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Militarizing Men: Gender, Conscription, and War in Post-Soviet Russia
A state's ability to maintain mandatory conscription and wage war rests on the idea that a "real man" is one who has served in the military. Yet masculinity has no inherent ties to militarism. The link between men and the military, argues Maya Eichler, must be produced and reproduced in order to fill the ranks, engage in combat, and mobilize the population behind war. In the context of Russia's post-communist transition and the Chechen wars, men's militarization has been challenged and reinforced. Eichler uncovers the challenges by exploring widespread draft evasion and desertion, anti-draft and anti-war activism led by soldiers' mothers, and the general lack of popular support for the Chechen wars. However, the book also identifies channels through which militarized gender identities have been reproduced. Eichler's empirical and theoretical study of masculinities in international relations applies for the first time the concept of "militarized masculinity," developed by feminist IR scholars, to the case of Russia.
- GenresRussiaHistoryNonfiction
256 pages, Hardcover
First published October 26, 2011
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March 12, 2024
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Я солдат
Недоношенный ребёнок войны
Я солдат
Мама залечи мои раны
Я солдат
Солдат забытой Богом страны
Я герой
Скажите мне, какого романа
Интересное небольшое исследование о связи большой политики в России и милитаризации общества. Тут уместно вспомнить знаменитое высказывание о «необходимости одержать маленькую победоносную войну», чтобы повысить свою популярность в качестве правителя. Авторы правильно уловили идею раннего Ельцина, который решил поправить свой пошатнувшийся политический рейтинг с помощью милитаризированной повестки. Только этот вопрос стоит рассматривать не только как желание устроить «маленькую победоносную войну», а в более широком смысле, включающее эмоциональный всплеск, подъём патриотизма, возвращение повестки «России как большой империи» и так далее.
Peter Lentini argues that the domestic crisis, and in particular the rising popularity of nationalists, forced Yeltsin to “‘get macho’ in relation to the Near Abroad, Chechnya and the North Atlantic community.” The author thus acknowledges the role of masculinity in the domestic struggle for power and how a tough stance is often associated with masculinity. Yeltsin and his advisers apparently saw military intervention in Chechnya as a means of boosting the president’s dwindling popularity among the public. Duma Defense Committee Chairman Sergei Iushenkov claimed that Oleg Lobov, secretary of the Security Council, told him in a personal conversation: “It is not only a question of the integrity of Russia. We need a small victorious war to raise the President’s ratings.”
Конечно, страшно даже представить, что все те десятки тысяч жертв с обеих сторон в Чечне были принесены в жертву только ради того чтобы в российском обществе Ельцин представ в образе а-ля Наполеон. Поэтому многим людям легче принять версию, что это была «война за территории», а не ради политического PR. Исходя из этого мне думается, что популярная нынче версия, что военный конфликт в Чечне начался сугубо по причине последней объявить о своей независимости, вследствие чего Ельцин якобы выполнял «священный долг» перед россиянами по предотвращению распаду страны, является или может являться надуманным. Опросы 90-х годов свидетельствуют о совсем другом желании россиян.
In December 1994 as well as in January 1995 only 30 percent of respondents supported “decisive measures to bring order to Chechnya,” and between 60 and 70 percent rejected the use of force. Forty-one percent of those polled in spring of 1995 could not pinpoint the reasons behind the war. Some 22 percent suspected that the war was connected to a cover-up involving high-ranking political and military figures, and 18 percent of respondents believed the war was linked to crime fighting within Chechnya. Only 14 per-cent of those polled agreed that the war was about the integrity of the state, and only 10 percent thought it was about the protection of Russian citizens.
О чём могут говорить эти опросы? Они могут говорить о том, что Ельцин не только в сфере экономики проводил действия противоречащие желаниям народа, но даже в такой, казалось бы, важной для россиян сфере, как территориальное единство. Получается, что Ельцин не только построил современную экономику России которой были недовольны большинство россиян, но он начал совершенно никому не нужную, кровавую авантюру в Чечне, вместо того чтобы как все нормальные люди решать этот вопрос мирно. Это так же показывает, что россияне не являются милитаризированной нацией, что все эти национальные штампы были придуманы в том же Кремле, чтобы оправдать все последующие военные кампании. И это также показывает, что уже в самом начале так называемой «свободной и демократической» России, верховная власть плевать хотела на мнение народа. Даже наоборот, она навязывала собственное милитаризированное мнение. Как показывает книга, у Ельцина это сделать не получилось и не в последнюю очередь из-за низких цен на нефтегазовые ресурсы, а вот у Путина построения милитаризованного общества пошло ввысь, хотя и тут успехи оказались довольно несущественными (хотя теракты в Москве существенно помогли Путину на первых этапах взвинтить милитаристскую истерику и избавиться от такого критика как «Солдатские матери», о чём также пишет автор).
Public support for the second war reached its peak in February 2000, with 70 percent of respondents in favor of continuing the military operation. As the war dragged on, and a quick victory did not materialize, support decreased. By May 2002, over 60 percent of the population supported negotiations. In 2002, citizens considered Putin’s main failure to be the continued war in Chechnya.
Важным, однако, является то, что российский народ не является носителем идеи войны России со всем миром, а это сугубо повестка политической элиты России, которую она навязывает обществу. А чтобы общество не с брыкнуло, уже начиная с правления Ельцина, все силы вкладывались в силовой рычаг, т.е. использовалась та же силовая политика, что и в отношении чеченцев, только при Ельцине эта милицейская дубинка ещё не так откровенно била несогласных, как это стало происходить при Путине. И дело не в «либерале» Ельцине, а дело в ценах на нефть.
Далее автор рассматривает сущность российской воинской службы. Автор очень точно показывает всю бессмысленность призывной армии, отмечая не просто насилие в российской призывной армии, а пытки и истязания. Как правильно отмечает один интервьюируемый, молодым мужчинам скучно в армии, вот они, таким образом, и развлекают себя.
As one interviewee put it bluntly: “Here, the soldier is a slave.” Dedovshchina involves systemic physical and psychological violence toward newer recruits, including the exploitation of their labor.
<…>
Two of my interviewees mentioned the case of officers selling conscripts’ labor to a local Coca-Cola factory in Samara. The conscripts were forced to work at the plant while the officers collected their salaries.
Так же я полностью согласен с автором в том, что в России служба в армии рассматривалась как признак низкого социального статуса, т.е. попадание в армию является признаком того, что семья не смогла откупиться от современного рабства.
Sergei, an antidraft activist in Samara, underscored that draft evasion has become a sign of social status. He explained: “Nobody wants to feel that they are socially limited, and military service today is a sign of low social status. If a person has low social status, that means he serves in the army, because he can’t ‘buy his way out.’
<…>
Iurii, one of my interviewees, argued that it is mostly rural and working-class men who hold on to the myth of the military as a “school of manhood” and see military service as offering social mobility and opportunity (sotsial’nyi lift). This observation holds some truth as a result of the deep social crisis afflicting Russia’s depressed rural regions. Polling results show that the idea of military service as a school of life is more common among rural and less-educated respondents.
Конечно, не все солдаты проходили через пытки и унижение, но дедовщина как таковая была явлением повсеместным. Самая известная шутка – «копать от забора до обеда» – очень хорошо передаёт всю абсурдность и бессмысленность призывной армии. Поэтому удивительно, что на фоне политики по продвижению милитаризма под видом патриотизма, который начали продвигать ещё при Ельцине, никто так и не удосужился создать профессиональную армию, в которой бы не занимались тем, что унижали, пытали, а иногда и насиловали солдат, а учили бы военному ремеслу. Это не значит, что я поддерживаю политику большей милитаризации, это значит, что я хочу подчеркнуть идею унижения одних людей другими. Можно подумать, что российская власть просто не могла с этой напастью справиться, но с моей точки зрения, российская власть даже поощряло дедовщину. В чём смысл этого? В том чтобы сломать волю человека чтобы и он начал пытать и мучить ни в чём не повинных людей (именно так и работает дедовщина). Такие люди более склоны совершать военные преступления, чем солдаты, не сломленные и с высокой самооценкой. Я не думаю, что такая политика была прописана где-то в документах, но думаю, что это было негласное правило сохранять дедовщину и не пытаться её искоренить. Это как с КГБ и прочими силовыми органами, которые даже никто не пытался реформировать после 1991. Все понимали в российской власти, что однажды опыт КГБ им может пригодиться - пригодится, чтобы остаться у власти.
Но больше всего меня потрясла история о двух организациях «Солдатских матерей». Честно сказать, я даже и не знал, что одна из них активно поддерживала существование армии как института. Конечно, такие люди есть в каждой стране, но всё же не в каждой стране есть чуть ли не официально признанное рабство.
While members of the CSMR and SMSP encourage mothers to keep their sons out of military service, the Samara soldiers’ mothers encourage mothers to support their sons during military service and think of themselves as mothers of defenders of the fatherland. Instead of opposing the military, they decry the demise of militarized patriotism. Both Ol’ga T. and Tat’iana N. see the lack of patriotism and of prestige for the military as major problems for contemporary Russia.
---
It's an interesting little study on the connection between big politics in Russia and the militarization of society. The famous saying about "small victorious war" to increase one's popularity as a ruler comes to mind here. The authors correctly captured the idea of early Yeltsin, who decided to correct his shaky political rating with the help of a militarized agenda. Only this issue should be seen not only as a desire to stage a "small victorious war" but in a broader sense, including an emotional outburst, a rise in patriotism, the return of the "Russia as a big empire" agenda, and so on.
Peter Lentini argues that the domestic crisis, and in particular the rising popularity of nationalists, forced Yeltsin to “‘get macho’ in relation to the Near Abroad, Chechnya and the North Atlantic community.” The author thus acknowledges the role of masculinity in the domestic struggle for power and how a tough stance is often associated with masculinity. Yeltsin and his advisers apparently saw military intervention in Chechnya as a means of boosting the president’s dwindling popularity among the public. Duma Defense Committee Chairman Sergei Iushenkov claimed that Oleg Lobov, secretary of the Security Council, told him in a personal conversation: “It is not only a question of the integrity of Russia. We need a small victorious war to raise the President’s ratings.”
Of course, it is even scary to imagine that all those tens of thousands of victims on both sides in Chechnya were sacrificed just to make Yeltsin appear in Russian society as a la Napoleon. Therefore, it is easier for many people to accept the version that it was a "war for territory" and not for political PR. On this basis, I think that the currently popular version that the military conflict in Chechnya began purely because the latter declared its independence, as a result of which Yeltsin was supposedly fulfilling his "sacred duty" to Russians to prevent the disintegration of the country, is or may be far-fetched. Polls from the 1990s indicate a very different wish among Russians.
In December 1994 as well as in January 1995 only 30 percent of respondents supported “decisive measures to bring order to Chechnya,” and between 60 and 70 percent rejected the use of force. Forty-one percent of those polled in spring of 1995 could not pinpoint the reasons behind the war. Some 22 percent suspected that the war was connected to a cover-up involving high-ranking political and military figures, and 18 percent of respondents believed the war was linked to crime fighting within Chechnya. Only 14 per-cent of those polled agreed that the war was about the integrity of the state, and only 10 percent thought it was about the protection of Russian citizens.
What can these polls tell us? They can say that Yeltsin not only conducted actions contrary to the wishes of the people in the economic sphere but even in such a seemingly important sphere for Russians as territorial unity. It turns out that Yeltsin not only built the modern economy of Russia, which was dissatisfied with the majority of Russians, but he started a completely unnecessary, bloody adventure in Chechnya instead of solving this issue peacefully like all normal people. It also shows that Russians are not a militarized nation and that all these national stamps were invented in the same Kremlin to justify all subsequent military campaigns. And it also shows that already at the very beginning of the so-called "free and democratic" Russia, the supreme power did not give a damn about the opinion of the people. Even on the contrary, it imposed its own militarized opinion. As the book shows, Yeltsin failed to do this, not least because of low prices for oil and gas resources, but Putin's efforts to build a militarized society went upwards although even here, the successes were rather insignificant (although the terrorist attacks in Moscow significantly helped Putin in the first stages to stir up militaristic hysteria and get rid of such critics as the "Soldiers' Mothers," which the author also writes about).
Public support for the second war reached its peak in February 2000, with 70 percent of respondents in favor of continuing the military operation. As the war dragged on, and a quick victory did not materialize, support decreased. By May 2002, over 60 percent of the population supported negotiations. In 2002, citizens considered Putin’s main failure to be the continued war in Chechnya.
What is important, however, is that the Russian people are not the bearers of the idea of Russia's war with the whole world, but this is purely the agenda of Russia's political elite, which it imposes on society. And to keep society on its toes, since Yeltsin's reign, all forces have been invested in the lever of force, i.e., the same force policy was used as in relation to the Chechens, only under Yeltsin this police baton did not beat dissenters as blatantly as it began to happen under Putin. And it's not about the "liberal" Yeltsin, it's about oil prices.
Next, the author examines the essence of the Russian military service. The author very accurately shows the senselessness of the conscript army by pointing out not just the violence in the Russian conscript army but also torture and humiliation. As one interviewee correctly points out, young men are bored in the army, so they entertain themselves in this way.
As one interviewee put it bluntly: “Here, the soldier is a slave.” Dedovshchina involves systemic physical and psychological violence toward newer recruits, including the exploitation of their labor.
<…>
Two of my interviewees mentioned the case of officers selling conscripts’ labor to a local Coca-Cola factory in Samara. The conscripts were forced to work at the plant while the officers collected their salaries.
I also completely agree with the author that in Russia, military service was seen as a sign of low social status, i.e., joining the army was a sign that the family was unable to buy off modern slavery.
Sergei, an antidraft activist in Samara, underscored that draft evasion has become a sign of social status. He explained: “Nobody wants to feel that they are socially limited, and military service today is a sign of low social status. If a person has low social status, that means he serves in the army, because he can’t ‘buy his way out.’
<…>
Iurii, one of my interviewees, argued that it is mostly rural and working-class men who hold on to the myth of the military as a “school of manhood” and see military service as offering social mobility and opportunity (sotsial’nyi lift). This observation holds some truth as a result of the deep social crisis afflicting Russia’s depressed rural regions. Polling results show that the idea of military service as a school of life is more common among rural and less-educated respondents.
Of course, not all soldiers went through torture and humiliation, but hazing as such was a ubiquitous phenomenon. The most famous joke - "digging from the fence to lunch" - conveys very well the absurdity and senselessness of the conscript army. It is therefore surprising that against the background of the policy of promoting militarism under the guise of patriotism, which began to be promoted under Yeltsin, no one has ever bothered to create a professional army that would not be engaged in humiliating, torturing, and sometimes raping soldiers, but would teach them the military craft. This does not mean that I support a policy of greater militarization; it means that I want to emphasize the idea of humiliation of some people by others. You might think that the Russian government just couldn't deal with this scourge, but from my perspective, the Russian government even encouraged hazing. What is the point of this? It's about breaking a person's will so that he starts torturing and tormenting innocent people (that's how hazing works). Such people are more prone to commit war crimes than soldiers who are not broken and have high self-esteem. I don't think that this policy was prescribed somewhere in the documents, but I think that it was an unspoken rule to preserve hazing and not try to eradicate it. It's like with the KGB and other security agencies, which nobody even tried to reform after 1991. Everyone in the Russian government realized that one day, they might need the KGB experience to stay in power.
But what shocked me most of all was the story of the two "Soldiers' Mothers" organizations. To be honest, I didn't even know that one of them actively supported the existence of the army as an institution. Of course, there are such people in every country, but still, not every country has almost officially recognized slavery.
While members of the CSMR and SMSP encourage mothers to keep their sons out of military service, the Samara soldiers’ mothers encourage mothers to support their sons during military service and think of themselves as mothers of defenders of the fatherland. Instead of opposing the military, they decry the demise of militarized patriotism. Both Ol’ga T. and Tat’iana N. see the lack of patriotism and of prestige for the military as major problems for contemporary Russia.
Я солдат
Недоношенный ребёнок войны
Я солдат
Мама залечи мои раны
Я солдат
Солдат забытой Богом страны
Я герой
Скажите мне, какого романа
Интересное небольшое исследование о связи большой политики в России и милитаризации общества. Тут уместно вспомнить знаменитое высказывание о «необходимости одержать маленькую победоносную войну», чтобы повысить свою популярность в качестве правителя. Авторы правильно уловили идею раннего Ельцина, который решил поправить свой пошатнувшийся политический рейтинг с помощью милитаризированной повестки. Только этот вопрос стоит рассматривать не только как желание устроить «маленькую победоносную войну», а в более широком смысле, включающее эмоциональный всплеск, подъём патриотизма, возвращение повестки «России как большой империи» и так далее.
Peter Lentini argues that the domestic crisis, and in particular the rising popularity of nationalists, forced Yeltsin to “‘get macho’ in relation to the Near Abroad, Chechnya and the North Atlantic community.” The author thus acknowledges the role of masculinity in the domestic struggle for power and how a tough stance is often associated with masculinity. Yeltsin and his advisers apparently saw military intervention in Chechnya as a means of boosting the president’s dwindling popularity among the public. Duma Defense Committee Chairman Sergei Iushenkov claimed that Oleg Lobov, secretary of the Security Council, told him in a personal conversation: “It is not only a question of the integrity of Russia. We need a small victorious war to raise the President’s ratings.”
Конечно, страшно даже представить, что все те десятки тысяч жертв с обеих сторон в Чечне были принесены в жертву только ради того чтобы в российском обществе Ельцин представ в образе а-ля Наполеон. Поэтому многим людям легче принять версию, что это была «война за территории», а не ради политического PR. Исходя из этого мне думается, что популярная нынче версия, что военный конфликт в Чечне начался сугубо по причине последней объявить о своей независимости, вследствие чего Ельцин якобы выполнял «священный долг» перед россиянами по предотвращению распаду страны, является или может являться надуманным. Опросы 90-х годов свидетельствуют о совсем другом желании россиян.
In December 1994 as well as in January 1995 only 30 percent of respondents supported “decisive measures to bring order to Chechnya,” and between 60 and 70 percent rejected the use of force. Forty-one percent of those polled in spring of 1995 could not pinpoint the reasons behind the war. Some 22 percent suspected that the war was connected to a cover-up involving high-ranking political and military figures, and 18 percent of respondents believed the war was linked to crime fighting within Chechnya. Only 14 per-cent of those polled agreed that the war was about the integrity of the state, and only 10 percent thought it was about the protection of Russian citizens.
О чём могут говорить эти опросы? Они могут говорить о том, что Ельцин не только в сфере экономики проводил действия противоречащие желаниям народа, но даже в такой, казалось бы, важной для россиян сфере, как территориальное единство. Получается, что Ельцин не только построил современную экономику России которой были недовольны большинство россиян, но он начал совершенно никому не нужную, кровавую авантюру в Чечне, вместо того чтобы как все нормальные люди решать этот вопрос мирно. Это так же показывает, что россияне не являются милитаризированной нацией, что все эти национальные штампы были придуманы в том же Кремле, чтобы оправдать все последующие военные кампании. И это также показывает, что уже в самом начале так называемой «свободной и демократической» России, верховная власть плевать хотела на мнение народа. Даже наоборот, она навязывала собственное милитаризированное мнение. Как показывает книга, у Ельцина это сделать не получилось и не в последнюю очередь из-за низких цен на нефтегазовые ресурсы, а вот у Путина построения милитаризованного общества пошло ввысь, хотя и тут успехи оказались довольно несущественными (хотя теракты в Москве существенно помогли Путину на первых этапах взвинтить милитаристскую истерику и избавиться от такого критика как «Солдатские матери», о чём также пишет автор).
Public support for the second war reached its peak in February 2000, with 70 percent of respondents in favor of continuing the military operation. As the war dragged on, and a quick victory did not materialize, support decreased. By May 2002, over 60 percent of the population supported negotiations. In 2002, citizens considered Putin’s main failure to be the continued war in Chechnya.
Важным, однако, является то, что российский народ не является носителем идеи войны России со всем миром, а это сугубо повестка политической элиты России, которую она навязывает обществу. А чтобы общество не с брыкнуло, уже начиная с правления Ельцина, все силы вкладывались в силовой рычаг, т.е. использовалась та же силовая политика, что и в отношении чеченцев, только при Ельцине эта милицейская дубинка ещё не так откровенно била несогласных, как это стало происходить при Путине. И дело не в «либерале» Ельцине, а дело в ценах на нефть.
Далее автор рассматривает сущность российской воинской службы. Автор очень точно показывает всю бессмысленность призывной армии, отмечая не просто насилие в российской призывной армии, а пытки и истязания. Как правильно отмечает один интервьюируемый, молодым мужчинам скучно в армии, вот они, таким образом, и развлекают себя.
As one interviewee put it bluntly: “Here, the soldier is a slave.” Dedovshchina involves systemic physical and psychological violence toward newer recruits, including the exploitation of their labor.
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Two of my interviewees mentioned the case of officers selling conscripts’ labor to a local Coca-Cola factory in Samara. The conscripts were forced to work at the plant while the officers collected their salaries.
Так же я полностью согласен с автором в том, что в России служба в армии рассматривалась как признак низкого социального статуса, т.е. попадание в армию является признаком того, что семья не смогла откупиться от современного рабства.
Sergei, an antidraft activist in Samara, underscored that draft evasion has become a sign of social status. He explained: “Nobody wants to feel that they are socially limited, and military service today is a sign of low social status. If a person has low social status, that means he serves in the army, because he can’t ‘buy his way out.’
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Iurii, one of my interviewees, argued that it is mostly rural and working-class men who hold on to the myth of the military as a “school of manhood” and see military service as offering social mobility and opportunity (sotsial’nyi lift). This observation holds some truth as a result of the deep social crisis afflicting Russia’s depressed rural regions. Polling results show that the idea of military service as a school of life is more common among rural and less-educated respondents.
Конечно, не все солдаты проходили через пытки и унижение, но дедовщина как таковая была явлением повсеместным. Самая известная шутка – «копать от забора до обеда» – очень хорошо передаёт всю абсурдность и бессмысленность призывной армии. Поэтому удивительно, что на фоне политики по продвижению милитаризма под видом патриотизма, который начали продвигать ещё при Ельцине, никто так и не удосужился создать профессиональную армию, в которой бы не занимались тем, что унижали, пытали, а иногда и насиловали солдат, а учили бы военному ремеслу. Это не значит, что я поддерживаю политику большей милитаризации, это значит, что я хочу подчеркнуть идею унижения одних людей другими. Можно подумать, что российская власть просто не могла с этой напастью справиться, но с моей точки зрения, российская власть даже поощряло дедовщину. В чём смысл этого? В том чтобы сломать волю человека чтобы и он начал пытать и мучить ни в чём не повинных людей (именно так и работает дедовщина). Такие люди более склоны совершать военные преступления, чем солдаты, не сломленные и с высокой самооценкой. Я не думаю, что такая политика была прописана где-то в документах, но думаю, что это было негласное правило сохранять дедовщину и не пытаться её искоренить. Это как с КГБ и прочими силовыми органами, которые даже никто не пытался реформировать после 1991. Все понимали в российской власти, что однажды опыт КГБ им может пригодиться - пригодится, чтобы остаться у власти.
Но больше всего меня потрясла история о двух организациях «Солдатских матерей». Честно сказать, я даже и не знал, что одна из них активно поддерживала существование армии как института. Конечно, такие люди есть в каждой стране, но всё же не в каждой стране есть чуть ли не официально признанное рабство.
While members of the CSMR and SMSP encourage mothers to keep their sons out of military service, the Samara soldiers’ mothers encourage mothers to support their sons during military service and think of themselves as mothers of defenders of the fatherland. Instead of opposing the military, they decry the demise of militarized patriotism. Both Ol’ga T. and Tat’iana N. see the lack of patriotism and of prestige for the military as major problems for contemporary Russia.
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It's an interesting little study on the connection between big politics in Russia and the militarization of society. The famous saying about "small victorious war" to increase one's popularity as a ruler comes to mind here. The authors correctly captured the idea of early Yeltsin, who decided to correct his shaky political rating with the help of a militarized agenda. Only this issue should be seen not only as a desire to stage a "small victorious war" but in a broader sense, including an emotional outburst, a rise in patriotism, the return of the "Russia as a big empire" agenda, and so on.
Peter Lentini argues that the domestic crisis, and in particular the rising popularity of nationalists, forced Yeltsin to “‘get macho’ in relation to the Near Abroad, Chechnya and the North Atlantic community.” The author thus acknowledges the role of masculinity in the domestic struggle for power and how a tough stance is often associated with masculinity. Yeltsin and his advisers apparently saw military intervention in Chechnya as a means of boosting the president’s dwindling popularity among the public. Duma Defense Committee Chairman Sergei Iushenkov claimed that Oleg Lobov, secretary of the Security Council, told him in a personal conversation: “It is not only a question of the integrity of Russia. We need a small victorious war to raise the President’s ratings.”
Of course, it is even scary to imagine that all those tens of thousands of victims on both sides in Chechnya were sacrificed just to make Yeltsin appear in Russian society as a la Napoleon. Therefore, it is easier for many people to accept the version that it was a "war for territory" and not for political PR. On this basis, I think that the currently popular version that the military conflict in Chechnya began purely because the latter declared its independence, as a result of which Yeltsin was supposedly fulfilling his "sacred duty" to Russians to prevent the disintegration of the country, is or may be far-fetched. Polls from the 1990s indicate a very different wish among Russians.
In December 1994 as well as in January 1995 only 30 percent of respondents supported “decisive measures to bring order to Chechnya,” and between 60 and 70 percent rejected the use of force. Forty-one percent of those polled in spring of 1995 could not pinpoint the reasons behind the war. Some 22 percent suspected that the war was connected to a cover-up involving high-ranking political and military figures, and 18 percent of respondents believed the war was linked to crime fighting within Chechnya. Only 14 per-cent of those polled agreed that the war was about the integrity of the state, and only 10 percent thought it was about the protection of Russian citizens.
What can these polls tell us? They can say that Yeltsin not only conducted actions contrary to the wishes of the people in the economic sphere but even in such a seemingly important sphere for Russians as territorial unity. It turns out that Yeltsin not only built the modern economy of Russia, which was dissatisfied with the majority of Russians, but he started a completely unnecessary, bloody adventure in Chechnya instead of solving this issue peacefully like all normal people. It also shows that Russians are not a militarized nation and that all these national stamps were invented in the same Kremlin to justify all subsequent military campaigns. And it also shows that already at the very beginning of the so-called "free and democratic" Russia, the supreme power did not give a damn about the opinion of the people. Even on the contrary, it imposed its own militarized opinion. As the book shows, Yeltsin failed to do this, not least because of low prices for oil and gas resources, but Putin's efforts to build a militarized society went upwards although even here, the successes were rather insignificant (although the terrorist attacks in Moscow significantly helped Putin in the first stages to stir up militaristic hysteria and get rid of such critics as the "Soldiers' Mothers," which the author also writes about).
Public support for the second war reached its peak in February 2000, with 70 percent of respondents in favor of continuing the military operation. As the war dragged on, and a quick victory did not materialize, support decreased. By May 2002, over 60 percent of the population supported negotiations. In 2002, citizens considered Putin’s main failure to be the continued war in Chechnya.
What is important, however, is that the Russian people are not the bearers of the idea of Russia's war with the whole world, but this is purely the agenda of Russia's political elite, which it imposes on society. And to keep society on its toes, since Yeltsin's reign, all forces have been invested in the lever of force, i.e., the same force policy was used as in relation to the Chechens, only under Yeltsin this police baton did not beat dissenters as blatantly as it began to happen under Putin. And it's not about the "liberal" Yeltsin, it's about oil prices.
Next, the author examines the essence of the Russian military service. The author very accurately shows the senselessness of the conscript army by pointing out not just the violence in the Russian conscript army but also torture and humiliation. As one interviewee correctly points out, young men are bored in the army, so they entertain themselves in this way.
As one interviewee put it bluntly: “Here, the soldier is a slave.” Dedovshchina involves systemic physical and psychological violence toward newer recruits, including the exploitation of their labor.
<…>
Two of my interviewees mentioned the case of officers selling conscripts’ labor to a local Coca-Cola factory in Samara. The conscripts were forced to work at the plant while the officers collected their salaries.
I also completely agree with the author that in Russia, military service was seen as a sign of low social status, i.e., joining the army was a sign that the family was unable to buy off modern slavery.
Sergei, an antidraft activist in Samara, underscored that draft evasion has become a sign of social status. He explained: “Nobody wants to feel that they are socially limited, and military service today is a sign of low social status. If a person has low social status, that means he serves in the army, because he can’t ‘buy his way out.’
<…>
Iurii, one of my interviewees, argued that it is mostly rural and working-class men who hold on to the myth of the military as a “school of manhood” and see military service as offering social mobility and opportunity (sotsial’nyi lift). This observation holds some truth as a result of the deep social crisis afflicting Russia’s depressed rural regions. Polling results show that the idea of military service as a school of life is more common among rural and less-educated respondents.
Of course, not all soldiers went through torture and humiliation, but hazing as such was a ubiquitous phenomenon. The most famous joke - "digging from the fence to lunch" - conveys very well the absurdity and senselessness of the conscript army. It is therefore surprising that against the background of the policy of promoting militarism under the guise of patriotism, which began to be promoted under Yeltsin, no one has ever bothered to create a professional army that would not be engaged in humiliating, torturing, and sometimes raping soldiers, but would teach them the military craft. This does not mean that I support a policy of greater militarization; it means that I want to emphasize the idea of humiliation of some people by others. You might think that the Russian government just couldn't deal with this scourge, but from my perspective, the Russian government even encouraged hazing. What is the point of this? It's about breaking a person's will so that he starts torturing and tormenting innocent people (that's how hazing works). Such people are more prone to commit war crimes than soldiers who are not broken and have high self-esteem. I don't think that this policy was prescribed somewhere in the documents, but I think that it was an unspoken rule to preserve hazing and not try to eradicate it. It's like with the KGB and other security agencies, which nobody even tried to reform after 1991. Everyone in the Russian government realized that one day, they might need the KGB experience to stay in power.
But what shocked me most of all was the story of the two "Soldiers' Mothers" organizations. To be honest, I didn't even know that one of them actively supported the existence of the army as an institution. Of course, there are such people in every country, but still, not every country has almost officially recognized slavery.
While members of the CSMR and SMSP encourage mothers to keep their sons out of military service, the Samara soldiers’ mothers encourage mothers to support their sons during military service and think of themselves as mothers of defenders of the fatherland. Instead of opposing the military, they decry the demise of militarized patriotism. Both Ol’ga T. and Tat’iana N. see the lack of patriotism and of prestige for the military as major problems for contemporary Russia.
January 26, 2021
This was a really interesting book. I'm not sure if the lens of feminist theory is always the best for looking at things, but it offered up some interesting insights into the military and into the post-Soviet Russian military in particular. This is an interesting book for anyone interested in Civil-Military relations (CMR), especially the sociological and social dimensions. It is also an interesting look at the way that society in Russia changed after the break up of the Soviet Union as it was reflected in the military and society's response to military action in Chechnya (twice).
The book is well-written and a pretty quick read. It's accessible for a non-academic audience and is of interest to specialists as well as those who may be new to CMR or military issues in general. It will be of most interest to those who are interested in viewing society through a feminist theory lens.
The book is well-written and a pretty quick read. It's accessible for a non-academic audience and is of interest to specialists as well as those who may be new to CMR or military issues in general. It will be of most interest to those who are interested in viewing society through a feminist theory lens.
July 14, 2024
This is an easy read, well-written and researched, and a very interesting perspective on the gender perspective of the evolution of militarization and identities in Russia from World War II to the Second Chechen War. The author explains the use of gender roles as a tool by Soviet and post-Soviet governments, including the impact of glasnost and capitalism on the military and conscription.
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