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The World America Made
What would the world look like if America were to reduce its role as a global leader in order to focus all its energies on solving its problems at home? And is America really in decline? Robert Kagan, New York Times best-selling author and one of the country’s most influential strategic thinkers, paints a vivid, alarming picture of what the world might look like if the United States were truly to let its influence wane.
Although Kagan asserts that much of the current pessimism is misplaced, he warns that if America were indeed to commit “preemptive superpower suicide,” the world would see the return of war among rising nations as they jostle for power; the retreat of democracy around the world as Vladimir Putin’s Russia and authoritarian China acquire more clout; and the weakening of the global free-market economy, which the United States created and has supported for more than sixty years. We’ve seen this before—in the breakdown of the Roman Empire and the collapse of the European order in World War I.
Potent, incisive, and engaging, The World America Made is a reminder that the American world order is worth preserving, and America dare not decline.
Although Kagan asserts that much of the current pessimism is misplaced, he warns that if America were indeed to commit “preemptive superpower suicide,” the world would see the return of war among rising nations as they jostle for power; the retreat of democracy around the world as Vladimir Putin’s Russia and authoritarian China acquire more clout; and the weakening of the global free-market economy, which the United States created and has supported for more than sixty years. We’ve seen this before—in the breakdown of the Roman Empire and the collapse of the European order in World War I.
Potent, incisive, and engaging, The World America Made is a reminder that the American world order is worth preserving, and America dare not decline.
149 pages, Hardcover
First published February 7, 2012
76 people are currently reading
1577 people want to read
About the author
Robert Kagan
28 books239 followersRobert Kagan is an American historian and foreign policy commentator. Robert Kagan is the son of Yale classical historian and author, Donald Kagan. He is married to Victoria Nuland, the former U.S. ambassador to NATO, and has two children. He is the brother of political commentator Frederick Kagan.
Kagan is a columnist for the Washington Post and is syndicated by the New York Times Syndicate. He is a contributing editor at both The New Republic and the Weekly Standard, and has also written for the New York Times, Foreign Affairs, the Wall Street Journal, Commentary, World Affairs, and Policy Review.
Kagan is a columnist for the Washington Post and is syndicated by the New York Times Syndicate. He is a contributing editor at both The New Republic and the Weekly Standard, and has also written for the New York Times, Foreign Affairs, the Wall Street Journal, Commentary, World Affairs, and Policy Review.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 107 reviews
December 22, 2012
Having read in 1988 Paul Kennedy's "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers," whose front cover featured an American flag about to fall off a precipice, I was fascinated to see Kagan's title 15 years after Kennedy's book was published. In '87, when Kennedy hit the shelves, the ascendency of Japan to the throne of first among nations was widely-accepted conventional wisdom.
Of course, it didn't happen (or hasn't happened yet) the way Kennedy had predicted. Japan has been mired in economic and social messes of its own, and the U.S. economy, for all its problems, has retained its position of dominance. Kagan argues, while allowing for scenarios under which the current situation could change, that no other nation, including China, is yet in a position to seriously challenge U.S. military dominance and global thought leadership.
Kagan survives as a somewhat conservative fellow at the liberal-leaning Brookings Institution, which should tell you something of the man's stature as a top-rank analyst. He writes with Kennedy in mind; interacting openly with Kennedy's 1980's thesis that America, like all the great powers before it, had bankrupted itself due to projecting its power beyond what could be sustained.
Kagan provides his evidence that since the end of WWII, global geopolitics has been operating in a "Pax Americana" (though he does not use that term) that continues to this day, but that will require continued committment, hard work, and yes - sometimes even a compromising of values in selected cases - in order to be sustained.
Through it all, Kagan maintains a very respectful tone toward those who see the world differently from him. People who are sick and tired of the bombast of radio talk-show hosts will appreciate the calm manner with which he states his case. You get the sense that if Bob Kagan lived in your neighborhood, you wouldn't mind sitting in the corner tavern with him over a beer and letting him talk shop.
The book sometimes falls short with providing enough hard evidence that supports Kagan's thesis. This is more of a conversational book that happens to be written by a scholar, than a scholarly book written to refute other scholarly positions. In fairness to Kagan, his goal (or his publisher's goal) may have been to keep the book to a readable length (they've succeeded) and to engage a more casual readership than just the serious student of geopolitics (again, success). Still, there were perhaps half a dozen occasions where I wanted more evidence from Kagan to support his arguments.
But in the final analysis, Kagan has, I think, written an important book that any American - indeed, any world citizen - who likes to think about history and the "march of nations" ought to read. You may not agree with him, but his suggestions about how the national core values of today's leading nations interact to create the peace or conflict we experience, are worthy to consider.
Of course, it didn't happen (or hasn't happened yet) the way Kennedy had predicted. Japan has been mired in economic and social messes of its own, and the U.S. economy, for all its problems, has retained its position of dominance. Kagan argues, while allowing for scenarios under which the current situation could change, that no other nation, including China, is yet in a position to seriously challenge U.S. military dominance and global thought leadership.
Kagan survives as a somewhat conservative fellow at the liberal-leaning Brookings Institution, which should tell you something of the man's stature as a top-rank analyst. He writes with Kennedy in mind; interacting openly with Kennedy's 1980's thesis that America, like all the great powers before it, had bankrupted itself due to projecting its power beyond what could be sustained.
Kagan provides his evidence that since the end of WWII, global geopolitics has been operating in a "Pax Americana" (though he does not use that term) that continues to this day, but that will require continued committment, hard work, and yes - sometimes even a compromising of values in selected cases - in order to be sustained.
Through it all, Kagan maintains a very respectful tone toward those who see the world differently from him. People who are sick and tired of the bombast of radio talk-show hosts will appreciate the calm manner with which he states his case. You get the sense that if Bob Kagan lived in your neighborhood, you wouldn't mind sitting in the corner tavern with him over a beer and letting him talk shop.
The book sometimes falls short with providing enough hard evidence that supports Kagan's thesis. This is more of a conversational book that happens to be written by a scholar, than a scholarly book written to refute other scholarly positions. In fairness to Kagan, his goal (or his publisher's goal) may have been to keep the book to a readable length (they've succeeded) and to engage a more casual readership than just the serious student of geopolitics (again, success). Still, there were perhaps half a dozen occasions where I wanted more evidence from Kagan to support his arguments.
But in the final analysis, Kagan has, I think, written an important book that any American - indeed, any world citizen - who likes to think about history and the "march of nations" ought to read. You may not agree with him, but his suggestions about how the national core values of today's leading nations interact to create the peace or conflict we experience, are worthy to consider.
June 29, 2012
This book was pretty good, but it was a cursory treatment of its subject. The author's premise is that the Pax Americana of the past 65 years benefits most of the people in the world and that most of the world would be worse off if the United States decides that we should withdraw from our role as leader of the free world. He does not subscribe to the notion that civilization has evolved enough that economic prosperity, relative peace, freedom, global trade and exchange of information would survive no matter who is in charge - or if nobody is really in charge, as in a multi-polar global power structure. He gives very good examples of what happens when nobody is in charge: such as the disaster of world economic collapse and WWII in the mid 20th century when Britain could no longer support the Pax Britanica, but the United States was unwilling to take on the role of leader of the liberal world. And he makes a strong case that, if China becomes dominant, authoritarian and mercantilist values will dominate over the liberal, free-trade values of recent history, to the detriment of most of the world's peoples. He also makes the case that the United States isn't necessarily in long-term decline and can easily continue to support liberal values across the globe, if we have the will to do it. The author is a pragmatist. He gives many examples of how the U.S. doesn't always get our way, even when we are the biggest kid on the block. And he readily admits that our motives aren't always pure and our actions are often harmful. But he still contends, and I agree, that our leadership is generally respected because most of the world, understands that we do have ideals, however imperfectly we execute on them. The world would be worse off without our leadership.
December 6, 2014
Kagan offers a solid, concise statement in this little pamphlet of why the liberal world order depends on American power and why it is worth defending. I broadly agree with his interpretation of world politics, which is a blend of conservative realism and democratic idealism.
Here's his argument in a nutshell: "If one wants a more liberal order, there may be no substitute for powerful liberal nations to build and defend it. International order is not an evolution; it is an imposition. It is the domination of one vision over others -- in this case, the domination of liberal principles of economics, domestic politics, and international relations over other, nonliberal principles. It will last only as long as those who imposed it retain the capacity to defend it." (97)
Kagan threads the needle between liberal internationalists who are uncomfortable with or embarassed by American power, and nationalist America-firsters who dislike or disbelieve in American's responsibilities around the world. This is a difficult but important balance to strike.
My only beef with this book is that it is both too short and too long. At 140 pages, this is just a padded out version of his influential article in The New Republic from earlier in the year. It offers more detail and more argument, but not much more insight. It is too short to be a real scholarly or historical look at world order, but without much more substance it begins to feel somewhat repetetive and chatty. I confess I'm just jealous because I wish I had a literary agent who could get me book deals for extended op-eds, which is really what this book is, but Kagan has the credentials so I'm glad at least someone is out there making the argument.
Here's his argument in a nutshell: "If one wants a more liberal order, there may be no substitute for powerful liberal nations to build and defend it. International order is not an evolution; it is an imposition. It is the domination of one vision over others -- in this case, the domination of liberal principles of economics, domestic politics, and international relations over other, nonliberal principles. It will last only as long as those who imposed it retain the capacity to defend it." (97)
Kagan threads the needle between liberal internationalists who are uncomfortable with or embarassed by American power, and nationalist America-firsters who dislike or disbelieve in American's responsibilities around the world. This is a difficult but important balance to strike.
My only beef with this book is that it is both too short and too long. At 140 pages, this is just a padded out version of his influential article in The New Republic from earlier in the year. It offers more detail and more argument, but not much more insight. It is too short to be a real scholarly or historical look at world order, but without much more substance it begins to feel somewhat repetetive and chatty. I confess I'm just jealous because I wish I had a literary agent who could get me book deals for extended op-eds, which is really what this book is, but Kagan has the credentials so I'm glad at least someone is out there making the argument.
October 29, 2019
Mindig meglepődöm azon, mennyire szeretek jól felépített érvrendszereket tanulmányozni még akkor is, ha olyan dolgok mellett teszik le a garast, amiktől nekem felszalad a szemöldököm a fejbúbomig, de úgy, hogy bicskával kell visszafeszegetnem a helyére. Kagan tulajdonképpen Huntington elméletét visz tovább (szőrmentén) – hogy a világtörténelem civilizációk összecsapásainak sorozata, de kimondja azt is, amire Huntington csak gondol: hogy addig jó nekünk, amíg ezekben az összecsapásokban az Egyesült Államok a legerősebb kutya*. Másfelől szellemi elődjénél lényegesen összeszedettebb, finomabb érvelési rendszert épít fel, és ahhoz is elég intelligens, hogy már a legelején leszögezze: Amerikát és az amerikai liberális** államberendezkedést esetenként kifejezetten inkompetens, és erkölcsileg távolról sem makulátlan világhatalomnak tartja, csak hát még mindig fényévekkel jobb, mintha a helyén a jelenlegi Kínát vagy Oroszországot kellene eltűrnünk. Ezzel én a magam részéről tökéletesen egyetértek.
A kötettel szemben nekem nem is annyira értelmi, inkább érzelmi ellenvetéseim voltak. Kagan egyértelműen az egypólusú világrend mellett érvel, természetesen az USÁ-val a középpontban. Felhívja a figyelmet arra, hogy a két- vagy többpólusú rendszerek sokkal nagyobb eséllyel okoznak világégéseket, egy egypólusú rendszerből a többpólusúba való átmenet pedig még soha nem történt meg komoly véráldozat nélkül. Hogy ez a veszély létezik, azt elfogadom, de ettől még annyira nyilván nem kell elájulnom az egypólusú rendszer ideájáért. A másik gondom, hogy Kagan, mint az összes általam ismert amerikai történész-politológus (talán Fukuyama kivételével), folyamatosan olyan marginális tényezőként (sőt: lekezelően) kezeli Európát, hogy attól feláll a hátamon a szőr. Természetesen van igazság a szavaiban, de ezek mögött a kijelentések mögött ott érzem a szilárd hitet, hogy jelentős katonai erő nélkül egy közösséget nem is kell emberszámba venni – én viszont úgy gondolom, hogy bár pusztán a gazdasági fegyverek alkalmazása talán valóban nem biztosítja olyan arányban a sikert, mint nyomatékul pár anyahajó és egy halom tengerészgyalogos, de erkölcsileg lényegesen elfogadhatóbb opciót jelent***. A harmadik gondom tisztán történelemszemléleti. Kagan elveti a fukuyama-i modellt, ami szerint a világ a liberalizálódás felé halad, és ehelyett azt vallja, hogy semmiféle általában vett „fejlődésről” nem beszélhetünk. (Ebből amúgy az következik, hogy a demokrácia nem kialakul, hanem ki kell kényszeríteni.) Én viszont javíthatatlan hegeliánusként (e percben jöttem rá, hogy az vagyok) még mindig úgy látom, hogy léteznek egymásra épülő tapasztalatok a történelemben, amik együttesen valamiféle fejlődési ívet rajzolnak ki – a dolgok nem véletlenül következnek be, hanem más dolgok találkozásából alakulnak ki. Ez a fejlődés persze nem folyamatos, visszaesések, sőt: ciklikus ismétlődések tarkítják, és azt sem lehet biztosan tudni, hogy valójában a demokrácia felé vezet el az út, vagy valami más felé. Hiszen ha nem lenne fejlődés, akkor az sem lenne, ami most van, nem igaz? Vagy de, igaz?
Mindenképpen ajánlom azoknak, akit érdekel, hogy mit gondolnak az amerikaiak. Nem úgy egyenként, hanem mint nemzet. (Már ha egy nemzet gondol egyáltalán valamit.) Rövid, velős összefoglalása azoknak az elképzeléseknek, amelyek az amerikai külpolitika aktivitást mozgatják. És nem muszáj egyetérteni vele.
*A könyv utolsó harmada amúgy meggyőző érvelés amellett, hogy e pillanatban is ő a legerősebb kutya, és nincs arra bizonyíték, hogy ez az elkövetkezendő évtizedekben jelentősen megváltozna. Leszögezi (és valószínűleg igaza van), hogy Amerika története bővelkedett az olyan periódusokban, amikor lényegesen nagyobb volt a gebasz, mint manapság (lásd: polgárháború Észak és Dél között, gazdasági válság ’30-as években, Korea, rakétaválság, Vietnam, olajválság a ’70-es években, stb.), de valahogy mindig kikaparta magát a trutyiból. Ez abból fakad, hogy a demokratikus rendszerek a történelmi viharokban általában sokkal hajlékonyabbnak bizonyulnak az autoriter államoknál, amelyek inkább törnek, mint hajolnak. (Ebben amúgy határozottan szembehelyezkedik Huntington lényegesen pesszimistább víziójával.)
**És azon is mindig meglepődöm, hogy az óceán túlpartján mennyire más a „liberális” szó jelentéstartalma, mint mifelénk. Ott sok szempontból a konzervatív szinonimájának is tekinthető – ami érthető, ha belegondolunk, hogy az a nemzeti tradíció, amire támaszkodnak, nem elválasztható liberális gyökerű alkotmányuktól.
***És hát (ahogy azt amúgy Kagan is megjegyzi) a katonai erő sem biztosíték arra, hogy egy szuperhatalom meg tudja oldani valamely térség problémáit, mint ahogy azt a Közel-Kelet eseményei fényesen példázzák.
A kötettel szemben nekem nem is annyira értelmi, inkább érzelmi ellenvetéseim voltak. Kagan egyértelműen az egypólusú világrend mellett érvel, természetesen az USÁ-val a középpontban. Felhívja a figyelmet arra, hogy a két- vagy többpólusú rendszerek sokkal nagyobb eséllyel okoznak világégéseket, egy egypólusú rendszerből a többpólusúba való átmenet pedig még soha nem történt meg komoly véráldozat nélkül. Hogy ez a veszély létezik, azt elfogadom, de ettől még annyira nyilván nem kell elájulnom az egypólusú rendszer ideájáért. A másik gondom, hogy Kagan, mint az összes általam ismert amerikai történész-politológus (talán Fukuyama kivételével), folyamatosan olyan marginális tényezőként (sőt: lekezelően) kezeli Európát, hogy attól feláll a hátamon a szőr. Természetesen van igazság a szavaiban, de ezek mögött a kijelentések mögött ott érzem a szilárd hitet, hogy jelentős katonai erő nélkül egy közösséget nem is kell emberszámba venni – én viszont úgy gondolom, hogy bár pusztán a gazdasági fegyverek alkalmazása talán valóban nem biztosítja olyan arányban a sikert, mint nyomatékul pár anyahajó és egy halom tengerészgyalogos, de erkölcsileg lényegesen elfogadhatóbb opciót jelent***. A harmadik gondom tisztán történelemszemléleti. Kagan elveti a fukuyama-i modellt, ami szerint a világ a liberalizálódás felé halad, és ehelyett azt vallja, hogy semmiféle általában vett „fejlődésről” nem beszélhetünk. (Ebből amúgy az következik, hogy a demokrácia nem kialakul, hanem ki kell kényszeríteni.) Én viszont javíthatatlan hegeliánusként (e percben jöttem rá, hogy az vagyok) még mindig úgy látom, hogy léteznek egymásra épülő tapasztalatok a történelemben, amik együttesen valamiféle fejlődési ívet rajzolnak ki – a dolgok nem véletlenül következnek be, hanem más dolgok találkozásából alakulnak ki. Ez a fejlődés persze nem folyamatos, visszaesések, sőt: ciklikus ismétlődések tarkítják, és azt sem lehet biztosan tudni, hogy valójában a demokrácia felé vezet el az út, vagy valami más felé. Hiszen ha nem lenne fejlődés, akkor az sem lenne, ami most van, nem igaz? Vagy de, igaz?
Mindenképpen ajánlom azoknak, akit érdekel, hogy mit gondolnak az amerikaiak. Nem úgy egyenként, hanem mint nemzet. (Már ha egy nemzet gondol egyáltalán valamit.) Rövid, velős összefoglalása azoknak az elképzeléseknek, amelyek az amerikai külpolitika aktivitást mozgatják. És nem muszáj egyetérteni vele.
*A könyv utolsó harmada amúgy meggyőző érvelés amellett, hogy e pillanatban is ő a legerősebb kutya, és nincs arra bizonyíték, hogy ez az elkövetkezendő évtizedekben jelentősen megváltozna. Leszögezi (és valószínűleg igaza van), hogy Amerika története bővelkedett az olyan periódusokban, amikor lényegesen nagyobb volt a gebasz, mint manapság (lásd: polgárháború Észak és Dél között, gazdasági válság ’30-as években, Korea, rakétaválság, Vietnam, olajválság a ’70-es években, stb.), de valahogy mindig kikaparta magát a trutyiból. Ez abból fakad, hogy a demokratikus rendszerek a történelmi viharokban általában sokkal hajlékonyabbnak bizonyulnak az autoriter államoknál, amelyek inkább törnek, mint hajolnak. (Ebben amúgy határozottan szembehelyezkedik Huntington lényegesen pesszimistább víziójával.)
**És azon is mindig meglepődöm, hogy az óceán túlpartján mennyire más a „liberális” szó jelentéstartalma, mint mifelénk. Ott sok szempontból a konzervatív szinonimájának is tekinthető – ami érthető, ha belegondolunk, hogy az a nemzeti tradíció, amire támaszkodnak, nem elválasztható liberális gyökerű alkotmányuktól.
***És hát (ahogy azt amúgy Kagan is megjegyzi) a katonai erő sem biztosíték arra, hogy egy szuperhatalom meg tudja oldani valamely térség problémáit, mint ahogy azt a Közel-Kelet eseményei fényesen példázzák.
January 1, 2023
A concise, accessible history of how the US constructed the current international order after World War II. Reads very much like a 140-page New York Times op-ed, rather than an academic book. This makes Kagan's writing easy to follow.
His main argument is that the United States is the cornerstone of the world order. No one else is capable or willing to step-up and take leadership of the order, or at least not countries the US would accept. US military and economic power are important in sustaining the order, which Kagan argues is actually quite inexpensive, when one considers the costs of the two World Wars.
Kagan is writing this book because he sees fears of US decline as premature and too hastily assessed. He views American geography, military firepower, and system of alliances as keeping Washington much safer than stated by opponents of American primacy. Kagan worries that a reduced American role in the world will create a vacuum, which ultimately will become filled by powers who opposed or do not want to continue the project of American liberalism.
While Kagan's succinct summary of history and his realism about the short-comings of a rules-based international order are helpful, he often creates strawman arguments to dismiss the claims of those who disagree with him. He also overestimates the support for the liberal world order, especially among many Americans, and more importantly, many countries in the developing world. While Europe and the Asian Tigers may appreciate what the US has created, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea certainly do not. Joining them, are many countries from Latin America, Africa, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. They feel increasingly left out as relative economic inequality continues to grow.
His main argument is that the United States is the cornerstone of the world order. No one else is capable or willing to step-up and take leadership of the order, or at least not countries the US would accept. US military and economic power are important in sustaining the order, which Kagan argues is actually quite inexpensive, when one considers the costs of the two World Wars.
Kagan is writing this book because he sees fears of US decline as premature and too hastily assessed. He views American geography, military firepower, and system of alliances as keeping Washington much safer than stated by opponents of American primacy. Kagan worries that a reduced American role in the world will create a vacuum, which ultimately will become filled by powers who opposed or do not want to continue the project of American liberalism.
While Kagan's succinct summary of history and his realism about the short-comings of a rules-based international order are helpful, he often creates strawman arguments to dismiss the claims of those who disagree with him. He also overestimates the support for the liberal world order, especially among many Americans, and more importantly, many countries in the developing world. While Europe and the Asian Tigers may appreciate what the US has created, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea certainly do not. Joining them, are many countries from Latin America, Africa, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. They feel increasingly left out as relative economic inequality continues to grow.
July 2, 2025
I have a lot of beef with parts of this book (all the American exceptionalism), but I have to say that it was indeed thought-provoking and I see why my school recommended it. Good to consider what assumptions we make/things the world takes for granted in a unipolar, largely US-led world. I think Kagan really underestimated how much the threat to liberal democracy started at home, though, rather than abroad.
February 12, 2023
Typical justifications for unconstitutional interventionist foreign policy by a professional Zionist agitator with a neoconservative's characteristic fetishistic fondness for warmongering. I did give it 2 stars instead of 1 though because it was a good and easily digestible introductory primer to the different schools of foreign policy thought.
November 6, 2016
Could have been much better done. Thought it would be a persuasive, history-rich argument for the necessity of American power to underpin the international order, but more surface-level, especially considering Kagan’s previous books. His TNR/Brookings essays will do.
June 15, 2017
interesting and well written, but not persuasive. kagan is frequently blinded by patriotism, and most arguments don't hold post-2016.
August 26, 2016
Is America in decline? If so, is that a good thing? Kagan's answers are "No, at least not yet" and "It depends on what you want the world to be like." His concluding hunch: "Perhaps if Americans had a clearer picture of what might come after the American world order, they would be more inclined to continue struggling to preserve the world they have made." A quick and enjoyable read. A good companion volume to Bret Stephens's America in Retreat.
Notable Quotes:
"Foreign policy is like hitting a baseball: if you fail 70% of the time, you go to the Hall of Fame." (125)
"When Winston Churchill observed that Americans could always be counted on to do the right thing, but only after exhausting all other alternatives, it was a sardonic, backhanded kind of compliment." (15)
"The better idea doesn't have to win just because it is the better idea. It requires great powers to champion it." (21)
"American officials claim to be puzzled by China's naval buildup. They ask for greater 'transparency' about China's intentions. They might as well ask why a tiger grows teeth. This is the normal behavior of rising great powers." (87)
"History suggests that when we look at the behavior of nations and try to understand their motives and ambitions, we need to be aware that their calculations are affected by what they believe they can achieve and what they believe is off-limits. One thing we do know for sure: a China unchecked by American power would be a different China from one that must worry about American power." (86)
"No group of nations has ever come closer to achieving the liberal internationalist ideal, the Kantian perpetual peace [than the European Union]. But the price has been a Europe increasingly disarming itself while the other great powers refuse to follow it...Would this postmodern Europe even survive if it truly had to fend for itself in a world that did not play by its rules? The irony is that the success of the American world order has made it possible for so many people to believe that it can be transcended, that American power may be longer be necessary to sustain it...Instead of realizing that great-power conflict and competition have been suppressed, people imagine that the great powers themselves are fundamentally changing character, that institutions, laws, and norms are taking hold. It is as if New Yorkers strolling through a safe Central Park decided that police were no longer going to be needed. The park is safe because the human race has evolved." (99)
"Liberal economic orders are not self-sustaining. Historically, their creation and survival have been the work of great powers willing and able to support open trade and free markets, and to do so using all the necessary tools, including military power, to keep trade avenues open...One key element of the liberal economic order over the past two centuries has been control of the seas. Today, although we live in a digital age, goods are not beamed through the ether. Much of the world's oil and gas, raw materials, ores and minerals, and food and grain still travel by ship, which means that free trade still requires open trade routes on the high seas...Since World War II the United States has used its dominance of the oceans to keep trade routes open for everyone, even during periods of conflict. But it is not enough to have an interest in free trade. Today, Portugal and Singapore have an interest in free trade and open oceans, but they lack the capacity to keep trade routes open. Only the U.S. has had both the will and the ability to preserve freedom of the seas. Indeed, it has done so largely by itself, policing the world's oceans with its dominant navy with only minor assistance from other powers, while other trading nations, from Germany to Japan, from Brazil to India, from Russia to China, have been content to be 'free riders.' This has been one of America's most important contributions to the present liberal world order." (76-77)
Notable Quotes:
"Foreign policy is like hitting a baseball: if you fail 70% of the time, you go to the Hall of Fame." (125)
"When Winston Churchill observed that Americans could always be counted on to do the right thing, but only after exhausting all other alternatives, it was a sardonic, backhanded kind of compliment." (15)
"The better idea doesn't have to win just because it is the better idea. It requires great powers to champion it." (21)
"American officials claim to be puzzled by China's naval buildup. They ask for greater 'transparency' about China's intentions. They might as well ask why a tiger grows teeth. This is the normal behavior of rising great powers." (87)
"History suggests that when we look at the behavior of nations and try to understand their motives and ambitions, we need to be aware that their calculations are affected by what they believe they can achieve and what they believe is off-limits. One thing we do know for sure: a China unchecked by American power would be a different China from one that must worry about American power." (86)
"No group of nations has ever come closer to achieving the liberal internationalist ideal, the Kantian perpetual peace [than the European Union]. But the price has been a Europe increasingly disarming itself while the other great powers refuse to follow it...Would this postmodern Europe even survive if it truly had to fend for itself in a world that did not play by its rules? The irony is that the success of the American world order has made it possible for so many people to believe that it can be transcended, that American power may be longer be necessary to sustain it...Instead of realizing that great-power conflict and competition have been suppressed, people imagine that the great powers themselves are fundamentally changing character, that institutions, laws, and norms are taking hold. It is as if New Yorkers strolling through a safe Central Park decided that police were no longer going to be needed. The park is safe because the human race has evolved." (99)
"Liberal economic orders are not self-sustaining. Historically, their creation and survival have been the work of great powers willing and able to support open trade and free markets, and to do so using all the necessary tools, including military power, to keep trade avenues open...One key element of the liberal economic order over the past two centuries has been control of the seas. Today, although we live in a digital age, goods are not beamed through the ether. Much of the world's oil and gas, raw materials, ores and minerals, and food and grain still travel by ship, which means that free trade still requires open trade routes on the high seas...Since World War II the United States has used its dominance of the oceans to keep trade routes open for everyone, even during periods of conflict. But it is not enough to have an interest in free trade. Today, Portugal and Singapore have an interest in free trade and open oceans, but they lack the capacity to keep trade routes open. Only the U.S. has had both the will and the ability to preserve freedom of the seas. Indeed, it has done so largely by itself, policing the world's oceans with its dominant navy with only minor assistance from other powers, while other trading nations, from Germany to Japan, from Brazil to India, from Russia to China, have been content to be 'free riders.' This has been one of America's most important contributions to the present liberal world order." (76-77)
April 4, 2023
Interesting and worth a read but nothing particularly gripping. His counter factual arguments are wafer thin and reads like a holiday flick.
December 31, 2016
Insightful approach to the both historic and current role of the USA in the contemporary world, as a factor of (counter)balance to the many and various autocratic regimes. Although the author is known to have been a political advisor to several key American political figures, he is not affraid to pertinently criticize, but also to convincingly praise many of America's involvement moments in the international relations throughout the 20th century and how these mixtures (including in the internal affairs of other states) have influenced the shaping and evolution of the world we live in.
Ultimately, the author argues that, although not a few have been the times when the US have pursued their own interests (often using petty means and borderline ethics to reach their goal), the evolution of our world would have been completely different (and not one for the better, but on the contrary) if Americans hadn't been actively involved in the world politics of the past 100 years. And this statement - factual or counterfactual, either you love or you hate America and the Americans - I reckon is axiomatic enough to start from a common premise in understanding contemporary history.
Ultimately, the author argues that, although not a few have been the times when the US have pursued their own interests (often using petty means and borderline ethics to reach their goal), the evolution of our world would have been completely different (and not one for the better, but on the contrary) if Americans hadn't been actively involved in the world politics of the past 100 years. And this statement - factual or counterfactual, either you love or you hate America and the Americans - I reckon is axiomatic enough to start from a common premise in understanding contemporary history.
July 24, 2012
Apparently, this book is publicly endorsed by President Obama.
An intriguing recount of how America rose to be thee world power, and why (like it or not..) America will remain on top for the foreseeable future. Although, we may have to learn how to share..
Read like a very objective look at America and it's global actions and role.
*written by a greek dude.
An intriguing recount of how America rose to be thee world power, and why (like it or not..) America will remain on top for the foreseeable future. Although, we may have to learn how to share..
Read like a very objective look at America and it's global actions and role.
*written by a greek dude.
December 14, 2016
I really liked this book. It wasn't too political, I couldn't tell if the author was a conservative or a liberal. He gives reasons about why, and how America shaped the global order. It also explains how the world percieves america and how the world would be without America.
Overall, America is still THE world Superpower, and if we have some foresight, we'll want to keep it that way.
Overall, America is still THE world Superpower, and if we have some foresight, we'll want to keep it that way.
January 19, 2018
This is a super short read, but it is dense with a lot of big ideas and a good overview of some world history. Enjoyed it and it gave me a lot to think about.
December 27, 2016
In a rejoinder to all of the declinist books being published, and the general view of the American public that the US is in decline, the historian Robert Kagan wrote the book The World America Made. [1]
Starting from a reasonable assumption that decline is not a factor of uncontrollable events, The World America Made postulates the idea that America is like George Bailey in the 1946 classic It’s a Wonderful Life: a hero who does not understand all of the lives he has helped to furnish, and he can only comprehend this fact through a counter-factual history being presented from an angel (Kagan). Kagan’s desired goal is to convince Americans not to commit “superpower suicide”, and that they should carry on being the world’s hegemon – allowing the liberal international order to carry on. (p.7)
Kagan roughly divides the book into three main sections. In the first section he argues that the post-war world order, that promotes capitalism, peace and democracy, was only created due to American power – not the power of liberal ideas. In order to argue his position, Kagan independently analyses all of the building-blocks that make up the liberal international order and explains why each one were only brought about due to the influence of the US.
While Kagan’s argument is fluently written – a redeeming quality of the whole book – his style of argumentation is quite poor because he repeatedly fails to develop the central concepts that the rest of the argument stands upon. For example, in his attempt to challenge the notion that the “international free-market system is simply a natural stage in the evolution of the global economy”, Kagan just quotes an assertion from the political scientist Robert Gilpin, who wrote in his book U S Power Multinational Corp that “A liberal international economy cannot come into existence and be maintained unless it has behind it the most powerful state(s) in the system.” (p.37) Kagan fails to develop this point and address some basic questions: Why can a liberal international economy not come into existence on its own? What is the argument of the theorists who believe it will? Why does it need the backing of the most powerful state(s) in the system? Failing to address these basic questions means that Kagan’s later in-depth observations, which would be quite persuasive if not for this hurdle, loses most of its potency.[2]
Logically, following on from the premise that our liberal order only came into being through American dominance, Kagan argues that if US power were to decline the current world order would crumble and in the post-American world we would discover that “the alternative to American power was not peace and harmony but chaos and catastrophe.” (p.99)
In parts, Kagan’s analysis is ok; his argument that in a world that is devoid of American dominance, countries such as Russia and China would be granted more ability, and that they would act of this ability, to suppress democracy is backed up with a rudimentary analysis of the country’s foreign policy and their overall strategic goals – which will result in the squashing of democracy in a lot of countries (Taiwan, Ukraine and Georgia, to name a few). However, his analysis on other areas is quite pathetic. When he argues that the liberal economic order would not continue, his argument boils down to fact that the US Navy will not be able to police the seas, something that all the major powers have the capabilities to do; and that some states will act against their own self-interest and will upend the liberal economic order, only because they are autocratic regimes.[3] His analysis gets even worse when he begins to scoff at alternative ways that can be used to maintain the liberal international order in a world that is not dominated by the US, most notably through institutions.
Throughout the book Kagan dismisses the United Nations and completely ignores the success of many international institutions. And his refutation of the entire theory of liberal institutionalism – a concept that, if true, has the ability to maintain the current international order – is found in one sentence (which does need to be quoted in full because it is an accurate representation of his style of argumentation): “All efforts to hand of the maintenance of international peace and security to an international body with greater authority than the nations within it, or to rely on nations to abide by international rules, regardless of their power to flout them, have failed.” (p.75) There are two problems with this statement: first, it just dismisses, and also fails to grasp the argument of the liberals and neoliberals, a very complex position with ZERO evidence; and, secondly, Kagan’s failure to understand that, throughout the history of the human race, there has never been an international body that has greater authority then states means he is arguing against strawmen – a recurring pattern in the book.[4]
In the last section, Kagan turns his mind to the question: “So is the United States in decline?” And Kagan chooses to argue that the United States is not in decline.
At the start of this section, Kagan states that in order to measure a nations relative power we must analyse three factors that “make up what the Chinese call ‘comprehensive national power’”: the size of the state’s economy relative to other states; the states relative degree of military power; and, finally, the state’s “degree of political influence it wields in the international system.” (p.103)
Unfortunately, due to Kagan backing up most of his arguments with problematic assertions, faulty reasoning and taking too much of a sanguine view then what all the evidence allows, his analysis of each one of the factors loses a lot of its credibility.[5]
An example of Kagan making an extremely problematic assertion is when he states that “great powers rarely decline suddenly.” (p.103) The book by the historian Niall Ferguson, Civilization: The Six Killer Apps of Western Power, demonstrates the fragility of Kagan’s assertion because Ferguson argued that the Great Powers do decline suddenly when they lose one of the six “apps” that made them “great” in the first place, such as the protestant work ethos. In addition, later on in the book Kagan goes onto disagree with his own assertion: he later remarks that the decline of the British Empire, one of the largest empires in history, declined over a couple of decades. As pointed out by Michiko Kakutani, the only thing the reader can conclude – without coming to the conclusion that this section is illogical – is that it depends on what one defines as “suddenly.”[6]
Overall, while Kagan’s prose is excellent, the reader will find his analysis to be lacking and superficial at best. When combined with Kagan’s tendency to create strawmen, his outright dismissal of complex theories, his problematic assertions and his unjustified sanguine view of America’s current situation, one will wish that they skipped The World America Made for Josef Joffe’s The Myth of America's Decline – an in-depth analysis of America’s current situation in the world and rebuttal of the declinist argument.
Notes
1. Some examples of the declinist books that were published: Fred Kaplan, Daydream Believers: How a Few Grand Ideas Wrecked American Power (London: Wiley, 2008); Arvind Subramanian, Eclipse: Living In The Shadow of China’s Economic Dominance (Washington D.C.: Peterson Institution for International Economics 2011); Mark Steyn, After America: Get Ready For Armageddon (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2011)
2. Here are some of Kagan’s latter observations: “few powerful nations have ever perceived their well-being as intimately tied to a liberal free-trade international economy and had the will and power to sustain it” – “in the modern era of the nation state, there have only been two”: Great Britain and the U.S. Other great powers of “recent centuries – the sixteenth century Ottomans and Philip II’s Spain, France in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, nineteenth- and twentieth-century Germany, and the Soviet Union – had little interest in free markets, free trade, and a liberal economic order.” In addition, he notes that the way the US built the liberal economic order was through the Marshall plan and their occupation of Japan. (See: Kagan, America, p.37-38.)
3. It is important to note that Kagan does not provide evidence – or, at the very least, cite a source – and reasoning as to why autocratic regimes would act against their own self-interest and have a penchant for undermining international liberal economic orders. (This criticism also applies to his argument that countries would not police the seas.)
4. As pointed out by Robert Keohane, Kagan’s favourite way to set up these strawmen is by asserting that a theorist thinks a trend is “inevitable,” “irreversible” or that they believe in “multipolar harmony” – a concept that completely goes against the basic ideas of the realists and liberals that he cites. (For more info see Robert Keohane, ‘Hegemony and After’, Foreign Affairs Volume 91, Number 4 (2012), p. 114-118.)
5. An example of Kagan taking too much of a sanguine view then what all of the evidence allows, is when he makes the capacious claim that America’s “share of the world’s GDP has held remarkably steady … over the past four decades. In 1969 the United States produced roughly a quarter of the world’s economic output. Today it still produces roughly a quarter.” Kagan cites figures from USDA Economic Research Service. However, lots of different data sets disagree. For example, a data set prepared by the IMF shows that America is in decline: from 22.6% in 1989, the U.S. share of global GDP (based on PPP) had fallen to 16.5 in 2010 – a figure Kagan had access to – and has been declining ever since, with current projections stating that by 2020 the U.S. share of global GDP would have decreased to 14.9%. (See respectively: Kagan, America, p.105; International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database [Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) share of world total] (October 2015), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/w... (Date accessed: 22/10/2016).)
6. For quote see: Michiko Kakutani, ‘Historian Who Influences Both Obama and Romney,’ The New York Times. February 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/boo... (Date accessed: 21/10/2016)
Starting from a reasonable assumption that decline is not a factor of uncontrollable events, The World America Made postulates the idea that America is like George Bailey in the 1946 classic It’s a Wonderful Life: a hero who does not understand all of the lives he has helped to furnish, and he can only comprehend this fact through a counter-factual history being presented from an angel (Kagan). Kagan’s desired goal is to convince Americans not to commit “superpower suicide”, and that they should carry on being the world’s hegemon – allowing the liberal international order to carry on. (p.7)
Kagan roughly divides the book into three main sections. In the first section he argues that the post-war world order, that promotes capitalism, peace and democracy, was only created due to American power – not the power of liberal ideas. In order to argue his position, Kagan independently analyses all of the building-blocks that make up the liberal international order and explains why each one were only brought about due to the influence of the US.
While Kagan’s argument is fluently written – a redeeming quality of the whole book – his style of argumentation is quite poor because he repeatedly fails to develop the central concepts that the rest of the argument stands upon. For example, in his attempt to challenge the notion that the “international free-market system is simply a natural stage in the evolution of the global economy”, Kagan just quotes an assertion from the political scientist Robert Gilpin, who wrote in his book U S Power Multinational Corp that “A liberal international economy cannot come into existence and be maintained unless it has behind it the most powerful state(s) in the system.” (p.37) Kagan fails to develop this point and address some basic questions: Why can a liberal international economy not come into existence on its own? What is the argument of the theorists who believe it will? Why does it need the backing of the most powerful state(s) in the system? Failing to address these basic questions means that Kagan’s later in-depth observations, which would be quite persuasive if not for this hurdle, loses most of its potency.[2]
Logically, following on from the premise that our liberal order only came into being through American dominance, Kagan argues that if US power were to decline the current world order would crumble and in the post-American world we would discover that “the alternative to American power was not peace and harmony but chaos and catastrophe.” (p.99)
In parts, Kagan’s analysis is ok; his argument that in a world that is devoid of American dominance, countries such as Russia and China would be granted more ability, and that they would act of this ability, to suppress democracy is backed up with a rudimentary analysis of the country’s foreign policy and their overall strategic goals – which will result in the squashing of democracy in a lot of countries (Taiwan, Ukraine and Georgia, to name a few). However, his analysis on other areas is quite pathetic. When he argues that the liberal economic order would not continue, his argument boils down to fact that the US Navy will not be able to police the seas, something that all the major powers have the capabilities to do; and that some states will act against their own self-interest and will upend the liberal economic order, only because they are autocratic regimes.[3] His analysis gets even worse when he begins to scoff at alternative ways that can be used to maintain the liberal international order in a world that is not dominated by the US, most notably through institutions.
Throughout the book Kagan dismisses the United Nations and completely ignores the success of many international institutions. And his refutation of the entire theory of liberal institutionalism – a concept that, if true, has the ability to maintain the current international order – is found in one sentence (which does need to be quoted in full because it is an accurate representation of his style of argumentation): “All efforts to hand of the maintenance of international peace and security to an international body with greater authority than the nations within it, or to rely on nations to abide by international rules, regardless of their power to flout them, have failed.” (p.75) There are two problems with this statement: first, it just dismisses, and also fails to grasp the argument of the liberals and neoliberals, a very complex position with ZERO evidence; and, secondly, Kagan’s failure to understand that, throughout the history of the human race, there has never been an international body that has greater authority then states means he is arguing against strawmen – a recurring pattern in the book.[4]
In the last section, Kagan turns his mind to the question: “So is the United States in decline?” And Kagan chooses to argue that the United States is not in decline.
At the start of this section, Kagan states that in order to measure a nations relative power we must analyse three factors that “make up what the Chinese call ‘comprehensive national power’”: the size of the state’s economy relative to other states; the states relative degree of military power; and, finally, the state’s “degree of political influence it wields in the international system.” (p.103)
Unfortunately, due to Kagan backing up most of his arguments with problematic assertions, faulty reasoning and taking too much of a sanguine view then what all the evidence allows, his analysis of each one of the factors loses a lot of its credibility.[5]
An example of Kagan making an extremely problematic assertion is when he states that “great powers rarely decline suddenly.” (p.103) The book by the historian Niall Ferguson, Civilization: The Six Killer Apps of Western Power, demonstrates the fragility of Kagan’s assertion because Ferguson argued that the Great Powers do decline suddenly when they lose one of the six “apps” that made them “great” in the first place, such as the protestant work ethos. In addition, later on in the book Kagan goes onto disagree with his own assertion: he later remarks that the decline of the British Empire, one of the largest empires in history, declined over a couple of decades. As pointed out by Michiko Kakutani, the only thing the reader can conclude – without coming to the conclusion that this section is illogical – is that it depends on what one defines as “suddenly.”[6]
Overall, while Kagan’s prose is excellent, the reader will find his analysis to be lacking and superficial at best. When combined with Kagan’s tendency to create strawmen, his outright dismissal of complex theories, his problematic assertions and his unjustified sanguine view of America’s current situation, one will wish that they skipped The World America Made for Josef Joffe’s The Myth of America's Decline – an in-depth analysis of America’s current situation in the world and rebuttal of the declinist argument.
Notes
1. Some examples of the declinist books that were published: Fred Kaplan, Daydream Believers: How a Few Grand Ideas Wrecked American Power (London: Wiley, 2008); Arvind Subramanian, Eclipse: Living In The Shadow of China’s Economic Dominance (Washington D.C.: Peterson Institution for International Economics 2011); Mark Steyn, After America: Get Ready For Armageddon (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2011)
2. Here are some of Kagan’s latter observations: “few powerful nations have ever perceived their well-being as intimately tied to a liberal free-trade international economy and had the will and power to sustain it” – “in the modern era of the nation state, there have only been two”: Great Britain and the U.S. Other great powers of “recent centuries – the sixteenth century Ottomans and Philip II’s Spain, France in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, nineteenth- and twentieth-century Germany, and the Soviet Union – had little interest in free markets, free trade, and a liberal economic order.” In addition, he notes that the way the US built the liberal economic order was through the Marshall plan and their occupation of Japan. (See: Kagan, America, p.37-38.)
3. It is important to note that Kagan does not provide evidence – or, at the very least, cite a source – and reasoning as to why autocratic regimes would act against their own self-interest and have a penchant for undermining international liberal economic orders. (This criticism also applies to his argument that countries would not police the seas.)
4. As pointed out by Robert Keohane, Kagan’s favourite way to set up these strawmen is by asserting that a theorist thinks a trend is “inevitable,” “irreversible” or that they believe in “multipolar harmony” – a concept that completely goes against the basic ideas of the realists and liberals that he cites. (For more info see Robert Keohane, ‘Hegemony and After’, Foreign Affairs Volume 91, Number 4 (2012), p. 114-118.)
5. An example of Kagan taking too much of a sanguine view then what all of the evidence allows, is when he makes the capacious claim that America’s “share of the world’s GDP has held remarkably steady … over the past four decades. In 1969 the United States produced roughly a quarter of the world’s economic output. Today it still produces roughly a quarter.” Kagan cites figures from USDA Economic Research Service. However, lots of different data sets disagree. For example, a data set prepared by the IMF shows that America is in decline: from 22.6% in 1989, the U.S. share of global GDP (based on PPP) had fallen to 16.5 in 2010 – a figure Kagan had access to – and has been declining ever since, with current projections stating that by 2020 the U.S. share of global GDP would have decreased to 14.9%. (See respectively: Kagan, America, p.105; International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database [Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) share of world total] (October 2015), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/w... (Date accessed: 22/10/2016).)
6. For quote see: Michiko Kakutani, ‘Historian Who Influences Both Obama and Romney,’ The New York Times. February 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/boo... (Date accessed: 21/10/2016)
July 5, 2017
Been meaning to read this for a few years and finally got around to it. It's a quick read, just 140 pages, but I'd highly recommend it--good food for thought, even if you don't agree with all of Kagan's conclusions. In a time when Americans of all political persuasions seem to be advocating a smaller, more disengaged, inward-looking role for America, Kagan delivers a clear, concise, and persuasive argument to the contrary. He challenges the widely-held belief that the world would continue to go on looking and functioning much as it does today if America--always the "reluctant superpower"--were to withdraw from its leadership role and leave others to take the lead in international affairs. Kagan persuasively argues that such a belief is a myth; that that the world we have known since 1945-- by historical standards the longest sustained period of peace (no wars between great powers), expansion of prosperity, and advance of liberal values that the world has ever seen--is not the product of some natural or inevitable evolution of human society, but was created, and is sustained, primarily by American power. Kagan argues that this world order is a lot more fragile than most people assume--and would almost certainly collapse or be replaced by something much darker if American power no longer maintained it.
Kagan opens the book with a de Tocqueville-esque depiction of Americans' self-image when it comes to foreign policy, noting that Americans have always been ambivalent about their role as a global leader. Americans are a reluctant, grudging superpower--they have never "considered themselves more than temporarily involved in the management of others' affairs...they will station forces overseas for decades, so long as no one tells them in advance that that is what they are going to do." "Americans would be scarier if they actually had a plan," Kagan remarks wryly.
Kagan argues that this peculiar character--an anomaly among great powers in human history--is why "for all its flaws, excesses, and failures," American power has been accepted and tolerated by much of the world for so long..."no other nation in centuries has enjoyed such broad acceptance of its use of power."
But what if America were no longer to preserve the liberal, democratic, free-market order that now dominates much of the globe? Wouldn't other countries just pick up the slack, since they have a stake in it continuing? Not likely, argues Kagan--either because some don't particularly like certain aspects of the current order (democracy, human rights, etc), or lack the capacity to do so. Open trade routes on the high seas, for example--essential for global trade and prosperity--are safeguarded by the US Navy, and that's something that only the United States has both the will and the ability to provide. A multipolar world would be a more unstable, more authoritarian, and more dangerous one.
Finally, Kagan argues that it is in America's self-interest to remain engaged in our leadership role. While expensive, these commitments must be weighed against the costs of what could happen if we allow the international order to unravel--trade routes becoming less secure, major wars between great powers, America's allies attacked, etc--which could be far greater than the economic costs we face of maintaining our position today.
Kagan notes that while America's dominance cannot continue indefinitely, "decline is a choice." All "empires and great powers rise and fall, and the only question is when. But the when does matter." Whether the American world order is worth preserving for the next generation is up to us.
Kagan opens the book with a de Tocqueville-esque depiction of Americans' self-image when it comes to foreign policy, noting that Americans have always been ambivalent about their role as a global leader. Americans are a reluctant, grudging superpower--they have never "considered themselves more than temporarily involved in the management of others' affairs...they will station forces overseas for decades, so long as no one tells them in advance that that is what they are going to do." "Americans would be scarier if they actually had a plan," Kagan remarks wryly.
Kagan argues that this peculiar character--an anomaly among great powers in human history--is why "for all its flaws, excesses, and failures," American power has been accepted and tolerated by much of the world for so long..."no other nation in centuries has enjoyed such broad acceptance of its use of power."
But what if America were no longer to preserve the liberal, democratic, free-market order that now dominates much of the globe? Wouldn't other countries just pick up the slack, since they have a stake in it continuing? Not likely, argues Kagan--either because some don't particularly like certain aspects of the current order (democracy, human rights, etc), or lack the capacity to do so. Open trade routes on the high seas, for example--essential for global trade and prosperity--are safeguarded by the US Navy, and that's something that only the United States has both the will and the ability to provide. A multipolar world would be a more unstable, more authoritarian, and more dangerous one.
Finally, Kagan argues that it is in America's self-interest to remain engaged in our leadership role. While expensive, these commitments must be weighed against the costs of what could happen if we allow the international order to unravel--trade routes becoming less secure, major wars between great powers, America's allies attacked, etc--which could be far greater than the economic costs we face of maintaining our position today.
Kagan notes that while America's dominance cannot continue indefinitely, "decline is a choice." All "empires and great powers rise and fall, and the only question is when. But the when does matter." Whether the American world order is worth preserving for the next generation is up to us.
March 13, 2018
First of all, I am on a roll with my professional reading so far this year. I have another completed book to review and I'm halfway through another already. While it may sound like conceit, I am really impressed with myself so far. I made it a point this year to do a better job of, not just reading, but maximizing my time and so far, so good.
Anyways, The World America Made made was a short look at the policies and decision throughout the history of America, with emphasis on the four most recent presidents, Bush, Clinton, Bush, and Obama. The World America Made also looks at more historical evidence but generally start at the end of World War II when America became a superpower. The book also dives into what America's role should be in the future and what it must be if we want to maintain our role as a world leader. The author argues that America should be a leader and I found his take to be reasonable, well-thought out, and very rational. Kagan does not believe that America is headed for a massive decline as though we are the next great empire to fall; the Roman analogy is of course used. He describes a world in which America steps back from it's long-held role and focuses only on America. Kagan believes that America must be a world leader, support its allies, and not fall back into policies isolationism.
There were also things I did not like in The World America Made. The conclusions were a little too subjective and relied too heavily upon an emotional reaction. I looked Kagan and his book up after reading and found that was a common criticism of The World America Made. A lot of the criticism about the book seemed based more upon the author than his writing. Naturally, I did some reading to find out why. Kagan has been an advisor to Sen. John McCain and served on a foreign policy panel for Secretaries of State Hillary Clinton and John Kerry. In fact, this book is said to have influenced President Obama's 2012 State of the Union Address. The fact the both parties values his opinions spoke highly of him.
The first sentence about Kagan on his wikipedia page states that he is a neoconservative. Now, in all fairness, I only loosely understood the title as I started his bio but I remember that back in college I was debating(or arguing I don't remember) with someone who got mad and called me a "neocon." I wasn't sure what it was but there was definitely a pejorative bite to it so I've always assumed it was a bad thing to be. So, I now know that a neoconservative is, basically, a left-leaning person who supports a more interventionist foreign policy. The movement grew from Democrats on the 60s and 70s who did not support their party's foreign policy stance. Many of the policy makers during the President George W. Bush administration could be considered neocons. Some refer to neocons a Reagan Liberals. Neocons could also be called "liberal hawks" which more recently represented Democrats who supported the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Knowing this now, I think that probably did describe me in college. As for the negative connotation of the term, there is a whole section on the pejorative usage of the term neocon on the wikipedia article. I recommend checking it out, it's a good article and it's never good to wait 15 years to find out if someone called you a mean name. The book is worth a read too. I think it represents a good starting point for understanding the purpose of foreign policy.
Anyways, The World America Made made was a short look at the policies and decision throughout the history of America, with emphasis on the four most recent presidents, Bush, Clinton, Bush, and Obama. The World America Made also looks at more historical evidence but generally start at the end of World War II when America became a superpower. The book also dives into what America's role should be in the future and what it must be if we want to maintain our role as a world leader. The author argues that America should be a leader and I found his take to be reasonable, well-thought out, and very rational. Kagan does not believe that America is headed for a massive decline as though we are the next great empire to fall; the Roman analogy is of course used. He describes a world in which America steps back from it's long-held role and focuses only on America. Kagan believes that America must be a world leader, support its allies, and not fall back into policies isolationism.
There were also things I did not like in The World America Made. The conclusions were a little too subjective and relied too heavily upon an emotional reaction. I looked Kagan and his book up after reading and found that was a common criticism of The World America Made. A lot of the criticism about the book seemed based more upon the author than his writing. Naturally, I did some reading to find out why. Kagan has been an advisor to Sen. John McCain and served on a foreign policy panel for Secretaries of State Hillary Clinton and John Kerry. In fact, this book is said to have influenced President Obama's 2012 State of the Union Address. The fact the both parties values his opinions spoke highly of him.
The first sentence about Kagan on his wikipedia page states that he is a neoconservative. Now, in all fairness, I only loosely understood the title as I started his bio but I remember that back in college I was debating(or arguing I don't remember) with someone who got mad and called me a "neocon." I wasn't sure what it was but there was definitely a pejorative bite to it so I've always assumed it was a bad thing to be. So, I now know that a neoconservative is, basically, a left-leaning person who supports a more interventionist foreign policy. The movement grew from Democrats on the 60s and 70s who did not support their party's foreign policy stance. Many of the policy makers during the President George W. Bush administration could be considered neocons. Some refer to neocons a Reagan Liberals. Neocons could also be called "liberal hawks" which more recently represented Democrats who supported the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Knowing this now, I think that probably did describe me in college. As for the negative connotation of the term, there is a whole section on the pejorative usage of the term neocon on the wikipedia article. I recommend checking it out, it's a good article and it's never good to wait 15 years to find out if someone called you a mean name. The book is worth a read too. I think it represents a good starting point for understanding the purpose of foreign policy.
March 16, 2018
I thought this book was well written and put together. I honestly couldn’t tell what political party Robert Kagan identifies as, which is a pretty amazing feat considering the topic of this piece. There were some details I found myself skimming over and others I swear I just read a few pages before. Reading this book today, in 2018, it does feel like Robert Kagan is perhaps a bit blinded by his patriotism. However, this book was written in 2012, so it’s easy to understand why he was optimistic about the United States not yet being in a state of decline. I’d be interested to hear his thoughts considering how things have gone with most recent election. Though, he’d probably just point out, as he does in his book, that America hasn’t been a steady uni-power during its reign. There have been times that is have been more influential and times of it being less. “It may be more than good fortune that has allowed the United States in the past to come through crises and emerge stronger and healthier than other nations while its various competitors have faltered. And it may be more than just wishful thinking to believe that it may do so again.”
December 26, 2022
A very interesting concise book mainly about the theme of American decline.
For Kagan every superpower in history shaped the world order in which it evolved. The US reluctantly did the same after WWII. Yet it did it in a particular way that reflected the supposedly some unique features of the American people.
The result was a world order that favors democracy and pressure autocracy, champions free market and keep free trade infrastructure open and restrains great powers from getting to each other’s throats.
This world order, kagan claims, is, despite its imperfections, unparalleled in human history. It’s the work of the US (directly or indirectly; consciously or unconsciously) and the result of any allege human social evolution. Therefore this order will collapse is the US is not around, not able or not willing to uphold it. The order will not uphold itself nor an autocratic China will uphold it.
Kegan then discuss what he call the myth of American decline and gave his arguments to debunk the idea. For him the decline is possible but not unavoidable, to the contrary America have what it takes to keep powerful and maintain the world it made.
For Kagan every superpower in history shaped the world order in which it evolved. The US reluctantly did the same after WWII. Yet it did it in a particular way that reflected the supposedly some unique features of the American people.
The result was a world order that favors democracy and pressure autocracy, champions free market and keep free trade infrastructure open and restrains great powers from getting to each other’s throats.
This world order, kagan claims, is, despite its imperfections, unparalleled in human history. It’s the work of the US (directly or indirectly; consciously or unconsciously) and the result of any allege human social evolution. Therefore this order will collapse is the US is not around, not able or not willing to uphold it. The order will not uphold itself nor an autocratic China will uphold it.
Kegan then discuss what he call the myth of American decline and gave his arguments to debunk the idea. For him the decline is possible but not unavoidable, to the contrary America have what it takes to keep powerful and maintain the world it made.
August 4, 2023
The World America Made by Robert Kagan is an engagingly written policy piece. A very long essay or a very short book, The World America Made simultaneously engages with the pessimists over the decline of US hegemony, while making an enduring argument for its continued presence on the world stage. His book, now over a decade old, is showing wear and tear. He appears prescient with regards to increased aggression from Russia, but I can also imagine his advocacy of the US, even with his own clearsighted acknowledgement of its prior failings, will grate progressive isolationists and strict multilateralists. I enjoyed the book though, and I wish there were more who did stuff like this.
November 4, 2025
This is a quick read and has a decent overview of American foreign policy as it aspired to be, but it has a lot of blind spots and is extremely West-centric in a lot of its statements. It does acknowledge that things haven't always met the aspirations, and it brings up a lot of good points, but it is hard to get past some of the ways things get glossed over. It was published shortly after the Arab Spring and did a good job of predicting that the governments that followed might not be democratic or liberal, but it seems the author is unaware of the stated Russian foreign policy and assumes that the US state department's beliefs about that were rational. It's ok.
January 25, 2018
US as a force of good in be world.
Succinct summary of the role the US had played in shaping the wold and the dangers of taking the liberal world order for granted. The author’s prose is clear and to the point, though at times I wish he could discuss examples in more details. As such, I would have happily read a book three times the length. Altogether, I heartily recommend this book is anyone trying to understand the challenges facing the US today and the effects of how those challenges are met.
Succinct summary of the role the US had played in shaping the wold and the dangers of taking the liberal world order for granted. The author’s prose is clear and to the point, though at times I wish he could discuss examples in more details. As such, I would have happily read a book three times the length. Altogether, I heartily recommend this book is anyone trying to understand the challenges facing the US today and the effects of how those challenges are met.
April 29, 2019
A great, concise summary of America's role in the world, along with a prescription for how America can retain this place. While I personally don't agree with all of Kagan's assertions, he stakes out a clear position that frames the issue in a helpful way and provides solid historical and contemporary evidence to support his thesis. This is a recommended read, especially in light of the current National Security Strategy.
April 4, 2018
Kagan's book had a pretty short shelf-life. 2016 more or less changed everything he discusses, and this wouldn't have been nearly so obvious if he hadn't called out numerous other authors for the same problem in his short book.
That said, Kagan is a mind worth reckoning with, and the book is an interesting thought experiment.
That said, Kagan is a mind worth reckoning with, and the book is an interesting thought experiment.
December 2, 2016
The author is very informed and makes a good argument. However, this book is all over the place and at times I forgot what he was originally arguing until he finally comes back around to the initial point.
December 15, 2017
What worked: This was a somewhat rosy treatment of America's role in the world, but more balanced than I expected.
What didn't: It was too superficial for the length. I wanted either less or more, as it was this sat in an awkward space where it seemed repetitive and/or insufficiently explored
What didn't: It was too superficial for the length. I wanted either less or more, as it was this sat in an awkward space where it seemed repetitive and/or insufficiently explored
September 19, 2020
Could have been much better done. Thought it would be a persuasive, history-rich argument for the necessity of American power to underpin the international order, but more surface-level, especially considering Kagan’s previous books. His TNR/Brookings essays will do.
June 17, 2021
Solid, short, summary of the geopolitical situation in 2012. I think it reflects a lot of what became conventional wisdom in the 2nd Obama administration. Feels dated after the Trump years, but still worth a read.
May 7, 2024
If you ever wondered why this country spends so much on the military… if you ever wondered why you have the ability to travel abroad without fear of harm… if you think USA is crap. This book will help you understand they how and why this country operates the way it does.
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