In "an entertaining and iconoclastic fashion" (Philadelphia Inquirer), the celebrated historian reinterprets the traditions that have shaped U.S. foreign policy from 1776 to the present. "McDougall has written a lively and provocative book" (Wall Street Journal) that is "a rich study of the American experience" (Los Angeles Times).
The attempt to cover the vast expanse of American foreign policy traditions is a difficult one. The author convincingly manages to derive eight major ideas as the key drivers of American foreign policy: liberty at home, unilateralism, Manifest Destiny, the American system or Monroe Doctrine, progressive imperialism, Wilsonianism or liberal internationalism, containment, and what the author describes as global meliorism. The author does a strong job describing these traditions in each of the chapters dedicated to them, and avoids the major pitfall of many US foreign policy historians of starting in the 1890s. The author effectively incorporates the traditions of America’s founding years into the broader story. All of these areas represent substantial strengths.
However, the book’s weaknesses are at their most clear in its final section in which the author weighs and analyses the respective theories. This builds on examples of clear bias in earlier chapters. In the chapter on global meliorism, a principle which others might refer to as humanitarianism, the author claims that this tradition is in truth responsible for America’s quagmire in Vietnam. The liberal, do-gooder Johnson administration was drawn into the war by a desire to improve the lives of the Vietnamese people. This is, of course, absurd. Before the war was even over the Pentagon Papers had long since revealed that US motivations were in its own calculations: 70% protecting US reputation as a guarantor and avoiding humiliating defeat, 20% preventing Communist Chinese expansion in South-East Asia, 10% permitting the South Vietnamese to enjoy a higher standing of living. By its own record, any global meliorism only accounted for 10% of motivation. The other 90% was broadly linked to containment either directly or implicitly. Thus, the author’s claim to lay the blame for the Vietnam catastrophe at the feet of meliorism strains credulity. It can only be explained by prejudice. The author sees both global meliorism and the Vietnam War as bad things (rightly so in the latter case) but appreciates containment. Therefore the bad war must be the fault of the bad tradition not the good tradition.
Similar silliness pervades the final section. The author claims that the institutions that were spawned by the meliorist tradition such as USAID or the Peace Corps should be shuttered. This was a fine supposition in the 1990s, however, in 2025, it is thoroughly disproven. Since USAID’s closure in February 2025, at least 300,000 people have died as a result so far. While the lives of poor Africans or South Asians may not be a US national security concern, it’s relatively low cost and high humanitarian return make inaction morally indefensible.
Finally, the author dismisses Wilsonianism as childish. I will not attempt an unqualified defense of Wilson, who occasionally admitted to a degree of naïveté. However, to dismiss Wilson as childish is a disservice to the reader, author, and to Wilson himself. Wilson saw a Europe torn apart by the most horrific war to that date. To propose an alternative path defined by a higher purpose was not only wise but shrewd. After all, the peace built by Castlereagh, Metternich, and Alexander I was defined by a belief that the common moral principle of monarchical solidarity, social conservatism and fear of revolution could transcend the petty interests of any specific great power. Why couldn’t liberal internationalism, self-determination, and fear renewed horrors of another general war do the same? In a counter factual world where the US joined the League of Nations and brought the Wilsonian spirit to the heart of global affairs, could another World War have been avoided? The answer is of course unknowable. However, the liberal order built by the US after World War II defended by containment has proven the most peaceful in history. It maybe impossible to determine the exact casual mechanism which has triggered this (nuclear weapons, the UN, the global power structure, some combination of the above), however, it deserves more than dismissal as childish.
Broadly, the book does a good job at analysis but is at its weakest when it swerves into editorial. The author’s personal opinions could the analysis to the points of ridiculousness. It would be interesting to see how events since the publication would fit into this framework. Was the Iraq War caused by containment, progressive imperialism, or global meliorism? Is Trump truly a unilateralist or something fully distinct? A healthy and strong debate could be had on this topic.
A history of American foreign policy from the time of the Revolution until shortly before the book was published in 1997. McDougall makes the case that the US was never really isolationist although its rise in power drastically changed how it could and did relate to other countries. He argues that there have been many blunders and bad ideas, but we've also had successes.
It was interesting to read almost 30 years later thinking about the state of the world and the US now: a lot has changed!
This book provides a good overview of the history of US foreign policy but for a book centered around defining particular schools of thought in American foreign policy thinking frequently underjustifies its explanations of the reasoning of major actors and sometimes make contradictory claims about hwo different schools of thought interacted
3.5 rounded up to 4. Learned a lot about Wilson (TR called him a Byzantine logothete supported by flubdubs, mollycoddles, and flapdoodle pacifists). Good nuanced overview of Manifest Destiny. But the book is overly chatty, and the conceptual framework (there are 8 distinct traditions in American foreign policy) obscures as much as it reveals.
Despite being published in 1998, McDougall accurately (and almost prophetically) foresees many of the failures of U.S. foreign policy which took place in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. Any reader who is interested in a rethink of underlying assumptions regarding America’s role in the world should look to McDougall for guidance.
Excellent review of American foreign policy, but it seems he might have left out the fact that, at least since WWII, America has trained our partner nations' militaries.
Overall, McDougal seems to delight in hot takes - arguing we should abolish USAID (p.210), or that we must pursue never ending expansion (by which I think he meant economic growth, though if he meant that he could have been more explicit, p.216). But I think his main point - that American foreign policy has been driven by what Americans see as both MORAL and PRACTICAL is well taken (p.9). To fully develop this idea, he defines eight traditions and provides plenty of evidence that a critical mass of Americans have agreed that these fit the criteria of being both moral and practical. I also appreciated his point that American Foreign Policy is often confused because Americans rarely agree on what is moral, practical, or both (McDougal narrowed the list down to eight guiding principles, but he points out that others have even longer lists). McDougal admits he is not the first to make this observation, citing among others Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko (p.199). But introducing old ideas to new audiences is one of the main jobs of a historian.
McDougal's overall framing of these eight traditions into 'new' and 'old' testaments also makes sense to me...I think. When McDougal calls the first four traditions the 'Old Testament' and likens early Americans to Jews, I think he's referring to Jew's lack of interest in proselytizing. Similarly, I think when he calls the latter four traditions the 'New Testament' I think he's referring to Christianity's proselytizing, missionary zeal. I say "I think", because again, McDougal does not specifically state that he's referring to the Jewish anti- proselytizing tradition. If I were not Jewish myself, I'm not sure I would have had the context I needed to understand this point (as is, I'm a little worried that I'm reading something that isn't there BECAUSE I'm Jewish, so yes, clarification would have been nice).
I also think McDougal strains his arguments past their breaking point when he strays into domestic policy. Such assertions include that 1) we built up our welfare state to impress the third world away from communism (p.219), or that 2) cold-war fatigue is responsible for the decline of the nuclear family (pun intended? also p.219) or that 3) our foreign aid expenditures are why our inner cities crumbled (210). Our cities crumbled largely because of the money we spent destroying them with highways and parking lots, and certainly not because USAID swallowed the whole government budget. I won't dive into 1 and 2, but they seem to similarly overstate the influence of foreign policy on domestic issues.
Ultimately, this book introduces the reader to many concepts historians have wrestled with regarding US foreign policy - and invites you to join the fight.
This is better than his follow-up/rewrite, "The Tragedy of US Foreign Policy," if only because this book doesn't engage in pro-Nixon conspiracy theories, unlike that one.
It's very good. But, it's not fantastic. And, had I read it years ago, I might have three-starred it to offset some of the five-star reviews. On second thought, I'm going to do that anyway, but not just for that reason.
First, I'm not sure if the Old Testament/New Testament split plays as concisely as McDougall claims. I mean, the Mexican War was clearly aggressive and imperialist, underscored by Polk already having written a war message for Congress even before hearing about Taylor's clash with Mexico in disputed territory. (McDougall doesn't tell you that part, either, that Polk had already crafted that war message.)
Before that, clear eyes on expansion into Canada also undercut some of the themes of his "Old Testament." Of course, McDougall doesn't really mention that, either.
Next, let's get to the New Testament half, and explicitly, his analysis of Wilson, where McDougall shows he is no Walter Karp.
First, on the German submarine blockade vs. the British blockade by extension, McDougall supports Wilson challenging the Germans but not the Brits by saying "but submarines took lives." So, too, would surface ships, had we actually tried to run the British blockade by extension. That comment lost a star from five stars right there.
Then, he gets a couple of things wrong on the end of WWII.
First, in the Pacific, up to just a couple of months before Hiroshima, Japanese peace feelers to neutral nations were on the basis of it keeping all acquisitions through 1920. An "early truce with Toyko (that) might have contained Soviet power in Asia" wasn't going to happen on that basis.
Second, although Patton may have been the only top-level brass in the ETO who wanted to keep moving East, even to provoking war with the Russkies, a number of lesser officers wanted to do that, too.
In summation, between the the mistakes, the selective readings and the relatively slim size, I'm not sure of all the enthusiasm. It's not bad, indeed. It's more than two stars. But not more than three.
Interesting look at American History, with some interesting views on the "isms" of American Foreign Policy. Had to give it one star for whereas the "old" and "new" testament sections of the books provide reasonable support for the arguments presented the last chapter offers little support, presents shortsighted arguments, draws false historical analogies, ignores system level changes, and fails to consider restraints on the achievement of outcomes. (oh, yeah and Canadian Providences are never going to join the US!)
While the man had very good points to make there were a few that I think were a little out of date (the book was written in 1997). I don't believe his views apply as fully today as they might have back then. However, it was extremely informative and educational, but a little bit of a 'should' read as opposed to a reading for enjoyment. Don't get me wrong, I enjoyed it, but it's one of those learning books you really read to learn more than anything else. :)
Wow! Written in 1997, this book predates all the debates about the loss of liberty at home, yet predicts just such events while examining the past traditions of American Foreign Policy. I would enjoy an updated version from Mr. McDougall. His historical analysis does leave some questions but is very convincing overall (to me). I strongly recommend this to anyone looking for answers / options to what the US should / could do in the arena of foreign policy.
An eminently readable, deliberately provocative and yet thought provoking re-interpretation of many of the classic themes in the US history of foreign policy. A valuable contribution to any serious "re-assessment" of the US' role in international affairs and valuable addition to the seminal debates of the late 1990s.
This is an excellent survey of the diplomatic history of the United States. It goes off the rails in the last two chapters. McDougall's reading of Vietnam is way off, and his recommendations in the final chapter are mostly just nuts. But the rest is pure gold.
This book does a very good job over viewing the various strands of American foreign policy over the last 200+ years. Some very interesting facts as well. His thesis is laid out fairly well even if one disagrees in part or whole.
The best concise history of United States foreign policy I have come across. This book shaped my outlook on our foreign affairs. I look forward to re-reading this.