Valley of Decision: The Siege of Khe Sanh

by John Prados, Ray W. Stubbe

Widely acknowledged as the definitive history of the siege of Khe Sanh when first published in hardcover in 1991, this book tells the whole incredible story of one of the most pivotal and bloody battles of the Vietnam War. Historian John Prados and Khe Sanh survivor Ray Stubbe recount the brutal seventy-seven days of combat and present the larger political context that formed the all-important backdrop to the events on the battlefield in 1968. From the first direct hit on the fifteen-hundred tons of ammunition stockpiled in the U.S. compound, through the day and night patrols, pounding mortar fire, and shifting battle lines, the words and deeds of the men of Khe Sanh are brought to life with a skillful combination of documentation and eyewitness accounts-from both sides of the conflict. Unique among books about the war, the comprehensiveness of this study will satisfy the most demanding specialist. Its sense of drama and action and its use of on-the-scene testimony will intrigue the general reader. 576 pages. 65 photographs. 16 line drawings. Paperback. 6 x 9 inches.

Genres: History, Military History, War, Military Fiction, Nonfiction, American History

576 pages, Paperback

First published December 1, 1991

About the author

Dr. John Prados is an American historian & researcher whose primary areas of specialisation are the history of World War II, the Vietnam War, the Cold War and politico-military affairs generally. He earned his Ph.D. from Columbia University in Political Science (International Relations). Dr. Prados is a senior fellow and project director with the National Security Archive at George Washington University (Washington, D.C.).

Reviews

[Stefania Dzhanamova · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is the brilliant result of the collaboration between historian and international security affairs analyst John Prados and Ray Stubbe, a retired naval Lutheran chaplain who served throughout the battle of Khe Sanh with the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines. 

Stubbe provides the stories of the men who fought at Khe Sanh. Intimately involved with the Marines whose experiences he shared, he visited all their positions, went along on patrols and other missions, and stayed overnight with the young men manning the hills of Khe Sanh. When Khe Sanh became a battlefield, he was there. When the combat base fell under siege, he shared its fate.

He kept a diary, in which he recorded every kind of fact and rumor. He has also browsed through a considerable number of Marine records, award citation files, official debriefings, and a certain amount of material obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, and has interviewed all Khe Sanh survivors that he could find. The materiel that he assembled from all his efforts serves as the basis for his part of his and Prados's work. He chronicles the fates of the Marines with great detail and compassion, conveying the agony of fighting in the hills of Khe Sanh. The space that could be devoted to the stories of the men was limited, but Stubbe has made the most of what he had. He has obviously taken care to use quotations accurately because they have not lost the atmosphere of Khe Sahn. He has not rewritten them or corrected the grammar mistakes, and this is what makes them sound so authentic. 

Prados's contribution is different, but not less important. Stubbe's narrative, while fascinating, is weak on the larger operational and strategic context in which the siege of Khe Sanh happened. This is why Prados, as a professional historian, focuses on the bigger picture, filling the gaps in his co-author's account with his in-depth knowledge about the North Vietnamese side of the battle, the conduct of the campaign in Washington and Saigon, and certain battle scenes. While Stubbe found more Marines to interview, Prados gained access to new declassified materials and documentary collections.

Some of Prados's most valuable discoveries, which he includes in the book, are segments of MACV Commander William Westmoreland's historical notes and backup materials, a small amount of the top secret back-channel correspondence between Generals Westmoreland and Earle Wheeler, who was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, and summaries and translations of captured North Vietnamese documents. The latter make it possible to gain insight into the other side of the Khe Sahn battle. Prados also bases his research on records of many of General Westmoreland's telephone conversations, especially with subordinates, that he discovered. 

Unlike previous accounts of Khe Sanh, Prados and Stubbe's work makes an effort to tell the whole history of Khe Sahn, not only that of the 1968 siege. The authors write about the battles the previous year, the evolution of the Special Forces camp, the place of Khe Sanh in the high command's strategic vision, and also the village and the indigenous Bru fighters. This background information helps set the proper context for the siege, which is helpful. Other authors have overwhelmed me by throwing me directly into the action of the battle. I appreciate that Prados and Stubbe have chosen a different approach.

They also pay attention to the North Vietnamese side, which makes their account stand out among the American-biased combat memoirs that I have read. Although the information about the North Vietnamese Army forces and the Viet Cong is limited because Vietnam has yet to declassify sources, it is clear that Prados and Stubbe had tried to improve the reader's knowledge of the Communist adversary at Khe Sanh as much as was possible with the meager sources available. 

Most importantly, there are new, well-drawn maps. Many books about Khe Sanh suffer from the use and repeated reuse of the same maps, on which many important features do not even appear. The authors of this work have compiled a completely fresh set of maps, some astonishingly detailed, though. They contribute significantly to the presentation of the story. Similarly, the interesting collection of photographs does not suffer from an excess of popular photographs that can be seen even on Google, but boasts a variety of fresh images alongside the traditional ones. 

VALLEY OF DECISION may not be the definitive work on the battle and siege of Khe Sanh. Some important questions that Prados raises, such as the reason for the Americans' persistence in staying at Khe Sanh, Westmoreland's actual objectives, and President Lyndon B. Johnson's perception of the Vietnam conflict, remain unanswered, and Prados's narrative is confusing at times. For instance, he discusses General Westmoreland's decision to establish the MACV headquarters, and he does not write anything else about it for two hundred pages until he mentions the Provisional Corps Vietnam commanded by an army general and operating in 1st Corps. The reader is left wondering when and why the MACV changed its name. However, the authors have still done a great job both in terms of researching and writing. This book easily ranks among the most well-rounded, if it is not the most well-rounded, about Khe Sahn that I have read. I highly recommend it.

[Mike · Rating 3 out of 5]

The Valley of Decision gets 3 Stars although I had hoped for more. Khe Sanh is the iconic battle of the American years in Vietnam (like Dien Bien Phu was for the French) and this book started out as the authoritative account of the battle. And it partly lives up to that by a thorough vetting of the interplay between MACV, US Joint Chiefs, US President and the limited historical documents from the NVA leaders before, during and after the battle. The book also covers lots of actions around Khe Sanh, doctrinal battles between the Army, Air Force and Marines on control of the air campaign, the hill fights before the main Khe Sanh siege, the local inhabitants (the Bru), some of the peripheral fights (e.g., Lang Vei). The book is also strong in interpreting the various stratagems and tactics for picking Khe Sanh and fighting there. Where I thought it fell short was the actual siege. The main battle is hardly covered and not in great detail, which I was looking for. A good book to fill out your understanding of the Vietnam War. Bottom line, we did not need to fight there:

“When you’re at Khe Sanh, you’re not really anywhere,” said Brigadier General Lowell B. English on one occasion. Assistant commander of the 3rd Marine Division, English at least could not be accused of not having the big picture. “It’s far away from everything,” English said of Khe Sanh. “You could lose it and you really haven’t lost a damn thing.” William C. Westmoreland saw things differently.

Vietnam compared to WWII for the infantry:

In fact, Vietnam was a searing experience for all those who went through combat. World War II veterans may have seen battles unfold on a larger scale, but nothing rivaled Vietnam in the constancy of risk, the immediacy of danger. The average World War 11 Marine spent seventy days a year in combat. A Marine tour in South Vietnam lasted only thirteen months, but in that time an infantryman could expect to be on combat detail for some 270 days. Moreover, combat in Vietnam seemed wholly illogical -veterans of the “big war” proudly recalled the islands they had captured, the objectives seized. Marines in Vietnam spent their days repeatedly sweeping the same terrain, capturing the same hills and hamlets, sometimes falling victim to ambushes in the same places.

There wasn’t much about the ARVN involved at Khe Sanh but here was one brave Vietnamese pilot:

One Vietnamese pilot, nicknamed “Moustacio,” pulled an incredible feat the day one of the teams had trouble across the border. Moustacio went out on the recovery flight and got hit; the bullet went right through his neck, behind the jugular vein, a shallow wound but one that bled profusely. Instead of seeking treatment, he got rid of half his crew, including the copilot, retaining only the door gunner. Then Moustacio went back for another run, holding his fist into his neck to keep back the blood. He returned with two more recon men. By then Moustacio was so weak he could not even get out of the seat, and a big SOG master sergeant named Scurry lifted the Vietnamese pilot out of the chopper and took him to a Marine medical station. The doctor apparently thought Moustacio was a North Vietnamese and wanted to treat others first. Scurry rasped, “Treat this sonofabitch before I knock you out! He’s one of ours!” Just two weeks later Moustacio was flying again.

The US came up with some nasty things to scatter along the Ho Chi Minh trail:

…employing such new technologies as remote sensors, acoustic, chemical, and others; button bomblets, mines that were designed merely to trip acoustic sensors; and Gravel, air-seeded antipersonnel mines to wound feet and legs. The Gravel mine, which carried the weapon designation XM-4IE, actually consisted of a three-inch cloth bag containing powder plus two plastic pellets. The device was undetectable to standard mine detectors, and the pellets were invisible on X-rays. Every wound would have to be treated by exploratory surgery. Large numbers of Gravel mines could be dispensed from each munition casing.

The NVA soldier had a tough life, getting to and surviving the battlefield:

Similarly evocative is this account of a soldier’s trip south with the 101st Regiment of the NVA 325-C Division:

The cadre and soldiers . . . carried heavy loads, walked on foot two and a half months long, ate short rations of rice with salt only, and drank water from the streams, so some soldiers and cadre suffered malaria. Upon arrival in [the south] the total number of soldiers suffering malaria increased quickly. Within a month, 120 members of the 101st Regiment contracted malaria. A number of others began to contract this disease, but they still had to engage in combat. For lack of beds and mats in the dispensaries, all patients lay in hammocks fastened to trees. Treatment was not sufficient with two medics for 120 patients. Then . . . these two medics were sent to battle to give aid to wounded soldiers. No one took care of the patients. Thus the moderately sick patients looked after the serious ones. …As for healthy soldiers, their conditions were no better; when not in combat they were forced to work all day and night. For rations, each was given two cans of rice, some manioc and salt.

There are always some humorous stories to ease the tension:

There were as many stories as there were recon Marines. Sergeant James L. Hutton coming in from the States had some idea he could establish dominance by snapping the men into shape. Soon after his arrival he took one of the most experienced recon teams, men who had spent days on end in the bush outpacing NVA search cordons, and ordered them out for some toughening, specifically a run around the airstrip.

“I want to hear those legs thunder, Marines!” Hutton called out as the men began their circuit.

Recon Marine Robert E. Pagano sets the scene: “So he ran us around the airstrip. Of course it was almost 110 [degrees] out. And by the time we got all the way around the airstrip he wasn’t in too good a shape, and we were pretty OK. . . . We said, ‘Come on, Sarge, let’s thunder around one more time!’ ” Hutton never called physical training again. At Khe Sanh forever after he would be known as “Thunder Legs.”

The NVA did not “lure” Westmoreland into the battle at Khe Sanh as he wanted a fight there. However, the NVA did make it look like a great idea:

This was the situation when reports began to come in of new movements of NVA divisions down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Westmoreland probably theorized that one thing that could reduce the difficulty of his plan would be to defeat the main body of NVA forces inside South Vietnam. Khe Sanh was a good location away from populated areas, U.S. firepower could be concentrated there with less fear of civilian casualties; the Saigon government was hardly active in the area, making coordination with it less important; the enemy seemed interested enough in the place to be drawn into combat. William Westmoreland wanted a battle at Khe Sanh. Contrary to previous accounts, which attribute the battle solely to Hanoi’s intentions, the battle at Khe Sanh was not merely some plan concocted by the NVA.

The siege of Khe Sanh depended on the air campaign, and what airpower delivered:

Summarized differently, tactical aircraft delivered 39,179 tons against the 59,542 brought by B52s. That amounted to almost 1,300 tons of bombs around Khe Sanh, the equivalent of a 1.3-kiloton tactical nuclear weapon, every day of the siege. Allied aircraft were delivering approximately five tons of bombs for every one of the 20,000 NVA soldiers initially estimated to be in the Khe Sanh area, or more than 15 tons per man measured against roughly 6,450 Marines and ARVN troops in the garrison. This was indeed a cascade of bombs.

[Steve · Rating 4 out of 5]

This reader would generally agree with the review give above on the book but would add it also provides insight to the service rivalries, Washington politicking/interventions and most significantly, offers detailed narratives on the battles on the hills surrounding Khe Sanh. Hills that were to prove critical to the defense of the base.
I would also agree with Tim’s review (below) in that the maps were poor at best, greater use of them, especially if inserted adjacent to the related narratives, would have added significantly. I also question, since this was a joint draft, if a book solely written by Ray Stubbe would not have had more impact as he was a chaplain stationed there at the time of the siege. Prados, I assume, provided much of the political and inter-service research that added to the overall picture but I didn’t appreciate his style of presentation.
Lastly, I found very moving the final section of the book where veterans of the engagement made remarks years after the fact, remarks on friends lost, memories that still haunt and nightmares lived. As a fellow veteran I can sympathize, yet never having lived through such an event, I can’t begin to imagine their pain and sense of loss. They gave so much to a society that seldom thinks of the cost they paid nor can appreciate the scars left.

[David Baker · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting, informative and valuable contribution to the library of books on Vietnam and especially the odd battle of Khe Sahn. Certainly worth the read, but the first half of the book is much better written and much more engaging than the second half which devolves into lists of units and commanders and tonnages and dates with much less sense of purpose. I would not rely on this book as a primary source either for strategy or for tactics and there are much better books out there that tell the real story of the men inside the wire who lived and died on a red, muddy plateau in the highlands of Souther Vietnam.

[Tim · Rating 3 out of 5]

Great detail so far - would love more detailed maps