Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge (Representation and Mind series) by Drew Khlentzos

by Drew Khlentzos

In this important book, Drew Khlentzos explains the antirealist argumentfrom a realist perspective. He defends naturalistic realism against the antirealistchallenge, and he considers the consequences of his defense for our understanding ofrealism and truth. Khlentzos argues that the naturalistic realist view that theworld exists independently of the mind must take into consideration what he callsthe representation if the naturalistic realist view is true, how can mentalrepresentation of the world be explained?He examines this major antirealistchallenge in detail and shows that many realists have dismissed it because they havenot understood its nature. He sees it as a philosophical the antirealistchallenge, if sound, does not prove that there are no objects that existindependently of the mind, but that there is no rational basis for thinking thatthere are; we have good reason to believe in the naturalistic view, but (given theantirealist arguments) we have no way of knowing how it could be true. Khlentzossurveys the antirealist arguments of Michael Dummett, Hilary Putnam, and CrispinWright and suggests a realist answer. He argues for a radically nonepistemicconception of truth, and against pragmatist, intuitionist, verificationist, andpluralist alternatives. He examines and rejects some current versions of physicalismand functionalism, and offers an original version of the correspondence theory oftruth.

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First published March 26, 2004