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The Myth of the Great War: A New Military History of World War I
“Students of military history love to argue, and John Mosier gives them much to argue about. From armaments and tactics to strategy and politics, he challenges conventional wisdom and forces a rethinking of the war that inaugurated the modern era.” — H.W. Brands, author of The First American and The Last Romantic
“Ther is much in this book I really admire, not least its brilliant recasting of the traditional military narrative.” — Niall Ferguson, author of The Pity of War
“A compelling and novel reassessment of World War I military history.”— — Kirkus Reviews
“Packed with evidence, much of it ingeniously obtained and argued.” — Washington Post
“Ther is much in this book I really admire, not least its brilliant recasting of the traditional military narrative.” — Niall Ferguson, author of The Pity of War
“A compelling and novel reassessment of World War I military history.”— — Kirkus Reviews
“Packed with evidence, much of it ingeniously obtained and argued.” — Washington Post
402 pages, Kindle Edition
First published April 24, 2001
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 68 reviews
December 3, 2009
This book was recommended by a friend but I should have been wary when the author states in the intoduction that he doesn't have a lot of knowledge of World War One (he's a professor of English who specializes in European literature). That was an understatement. The goal Dr. Mosier sets for himself is to correct many of the "myths" he claims to have found in the history of World War One. Unfortunately most of what he is debunking aren't myths or were corrected years ago. That the Germans were very effective at operational and tactical combat and the Allied High Command had issues dealing with the nature of modern war are not remotely new ideas, not even close. His assertion that the American Expeditionary Force fought so well and competently that the Germans felt compelled to approach President Wilson about ending the war shows a shocking lack of knowledge or understanding of the diplomatic history of World War One. The AEF undoubtedly had a hand in ending the war but it was more about adding 2 million soldiers to the Allied side, numbers the Germans could never hope to match or defeat, than about the tactical competence of the AEF. Not all of the book is this bad. His expanation of the superiority of the German military and their tactics, espcially the advantage in artillery, is illuminating. As is his description of the campaigns of 1914 and 1915 after that though he steps off into rants and polemics that have little historical foundation. The entire book is written in an arrogant and condescending style that I found disappointing. It's as if Mosier is subconsciously aware of his ignorance of the subject matter and over-compensates for this by presenting his arguments in what, I would imagine he felt, is a supremely confident manner. Unfortunately it smacks of overconfidence. There are much better and more accurate histories of the Great War available. MYTH OF THE GREAT WAR is best avoided.
April 29, 2014
The figures in this book are simply wrong. I have read a few books on the Great War which cite a much larger range of statistics from numerous sources and his claims of fatalities just aren't right. He has used the most selective sources possible to give an extremely Americanized opinion on the war, and while they certainly contributed he seems to forget that Entente had been fighting Germany for four years before America joined, and that because of an economic blockade Germany was constantly getting weaker not the allies. He almost ignores major German offensives where they committed the same errors the allies did, such as Verdun and his figures he publishes of the 2:5 ratio are wrong. He makes stupid technological comparisons, criticizing British tanks for not having as powerful engines as WW2 tanks. The book is ridiculous and frankly, so is the author.
October 27, 2012
Mosier demonstrates how the French and English just barely survived their own errors of judgment, hanging on long enough against a quite superior German army until the Americans arrived to save the day and win the war.
After showing what was wrong with French and British equipment, strategy, and tactics as compared to those of the Germans, he does not (to my taste) explain in sufficient detail why the Americans were able to win battles so quickly and decisively where the French had failed. This may be a defect in my reading instead of in his writing.
I will not soon forget Mosier's themes. I want to go back now and re-read Keegan on WWI. I'm going to resist the temptation, I think, for a while--too many other books waiting on the shelf--but I'm impressed by the way his thesis has given me questions to ask about every other history of WWI.
After showing what was wrong with French and British equipment, strategy, and tactics as compared to those of the Germans, he does not (to my taste) explain in sufficient detail why the Americans were able to win battles so quickly and decisively where the French had failed. This may be a defect in my reading instead of in his writing.
I will not soon forget Mosier's themes. I want to go back now and re-read Keegan on WWI. I'm going to resist the temptation, I think, for a while--too many other books waiting on the shelf--but I'm impressed by the way his thesis has given me questions to ask about every other history of WWI.
January 14, 2015
Mosier argues that the German army fought a more effective war than did the Allied forces until the failure of the 1918 offensive. His sources are useful, his writing is good, and his argument is hard to counter.
March 13, 2009
Revisionist junk.
February 16, 2020
Like any good historical revisionism, Mosier's book has its flaws and its virtues. Mosier did as much as anyone to remind WWI writers - particularly popular historians - that America's contributions to the success of the Allies were actual and not merely potential and that but for her intervention in force Britain and France faced a strong possibility of defeat or at least an unfavorable negotiated settlement. He marshals his evidence for these points persuasively. However, the work teeters toward being obtuse and ignoring counterarguments that are themselves well-supported by evidence. It is not definitive and should not be appreciated as such, but for its contribution to changing the conversation it is justly appreciated.
January 25, 2020
Generally I see nothing against people stepping outside their own area of expertise; such forays can lead to new insights and fresh ideas but only if they are carried out with a certain amount of humility and respect for the knowledge of those who are specialists in the area. Unfortunately this is not Professor Mosier's way; his approach is arrogant and he holds military historians in contempt - the first lines of the Preface to the Paperback Edition reveal that he has an enormous chip on his shoulder (perhaps as a child he was frightened by a historian).
He also holds the British and French military leaders of the First World War in contempt. Maybe he is right to do so but this is hardly new. It is rather difficult to know what 'myth' Mosier thinks he is busting.
The book is well written (as you would hope from a Professor of English) but there is a certain amount of avoidable repetition and the narrative is marred by minor errors and omissions; for instance, the reader is informed that some event occurred 'on the 23rd' but then has to hunt around to work out which month is being referred to. Mosier is also sometimes lax over compass points, so Meaux, for instance, is described as north of Paris rather than east. The maps that accompany the text are inaccurate sketches that do not help, curious for an author who is, quite rightly, concerned with details of terrain, strategic points and lines of communication. There are some other curiosities. Mosier's comments on the aerial war are strange. I do not believe that aerial bombardment was more accurate in the First World War than in later periods and I have never read such a claim before. He also seems to assume that the Germans had aerial superiority over the Western Front throughout the War, which is incorrect; certainly they had it at times, such as during the Second Battle of Arras which coincided with 'Bloody April' 1917, but not at other times.
Mosier's maths are also suspect. On page 148 he says that the French General Staff's estimates of numbers of troops on both sides of the lines, 14 Allied men for every 11 Germans, were 'wildly inaccurate'. He then gives some precise figures showing that the French had about 2.1 million men on the Western Front and the Germans about 2.2 million in early 1915. He then makes the rather vague statement that the Belgians and British 'together hardly came to another half a million'. This can only mean, presumably, that there were (just) half a million Belgian and British troops. I am no mathematician myself but that means that there were 13 Allied men for every 11 Germans, so the French estimates were hardly 'wildly' inaccurate. In a sense this is an unimportant point because Mosier goes on to argue, rather more convincingly, that firepower mattered far more than manpower in the First World War, but it make me suspicious of his other claims. Another aspect of this is his statement that most casualties in the War were caused by artillery, whereas in earlier wars small arms had been more destructive. This is partly true but it doesn't take into account the calculation that between a quarter and a third of all military deaths in the First World War were due to disease. Nowhere in his extensive use of casualty figures does Mosier acknowledge this.
Mosier is full of praise for German strategy and tactics, pointing out that the successes of the German army in the Second World War owed much to the tactical developments of the First. This is certainly true but again it is not a new idea. I remember reading this in Len Deighton's book 'Blitzkrieg' years ago. Ultimately Mosier's thesis is that the Allies had lost the War by early 1918 and that only the intervention of large numbers of American troops turned the tide and defeated the Germans. Whether this rather simplistic analysis is correct I am not sure but I don't think any serious historians have ever much doubted the considerable impact of fresh American forces in the final stage of the War. It is curious again that Mosier bases his analysis of Allied defeat largely on casualty figures, despite his well-made argument that it was firepower, not men, that mattered.
At the end of the book Mosier writes with misplaced pride of the hubristic American War memorials that disfigure the French countryside and contrasts them with what he sees as the neglected French cemeteries. He is of course full of praise for the well maintained German cemeteries but interestingly he does not mention the Commonwealth War Graves Commission; their cemeteries are every bit as well designed and maintained as the German ones but if he is unable to criticise a British institution he ignores it.
He also holds the British and French military leaders of the First World War in contempt. Maybe he is right to do so but this is hardly new. It is rather difficult to know what 'myth' Mosier thinks he is busting.
The book is well written (as you would hope from a Professor of English) but there is a certain amount of avoidable repetition and the narrative is marred by minor errors and omissions; for instance, the reader is informed that some event occurred 'on the 23rd' but then has to hunt around to work out which month is being referred to. Mosier is also sometimes lax over compass points, so Meaux, for instance, is described as north of Paris rather than east. The maps that accompany the text are inaccurate sketches that do not help, curious for an author who is, quite rightly, concerned with details of terrain, strategic points and lines of communication. There are some other curiosities. Mosier's comments on the aerial war are strange. I do not believe that aerial bombardment was more accurate in the First World War than in later periods and I have never read such a claim before. He also seems to assume that the Germans had aerial superiority over the Western Front throughout the War, which is incorrect; certainly they had it at times, such as during the Second Battle of Arras which coincided with 'Bloody April' 1917, but not at other times.
Mosier's maths are also suspect. On page 148 he says that the French General Staff's estimates of numbers of troops on both sides of the lines, 14 Allied men for every 11 Germans, were 'wildly inaccurate'. He then gives some precise figures showing that the French had about 2.1 million men on the Western Front and the Germans about 2.2 million in early 1915. He then makes the rather vague statement that the Belgians and British 'together hardly came to another half a million'. This can only mean, presumably, that there were (just) half a million Belgian and British troops. I am no mathematician myself but that means that there were 13 Allied men for every 11 Germans, so the French estimates were hardly 'wildly' inaccurate. In a sense this is an unimportant point because Mosier goes on to argue, rather more convincingly, that firepower mattered far more than manpower in the First World War, but it make me suspicious of his other claims. Another aspect of this is his statement that most casualties in the War were caused by artillery, whereas in earlier wars small arms had been more destructive. This is partly true but it doesn't take into account the calculation that between a quarter and a third of all military deaths in the First World War were due to disease. Nowhere in his extensive use of casualty figures does Mosier acknowledge this.
Mosier is full of praise for German strategy and tactics, pointing out that the successes of the German army in the Second World War owed much to the tactical developments of the First. This is certainly true but again it is not a new idea. I remember reading this in Len Deighton's book 'Blitzkrieg' years ago. Ultimately Mosier's thesis is that the Allies had lost the War by early 1918 and that only the intervention of large numbers of American troops turned the tide and defeated the Germans. Whether this rather simplistic analysis is correct I am not sure but I don't think any serious historians have ever much doubted the considerable impact of fresh American forces in the final stage of the War. It is curious again that Mosier bases his analysis of Allied defeat largely on casualty figures, despite his well-made argument that it was firepower, not men, that mattered.
At the end of the book Mosier writes with misplaced pride of the hubristic American War memorials that disfigure the French countryside and contrasts them with what he sees as the neglected French cemeteries. He is of course full of praise for the well maintained German cemeteries but interestingly he does not mention the Commonwealth War Graves Commission; their cemeteries are every bit as well designed and maintained as the German ones but if he is unable to criticise a British institution he ignores it.
August 27, 2020
This book was frustrating.
It isn’t a book one can approach without first being extremely well read on the war (I’m not). My impression is that Mosier intended it for those academics whose expertise on the conflict eliminates any need for specific exposition in certain areas. This left me horribly puzzled as I slogged ever so painfully through the work.
The author throws out facts and leaves them hanging in the air. It’s as if he expects the reader to simply know what he’s talking about.
On page 26 we are told that an Emil Durant was summarily retired from the army, “...as he had the misfortune of having married General Boulanger’s daughter.” We aren’t told why that was a liability to Durant’s career. Was it a scandal? I was left to guess. Frustratingly the footnote leads you to a source and nothing more.
We are introduced to Joseph Gallieni fairly early in the work, and then are told on page 262 “But now that Gallieni was dead....”.
He died? How? Where? Why? We aren’t told. The announcement of his suggested the author mentioned of Gallieni’s death somewhere in the work. Nope. I wasted five minutes of my life verifying that.
The geographical references, which are extensive, aren’t well supported by the few maps provided, if at all. He mentions towns that aren’t on any map he provides.
His breakdown on the weapons was illuminating. The overall big picture of the geopolitical situation impacting the war made sense...though we aren’t told how the war started. You’re apparently supposed to know that. While I did, others may not. The Archduke and his assassination in Sarajevo aren’t even mentioned in passing.
On page 305 he writes that some German officers had trepidations over Americans entering the war, as they had grown up reading tales of the Civil War and the Wild West. “...[T]he idea of having to fight a country where the average farmhouse probably had as many guns as the average German infantry platoon was far from reassuring.” It isn’t clear whether Mosier believes this nonsense or is providing it as one of the justifications for the title of his book. Did the German’s truly believe that? He doesn’t source it if so. Whose silly hyperbole was it? Mosier’s? The Germans? And finally, on page 342 he makes references to the staffing of the Belgian and French forts: “The biggest problem had been not with the hardware in 1914, but with the men inside (when there garrisons inside at all [sic]). But this could be remedied as well, by garrisoning the forts in the same way that submarines or major warships were staffed, and through proper training.” (Note the [sic] denotes the error is his, not mine. The “were” is missing.) Great! So what does he mean by that? What was it about naval ships and staffing and training that would have solved the problem? He. Doesn’t. Say.
There are a half dozen or more areas I found where this fell short. One that quickly bears mention is the German home front’s collapse of morale due to famine from the British blockade. German morale tanked. He doesn’t address that. Again, this is not a book for those without at least in-depth knowledge of the war. I lacked it, and didn’t enjoy reading it. It was largely a waste of my time.
It isn’t a book one can approach without first being extremely well read on the war (I’m not). My impression is that Mosier intended it for those academics whose expertise on the conflict eliminates any need for specific exposition in certain areas. This left me horribly puzzled as I slogged ever so painfully through the work.
The author throws out facts and leaves them hanging in the air. It’s as if he expects the reader to simply know what he’s talking about.
On page 26 we are told that an Emil Durant was summarily retired from the army, “...as he had the misfortune of having married General Boulanger’s daughter.” We aren’t told why that was a liability to Durant’s career. Was it a scandal? I was left to guess. Frustratingly the footnote leads you to a source and nothing more.
We are introduced to Joseph Gallieni fairly early in the work, and then are told on page 262 “But now that Gallieni was dead....”.
He died? How? Where? Why? We aren’t told. The announcement of his suggested the author mentioned of Gallieni’s death somewhere in the work. Nope. I wasted five minutes of my life verifying that.
The geographical references, which are extensive, aren’t well supported by the few maps provided, if at all. He mentions towns that aren’t on any map he provides.
His breakdown on the weapons was illuminating. The overall big picture of the geopolitical situation impacting the war made sense...though we aren’t told how the war started. You’re apparently supposed to know that. While I did, others may not. The Archduke and his assassination in Sarajevo aren’t even mentioned in passing.
On page 305 he writes that some German officers had trepidations over Americans entering the war, as they had grown up reading tales of the Civil War and the Wild West. “...[T]he idea of having to fight a country where the average farmhouse probably had as many guns as the average German infantry platoon was far from reassuring.” It isn’t clear whether Mosier believes this nonsense or is providing it as one of the justifications for the title of his book. Did the German’s truly believe that? He doesn’t source it if so. Whose silly hyperbole was it? Mosier’s? The Germans? And finally, on page 342 he makes references to the staffing of the Belgian and French forts: “The biggest problem had been not with the hardware in 1914, but with the men inside (when there garrisons inside at all [sic]). But this could be remedied as well, by garrisoning the forts in the same way that submarines or major warships were staffed, and through proper training.” (Note the [sic] denotes the error is his, not mine. The “were” is missing.) Great! So what does he mean by that? What was it about naval ships and staffing and training that would have solved the problem? He. Doesn’t. Say.
There are a half dozen or more areas I found where this fell short. One that quickly bears mention is the German home front’s collapse of morale due to famine from the British blockade. German morale tanked. He doesn’t address that. Again, this is not a book for those without at least in-depth knowledge of the war. I lacked it, and didn’t enjoy reading it. It was largely a waste of my time.
April 17, 2020
Without doubt the worst book I have ever read on WW1. Undoubtedly an anglophobe & germanophile the author simplifies the complexities of fighting war in an alliance. He also fails to recognise the exceptional efforts of the British & Commonwealth in creating an army in the space of 4 years that eventually defeated the German army that was a highly professional and competent organisation, and over emphasises the American contribution to the war. After finally managing to wade my way through it , it was straight to the goodwill centre. Not a book I would add to my Great War library.
January 4, 2019
I would certainly not recommend this to anyone who has not already read a dozen or so good books on WW I. Anyone who has done so would not find anything particularly revelatory in this book, and will find some things to disagree with.
October 26, 2025
I would describe this book as an exercise in re-revision. Lots of military historians will tell you that the generals of the great war were trying their best in circumstances where technology had made it very hard to conduct defensive operations. Mosier explains that the British and French generals were incompetent boobs who fought vastly worse than the Germans, whether on the offense or defense. This should not shock us too much as a view since it is what a great many of the allied civilian leaders at the time thought. Churchill and Lloyd George were as well informed as it is possible to be, and they both thought that the Allied commanders were incompetent butchers.
The centerpiece of the argument is a claim that the allied armies at the time systematically lied about casualties and about the success of their operations and that the true casualty figures on the western front shows something like a 2 to 1 ratio in favor of the Germans. If these claims are right, I think the author thesis clearly holds. Annoyingly a lot of historians have poked at the numbers and come to pretty divergent views. The accounting is just very hard. But as near as I can tell Mosier is on the mark and that the allies suffered worse and especially suffered worse in 1915 through 1917 when they were deliberately attempting to conduct attritional warfare.
Mosier points to three basic German innovations that the allies were horrifying and slow to copy: large quantities of high trajectory heavy artillery able to loft explosive shells over hills; an effective staff to plan operations; tactical defense in depth. In this account, the British and French never fully copied any of these, and it was left to the AEF to deploy an effective combat army and win the war.
The prose is lively, and I think the argument has some truth to it, but I can’t quite give it five stars. The book is hampered a bit by lacking maps, which means that a reader cannot quite follow the argument in places. Mosier there’s a lot of very detailed critiques about which offensive where might have broken through too important objectives and where was the high ground. It’s hard to check this without having an atlas propped in front of you. He has a habit of throwing off conclusory aside about who was effective and who wasn’t without doing any work to justify these claims to the reader.
Most seriously he doesn’t discuss any of the eastern theaters of the war. At the same time as the big American offensive on the western front, the British were tearing apart the Ottoman armies, and the allies had managed to knock Bulgaria out of the war. How did that happen? Did they have radically different techniques or equipment there? Mosier tells us it doesn’t matter and doesn’t explain himself.
The centerpiece of the argument is a claim that the allied armies at the time systematically lied about casualties and about the success of their operations and that the true casualty figures on the western front shows something like a 2 to 1 ratio in favor of the Germans. If these claims are right, I think the author thesis clearly holds. Annoyingly a lot of historians have poked at the numbers and come to pretty divergent views. The accounting is just very hard. But as near as I can tell Mosier is on the mark and that the allies suffered worse and especially suffered worse in 1915 through 1917 when they were deliberately attempting to conduct attritional warfare.
Mosier points to three basic German innovations that the allies were horrifying and slow to copy: large quantities of high trajectory heavy artillery able to loft explosive shells over hills; an effective staff to plan operations; tactical defense in depth. In this account, the British and French never fully copied any of these, and it was left to the AEF to deploy an effective combat army and win the war.
The prose is lively, and I think the argument has some truth to it, but I can’t quite give it five stars. The book is hampered a bit by lacking maps, which means that a reader cannot quite follow the argument in places. Mosier there’s a lot of very detailed critiques about which offensive where might have broken through too important objectives and where was the high ground. It’s hard to check this without having an atlas propped in front of you. He has a habit of throwing off conclusory aside about who was effective and who wasn’t without doing any work to justify these claims to the reader.
Most seriously he doesn’t discuss any of the eastern theaters of the war. At the same time as the big American offensive on the western front, the British were tearing apart the Ottoman armies, and the allies had managed to knock Bulgaria out of the war. How did that happen? Did they have radically different techniques or equipment there? Mosier tells us it doesn’t matter and doesn’t explain himself.
November 3, 2017
A dry but convincing argument that Germany was winning World War One rather handily until they were abruptly crushed under a tidal wave of American manpower.
December 6, 2022
Many years ago I read that a French or British soldier's greatest enemy was their own generals and after reading this I understand what they mean. This is a very harsh evaluation of the criminally incompetent Allied leadership of World War I that led to the mass slaughter of their own troops.
This further illustrates why T.E Lawrence literally walked away from being knighted during the ceremony since so many of the criminal incompetents had been knighted. This also makes still more apparent why Robert Graves literally disowned his country and moved to Majorca. The disabled and presumably impotent Lord Chatterly in the D.H. Lawrence novel "Lady Chatterly's Lover" represented the physically and psychologically maimed men of that generation.
There was nothing resembling a victory for either France and Britain; any claims of victory were from Allied Propaganda. The Germans had 1/2 to 1/3 the casualties of the allies. The conventional wisdom states that it was a stalemate on the Western Front. The British and French armies were exhausted and the Germans broke through the lines and were headed toward Paris. There was no stalemate. The American Expeditionary Force entered the war and drove back the Germans and saved both France and the British Expeditionary Force while France and Britain were worrying about and trying to prevent the Americans from getting any credit for victories. Pershing wisely did not permit the troops to integrate with the French and British forces. The Allied troops were just cannon fodder to the generals. What was interesting is that probably the best of the French generals was Petain. Douglas Haig deserves nothing but contempt along with most of the other allied generals.
WWI ignited a conflagration in the 20th century that really didn't end until the the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
This further illustrates why T.E Lawrence literally walked away from being knighted during the ceremony since so many of the criminal incompetents had been knighted. This also makes still more apparent why Robert Graves literally disowned his country and moved to Majorca. The disabled and presumably impotent Lord Chatterly in the D.H. Lawrence novel "Lady Chatterly's Lover" represented the physically and psychologically maimed men of that generation.
There was nothing resembling a victory for either France and Britain; any claims of victory were from Allied Propaganda. The Germans had 1/2 to 1/3 the casualties of the allies. The conventional wisdom states that it was a stalemate on the Western Front. The British and French armies were exhausted and the Germans broke through the lines and were headed toward Paris. There was no stalemate. The American Expeditionary Force entered the war and drove back the Germans and saved both France and the British Expeditionary Force while France and Britain were worrying about and trying to prevent the Americans from getting any credit for victories. Pershing wisely did not permit the troops to integrate with the French and British forces. The Allied troops were just cannon fodder to the generals. What was interesting is that probably the best of the French generals was Petain. Douglas Haig deserves nothing but contempt along with most of the other allied generals.
WWI ignited a conflagration in the 20th century that really didn't end until the the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
February 20, 2016
"Myth of the Great War"" has stirred much controversy, and deservedly so. Mosier's take on the First World War -- that ""Germany won the battles and the Americans saved the Allies"" -- certainly offers a different perspective from most historians. My own reaction to this book is, read it with caution. There are a number of interesting points that Mosier raises, and he does focus on some aspects of the war (particularly the fighting on the Western Front in 1915 and the American battles in 1918) that don't get much coverage in other histories. However, several of his arguments have serious issues, particularly his ideas on what constitutes a ""victory,"" such as the German offensives in the war's final year. There are also several errors, both factual and typographical, that are present in the text (and this book being the paperback edition), which lead to some confusion. He also leaves out a great deal of history on other fronts, as well as political considerations, although the book is advertised as a military history. My suggestion is that Mosier's work is an intriguing read for those already familiar with the war, as it will pose some thought-provoking issues; those coming new to the subject should start elsewhere. An engaging, if deeply flawed, Great War history.
January 3, 2013
Having just read a few well written history books on WWII, I decided to read up on WWI. This was not a good place to start.
First of all, I found the tone very arrogant, and I felt a very clear bias throughout the book, which meant that I simply didn't trust what I was being told. The first half to three quarters of the book had some very good points that seemed to be well backed up, although in 'debunking the myths' I wanted some kind of comparison; I didn't know what the 'myths' were to begin with, so I had no basis for comparison.
Second, in the last quarter of the book, there was no coherent, logical explanation as to WHY the Americans were supposedly so much more effective than the French and the British, and there was one measly, rambling chapter about why the Germans surrendered. It was as if the book was 3/4 about the first two years of the war, and then it speeds through the last two superficially. Considering that the book's subtitle has the text "how the Americans saved the Allies", I expected more analysis to that end. Really disappointing.
First of all, I found the tone very arrogant, and I felt a very clear bias throughout the book, which meant that I simply didn't trust what I was being told. The first half to three quarters of the book had some very good points that seemed to be well backed up, although in 'debunking the myths' I wanted some kind of comparison; I didn't know what the 'myths' were to begin with, so I had no basis for comparison.
Second, in the last quarter of the book, there was no coherent, logical explanation as to WHY the Americans were supposedly so much more effective than the French and the British, and there was one measly, rambling chapter about why the Germans surrendered. It was as if the book was 3/4 about the first two years of the war, and then it speeds through the last two superficially. Considering that the book's subtitle has the text "how the Americans saved the Allies", I expected more analysis to that end. Really disappointing.
June 30, 2013
The other reviewers here who gave it low ratings have pretty much summed up my issues with this book. Most of what's touched on in here was already debunked years ago or was never a mystery in the first place. While I don't rank it as revisionist in the way that some do--there's plenty of evidence that the English command and the media deliberately mislead and warped facts to fit their needs (read "To End All Wars: A Story of Loyalty and Rebellion, 1914-1918" by Adam Hochschild for a far superior glimpse into what was really going on at the Home Front). But for anyone with even a passing knowledge of the events of this war, there's not much here that you don't already know or can debunk on your own.
September 6, 2013
This book is terrible. The author isn't a historian and is unaware of how historians conduct their research. His sources are few and all very old, and he seems unfamiliar with modern historigraphy on the war. He cherry-picks what he wants to talk about and leaves out what doesn't fit "his" theory that the Germans were winning the war until the US entered. He doesn't cover the naval war or the shortage of food in Germany by the end of 1917. But the worst aspect of the book is the Mosier's argument that war can be reduced to numbers. The Germans had more guns, they lost a smaller percentage of soldiers, but that doesn't mean they were winning, anymore than it means the US won in Vietnam.
May 17, 2015
The best WWI book by far. Having recently read Barbra Tuckman's Guns of August which was an excellent narrative she did not have access at the time to the archives Mosier got. His story is closer to the truth. The Brits and French were criminal in their ineptness and stupidity. The Americans saved their bacon. But as all history goes, it belongs to the victors and the Brits and French were lying and distorting from day one. Just a brilliant book and got to give Mosier his due because his other book (which I read) The Blitzkrieg Myth is also one of the best WWII books ever.
January 20, 2015
"Myths" of the Great War is more appropriate. Mosier addresses many misconceptions that came about largely as a result of government propaganda. None of Mosier's findings are all that revelatory and most of his conclusions are debatable. The tendency to focus on tactical and technical minutiae makes for a tedious narrative and Mosier's often arrogant tone is unappealing. There are much better written and more interesting histories of the First World War.
March 29, 2021
The author just keep reapeating that the germans lost less soldiers than the anglo-French alliance. Omits to talk about the eastern front like the battle of Tannenberg and German containement of the Brusilov offensive. Also almost nothing on the impact of US intervention against the german except a description of Pershing offensive in 1918. Not a word on US impact in supply, manpower, finances.
March 8, 2011
Brits really hate this volume as it minimizes their role in the victories of 1918, but Mosier makes a good case for the AEF. A stellar revisionist tome which has a place in any good military history collection.
July 18, 2015
Revisionist stoking of long-dead or fabricated controversies by an English professor who should keep doing his own job.
March 9, 2025
Ponderous, maps are poor and place names don't match the narrative.
November 9, 2025
A useful book for understanding World War I, as long as you understand that the "myths" he's debunking are more quick-history myths or textbook history myths. So if the image in your head is all of World War I is men running from trenches into a No-Man's land and machine gun fire and it is pointless on both sides, he will correct that myth. For serious historians that isn't a myth.
His main points: French and British propoganda has bled into history. Germany was winning, Germany was better and only Americans entering won the war. More/most thorough studies of World War I already acknowledge that Germans were better at waring. He provides useful details as to why, and that is the better firepower both in artillery and among what infantry units had (machine guns, rifles, grenades) and better tactics in using them. That's useful, and its well-written.
I think if one thinks they know a lot about the war, this is a book to challenge some assumptions and look at other points of view. It does this job well. Hence my "4" As reviewers have found he's highly critical of Allied generals, that turns some off. I think though I'd say contemporary critics of those generals were many, and Americans arrived already critical of Allied generals as well, so I was with Mosier on most of that.
He's not convincing on all points though. The way it's written the Germans only got exhausted in October 2018, and then gave up the next month. It's not acknowledging the problems with supply and food supply because of the naval war, and I remain unsure about his casualty figures, which others on GoodReads have disputed. I remain unconvinced that the Germans were winning up until 1917, but just broke with the American entry. Of course in strategic terms, the American arrival was decisive. But not enough here about the Germans wearing down. Mosier contends that the Germans were at 1914 levels in 1917, and it just doesn't make sense.
His main points: French and British propoganda has bled into history. Germany was winning, Germany was better and only Americans entering won the war. More/most thorough studies of World War I already acknowledge that Germans were better at waring. He provides useful details as to why, and that is the better firepower both in artillery and among what infantry units had (machine guns, rifles, grenades) and better tactics in using them. That's useful, and its well-written.
I think if one thinks they know a lot about the war, this is a book to challenge some assumptions and look at other points of view. It does this job well. Hence my "4" As reviewers have found he's highly critical of Allied generals, that turns some off. I think though I'd say contemporary critics of those generals were many, and Americans arrived already critical of Allied generals as well, so I was with Mosier on most of that.
He's not convincing on all points though. The way it's written the Germans only got exhausted in October 2018, and then gave up the next month. It's not acknowledging the problems with supply and food supply because of the naval war, and I remain unsure about his casualty figures, which others on GoodReads have disputed. I remain unconvinced that the Germans were winning up until 1917, but just broke with the American entry. Of course in strategic terms, the American arrival was decisive. But not enough here about the Germans wearing down. Mosier contends that the Germans were at 1914 levels in 1917, and it just doesn't make sense.
July 5, 2025
This book's tone and layout are normally things I dislike in a history book. Yet, as I knew hardly anything about the subject matter they both helped me understand what i was reading. The author wrote as if he were speaking which helped me to learn and muscle through the difficult subject matter. Reading the high casualty rates was not easy. On paper they were numbers, but in my mind they were someone's husband, father, son, uncle, or cousin. From reading this book i basically gathered at WWI played out in the same way as the Vietnam War. The lack of secure leadership and the projection of incorrect/inaccurate data fueled disaster and death. This book also offered up a perspective that I hadn't heard before: Germany surrendered to the US not because their army was weak or on the verge of collapse, but because they wanted to keep their army strong. They saw a weakness in the French army that they hoped to exploit later on. The only issue I truly had with the book was the mention of Prussia. In the beginning, the country was brought up several times but toward the middle it wasn't. But then that could be something I overlooked or misread.
July 26, 2020
The highly negative reviews of this book mostly divide into "author knows nothing about WWI" and "author just restates what is known to everyone", so I'm guessing the truth is somewhere in the middle. It certainly gives an interesting perspective on that war, and I appreciated that and generally liked the book.
It should be noted that this book is not an overview of events of WWI - it is written specifically for those who know at least the general scope of the war and assumes the readers know what the author is talking about. It's not a downside per se, just a question of the right audience and expectations.
There are certain downsides to the book that could have been fixed by editors: In many cases author repeats itself over and over. Maps are not very helpful because many of the locations mentioned in the text are not shown on them. The ending is very abrupt and does not really explain how Germany that seems to be winning the war is suddenly capitulating.
It should be noted that this book is not an overview of events of WWI - it is written specifically for those who know at least the general scope of the war and assumes the readers know what the author is talking about. It's not a downside per se, just a question of the right audience and expectations.
There are certain downsides to the book that could have been fixed by editors: In many cases author repeats itself over and over. Maps are not very helpful because many of the locations mentioned in the text are not shown on them. The ending is very abrupt and does not really explain how Germany that seems to be winning the war is suddenly capitulating.
October 27, 2024
The epynomous myth, says Mosier, is that the Anglo-French generals were well-supplied and knew what they were doing. Instead, he argues with great detail that the German artillery widely outclassed them, and then argues with good storytelling skills that the German generals knew much better how to use it.
I do think he falls too much in the "lions led by donkeys" myth. He holds up many Anglo-French assaults as stupidly throwing away lives time and time again, which doesn't interact with what I've read elsewhere about their trying new things to break through the trench stalemate. However, I totally believe what he says about how they needed the fresh American army to break the stalemate in the end.
But regarding the German artillery, I believe he's proved his case. That's a crucial element of the war, and I wouldn't be surprised if that was what enabled the Germans to make as good a performance as they did.
I do think he falls too much in the "lions led by donkeys" myth. He holds up many Anglo-French assaults as stupidly throwing away lives time and time again, which doesn't interact with what I've read elsewhere about their trying new things to break through the trench stalemate. However, I totally believe what he says about how they needed the fresh American army to break the stalemate in the end.
But regarding the German artillery, I believe he's proved his case. That's a crucial element of the war, and I wouldn't be surprised if that was what enabled the Germans to make as good a performance as they did.
December 12, 2022
Perhaps the most thorough overview of battlefield tactics of WWI, this book sheds light on a subject that is often misunderstood. When it comes to WWI, we often think of massive waves of soldiers charging over a barren no-man's-land after a heavy artillery barrage. While this is sadly a true picture of Allied assaults (especially the BEF), this is simply not true for the German military. Drawing from numerous firsthand resources, John Mosier is able to show that the casualties during the most infamous campaigns of the first world war were disproportionately heavy on the side of the Allies. Had America not entered the War, Germany would have won due to the Allies leadership playing bureaucratic politics and trying to suppress the facts of what was actually happening on the Western Front.
November 7, 2025
Found this book on my e-reader after I had finished his book Hitler vs. Stalin that is about the Eastern Front during WW2. John Mosier is a contrarian historian, and in my opinion, does a fantastic job trying to demonstrate how propaganda and the 'victors write history' can cloud the truth behind some major events in our past.
Mosier analyzes many of the large battles of the Western Front as well as the broader campaigns in Italy, Russia and the Balkans. He delves into the political and interpersonal reasons why certain decisions were made by the leaders of the war and really reveals how the reality of the war and what was happening were nowhere near the same.
5/5 - while abrasive, I feel that I see another side of the real historical background of a conflict that has continued to impact our everyday lives today.
Mosier analyzes many of the large battles of the Western Front as well as the broader campaigns in Italy, Russia and the Balkans. He delves into the political and interpersonal reasons why certain decisions were made by the leaders of the war and really reveals how the reality of the war and what was happening were nowhere near the same.
5/5 - while abrasive, I feel that I see another side of the real historical background of a conflict that has continued to impact our everyday lives today.
August 26, 2024
If the history of the first world hasn’t ever felt right to you, If the official narrative of what happened in 1914-1917 hasn’t made much sense to you, then this is the perfect book for you.
Mosier does an excellent job raising questions challenging the British and French narrative of the First World War, and surprisingly without intending to does a good job of explaining why the Germans are so successful militarily three decades later prior to the entry of the the United States.
This is a controversial take on the First World War that actually makes sense, it passes the “sniff test.”
Mosier does an excellent job raising questions challenging the British and French narrative of the First World War, and surprisingly without intending to does a good job of explaining why the Germans are so successful militarily three decades later prior to the entry of the the United States.
This is a controversial take on the First World War that actually makes sense, it passes the “sniff test.”
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