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96 pages, Paperback
First published May 16, 1983
"Clausewitz was no desk soldier. He received his baptism of fire at the age of 13, when the Prussian Army, on the left wing of the forces of the First Coalition containing and driving back the armies of the First French Republic, was campaigning first on the Rhine, then in the Vosges.
Advancing across that broad valley, trudging up and down those steep, wooded mountain tracks, he acquired that infantryman’s familiarity with terrain that was to inspire so many of the pages of On War."
"So it was with war. One could only learn how to conduct war, said Clausewitz, by learning, and learning from, what had already been done; by studying war not in the abstract but in the reality. Only thus could a truly comprehensive theory of war be developed, one that would make it possible not only to understand (as with painting or architecture) what the great masters had achieved, but to appreciate how their achievements came to be creative and not imitative acts, unique in themselves but enlarging the scope of expression available to their successors.
This meant studying the history of war, for ‘in the art of war experience counts for more than any number of abstract truths’ (p. 164). But the study of that history had itself to be an exercise of critical judgement.
One could not take for granted the reliability of historians. The bulk of histories, Clausewitz warned, were indeed so unreliable as to be almost useless. Most of what had come down from antiquity or the Middle Ages was too incomplete and inaccurate to be of value, even when it was not pure myth. Clausewitz was prepared to accept as material for study only those campaigns about which full and accurate knowledge was obtainable, which effectively restricted him to those fought in Europe,
and predominantly Western Europe, during the past two centuries."
"War is a clash between major interests that is resolved by bloodshed – that is the only way in which it differs from other conflicts. Rather than comparing it to an art we could more accurately compare it to commerce, which is also a conflict of human interests and activities; and it is still closer to politics, which in turn may be considered as a kind of commerce on a larger scale. (p. 149)
Any theory of war was thus a branch of social and political theory and had to be considered in the context of politics, ‘the womb in which war develops – where its outlines already exist in their hidden, rudimentary form, like the characteristics of living creatures in their embryos’...
"It is not easy, however, to give a fair and comprehensive summary of Clausewitz’s strategic doctrine, since it is presented with infuriating incoherence. Key passages relating to it are scattered almost at random throughout On War, fully bearing out his gloomy prophecy that his readers would find in the book only ‘a collection of material from which a theory of war was to have been distilled’. The section of the work entitled ‘On Strategy in General’ is only a collection of chapters on diverse topics linked by no very evident common theme. A casual reader might very reasonably assume that Clausewitz’s interest in the overall problems of strategy was slight in comparison with his almost obsessive concern with what he saw as the main tool of the strategist – the engagement, and in particular the major battle; a topic to which he devoted an entire book, perhaps the most powerfully written and best organized in the whole of On War."
"...there is no stopping-place short of the extreme."
Clausewitz was so anxious to deny that of bloodless victory through skillful manoeuvre. But the victory could be bloodless only if the strategist was prepared to shed blood; to fight and win, at whatever cost, the engagement he offered the enemy. 'All action is undertaken', as Clausewitz wrote, 'in the belief that if the ultimate test of arms should actually occur, the outcome would be favourable.... [H]owever ingenious the manoeuvres and combinations, however skillfully contrived the marches, none of them were of the slightest value unless at the end of it all the general was in a position to fight, and to win.Unexpectedly, Howard provides the reader with a brief overview of Clausewitz's learned experiences in both the sciences, but more strikingly in the arts. Ultimately, Clausewitz was fascinated with iterative learning, thus his desire to revise his unfinished seminal work as merely an example. "Intellectually, Clausewitz was very much a child of his time," Howard tells us, "[for] him war was not an activity governed by scientific laws but a clash of wills, or moral forces":
His studies in aesthetic theory taught him that the artist did not succeed simply by learning and applying a given set of rules, but rather that those rules had significance only as indications of what great artists had actually done, and had to be modified as the innovations and perceptions of new generations enriched the comprehension of their subject. All art, all thought (for as Clausewitz himself expressed it, all thought is art), was a creative activity, not an imitative or derivative one. And the same applied with particular force to the conduct of war.I found this aspect of Howard's introduction to be very curious, and it reminded me of studies of John Boyd. Howard's insinuations especially reminded me of Frans Osinga's Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd , where Boyd shares Clausewitz's fascination (almost obsession) of social sciences. This furthers my suspicion that the theories of Clausewitz and Boyd are not mutually exclusive, as some have suggested, but rather richly reinforcing.
War is the continuation of politics by other means.
the character of battle is slaughter, and its price is blood
wars could be of two kinds, those fought for the elimination of the opponent’s political independence and those fought to obtain favorable terms of peace.
The aggressor is always peace-loving (as Bonaparte always claimed to be); he would prefer to take over our country unopposed. To prevent his doing so one must be willing to make war and be prepared for it. In other words it is the weak, those most likely to need defense, who should always be armed in order not to be overwhelmed.