Papers in Philosophical Logic: v. 1 (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy) by Lewis

by David Kellogg Lewis

This is part of a three-volume collection of most of David Lewis's papers in philosophy, except for those which previously appeared in his Philosophical Papers (Oxford University Press, 1983 and 1986). They are now offered in a readily accessible form. This first volume is devoted to Lewis's work in philosophical logic. Topics covered include the formal semantics of natural languages; model-theoretic investigations of intensional logic; contradiction and relevance, the distinction between analog and digital representation; attempts to draw anti-mechanistic conclusions from Godel's theorem; Carnap's Aufbau; mereology and its relationship to set theory. The purpose of this collection, and the two volumes to follow, is to disseminate more widely the work of an eminent and influential contemporary philosopher. The volume will serve as a useful work of reference for teachers and students of philosophy.

Genres: Philosophy, Logic

Paperback Bunko

First published November 28, 1997

About the author

David Kellogg Lewis was a 20th century philosopher. Lewis taught briefly at UCLA and then at Princeton from 1970 until his death. He is also closely associated with Australia, whose philosophical community he visited almost annually for more than thirty years. He has made ground-breaking contributions in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophical logic. He is probably best known for his controversial modal realist stance: that there exist infinitely many concretely existing and causally isolated parallel universes, of which ours is just one, and which play the role of possible worlds in the analysis of necessity and possibility.

-wikipedia

Reviews

[Harry Vincent · Rating 4 out of 5]

8/10