised their subordinates; ‘Mutual mistrust, clique rivalries, and personal feuds divided the higher officer corps.
Italy’s weapons and weapons systems were also ineffective - the least effective, least numerous and most overpriced produced by a major combatant in the Second World War.
A single individual at Ansaldo designed all Italian tanks and armoured cars between 1933 and 1943. But this resulted in armour on the L3 that was easily perforated by machine-gun fire and on the M13/1940 that ‘shattered like glass’.
The Regia Aeronautica’s pilots had limited experience with night flying, instrument flying or blind navigation. Even by 1940 only 30% had reached a level of training that Regia Aeronautica deemed adequate. For those pilots that could fly, their engines were at risk of failing in flight because one of the suppliers of aircraft engines, Piaggio, falsified test results. Others failed because they lacked sand filters for use in the Libyan desert. And the planes the pilots flew were antiquated: the Italians were still producing the biplane FIAT CR42 as late as 1943. And produced “perhaps the worst monoplane fighter of the Second World War” the open-cockpit G50.
When attacking shipping, Regia Aeronautica lacked the heavy armor-piercing bombs needed to make an impression on the British Mediterranean fleet. And the bombs they did have had bomb casings that split open or fuses which proved unreliable. When these did work, lack of interservice communication often resulted in Regia Aeronautica bombing their own fleet as well as the British.
Regia Marina had some world-class battleships and heavy cruisers ‘except for…the accuracy and reliability of their main guns.’ Light cruisers sometimes disintegrated when hit and lacked protection against heavy weather. Destroyers tended to swamp in heavy seas. Ansaldo sold the navy ‘armor-plate with falsified proof test results’. The Regia Marina had not prepared for night combat which mean that Supermarina was repeatedly impelled to order then homeward in late afternoon.’ As a result, Regia Marina was reduced to search-and evade rather than search-and-destroy.
The one weapon Regia Marina excelled in, the maiale midget submarine, was not supported initially by Supermarina. Knox highlights that had the maiali been operationally ready in June 1940, Italy could have launched the devastating initial blow that the Germans [expected and the] British and French…feared, but never came.’
This strategic myopia, and its impact on each branch of the military, was compounded by the dissipation of effort that resulted from Fascist Italy’s political leadership. Strategically instead of focusing on defeating the Allies in Egypt and the Mediterranean, Mussolini ordered attacks on alpine France, sent air units to join the battle of Britain, attacked British Somaliland rather than Sudan, launched an unsuccessful invasion of Greece and then Yugoslavia, offered to send submarines for the Battle of the Atlantic, and sent units to fight alongside the Germans in the Soviet Union. Dissipation of effort also occurred tactically, as units would advance on broad fronts rather than concentrate, reinforced failure not success, and suffered defeat in detail.
The strategic myopia and dissipation of effort were exacerbated by an unwillingness of the military leadership to take decisive action - strategic passivity. At no time either before or during the war of 1940-43 did the service staffs or chiefs of general staff produce an agreed and coherent overall strategic concept. Knox argues that ‘Mussolini’s ideological ambition [triggered by the fall of France, propelled into war] a society, regime, and armed forces that lacked the technological insight and organizational skills to compete even with their defeated neighbours.’ The chief of the general staff, Badoglio, repeatedly and decisively vetoed all offensive planning. The naval leadership sought to preserve the fleet as an end in itself by disguising it as a diplomatic bargaining counter.
Even had Italy been able to concentrate its efforts and act decisively, its inadequate logistical base for war made execution of its strategy effectively impossible.
Italy joined the war ‘without the logistical doctrine, organization, or preparations required to fight effectively either a short Mediterranean war or a long one.’ Knox provides numerous examples to support this: Italian ports ‘lacked the skilled and disciplined labor force’ and the army and navy ‘maintained separate “embarkation and disembarkation offices.’ The logistical fiasco that attended Mussolini’s almost bloodless seizure of Albania in April 1939 showed that existing arrangements failed even in the absence of any enemy.’ Different calibre ammunition for its weapons, the lack of compensated vehicle compasses essential in the desert – despite thirty year of Italian military experience in Libya; the rejection by the navy staff of the new technology of radar.
As it embarked on war Italy was thirty to fifty years behind Germany in becoming an industrial society. Two-fifths of the Italian population was either illiterate or semi-literate. And the Italian budget was depleted after funding Fascist wars in Ethiopia and Spain. It had less equipment to transport its troops and even fewer people who knew how to use and maintain it. As Knox concludes parochialism, fragile military traditions, shortages of key technical skills; energy and raw material dependence; the regime’s inability to mobilize effectively what resources existed; the incompetence and venality of industry; the deficiencies in military culture that prevented the armed forces from imagining, much less preparing for modern war; strategic myopia, dissipation of effort, passivity, logistical ineffectiveness, and dependence; and the armed forces’ greater or lesser degrees of operational and tactical incapacity made military defeat almost inevitable.
While all of these factors contributed, they were not limited to Italy. France shared Italy’s strategic myopia; Britain dissipated its efforts across at various times Norway, Greece, the Middle East, East Africa, Asia, the Atlantic, and of course the defence of Britain. The Soviet Union also had a less educated population, but managed to produce the best tank of the war the T-34. While it is true that Italy alone seemed to conflate all of these challenges, a greater discussion of what these countries did to overcome these challenges, and what Italy failed to do, would have added to Knox’s narrative.
But that is not to take away from the explanation Knox has set out of why Italy’s defeat was inevitable. As Churchill quipped on Italy joining the Axis "It's only fair. We had to have them in the last war."
January 9, 2022
This is quite a remarkable book. MacGregor Knox is a leading historian on Fascist Italy. In that context, it might be expected that he would be cautious and balanced in his assessments. It is therefore all the more striking that his judgement regarding the Italian military forces is so damning. In effect, all the criticisms that have been made elsewhere regarding the performance of the Italian forces are true - with the exception that the troops themselves were not cowardly. Indeed, the bravery of the troops becomes clearer, as it is recognised how totally they were let down by their commanders.
In brief, Knox identifies that the Italian armed forces were guided by a fundamental belief in mass (the spirit of vast numbers of men was considered superior to technology) and by an almost pathological determination to avoid blame (which perversely expressed itself through senior commanders gathering all power into their own hands and then effectively absenting themselves).
A few examples illustrate how this worked in practice. All of Italy's tanks were designed by a single man, working on his own in Fiat. Although Italy's radar designs were in some respects world-leading in their technology, the Navy put each new version straight into storage, because it had no sense of what the new capability might be used for. The emphasis on martial spirit meant that training was considered of little importance, such that replacements were sent to tank units who had never driven a tank or fired a gun. The whole essence of Italy's military strategy appears to have been to keep the armed forces in being while Germany defeated the enemy, and then claim an equal share of the spoils.
Perhaps the most important point Knox makes is that none of this was driven by Mussolini, but by the existing culture of the Italian armed forces. In many respects, there are clear lines of continuity between the attitudes and performance of 1940-1943 and those of 1915-1918.
The book is short, highly readable, well argued, copiously referenced. Utterly essential reading for anyone wanting to understand the performance of the Italian armed forces.
In brief, Knox identifies that the Italian armed forces were guided by a fundamental belief in mass (the spirit of vast numbers of men was considered superior to technology) and by an almost pathological determination to avoid blame (which perversely expressed itself through senior commanders gathering all power into their own hands and then effectively absenting themselves).
A few examples illustrate how this worked in practice. All of Italy's tanks were designed by a single man, working on his own in Fiat. Although Italy's radar designs were in some respects world-leading in their technology, the Navy put each new version straight into storage, because it had no sense of what the new capability might be used for. The emphasis on martial spirit meant that training was considered of little importance, such that replacements were sent to tank units who had never driven a tank or fired a gun. The whole essence of Italy's military strategy appears to have been to keep the armed forces in being while Germany defeated the enemy, and then claim an equal share of the spoils.
Perhaps the most important point Knox makes is that none of this was driven by Mussolini, but by the existing culture of the Italian armed forces. In many respects, there are clear lines of continuity between the attitudes and performance of 1940-1943 and those of 1915-1918.
The book is short, highly readable, well argued, copiously referenced. Utterly essential reading for anyone wanting to understand the performance of the Italian armed forces.
December 9, 2020
A fascinating, though slim, volume on the ineptitude of the Italian Fascist regime and the military that was supposed to win the war Mussolini so desperately wanted. This is not a caricature, but a well detailed, footnoted, Strategic and Operational history history of the Italian armed forces during the reign of the Fascist dictatorship. It’s well worth reading if you have an interest in the higher levels of planning and running a military, incompetently.
January 31, 2018
Good, concise introduction to the poor performance and problems of the Italian military in the interwar period and Second World War, taking care to expand beyond the normal explanations of Fascist leadership and unpopular wars.
April 12, 2016
Short but very enlightening book.
Basically, italian results were catastrophic because, well, clichés were true. Most Italy's shortcomings were similar to France's, but some are indeed very indigenous.
First of all, the regime failed to build the martial ethos its propaganda claironned everywhere. Italians stayed Italians, with their usual distance and distrust toward the state, campanilismo, political apathy. The traditionnal superstructures also prevented the totalitarian build up Germany experienced : the Monarchy Mussolini couldn't topple, the Church and the omnipresent aristocratical elites dating back from the pre-risorgimento realms.
All of this ended with inept and arrogant commanders and apathetic soldiers, even if they fought bravely. The industry was also incapable of providing the basic necessities of modern war, let alone modern war machines: clientelism, corruption and self contentment as well as a severe lack of talented engineers. Only one guy, and not a bright one, designed all Italian tanks. And they all were failures. High command clinged also on old dogmas, such as mules and expendable peasants soldiers as well as a lack of planning like in 1848, 1866, 1886 and 1915.
Italiens were generally resigned with the war and very apathetic, whereas WW1 was seen to some extent as a national war. Hence a total absence of mobilisation.
In a short and very well writtin book, the author explain all this and more. Very useful to go beyond the usual history buffs jokes on Italian military and see why they fared so poorly.
A must read for all military history or WW2 buffs.
Basically, italian results were catastrophic because, well, clichés were true. Most Italy's shortcomings were similar to France's, but some are indeed very indigenous.
First of all, the regime failed to build the martial ethos its propaganda claironned everywhere. Italians stayed Italians, with their usual distance and distrust toward the state, campanilismo, political apathy. The traditionnal superstructures also prevented the totalitarian build up Germany experienced : the Monarchy Mussolini couldn't topple, the Church and the omnipresent aristocratical elites dating back from the pre-risorgimento realms.
All of this ended with inept and arrogant commanders and apathetic soldiers, even if they fought bravely. The industry was also incapable of providing the basic necessities of modern war, let alone modern war machines: clientelism, corruption and self contentment as well as a severe lack of talented engineers. Only one guy, and not a bright one, designed all Italian tanks. And they all were failures. High command clinged also on old dogmas, such as mules and expendable peasants soldiers as well as a lack of planning like in 1848, 1866, 1886 and 1915.
Italiens were generally resigned with the war and very apathetic, whereas WW1 was seen to some extent as a national war. Hence a total absence of mobilisation.
In a short and very well writtin book, the author explain all this and more. Very useful to go beyond the usual history buffs jokes on Italian military and see why they fared so poorly.
A must read for all military history or WW2 buffs.
June 14, 2012
This concise book is an expanded essay on why the Italians performed so abysmally in the Second World War. It did a great job of breaking down the subject into smaller aspects such as Society, Politics, Regime, & Industry; Armed Forces; Operations; and Tactics. The overall conclusion was: Mussolini was far too concerned about trying to impress world leaders, particularly Hitler; Italy was nowhere near as unified as Mussolini acted it was and thus could not act as dynamic national force; the Corporatism of Fascism protected the inefficient Italian industries that produced materiel that was consistently inferior in quality and antiquated in ability to apply to newer combat tactics; and the Italian Army never was able to grasp the shift from infantry to armor that occurred in the 1920s and 1930s (General Ettore Bastico: “Let us reserve our reverence for the infantryman and the mule.”) and the Italian Navy never was able to see beyond the geography of the Mediterranean to understand the inadequacy of Italian production of ships. What the book does not answer is why the Italians have some how been able to shed their Fascist image while the Germans and Japanese are still tarred by their actions in the Second World War but that really was not within the parameters of the book.
July 23, 2011
A how-to of the best way to lose a war that you shouldn't be fighting in, Hitler's Italian Allies focuses on the constant military blunders and political gaffes that led to Italy's less-than-stellar involvement in World War II. Remains very restricted to the war years of 1940-43, so some background in fascism and Italian and German politics during the era along with general knowledge of the war helps.
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