Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750

by Odd Arne Westad

As the twenty-first century dawns, China stands at a crossroads. The largest and most populous country on earth and currently the world's second biggest economy, China has recently reclaimed its historic place at the center of global affairs after decades of internal chaos and disastrous foreign relations. But even as China tentatively reengages with the outside world, the contradictions of its development risks pushing it back into an era of insularity and instability—a regression that, as China's recent history shows, would have serious implications for all other nations.

In Restless Empire , award-winning historian Odd Arne Westad traces China's complex foreign affairs over the past 250 years, identifying the forces that will determine the country's path in the decades to come. Since the height of the Qing Empire in the eighteenth century, China's interactions—and confrontations—with foreign powers have caused its worldview to fluctuate wildly between extremes of dominance and subjugation, emulation and defiance. From the invasion of Burma in the 1760s to the Boxer Rebellion in the early 20th century to the 2001 standoff over a downed U.S. spy plane, many of these encounters have left Chinese with a lingering sense of humiliation and resentment, and inflamed their notions of justice, hierarchy, and Chinese centrality in world affairs. Recently, China's rising influence on the world stage has shown what the country stands to gain from international cooperation and openness. But as Westad shows, the nation's success will ultimately hinge on its ability to engage with potential international partners while simultaneously safeguarding its own strength and stability.

An in-depth study by one of our most respected authorities on international relations and contemporary East Asian history, Restless Empire is essential reading for anyone wishing to understand the recent past and probable future of this dynamic and complex nation.

Genres: History, China, Nonfiction, Asia, Politics, World History, Military Fiction

528 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2012

About the author

Odd Arne Westad, FBA, is a Norwegian historian specializing in the Cold War and contemporary East Asian history. He is currently the ST Lee Professor of US-Asia Relations at Harvard University, teaching in the John F. Kennedy School of Government.

Reviews

[Max · Rating 4 out of 5]

Westad covers a lot of ground in 500 pages exploring China’s relationship to the world for the last 250 years. He describes the main events but particularly interesting are his descriptions of Chinese culture and how it changes and adapts as its exposure to the West increases. He ends with his thoughts on what this history tells us about China’s future. He focuses on the Chinese point of view. We see the evolution of Chinese thinking about the rest of the world and China’s place in that world. Westad takes a broad view with detail just sufficient to make his points. For me the level of detail felt right for the years prior to WWII about which I knew little, but his succinctness became very apparent when I got to the later years with which I was more familiar. The book is written for the general reader who wants an overview. Westad has won the Bancroft Prize and other awards for prior books. He is the ST Lee Professor of US-Asia Relations at Harvard and at the time of publication was Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics. He has also taught in China. My notes follow.

Westad begins with the Qing dynasty which took over China in 1644. The Qing expanded Chinese territory, subjugated insubordinate elements in remote territories and extracted tribute from neighboring states. 1750 was the peak of their empire. A fundamental issue was that of Chinese identity. Loyalty was typically to a local territory or clan not to the greater state. The glue was a shared culture based on Confucian ideals. Differing ethnicities and languages were divisive. The Qing themselves were Manchus whom many Chinese considered outsiders who had taken over China.

In the nineteenth century divided loyalties among the Chinese weakened the Qing as did their squandering resources trying to maintain an expansive empire. Thus the Qing were vulnerable just as the European powers became a dangerous threat. A major turning point was the Opium War 1839-1842. The Qing finally reacted to ever increasing European encroachment when they saw the effects of the exploitative opium trade on their citizens. The Qing quickly found they were no match for the British military. The loss of this war further eroded the standing of the Qing with their constituents. Then the Taiping Rebellion in the 1850s led by a man who claimed to be the brother of Jesus left 20 million dead. This near civil war followed by lesser rebellions further strained the Qing. Now foreigners and Chinese alike saw the dramatic decline in the Qing ability to wield power. In 1860, the British and French took advantage sacking Beijing and burning down the Qing Gardens of Eternal Brightness which contained hundreds of buildings including art pavilions, temples and libraries with countless treasures many ending up in Western museums. One French soldier noted, “I have walked for more than two days over more than 30 million worth of silks, jewels, porcelain, bronzes, sculptures, treasures! I do not think we have seen anything like it since the sack of Rome by the barbarians.”

The European powers carved out more enclaves in coastal China and expanded trade in the last half of the nineteenth century forming a new hybrid culture. Chinese and foreigners mixed in the trade zones. Exposure to the Western value of economic gain eroded traditional Confucian values of sincerity, honor and social relationship. Women who suffered subservience in a patriarchal Chinese society found considerably more freedom in Western controlled cities although conditions were harsh. Western goods and Western ways made their way into China however rural China would remain unpenetrated until the next century. More Chinese began emigrating sending news of the West home. Western missionaries transmitted culture both ways. They translated texts to and from the Chinese and they established schools teaching Western science and ideas. At the same time Chinese began going to school abroad. With a better understanding of the West the Chinese belief in China’s centrality in the world began to unravel. Finally in the late 1870s that Qing saw the need to have diplomats and embassies in Western countries. The divide between new and old, rural and urban would weigh heavily on China well into the next century.

Japan also faced the challenges of dealing with the West. But in 1868 the Meiji Restoration turned Japan from insular to an avid seeker of Western knowledge and technology. Japan’s success was envied in China with Japan looked upon as a model. Unfortunately, Japan soon saw its own opportunities in China leading to war in Korea in 1895. Korea, a traditional Chinese supplicant, came under Japanese control along with many lesser territories. The Qing again had been humiliated. Japan further showed its might obliterating the Russian Navy in a 1905 war which extended Japanese control in Manchuria, the homeland of the Qing. The difference between Japanese success and Chinese failure was lost on no one. The desire to emulate Japan’s success fueled Chinese efforts to find a system to replace the Qing Empire. After WWI Japan gained control of Germany’s Chinese territory. The Chinese now viewed Japan as their primary threat and Japan saw China as a failed state that required Japanese control.

In 1900 the Boxer rebellion erupted into a murderous melee against foreigners and Christians. The Qing were ambivalent. The foreign powers fought together to eliminate the Boxers and further subjugate the Qing who agreed to a harsh settlement to remain in power. Japan and the European powers were satisfied with a weak Chinese central government that they could control. But the Qing were too weak to retain control and in 1912 they abdicated and a republic was formed. Unfortunately the republic which lasted until 1928 was just another ineffective government run by a succession of weak leaders who could neither unite China nor advance Chinese interests. Remarkably China did not splinter, in large part due to foreign powers that wanted a weak central government.

In response to this continued humiliation Sun Yat-sen led the new Guomindang (GMD). The Soviet Union lent support to this revolutionary organization hoping to ultimately take it over with an embedded Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Sun died in 1925 leaving a power vacuum. His protégé, Chiang Kai-shek, acted decisively killing or capturing the CCP leaders and other opponents and taking charge of the GMD. He then launched a wildly successful campaign to take over the country. Chiang and the GMD ruled China from Nanjing from 1928-1938. While corrupt and inept it was still the most effective government China had seen in almost two centuries. Chinese nationalism held the country together. Japan soon showed its hand taking complete control of Manchuria in 1931. Chiang now fully recognized the Japanese threat but Japan was far too powerful to confront. All-out war would begin in 1937.

Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, Western culture increasingly penetrated China. Western controlled cities especially Shanghai were modern with cinemas, streetcars, jazz, and contemporary architecture. These cities were largely inhabited by Chinese who incorporated Western ways. European fashions were often hybridized with Chinese features. The Chinese avidly sought education. Western Science was particularly appreciated even though it could appear to confront Confucian values. More and more Chinese were educated abroad and more Westerners, particularly missionaries, established schools and universities in China. In the 1920s school was finally made compulsory in China even if only to the sixth grade but implementation was sketchy. Rural areas began to get exposure to the West. Hollywood played a leading role. Traveling projectionists would show movies in villages to mesmerized audiences. Also, many Chinese had emigrated regularly communicating with their relatives back home further exposing them to foreign ideas. Western investment in China and trade increased. By 1949 China was well integrated into the world economy. The government made extensive use of foreign advisors particularly in military, legal and diplomatic areas. Japanese were prominent at the beginning of the century followed by Germans until 1937. The Soviets helped the CCP. Americans came in the 1930s and 40s. Intermarriage steadily increased.

The Japanese invaded in force in 1937 and relentlessly pushed back Chiang’s troops. The Japanese captured his capital Nanjing (Nanking) where they raped and murdered over 200,000 residents. The war lasting until 1945 resulted in millions of Chinese deaths, many from famine, and sixty to ninety million homeless. Chiang and his GMD barely survived the war. Chiang’s greatest achievement was that against overwhelming force he never capitulated keeping China in one piece even if mostly occupied. His steadfastness and patriotism were widely recognized by the people of China and rewarded by the international community with China receiving a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. While Chinese industry and infrastructure had been decimated, China came out of the war with a renewed sense of national identity. Mao Zedong’s CCP had sporadically cooperated with the GMD against the Japanese depending on orders from Stalin. But Mao mostly made sure the CCP would be in a strong position at war’s end. He gained hundreds of thousands of new members selling the party as a defender against the Japanese. Mao ensured members were heavily indoctrinated in the importance of the CCP and his own role as Chairman.

With WWII over, the GMD and CCP went at it. After a poor start, the CCP rebounded proclaiming the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, forcing Chiang and his remaining troops to evacuate to Taiwan. In 1950 the Korean War started and Mao decided the Chinese needed to intervene. The war ended in a stalemate in 1953. At home Mao regimented Chinese life with local committees and an extensive network of informants, modeled after the Soviet Union. The CCP taught a history it wrote that made the rise of the CCP seem inevitable. They drove out foreigners and foreign owned businesses. They prohibited foreign books, movies and many other products. Violators in word or act were summarily punished. For example, lipstick smugglers were executed. Women, however, benefited from the abolition of arranged marriages and measures to end exploitation of young girls and some liked their Mao uniforms. Throughout the 1950s Soviet influence was pervasive: Soviet advisors, Soviet education, Soviet aid, and Soviet foreign policy. In a throwback to Stalin’s Great Terror Mao set quotas by province for the arrest and execution of counterrevolutionaries. By 1955 between four and five million had been executed and/or arrested. 1956 saw demonstrations and increasing tension. Mao responded with the Hundred Flowers Campaign allowing dissenters to openly express their opinions. Then in 1957 after identifying these “bourgeois rightists” Mao arrested them sending hundreds of thousands to labor camps.

In 1958 Mao proclaimed The Great Leap Forward, a program of collectivization and industrialization that spawned a disastrous famine killing 45 million before the program ended in failure in 1961. In the 1960’s Mao’s foreign policy turned isolationist. He had his army attack the Soviet Union along disputed borders, alienated North Korea, started a war with India and created tension with China’s ally, North Vietnam. Attempts at relations with developing countries such as Indonesia, Algeria and Cuba failed as all ended up rejecting China and the strings that accompanied its aid. In 1966, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution created chaos throughout China as gangs of young zealous Red Guards patrolled the country instigating violence everywhere they went. Mao reveled in their adulation at huge rallies (not unlike the equally narcissistic wannabe great leader in the US today). In another throwback to Stalin’s 1930s terror many high ranking CCP members were incarcerated and tortured along with countless others for trivial offenses such as wearing glasses or having a foreign language book or just being at the wrong place at the wrong time.

Mao cooled the rhetoric against the U.S and began tamping down the Revolution in 1969. He was afraid it was leaving China unprepared for war believing the Soviet Union might invade. Then conveniently in 1970, Nixon reached out to China, which dovetailed perfectly with Mao’s new direction. Mao died in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping eventually emerged as the new leader of the Party. Deng put pragmatism over ideology and opened China to foreign investment. His approach was to promise predominantly American companies low labor rates, free land and little or no taxes in exchange for technology transfer and training. New Chinese companies sprang up benefiting from this exchange. Chinese GDP quadrupled in the 1980s. To garner U.S. help in rebuilding China’s military Deng positioned China as the U.S.’s ally against the Soviet Union, even cooperating with the CIA. This worked particularly well with Reagan who wanted to put pressure on the Soviet Union.

As China began to emulate the American economy, so did demands for American style political freedom ending in the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989. Many of those building China’s booming economy had been educated abroad and were familiar with a free society. The shadow of Tiananmen still hangs over China. Many Chinese educated abroad do not want to return and few talented people want to relocate to China. While China did not adopt American style democracy it did adopt American style capitalism. There is the irony of a so called Communist government spawning draconian income inequality with (in 2010 figures) over a third of the population barely surviving on $2 per day while there are more than a hundred billionaires and 500,000 millionaires. China is now the world’s second largest economy with annual growth that usually doubles the U.S. yet the per capita income ranks it 71st (2017 World Bank) just behind Mexico and Kazakhstan.

More than with America, China’s challenges in the past several decades have been with its neighbors. Russia posed less of a threat than the Soviet Union after its collapse in 1991 and Putin’s Russia and China share a mutual respect as authoritarian regimes. North Korea presents a special problem for China should North Korea fall apart leading to a destabilizing mess and potentially a Western oriented reunited Korea on its border. Japan and China’s difficult history, territorial disputes and economic competition leave this relationship always contentious. Similarly prior wars and territorial disputes create problems with Vietnam and India. China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea alienate Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines. India is the biggest threat to Chinese dominance in Asia. It has a more stable open economy, a well-educated work force, widespread use of English, and will in a few decades have a larger population than China. Interestingly, in a complete 180, China now is encouraging women to have more babies. A nuclear armed India may find itself in a squeeze between a nuclear armed China and a nuclear armed Pakistan which is India’s arch enemy and China’s ally. This situation has the potential to lead to serious trouble given China’s desire for hegemony over the entire region.

A dangerous time will also come between China and the U.S. as China becomes the world’s largest economy but the U.S. remains the world’s supreme military power. Much depends on the future of the authoritarian rule of the CCP. It controls what the Chinese think. Schools manipulate history to shape Chinese thought in line with CCP goals. Just as Japanese students are taught history that omits the country’s responsibility for WWII atrocities; Chinese students are taught history that shows China and the CCP are always right. The internet and news is strictly censored and today each citizen is being individually graded for correct behavior which includes the use of facial recognition from video cameras. If a camera catches someone jaywalking, their grade is lowered! If such a society persists, China will remain out of synch with the rest of the world creating tension. Of course there are always wild cards such as the election of and behavior of Donald Trump. Irrational behavior can and as we see from this history often does alter expected trajectories. Projections are not predictions.

[Boudewijn · Rating 4 out of 5]

As the twenty-first century dawns, China stands at a crossroads. What will be its place in the new emerging world? This book offers essential reading for anyone wishing to understand the recent past and probable future of this dynamic and complex nation.

As one of the largest and most populous country and currently the world's biggest economy, China is ready to claim its place in the new emerging world. But as this was not always the case, Odd Arne Westad traces China's past in its foreign affairs, starting from the height of the Qing Empire in the eighteenth century up untill the recent opening of China under Deng Xiaping.

China’s interactions–and confrontations–with foreign powers have caused its worldview to fluctuate wildly between extremes of dominance and subjugation, emulation and defiance. From the invasion of Burma in the 1760s to the Boxer Rebellion in the early 20th century to the 2001 standoff over a downed U.S. spy plane, many of these encounters have left Chinese with a lingering sense of humiliation and resentment, and inflamed their notions of justice, hierarchy, and Chinese centrality in world affairs. Recently, China’s rising influence on the world stage has shown what the country stands to gain from international cooperation and openness.

This book offers a good insight in the psyche of China, the influence the outside world had on the mind and culture of the Chinese, it's promised and strengths but also its weak spots. Essential reading for anyone who wishes to understand the Chinese stance on the current foreign affairs.

[David Dinaburg · Rating 4 out of 5]

My points of comparison are virtually non-existent, so I may have internalized more of this author’s particularized views of China’s history than is especially beneficial. Succinctly: I swallowed this book en masse; interpreted it as gospel; a template against which all future information will be compared; a touchstone; idealized like a collegiate significant other and polished in memory so that all that can be recalled is smooth, rounded, flawless. I readily admit that I don’t know much about China, which is why I picked this up in the first place. I was not disappointed. I didn't bring enough prior knowledge with me to Restless Empire to legitimately dispute what I learned, which is not a great position to be in when writing any sort of response to non-fiction. But for being able to create cogent thoughts about modern China based on what seem to be accurate historical references, Restless Empire is a great first step for the China novice embarking on the thousand mile journey of Chinese history.

Stylistically, this book is slow in a measured and methodical way rather than plodding or pedantic:

“Today [people] often do not know the degree to which China was an open country before 1949 or the key role foreigners played in China’s development. Foreigners often do not understand the sense of humiliation today’s Chinese feel when the look back on the past, at least in the version they get presented: The concessions, the extraterritoriality, the financial reparations, and the haughty behavior of foreigners in China would be a bad example of international interaction for any country, but they particularly rile a generation grown up on spoonfuls of government-sanctioned nationalism.”

This is five hundred pages of well articulated and strongly supported research. It is information that I simply didn’t know about a country that has rarely been defined in terms other than “rival”, “other”, “exotic”, or “Communist” in a conversational setting beyond academia. “Over the past two millenia it has been an empire rather than a country, but an empire with very open and very fluid borders. Its inhabitants have, until very recently, been defined by the civilization they were part of rather than by the way they look or the ancestors they have.” China as a concept in American parlance summons a wide variety of specters, depending on the speaker: cheap manufactured good; human rights violations; outsourced jobs; Communism. It is difficult to find a reference with tone and tenor that isn’t slanted-- I cannot say for sure whether the author, Odd Arne Westad, has some agenda that I didn’t grok to, but I can say that, provided his facts are accurate, my comprehensive understanding of the nation of China has increased exponentially. Restless Empire leaves you with an almost too-clear picture of how a national history can color a global present.

”The US government banned Chinese immigration in 1882. It is the only restriction Congress has ever enacted directed against all citizens of a specific country. The ban lasted up to 1943, when Chinese officials managed to sufficiently embarrass their wartime ally to have it withdrawn.” This is a flatly absurd and repulsive historical fact that tends to be downplayed in American education. This is followed, a few hundred pages later, with some information that would seem innocuous, even laudable, taken on its own:

“For Americans with an interest in the outside world, China also became a prime object of the American desire for reform and modernization. A powerful movement for reform at home took hold in the 1890s. Missionaries, health workers, economists, engineers, and businessmen went to China with lessons drawn from the American experiment. After China became a republic in 1912, some Americans believed that the US republican heritage would be of particular significance to the Chinese.”

How distasteful, that juxtaposition; only a century ago citizens of the U.S. made it their business to “modernize” (read: “civilize”) a nation whose citizens were barred, root and stem, from coming to this country. Hypocrisy of the highest order, and, as mentioned, even after China shifted into a pro tem Republic the absolute ban was still in place. Not to forget the direct application of foreign violence.

“For foreign leaders, China was the first “failed state,” and the intervention in 1900 was the first “coalition of the willing,” meaning, in this case, an alliance of the main Western countries and Japan directed against Chinese “barbarity” and against the Qing state’s unwillingness to uphold “civilized” norms of government and public behavior....More fully than any event before it, the Boxer war had placed China outside the Western-led international system, a pariah state, the center of a 1900 axis of evil that incorporated resistance against colonial domination everywhere, from Sudan to Afghanistan to Korea.”

China’s view of Western Civilization doesn’t seem to have shifted all that much in the last two centuries, regardless of the invasions, banning, or embargoes.

“The matter that preoccupied Chinese more than anything else was the absence of filial piety and the lack of a moral rather than a material justification for actions taken. ‘It is not that our emperors or prime ministers of each dynasty were less intelligent than the Westerners,’ Liu Xihong exclaimed when visiting London in 1876, ‘but none among them strove to open up the skies or dig up the earth to compete with nature for enriching themselves. Our far-seeing ancestors also cared for the future, but not in the same ways as the English who always run at full speed to gain the advantage.’

Also in London around the same time, Zeng Jize noted, ’Just as one may imagine ancient China by looking at the West today, one may imagine the future of the West by looking at China today. A day will certainly arrive when one will return to the original state of things and when one will seek neither ingeniousness nor complexity, but only simplicity. Because material resources are limited and are not sufficient for the needs of all countries in the world.’

At the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2010, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao place the blame for the crisis on “inappropriate” macroeconomic policies of Western countries....
‘and their unsustainable model of development characterized by prolonged low savings and high consumption; excessive expansion of financial institutions in a blind pursuit of profit; lack of self-discipline among financial institutions and ratings agencies and the ensuing distortion of risk information and asset pricing; and the failure of financial supervision and regulation to keep up with financial innovations, which allowed the risks of financial derivatives to build and spread.’

Between those statements sits more than a century of political upheaval. The 1906 administration and constitutional reform was an attempt to make the empire look like a Westernized state to its foreign rivals. It was also a concession to those who wanted more democracy in China. But being an international pariah state, labelled as the first “failed” state--a country that looked like it was going to be picked apart by Western Imperial powers-- did not lead to more democracy. It did not strengthen the 1912 attempt at a modern Chinese Republic. ”China, they argued, was too big to be reformed--it was an empire rather than a normal state, and power could only be made accountable to the people if the political units were smaller, more integrated, and more culturally and linguistically coherent, as had happened in Europe. A young Hunanese, Mao Zedong, joined in the search for autonomy. “Our Hunan,” he wrote in September, 1920, “must wake up.”

Hunanese have but one alternative: that is Hunanese self-determination and self-government; that is for Hunanese to build, on the territory of Hunan, a “Hunan Republic.” Moreover, I sincerely think that to save Hunan, to save China, and to look towards cooperation with other liberated people of the whole world, we can do no other. If Hunanese people lack the determination and bravery to build Hunan independently into a country, then there is no hope for Hunan.

Rhetorically, arguments coming from the Texas Secession movement seem to run in a similar parallel. The future head of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) did not secede. Whether or not Texas will give rise to their own Longhorn version of the Chairman has yet to be seen. Communist China under Chairman Mao did almost the complete opposite of secession:

“While improving the conditions for national minorities, the CCP leaders insisted that the new China was to be a unitary, not a federal, state. Their entire political genesis dictated that aim: The CCP had been born as a reaction against imperialist designs to break up China. The party leaders firmly believed that with the right kind of policy everyone who lived within Chinese territory could be made to feel and think Chinese, as part of a Chinese socialist state. The resistance and distrust the party was met with as it tried to penetrate regions that in effect had been self-governing for more than two generations--Tibet, Qinghai, Xinjiang, and parts of the Southwest--convinced CCP leaders even further that Soviet advice was urgently needed.”

Again, I will point out that I don’t bring a lot of prior knowledge of China, so I can’t strongly critique the substance Restless Empire covers regarding communist China. At no point did I ever want to stop reading, however, because each paragraph unlocks another piece of a grand mosaic that eventually leads to a more vivid mental image of current China. If you were born after the 1940s, China has always been communist-- to you. It can be a rigorous mental exercise to acknowledge that it hasn't always been that way, and Restless Empire has no qualms in reminding you there is more to history than what the reader has colloquially gleaned over their lifetime. Rather than a single elementary or nationalistic interpretation, things seem to be presented with a scholarly indifference.

“The [CCP] regime did much to improve the position of women, by abolishing arranged marriages and the economic or sexual exploitation of young girls. Factory workers got set working hours and increases in pay. Peasants could break free of generations of abuse by landlords. Campaigns against opium use and prostitution were widely hailed, also outside of China, and the CCP’s literacy campaigns, modeled on the Soviet experience, were the most successful the world had ever seen. It did not matter much, most people thought, that jazz records or jazz musicians disappeared or that the regime--to better coordinate its campaigns--set all of the country on the same time zone (Beijing Time), forcing farmers in the far west to get out of bed at two a.m. to start their day.”

These are small facts that add a sense of reality to a country that has consistently been ignored or vilified throughout my lifetime. The Soviet Union and its subsequent collapse figure heavily into China’s modern development. While that may not be surprising to most, the role the United States played, and continues to play, seems to be at best ignored and at worst actively denied.

“The relationship with the United States stood left, right, and center in Communist China’s initial market revolution. Even though much of the capital came through Hong Kong, the experts, the methods, and the technology were often American. It was the United States, more than any other country, that lobbied for China’s entry into international institutions. It was also the United States that took the largest share of the PRC’s exports, on which China’s beginning prosperity depended. While many Americans worried about Japanese and European competition in the 1980s, very few worried about China. Most assumed that it would take generations before China’s economy got off the the ground and believed, with the US government, that strengthening China was in the national security interest of the United States.”

It would be difficult to overrepresent the global impact the United States has had after the end of the cold war, when it took up the mantle of the world’s sole hyperpower. It would be naive to assume that the rest of the world is ready to embrace a total U.S. cultural hegemony, so the treaties and organizations like 2001’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization charter that binds the members to seek “multipolarity” in trading and cultural interactions should not be a surprise. No matter your opinion on U.S. global interventionism, the world is a smaller place than it used to be, and the shrinking globe tends to encourage action, or at the very least the appearance of action. “In place of a grand strategy to change the world, China seems to offer little but firm belief in free trade and the inviolability of borders. China’s many abstentions on crucial votes in the UN Security Council have left the impression of a power that wants to abdicate responsibility in the international community rather than assume it.”

Whether or not China’s UN presence has been lackluster or cleverly subdued has yet to be seen. Their diplomatic tactics have modernized rapidly, as can be seen during the US-led invasion of Iraq in the early 2000s. China proved it could hang with the top countries in the world of Realpolitik:

“China did not want to be seen as the main opponent of unilateral US action and was happy to leave that task to Russia and the Americans’ own European allies, France and Germany. In the wake of the invasion, China secretly cooperated with the United States at the UN to enable a resolution that, postfactum, found the foreign occupation of Iraq “legal”, so that oil exports could continue. At the time, China was Iraq’s main foreign debtor. It was in the PRC’s interest to provide an income for the new occupation government and to keep Iraqi oil flowing, including to China itself.”

If that isn’t proof enough that China is more similar than not to the rest of the planet, the influx of Western-style commerce and the needs of global marketplace interoperability seem to be rounding down its edges:

“Foreign and Chinese investors alike are eager that their money be protected, and they have reaped a great harvest from the seeds they have sown. Today’s business law in China is remarkably similar to its Western parentage on crucial issues such as contract law, company law, banking law, and commercial dispute resolution. While the argument that emerging middle classes are more democratically inclined than other groups rarely holds up in history, the need to protect investments is, as Karl Marx observed for Europe in the nineteenth century, one of the reasons why the bourgeoisie generally create the rule of law. And, at least in most cases, it becomes hard over time to defend the principle that money has more rights than men.”

If you’re looking to learn about modern China, Restless Empire will give a base of understanding that is sufficient in depth and breadth to create your own general thoughts and conclusions. Reckless Empire is a long book, and it is a very clean one; there is no particular chapter or section that feels like a forced slog through a dreary morass of text which might so bog down a reader to the point of setting the book aside. The writing will continuously urge you along, though never at a brisk pace-- more a soft nudge from an old classmate reminding you to keep up with the assigned reading.

[Shui Kun · Rating 2 out of 5]

While I started off this book wary of Western bias, this skepticism gradually wore off (for the most parts). I was treated to a history lesson of events in Qing China leading up to contemporary times, from which much of the Chinese psyche today can be understood. Significant happenings (the Opium wars, World War II, Cultural Revolution) were covered. The dominant theme acknowledged by the author, was oppression and exploitation by foreign imperialists in what became China's Century of Humiliation (1839-1949). Similarly, China's rise under the CCP's rule up to present date and the development of its foreign relations were quite comprehensively related.

It was not till the last chapter "Modernities", regarding China's present and future, that I was hit with a kicker by the author. The writer, quite unfairly/naively, prescribes that China forgets the past and focuses on the present and future. The rest of the chapter is a thorough criticism of the CCP's policies, a judgment based entirely on a Western-centric worldview of governance.

One bizarre notion, out of numerous ones, is the suggestion that China should adopt the US interventionist policy on global matters. "The world may be tired of US interventionism, but it is certainly not ready to welcome an abstemious superpower. Most people, when crises occur, expect great powers to lead". It is not difficult to point out the contradiction in this statement the author makes. This is a people which has, up till recent times, been on the wrong end of this "interventionism". To ask them to emulate the "leadership" displayed by America meddling in foreign affairs (and even engineering many of the aforementioned crises), shows a lack of empathy at best.

A disappointing conclusion to an otherwise informative, albeit descriptive, book.

[Ali · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very good introduction to history of China, mostly focused on its foreign relations but also with good coverage of China's domestic affairs. I think this book should be a role model for introductory history books. Author is not obsessed with telling exact dates and all people involved, instead he is trying to show the bigger picture (turns and twists in political, social, cultural and economical spheres and their interrelation). I didn't always agree with author but it doesn't matter, I learned a lot. A well-deserved 5 stars!

[Thomas Ray · Rating 4 out of 5]

Restless Empire: China and the World since 1750, Odd Arne Westad (1960- https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Odd_A... ), 2012, 515 pages, ISBN 9780465019335, Dewey 327.51

Maps pp. x-xi, 61, 260, 295, 423, 433

Breezy. Easy to read, a light overview.

Westad takes a bland tone:

Patterns of emigration changed after 1850. Chinese who left were often contracted to foreign companies and went to work in plantation agriculture or mining. pp.
27, 226-227, 231-233.

Which could be said more clearly as:

The end of African slavery gave rise to the coolie trade: mostly to Peru and Cuba. It cost $120 to $170 to secure a coolie and ship him to Latin America. If alive, he was sold there for $350 to $400. --Sucheng Chan, /This Bittersweet Soil: The Chinese in California Agriculture, 1860-1910/, pp. 21-23. https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...

WAR with JAPAN, 1937-1945

Chiang broke the Yellow River's dikes in 1938 to slow the Japanese advance, killing at least 500,000 Chinese and leaving 3 million homeless. p. 262.

As the Guomindang armies ran out of supplies, they confiscated the scarce goods and produce of the peasants. As the war wore on, peasant communities cared less who was in control than how hunger and killing could be avoided in their villages. p. 269.

The Chinese Communist Party killed far more Chinese than Japanese. p. 272. By 1941 Mao's forces were in a civil war against Chiang's. p. 273.

The Guomindang's response to its funding crisis, to print more money, led to runaway inflation that impoverished almost everyone. p. 278.

INDONESIA and GHANA

China's support encouraged Indonesian Communists to attempt a coup in October 1965 and thereby facilitated the army's
subsequent crushing of the left in Indonesia. Likewise, Chinese advice to set up a people's militia helped trigger the army coup that overthrew Nkrumah. p. 352.

CULTURAL REVOLUTION

By 1968 the Cultural Revolution had descended into chaos, with bands of Red Guards fighting each other with heavy weapons in the streets. p. 357.

AMERICA

Throughout the 1980s the U.S. treated China as a de facto ally, sharing sensitive intelligence and classified aviation and missile technology. In 1982, Reagan committed the U.S. to phase out arms sales to Taiwan--a promise all later U.S. presidents have ignored. pp. 374-375.

INEQUALITY

As of 2012, over a third of Chinese lived on just over $2 per day. China by 2012 had 128 billionaires and half a million millionaires. p. 389. Fraction of population in poverty: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_... World Inequality Database: https://wid.world/country/china/ Bottom 50% share of income: https://wid.world/world/#sptinc_p0p50...

NEOCOLONIALISM

To join the World Trade Organization in 2001, China had to open all its domestic markets to foreign imports and foreign capital, and eliminate export subsidies. p. 399.

CONTROL

The Chinese Communist Party seems incapable of dealing with criticism, and to be afraid of anyone or anything outside the economic sector that the party has not explicitly sanctioned. p. 451. In the People's Republic of China, people are executed for what in Singapore would lead to a stiff fine. p. 442.

PRONUNCIATION p. ix

C = TS
Q = CH
X = SH
ZH = J

Chongqing = Chongching
Cixi = Tseshi
Deng Xiaoping = Shaoping
Qing = Ching
Zhou Enlai = Joe

[Dmitry · Rating 4 out of 5]

(The English review is placed beneath Russian one)

Так как эта книга стала моим первым знакомством с историей Китая, мне трудно оценить объективность автора. Но при этом меня никогда не покидало чувство, что автор что-то не договаривает, что он очень уже пытается всё сгладить, сгладить некоторые острые углы. И мне думается, что это обычное явление тех, чьи чувства к рассматриваемому вопросу можно описать словом «страсть». Люди, которые обожают свою тему, часто менее объективны, чем те, кто более спокойно или даже независимо подходят к вопросу. Примерами таких книг могут быть «Боевой клич свободы. Гражданская война 1861-1865» и «Властелины моря».
Что же касается данной книги, то тут автор рассматривает всё, что только можно рассмотреть, начиная с 1750 года и вплоть до наших дней, т.е. автор останавливается на 2010 и при этом делает прогноз на будущее.
Итак, автор начинает с рассмотрения заката последней династии - Мин - и что сопутствовало этому закату. Несмотря на то, что книга построена на тематических главах – Империализм, Япония, Республика, Иностранцы, Зарубежье, Война, Коммунизм – повествование всё равно ведётся от года к году, от десятилетия к десятилетию. Т.е. не стоит беспокоиться, что автор создал какой-то винегрет из отдельных тем. Нет, тут всё по стандартам. И благодаря этому мы будем видеть, как деградировал Китай в тот период, буквально по шагам (step by step). Это займёт подавляющую часть книги.
Как я понял автора (уж не знаю, специально он так сделал или нет), но читая книгу, начинаешь понимать, почему автор взял именно 1750 год. Как я понимаю, именно начиная с этой даты, началось сползание Китая в тот хаос, в котором он находился в 19-20 вв., пик которого пришёлся на Культурную революцию Мао. Т.е. коммунизм с его Мао Цзэдуном, это результат того посева который был сделан в 19-20 вв. и о котором мы и будем читать практически на всём протяжении книги. Что, как мне кажется, крайне интересно задумано. Китай принял коммунизм не из-за его привлекательности, а из-за попытки найти спасение, выкарабкаться из того болота в которое загнали страну как собственные правители так и иностранцы. Кстати иностранцам отводится особая роль. Возникает даже ощущение, что автор хочет чтобы и западные страны разделили ту ответственность за кровавые события, что происходили в середине XX в., т.к. половина книги – описание как западные страны нещадно эксплуатировали Китай, включая разрушение знаменитого императорского дворца. И вот тут мне не совсем понятно, т.к. с одной стороны автор пишет, что китайцы с огромным вожделением потребляли западные товары и западную культуру (в самом широком смысле), а с другой, в них зрели гроздья гнева из-за обращения иностранцев с китайским народом. В данном случаи у автора получилось очень всё мутно, чувствуется некая недосказанность, недоосвещённость вопроса.
Второй большой момент, это взаимоотношение с Японией. Тут, с моей точки зрения, автор также недостаточно точно смог донести идею. С одной стороны восхищение, а с другой – недоверие и возможно даже - враждебность. И то же самое по отношению ко всем соседям Китая. Это беда всей книги – поверхностность. Да, автор взял почти все темы, но без глубокого, ясного и чёткого объяснения. Получается такая двойственная позиция Китая: смотреть на успешных соседей и на западные страны, брать всё от них, но при этом относится к ним с большой враждебностью. Допустим, причиной является действия этих стран по отношению к китайскому населению. Однако я всё же не смог увидеть у автора чётких ответов по этому вопросу. Со стороны кого была враждебность (село, города, чиновники и пр.)? Кто в большей степени был потребителем иностранных товаров и культуры? Почему власти ничего не предпринимали для создания баланса? Да, автор объясняет, но объясняет как-то мутно.
Третий момент, это влияние СССР на коммунистический Китай. Согласно автору, Китай принимал СССР за модель, за идеал, с которого нужно брать пример и более того, он делал практически всё, что скажут в Кремле (но не абсолютно всё, разумеется).
В принципе, книга показывает картину в целом. Картину «Китай и мир». А это не подразумевает глубокого и подробного анализа. Например, автор пишет довольно много о китайцев за пределами Китая. Зачем? Ведь из-за этого происходит расфокусирование, читатель начинает терять нить повествования. И так по многим менее заметным вопросам, включая последние главы об отношении Китая с каждой страной в отдельности (Китай и СССР; Китай и США; Китай и Япония; Китая и Корея; Китай и Индия и так далее).
Попытка объять необъятное, всегда приводит к поверхностному изложению.

Since this book was my first acquaintance with the history of China, it is difficult for me to assess the objectivity of the author. But at the same time I had a feeling of understatement, because the author is very much trying to smooth everything over, to smooth over some sharp corners in the history of China. And I think that this is a common place for all researchers, whose feelings for the analyzed object can be described by the word "passion". People who adore their subject are often less objective than those who are more relaxed or even independent. Examples of such books are "Battle Cry of Freedom" by James M. McPherson and "Lords of the Sea" by John R. Hale.
As for this book, here the author considers everything that can only be considered, from 1750 to the present day, i.e. the author stops at 2010 and at the same time makes a forecast for the future.
So, the author begins with consideration of the sunset of the last dynasty - Ming - and that accompanied this sunset. Despite the fact that the book is built on thematic chapters - Imperialism, Japan, Republic, Foreigners, Foreign Countries, War, Communism - the story is still conducted from year to year, from decade to decade. In other words, there is no need to worry that the author has created a vinaigrette of separate themes. No, everything here is by standards. And thanks to this, we will see how China degraded at that time, literally in steps (step by step). This will take the vast majority of the book.
As I understood the author (I don't know if he did it on purpose or not), but reading the book you start to understand why the author took exactly 1750. As I understand it, from this date onwards, China began to slide into the chaos in which it was in the 19-20th centuries, the peak of which fell on the Mao Cultural Revolution. I.e. communism with Mao Zedong is the result of that sowing which was made in the 19-20 centuries and about which we will read almost all the way through the book. Which I think is very interesting. China accepted communism not because of its appeal, but because of an attempt to find salvation, to climb out of the swamp into which both its own rulers and foreigners had driven the country. By the way, foreigners have a special role to play. There is even a feeling that the author wants the Western countries to share the responsibility for the bloody events that took place in the middle of the XX century, as half of the book is a description of how the Western countries mercilessly exploited China, including the destruction of the famous imperial palace. And here I am not quite clear, because on the one hand the author writes that the Chinese consumed Western goods and Western culture with great lust (in the broadest sense), and on the other hand, they were full of anger because of the treatment by foreigners of the Chinese people. In this case, the author turned out to be very vague; there is a certain lack of explanation and lack of coverage of the issue.
The second big point is the relationship with Japan. Here, from my point of view, the author was also not able to convey the idea with sufficient precision. On the one hand, admiration, but on the other hand, distrust and perhaps even hostility. And the same is true of all China's neighbors. This is the trouble of the whole book - superficiality. Yes, the author has taken almost all the topics, but without a deep, clear and precise explanation. It turns out that China's dual position is to look at its successful neighbors and Western countries, to take everything from them, but at the same time it treats them with great hostility. Let us assume that the reason for this is the actions of these countries in relation to the Chinese population. However, I was still unable to see the author's clear answers to this question. Who was hostile (village, cities, officials, etc.)? Who was the main consumer of foreign goods and culture? Why did the authorities do nothing to create a balance? Yes, the author explains, but explains somehow vaguely.
The third point is the Soviet influence on communist China. According to the author, China took the USSR as a model, an ideal from which to take an example and, moreover, it did almost everything that the Kremlin would say (but not absolutely everything, of course).
In principle, the book shows the picture as a whole. The painting "China and the World". And this does not imply a deep and detailed analysis. For example, the author writes quite a lot about the Chinese outside China. Why? Because of this there is a defocusing, the reader begins to lose the thread of the narrative. And so on many less visible issues, including the last chapters on China's relationship with each country individually (China and the USSR; China and the US; China and Japan; China and Korea; China and India, and so on).
Attempting to embrace the immense always leads to a superficial presentation.

[Stanley Lee · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very informative briefer on Chinese history.

[Joseph · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very readable, detailed history of China and it's internal and external relations. The pro-Western slant is a bit obvious, but overall it seems fair and full of broad perspectives and relevant detail. A great introduction to the subject.

[Haplea · Rating 4 out of 5]

The book is a good and efficient overview of the last 250 years of China history for non-informed people like me, who at best were witness of the last decades of contemporary times. It is never boring, even if not brilliantly told like “Game without rules”, and despite its 500 pages it leaves the reader with a thirst for more details, which is a test of a good story. The book’s structuring in chapters with a main theme like Japan, war, communism, etc., unlikely at first sight to insure a smooth continuous story, surprisingly proves to be no obstacle to a chronologic, coherent history of China. Overall, in my opinion, this is a good informative book about China.

The last chapter, about the prospective of China progress, unfortunately is a bad one, and to me seems to result from author’s personal biases, not from his objectivity as a historian who has written all the precedent chapters with skill and talent. To exemplify, he is criticizing China for not following the western capitalist model even if this model has resulted in the present monumental crisis with no end in sight (forget the media’s lies) and the model is no more sustainable, ignoring that the proof of the pudding is in its eating, 9% grow over many decades for China versus less than 3% for the West, facts which speak for themselves. He is also criticizing China for not empowering more her minorities like the Tibetans, overlooking the American example which has rapidly built extreme wealth from confiscating and physically eliminating the Indians, whose territories could not have been acquired without depleting vast capital, if the United States were less ruthless. As morally wrong as these actions were, they nevertheless contributed to the American economic and social success, than why should they not work for the Chinese? As for China not following the democratic model of the West, no convincing argument is made that this is harmful; we have witnessed the media celebrations of democracy at work, by dipping the finger in ink in Afghanistan and Iraq, only to no avail for the countries progress, or found that authoritarian regimes in China or Singapore have bettered the lives of their citizens more than the USA or Europe have done (in some European places the unemployment is over 20%). Maybe, if the author would be less arrogant in his convictions as a Westerner, he will suspect that the Chinese model of state capitalism is, after all, a better model than the western one. Or maybe, deep-down, he is wishing China to fail in her building of a better society, reminding me the old Turkish saying:”The horses do not die when the dogs wish to”.

Over all, I honestly recommend this book to anyone who wishes to get a better understanding of China and likes an informed, easy and pleasant reading.

[Gijs · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good introductionary overview of Chinese historical international relations.

Post-Den Xiaoping, I would have loved a little more depth, but I guess the book is slightly dated.

I agree that conclusion feels a bit odd though, would love to see how Odd Arne Westad looks back on these conclusions given the last 15 years.

3.5/5

[Beth · Rating 3 out of 5]

A favourite columnist for the Globe and Mail raved about this book, so I bought and read it. I knew very little about Chinese history before reading it, and I did learn a lot. Having said that, I felt that the author often made what seemed to be broad generalizations without supporting data, drew conclusions that weren't convincingly argued, and left me feeling like I had only a little new insight regarding the past 250 years (and the next 50 or so) of what makes China tick. I had expected a book version of the kind of dense, fascinating writing that you find in the New York Times, the kind that makes you call out frequently to your partner to share just one more insightful passage. There was very little of this. So, did I learn something? Yes. A workmanlike job - but nothing terribly stimulating or thought-provoking.

[Jenna Fisher · Rating 4 out of 5]

Restless Empire was a solid read. Informative, comprehensive, analytical and thankfully absent long-winded wonk. At times the author jumps around in a non chronological fashion, which took some getting used to. But overall I'd definitely recommend it to anyone looking to more deeply understand the vast history and culture of China.

Obviously tackling a subject as vast as "China since 1750" is a herculean task, so this book - though 469 pages - cannot but attempt to brush stroke details. This means there are a lot of names, and only room for brief explanations of them.


The section on foreign influences in China surprised me. Learned a lot.

[Elda Mengisto · Rating 3 out of 5]

"The past shapes the present. Today's China is shaped by its modern metamorphosis, by the transformations wrought by both external and internal pressure. History is therefore the most fundamental background on which to understand present-day Chinese foreign relations" (16).

So is Odd Arne Westad's thesis in Restless Empire, which is an overview of Chinese international relations since 1750. He starts on how the Qing Dynasty of China conducted its foreign affairs, with the aforementioned 1750 representing the peak of their power. The Russians were the first to establish foreign relations with this state, in which they cooperated to a strong extent. The Qing also had a tributary system with their fellow neighbors, though it was a system that was slowly becoming outdated. We not only get to see how the history of China is juxtaposed with these foreign relations, and how China has become either stronger or weaker depending on them. In addition, rather than going through the "great man" theory of history or focusing on material interactions, Westad also focuses on issues such as migration, education, and relationships.

The first question Westad poses at the beginning about "what is China?", which is quite curious. While i did know that China wasn't born of a nation-state, and it did struggle to become a power when they became one, I didn't doubt about what I thought China was--a cultural identity, . Instead, he pictures China as "a culture, a state, and a geographical core, around which identities, boundaries, and definitions of purpose have shifted and adjusted for a very long time. Indeed, perhaps one of the reasons why the concept of China has been so durable is that it is so amorphous and so contentious" (4). It expands and decreases from land masses to people groups, though "rules and rituals", from which Westad argues, remains a guiding point.

In terms of the history of China, I already learned of it through multiple sources, so the general trajectory through China (fall of Qing, its interactions with Japan which was a prologue to WWII and subsequent struggle to reconcile historical, Mao's IR and the Sino-Soviet split, etc) wasn't anything new. What Westad adds to this conversation, however, is the societal interactions between powers. For example, at the twilight of the Qing Dynasty, students traveled to Japan for an education, in which "the two key concepts that Chinese in Japan and elsewhere discussed in the first decade of the new century were nationalism and republicanism" (107). A bit strange, considering China never saw itself as a nation up to that point, but it showed the interactions between the two countries educationally. Ironically, Japan would go on to turn back from these principles, of which international issues such as Taiwan (whom actually had a good relationship with the empire) and historical recognition. It reflects today in how China sees Japan as an usurper of power in East Asia and how hesitant they are in developing a diplomatic relationship with them.

One thing which was quite fascinating was how the Chinese people interacted with other countries, beyond that of international relations. The Qing Dynasty had more foreigners live in China and Chinese moving away, so their perception of the world was broadened significantly. Shanghai represented this phenomenon; while it was despised for such, "for most Chinese who saw the city, who lived in it or who dreamed about it, Shanghai symbolized the kind of existence they wanted for themselves and their children..." (180). Combined with increased translations of foreign works, Westad paints a dynamic picture of how China transformed, "because of international influences on education, advanced training, and research" (204). This a phenomenon which continues today, with further translations and collaboration in technology, energy, and climate change.

On the other hand, the California Gold Rush opened up the United States to China. Despite this, "the Chinese dream of being treated like other immigrants in North America was never realized" (223). They were the only ethnic group that got completely banned from the United States, and were used for menial labor. At the same time, Chinese Americans became some of the most-educated members of American society, and contributed to the American academic system, especially in the late 20th century-early 21st century. These are some highlights of the "Abroad" chapter, which was the most fascinating part of the book. It also connects to China's relationship with the United States--"it is a place many Chinese would like to go to, in order to visit, to sojourn, or to settle. But it is also a threatening and confusing zone, where politics, values, friendships and even the landscape are in constant flux" (365). The process in which China and the United States made rapprochements was an interesting struggle, one in which China accepts the rules-based order of modern IR, but rejects the American hegemony of it. I find it fascinating, especially as this is what I study and want to work with.

In terms of how it's still relevant, "Restless Empire" is a good start to China's modern international relations, in which it features movement across continents, high ambitions, and mixed results. It's more fascinating to note how ordinary people move along across the globe, and how they impacted southeast Asia and beyond. While they aren't all going to be the ones to help with foreign relations, I wonder how will they think about things on the mainland, 10 years on.

[Nick · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book brilliantly condenses the research of thousands of scholars into a compact guide to China's relationship with the outside world. Moreover, it provides a unique vision of how that history can lead to an understanding of China's ability to adapt in response to the larger world.

[Jeffrey · Rating 3 out of 5]

Westad has tried to summarise the history of "modern" China (after 1950s), in an attempt to show how the context has shaped the modern Chinese state. I felt that Restless Empire, while interesting in parts, also was frustrating in certain ways.

Firstly, although the book is roughly chronological, Westad has tried to organise the chapters by themes. This has meant that at times there is a bit too much repetition, but at the same time I feel that none of the chapters could stand alone.

Secondly, (although this may be more a personal gripe) Restless Empire highlights how in writing about history it is almost never fully objective. In many ways the presentation of the facts, is important to shaping the argument and the conclusion. Often the point of view is slightly "Western" and for me this is probably more true in the analyses than in the presentation of facts (which by and large is objective). For example, in arguing why China will struggle to project "soft power" and find it hard to displace the US more than economically from the world, Westad claims: "No young person of sound mind in Tokyo or Seoul, or even in Taibei or Singapore, is looking to the PRC for music to download, films to watch, or ideas to latch on to." (p459) And yet only last year the BBC reported: "The Chinese drama Story of Yanxi Palace is the most Googled TV show of 2018 globally... The search engine's analytics suggested that the top interest in the drama has come from Asian regions like Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei and Hong Kong". [1] One only needs to look in the influx of stars from Taiwan and Singapore and the views on YouTube and listens on Spotify to see that while it may be no Hollywood that this claim is not especially true. Westad also argues that the world "is certainly not ready to welcome an abstemious superpower." (p465) But why? In many ways (ironically given the historical examples of the concession he says were good places of infusion of different cultures), Westad analysis seems to come back to trying to analyse China using a "Western" framework.

For me, Fairbank's China: A New History represents a slightly better read for those looking to expand their knowledge on China.

[1] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-c...

[Calathai · Rating 3 out of 5]

Qing power reached a peak in 1750 where China was the central state of an Asian network. However, internal and external pressure starts creating problems and emperors start losing prestige. This process is slow and culminates in a clash with Western powers that are expanding in Asia just at a time when Qing is weakened. These clashes with the West undermines Qing prestige and revolts like the Taiping cripple the empire.

Western influence sets in motion reforms in Asia. Japan adapts quickly, but China fails: Japan takes over as the central power and the model, and for fear of more Western influence in the mainland starts its own expansionist project borrowing imperialistic ideology from the West. An interplay of Russia, China and Japan takes place, but Japan proves to be the stronger.

Meanwhile, in the mainland, reforms and Western influence calls for nationalism: there is no Qing rulers anymore, but Manchus that need to be overtaken. A Republic is form but it cannot control all of China and warlords spam everywhere. In such a weak state, war with Japan is expected and when it happens, China is politically united and financially destroyed.

The winner is the communist state, which draws closer to the Soviet Union for ideological and material support. However, where the Soviet Union fails and collapses, the Chinese survives once more and becomes the beacon for the International, even after isolationism policies.

[Josh · Rating 5 out of 5]

I picked up this book after being recommended it as pre-reading for a course on Chinese history. Westad is excellent at synthesising broad periods of history. He did it while synthesising the history of the global Cold War and he’s done it again with this book (noted that this book was written before the global cold war.) While books like Spence and Hsu’s survey on the history of modern China are useful, this book acts as a useful alternative to their books as it provides an equally strong synthesis. Despite its claims to focus on international relations of China, Westad covers enough of the History of Modern China (mostly some parts are a bit lacking like on the Chinese Civil War) that one can go in blind on Chinese history and come out with the broad narrative. Such a strong synthesis makes sense for China where its international development has been so rooted and integrated into global developments.

Westad does not just focus on geopolitical history but also focuses on social and cultural interactions with the wider world and he masterfully articulates how these point back to China’s (political) development and history. I do hope that other authors take up such an approach to the writing of the history other great powers like the US and Russia because of how integral foreign relations has been to their modern history, particularly over the 20th century.

[Saheb Singh · Rating 5 out of 5]

An incredibly informative book. Incredibly, incredibly so. What a resource, and a book that deserves to be read by all students of China that seek to understand it. Comprehensive and detailed would be the two best adjectives to describe it.

I am, although, struck by how differently China has turned out as compared to the possible trajectories outlined in the last chapter of the book. This book was published in 2013, right around the time Xi Jinping took the reigns, so there is no mention of him.
The difference in trajectories over the past ten years is not at all a comment on the expertise of the author. It is a testament to the disruption caused by Xi. As the author himself had said, the trajectory is hard to predict.
The last chapter also showed what was possible at the turn of the first decade of the 21st century, and how far down one track China has gone.
It remains to be seen what the possible futures are.

[Pei-jean Lu · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is an interesting look into the rise of China into the modern world from the golden era of the Qing Dynasty into the CCP of today as it seeks to emerge as a world superpower.
As someone who is Taiwan born with a ‘huaren’ (as described by the author) father who was born in what was then French Indochina, I have little direct generational connection to the mainland so I’m quick to make the distinction that I am not in anyway Chinese preferring to distance myself from any association with the mainland and the communist party that controls it even though the mainland is the main trading partner of Taiwan.
Admittedly in the end though given what has occurred in Hong Kong and also Xi Jinping’s completely Maoist era politics culminating in him now being chairman for life, I don’t at all see China at all emerging from the days of old

[Gabriel Stein · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting,but risk being overtaken by events

This is an extremely interesting overview of China’s relationship with the rest of the world over the past 250 or so years. However, as with all books of this kind, it risks being overtaken by events. For instance, this book was written while relations with Taiwan and China who are relatively good, something no longer the case. It was also written before the Chinese oppression of its Muslim Uighur citizens intensified. Even so, one should not dismiss the relatively optimistic predictions at the end, and as a review of the post, it is excellent.

[Ostap · Rating 4 out of 5]

4+
Very informative and captivating book. It would be 5 if not for the last 2 chapters. The penultimate one is written more like a policy conference speech, than like a book chapter, dryish and boring, as if the author was in a hurry to finish the book before a deadline. In the last chapter the author makes predictions about China's future. The problem is that the book was finished in 2012, right before Xi's ascent, and some of the predictions have already proved wrong, while the others look at least doubtful. Still, it's a very good book.

[Tacitus · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent history of China's internal development, foreign policy, and the interplay of the two. The central thesis is that China forms a hybrid throughout its history. This broadly means China hybridizes a Confucian authoritarian government that suppresses its minorities, while adapting to the world at large. The question is whether a China will become a world leader and trend setter in its own right, and chart its own course separate from its history, and without repeating the errors of the past.

[Carlos Martinez · Rating 3 out of 5]

I'm pretty ambivalent about this. Westad is an excellent writer and has done a huge volume of research, and my interest levels in the subject matter are pretty much sky high. However, Restless Empire is not at all grounded in historical materialism, and Westad's views are fairly mainstream anti-communist (those two things are, of course, not unrelated). On the one hand, I learned some stuff; on the other, I wrote "utter nonsense" in the margins quite a few times.

[Stone · Rating 4 out of 5]

Nice introductory-level book to China's modern history of diplomacy and foreign policies. Good overview of China's role as a regional and international power throughout the past few centuries with high regard of objectivity and consideration of balance between summaries and details, recommended for beginners of Chinese history.

[Anatolii Belikov · Rating 5 out of 5]

Since I’m about to learn Chinese, this is an excellent introduction to how PRC see the world around it from a historical perspective. The idea is China’s external affairs thru many lenses such as: colonialism, Soviet union, Maoism, Asian neighbours, US, Japan. How all these things affected the way, China built its relation to the world.

[Matt · Rating 5 out of 5]

There are many states I could use this kind of book for! A very well done primer on the history of modern China. The emphasis on China's international position makes it very relevant and interesting for the Western reader but does not come at the cost of discussion of China's internal political, economic, and social roots and transitions.

[Mark Cloutier · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book will let you in on very little known history, atleast in the west. A lot of European colonization happened in China during the Qing decline, definitely influencing modern day times and global history in general.
Recommended.

[Andrew · Rating 4 out of 5]

This should've been the first book I read on China. The author gives an excellent overview over the past approximately 260 years of history, from the last empire (the Qing) through the early 2010s. Highly recommend for anyone looking to understand China and it's place in the modern world.

[Cate · Rating 4 out of 5]

I greatly appreciate the decades of research that went into this definitive text on China’s relationship with the outside world since the 1750s. After reading this book, my eyes have been opened to the dynamism of the Chinese political and economic sectors.