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The Sovereignty Solution: A Common Sense Approach to Global Security
The Sovereignty Solution is not an Establishment national security strategy. Instead, it describes what the U.S. could actually do to restore order to the world without having to engage in either global policing or nation-building. Right now there is no coherent plan that addresses questions If terrorists were to strike Chicago tomorrow, what would we do? When Chicago is burning, whom would we target? How would we respond? There is nothing in place and no strategy on the horizon to either reassure the American public or warn the attack us, and this is what you can expect. We've also never had a plan that respect our sovereignty and we'll respect yours. There are two tracks to the strategy presented in this strengthening state responsibility abroad, and strengthening the social fabric here at home. Because no one considers the state of our social fabric in light of our foreign policy, or our foreign policy in light of what we might all agree America should stand for, this book is unique. Our goal? To provoke a serious national security debate that addresses and then redresses the gaps and disconnects between what the U.S. says, what the U.S. does, how the U.S. wants to be perceived, and how the U.S. actually is perceived. We offer a radically commonsensical way to recalibrate global security by getting countries to self-police.
- GenresPolitics
256 pages, Hardcover
First published December 15, 2011
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
July 7, 2014
The authors' arguments were interesting, and compelling in places. It's hard to disagree that the United States is excessively entangled, and in a haphazard manner, in all manner of conflicts that neither serve our strategic interests nor enhance our safety and security. But their proposed solution leaves holes you could drive a truck through.
Essentially, they argue that the United States should boil down its foreign policy to one in which we a) respect the sovereignty of other states, whether or not we agree with their politics, b) demand that our own be respected, and c) back up our demands with the credible threat of overwhelming conventional military force, itself backed up with very specific Congressional declarations of war or pre-emptive authorizations of force. The specifics are spelled out in various chapters, and are thought-provoking, to say the least (the chapter on clarifying culpability for civilian deaths in wartime is well-stated and ought to be required reading for every journalist in America).
What leaves me dry about this book is its similarity to ideas already tried and in many cases found wanting. While the authors make a convincing case that their ideas are not simply isolationism re-packaged, I in fact think that what they have re-packaged and sold to us is neutrality, Switzerland style. Essentially, we would completely re-think all of our alliances, and only engage in them when they served our immediate strategic security interests. Furthermore, we would only act militarily anywhere in the world in order to right a situation in which our sovereignty (loosely defined by the authors as our territorial integrity and the safety of our citizens within our borders) was violated. We would not act to play countries off each other, nor enforce weapons or technology-related embargoes or sanctions.
The problem with this is that it would allow potential adversaries to operate without fear of retribution from us until such time as they had delivered an unacceptably costly blow to us. Would we respect Iran's sovereignty until they delivered a nuclear warhead or dirty bomb to an American city? The authors would argue that the credible threat of force would deter such action by state actors, and would compel them to clamp down on non-state actors, but there is simply no telling what the Iranian mullahs or the Korean Kim dynasty's endgame might be in the face of imminent regime collapse. At that point the credible threat of force would mean less than nothing.
I also couldn't help but think of how World War II might have played out had the erstwhile American neutrality taken this shape at its outbreak in 1939. So long as American territory and citizens were unharmed, there would have been no oil embargo on the Japanese. They would have been able to position their air and naval forces such that any eventual conflict between Japan and the United States would have been unwinnable from our position. Furthermore, without the Anglo-American alliance and Lend-Lease, the UK would almost surely have fallen before America became involved in the conflict, depriving the Allies of the only staging area of any strategic value.
What rational person could argue that America's adventurism since Vietnam has, on the whole, been fruitful? From Iraq to Libya, from our tepid response to Russian aggression in Georgia and Ukraine to our incomprehensible waffling in Syria, America's mostly politically-motivated interventions, or lack thereof, make it clear to both our allies and our adversaries that our foreign policy lacks both coherence and willpower.
For this reason, 80% or more of what the authors argue is spot on. It's the last 20% or so that fails to go the distance, as I see it. The neutrality that works for Switzerland, Sweden, or whomever, works precisely because of the same geography that makes it necessary in the first place. These countries, surrounded by potential aggressor nations, chose neutrality because the risks to sovereignty and territorial integrity far outweighed the dubious gains to be had from alliances with their mercurial neighbors. But these same neighbors, in maintaining a balance of power, provided an umbrella of security. For the United States, no country exists to provide this umbrella. As George Friedman notes in The Next Decade, America is in the unenviable position of having to defend an empire it neither wanted nor can get rid of. As such, we have too big a target on our back to entirely retreat within our borders, only striking out like a snake when threatened.
Nevertheless, it's a worthwhile, if not easy, read that ought to stimulate some soul-searching and deep conversations at the highest echelons of American power. But I'm not holding my breath.
Essentially, they argue that the United States should boil down its foreign policy to one in which we a) respect the sovereignty of other states, whether or not we agree with their politics, b) demand that our own be respected, and c) back up our demands with the credible threat of overwhelming conventional military force, itself backed up with very specific Congressional declarations of war or pre-emptive authorizations of force. The specifics are spelled out in various chapters, and are thought-provoking, to say the least (the chapter on clarifying culpability for civilian deaths in wartime is well-stated and ought to be required reading for every journalist in America).
What leaves me dry about this book is its similarity to ideas already tried and in many cases found wanting. While the authors make a convincing case that their ideas are not simply isolationism re-packaged, I in fact think that what they have re-packaged and sold to us is neutrality, Switzerland style. Essentially, we would completely re-think all of our alliances, and only engage in them when they served our immediate strategic security interests. Furthermore, we would only act militarily anywhere in the world in order to right a situation in which our sovereignty (loosely defined by the authors as our territorial integrity and the safety of our citizens within our borders) was violated. We would not act to play countries off each other, nor enforce weapons or technology-related embargoes or sanctions.
The problem with this is that it would allow potential adversaries to operate without fear of retribution from us until such time as they had delivered an unacceptably costly blow to us. Would we respect Iran's sovereignty until they delivered a nuclear warhead or dirty bomb to an American city? The authors would argue that the credible threat of force would deter such action by state actors, and would compel them to clamp down on non-state actors, but there is simply no telling what the Iranian mullahs or the Korean Kim dynasty's endgame might be in the face of imminent regime collapse. At that point the credible threat of force would mean less than nothing.
I also couldn't help but think of how World War II might have played out had the erstwhile American neutrality taken this shape at its outbreak in 1939. So long as American territory and citizens were unharmed, there would have been no oil embargo on the Japanese. They would have been able to position their air and naval forces such that any eventual conflict between Japan and the United States would have been unwinnable from our position. Furthermore, without the Anglo-American alliance and Lend-Lease, the UK would almost surely have fallen before America became involved in the conflict, depriving the Allies of the only staging area of any strategic value.
What rational person could argue that America's adventurism since Vietnam has, on the whole, been fruitful? From Iraq to Libya, from our tepid response to Russian aggression in Georgia and Ukraine to our incomprehensible waffling in Syria, America's mostly politically-motivated interventions, or lack thereof, make it clear to both our allies and our adversaries that our foreign policy lacks both coherence and willpower.
For this reason, 80% or more of what the authors argue is spot on. It's the last 20% or so that fails to go the distance, as I see it. The neutrality that works for Switzerland, Sweden, or whomever, works precisely because of the same geography that makes it necessary in the first place. These countries, surrounded by potential aggressor nations, chose neutrality because the risks to sovereignty and territorial integrity far outweighed the dubious gains to be had from alliances with their mercurial neighbors. But these same neighbors, in maintaining a balance of power, provided an umbrella of security. For the United States, no country exists to provide this umbrella. As George Friedman notes in The Next Decade, America is in the unenviable position of having to defend an empire it neither wanted nor can get rid of. As such, we have too big a target on our back to entirely retreat within our borders, only striking out like a snake when threatened.
Nevertheless, it's a worthwhile, if not easy, read that ought to stimulate some soul-searching and deep conversations at the highest echelons of American power. But I'm not holding my breath.
April 30, 2023
prepare for an overhauled perspective on foreign policy. such common sense and simplicity; even if initial execution of this method would be messy, it marries both the liberal idealism of pacifists and the fierce protectionism of the “just nuke ‘em” crowd in a way that could very well have the majority of the country’s support and deliver the results everyone wants. such a worthwhile read.
July 2, 2021
Some concepts were far too simplistic, but I agreed with a lot of the concepts the authors proposed.
August 7, 2013
Essentially a pragmatically libertarian approach to foreign (and domestic) policy. Dry, but compelling and logically sound; because it's so rational it's unlikely to ever be implemented.
Some very interesting explorations of how America has essentially lost its identity and devolved into various ethnicities... I hadn't ever thought of this breakdown as a threat to national security, but it rings true and certainly explains a lot (the controversy over illegal immigration is their chief example).
Overall a good read, but might as well have been fiction for all its likelihood of ever becoming reality.
Some very interesting explorations of how America has essentially lost its identity and devolved into various ethnicities... I hadn't ever thought of this breakdown as a threat to national security, but it rings true and certainly explains a lot (the controversy over illegal immigration is their chief example).
Overall a good read, but might as well have been fiction for all its likelihood of ever becoming reality.
February 15, 2016
interesting take by the authors on international relations, but devoid of serious thinking. The authors use the ends ways means model for strategy, yet only consider military means as a solution for international relations, disregarding economic, diplomatic, and other forms of national power. Further, the authors' scholarship on organizations such as NATO seem to be lacking. Following the ideas of these authors is a recipe for continual warfare which could not possibly be supported by the national means available.
July 7, 2015
Excellent analysis of current military/political strategy successes and failures by the U.S. The author, a faculty member at the Naval Post-graduate School wrote the book with two active Special Forces Officers, so it reflects the views of individuals actively engaged in combat.
Very well-written, very thoughtful and thought-provoking.
Very well-written, very thoughtful and thought-provoking.
June 14, 2012
Good book. great unique perspective of a new American strategy.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews