The Long Road to Antietam: How the Civil War Became a Revolution

by Richard Slotkin

In the summer of 1862, after a year of protracted fighting, Abraham Lincoln decided on a radical change of strategy, one that abandoned hope for a compromise peace and committed the nation to all-out war. The centerpiece of that new strategy was the Emancipation Proclamation: an unprecedented use of federal power that would revolutionize Southern society. In The Long Road to Antietam, Richard Slotkin, a renowned cultural historian, re-examines the challenges that Lincoln encountered during that anguished summer 150 years ago. In an original and incisive study of character, Slotkin re-creates the showdown between Lincoln and General George McClellan, the Young Napoleon whose opposition to Lincoln included obsessive fantasies of dictatorship and a military coup. He brings to three-dimensional life their ruinous conflict, demonstrating how their political struggle provided Confederate General Robert E. Lee with his best opportunity to win the war, in the grand offensive that ended in September of 1862 at the bloody Battle of Antietam.

Genres: History, Civil War, Nonfiction, American Civil War, American History, War, United States

512 pages, Hardcover

First published July 9, 2012

About the author

Richard Slotkin is an American cultural critic, historian, and novelist. He is Olin Professor of English and American Studies Emeritus at Wesleyan University, where he was instrumental in establishing the American Studies and Film Studies programs. His work explores the mythology of the American frontier and its influence on national identity. His trilogy—Regeneration Through Violence, Fatal Environment, and Gunfighter Nation—is widely regarded as a seminal analysis of the frontier myth in American culture. Slotkin has also written historical novels, including Abe: A Novel of the Young Lincoln and The Crater: A Novel of the Civil War. His contributions to scholarship and literature have earned him numerous accolades, including the Albert J. Beveridge Award and multiple National Book Award nominations.

Reviews

[Matt · Rating 5 out of 5]

“The significance of Antietam lies not in the battle itself but in the campaign that produced it. That campaign was the result of a radical turn in the strategies of both Union and Confederacy – a series of political and military decisions made over a four-month period in the summer and fall of 1862 that transformed the policies, principles, and purposes that had hitherto governed the conduct of the war. Before Antietam it was still possible for Americans to imagine a compromise settlement of sectional differences. After Antietam, and the Emancipation Proclamation, the only way the war could end was by the outright victory of one side over the other. Either way, the result would be a revolutionary transformation of American politics and society…”
- Richard Slotkin, The Long Road to Antietam: How the Civil War Became a Revolution

The Battle of Antietam is probably the most consequential indecisive battle in the history of the United States.

Tactically speaking, the engagement between the Confederate forces of Robert E. Lee and the Union forces of George McClellan was a draw. When September 17, 1862 dawned, the opposing armies faced each other across the titular Maryland creek. By the time night fell, concluding the single bloodiest day in American arms, those positions had not really changed. A series of poorly coordinated, piecemeal attacks by McClellan had failed to dislodge Lee, despite an enormous superiority in manpower. As a result, neither side had grasped an obvious advantage.

Strategically speaking, the edge goes to McClellan. Despite McClellan’s unwillingness to keep fighting, Lee’s position was untenable, and the Confederates left the field, escaping back into Virginia, thereby ending Lee’s first invasion of the North.

Despite this, Antietam was viewed by many as a Union loss, and with good reason.

Not only did McClellan have more than enough men to crush the Confederate Army, but blind luck had given him a copy of Lee’s orders that described the Confederate’s marching orders. Based on this bit of providence, McClellan knew that Lee’s army was divided and out of mutually-supporting range. If he had moved quickly, he could have destroyed the Confederates in detail. Quickness, though, was never one of McClellan’s virtues, and though he reached Antietam in time to force an unequal contest on Lee, he tarried like a college freshman waiting till midnight to start a term paper. Thus, the ensuing struggle, though it left the Union Army in possession of the town of Sharpsburg, did not really feel like a triumph. Or, at least, not the complete conquest it should have been.

Still, as Richard Slotkin writes in The Long Road to Antietam, the importance of this battle goes far beyond thwarted invasions, territorial possession, or casualty figures. It comes instead from a card up the sleeve of President Abraham Lincoln, which he had been holding since July 1862.

That card was the Emancipation Proclamation.

The Long Road to Antietam wonderfully tells two parallel stories. The first is of the battle itself. To that end, Slotkin begins with a rather lengthy leadup to the encounter, devoting three separate sections and over two-hundred pages to Union strategy, Confederate strategy, and the war aims of both sides. Focusing on four major characters – Lincoln, McClellan, Lee, and Confederate President Jefferson Davis – Slotkin does a marvelous job of contextualizing Antietam, providing a well-written and coherent summary of the progress of the war up to September 1862. This includes an extremely lucid recap of McClellan’s Peninsular Campaign (which Slotkin observes could’ve been McClellan’s Inchon, except that McClellan was no Douglas MacArthur), as well as the Union disaster at Second Bull Run.

In telling this tale, Slotkin does an amazing job of viewing all decisions through the information contemporaneously available to the participants. Thus, instead of simply judging a decision as good or bad, he takes a hard look at why a decision was made in the first place. For example, Slotkin explains all the reasons for Lee’s Maryland invasion – which looks unnecessarily bold and convoluted – and deems it a worthy risk, taking pressure off of Richmond, allowing Virginia farmers to get back into their field, and potentially encouraging a border state to secede.

Slotkin’s battle narrative is also very good. He keeps his focus higher-up the chain of command, mainly channeling events through McClellan, so that there are fewer on-the-ground anecdotes than you get in a typical account of a Civil War clash. With that said, Slotkin does a good job of providing a sample of the ferocity of battle. One pungent detail especially captures his eye: the bloody feces that marked the battle-lines of the dysentery-ridden Confederates.

The second story Slotkin tells is that of the Emancipation Proclamation. Here, Slotkin’s lens closes a bit more, to rest on the political struggle between President Lincoln and General McClellan, who is portrayed as a cross between a potentially-traitorous Julius Caesar, and a dithering Hamlet.

As the subtitle makes clear, Slotkin believes that the Emancipation Proclamation turned the Civil War into a revolution, seismically upending the social order. Suddenly, the war that began because of slavery, transformed into a war to end slavery. Sharp and insightful, Slotkin handles this material with both expertise and readability. I’ve read a couple of Slotkin’s other works, and have found myself at a bit of a loss, as Slotkin has a propensity for theory and abstraction over recounting actual events. In The Long Road to Antietam, though, he clearly shows how he reaches his conclusions.

Having spent an extensive amount of time studying the Civil War, I don’t think Slotkin’s assertions are groundbreaking. That is, it’s no surprise that he lauds Lincoln’s masterstroke, which destabilized the South, created some 200,000 thousand new recruits, and staked out the moral high ground for all time. Even so, it’s nice to have that discussion included in an equally-absorbing look at how the Antietam campaign-and-battle unfolded.

The main surprise in The Long Road to Antietam is how sympathetic Slotkin is towards George McClellan. Even in an overtly political war – where generals were given their stars based on their affiliations and constituencies – McClellan stood out for his attempts to influence policy. For modern Americans, imbued with the idea that the President is the Commander-in-Chief, McClellan is a frightening figure, demanding the sacking of cabinet members, toying with the notion of dictatorship, and generally holding the country hostage to his perceived indispensability.

Slotkin, though, gives McClellan his due as an administrator and organizer. He also defends a lot of McClellan’s choices. Specifically, he gives McClellan the benefit of the doubt by assuming that McClellan truly believed the preposterous intelligence reports he received on the size of Lee’s army. It’s an interesting proposition, I suppose, but I’m not sure I’m buying it. McClellan’s intelligence operation was a huge part of his generalship, and it was a mess. It’s not just that he relied on the Pinkerton’s ridiculous reports, it’s that he apparently never saw a prewar census, which would have made the phantom armies he conjured a demographic impossibility.

(One striking thing that Slotkin mentions on several occasions: McClellan’s “reserve” at Antietam essentially outnumbered the entirety of Lee’s forces).

By the end of this book, I think Slotkin makes a pretty good argument for Antietam – not Gettysburg – being the most fascinating contest of the Civil War. On the field, it was a gruesome slugfest, a harbinger of World War I in which many were lost while little was gained. Off the field, it changed the course of the world.

If McClellan had been a better general – had he substantially destroyed Lee’s army – he would have been in the position to demand real policy changes. He might, in fact, have gained enough leverage to force a retraction of the Emancipation Proclamation. Even without a retraction, he could have mooted its impact by forcing the Confederates to the negotiating table, where protection of Southern “property rights” might have been a precondition for returning to the fold.

If McClellan had been a worse general, Lee’s invasion of Maryland might have succeeded, prompting European recognition of the Confederate States of America, the secession of the border states, and the rise of antiwar Democrats.

Instead of these extremes, we get McClellan the Mediocre, who did just enough to keep from losing and to keep from decisively winning. His utterly average performance might not have meant anything, except for the genius of Abraham Lincoln. In Antietam, Lincoln saw a pinhole of light. Through that pinhole he drove a train. It would take further fighting, further mistakes, further bloodshed, but the choices made after Antietam set the conditions necessary to turn the war into a crusade, and to turn that crusade into a final victory.

[Paul Haspel · Rating 4 out of 5]

The long road that led 125,000 Civil War soldiers to the rocky hills around Antietam Creek, Maryland, where they fought a battle that remains the bloodiest day in American history, began with key decisions made by four powerful men in two capitals. At the U.S. capital in Washington, President Abraham Lincoln mulled over the possibility that what had been, officially, a war strictly to restore the Union should be made a war to abolish slavery as well. Lincoln’s top general, the “Young Napoleon” George B. McClellan, was afflicted by a Napoleonic belief in his own greatness; he despised President Lincoln, believed that the war should leave slavery untouched, and felt that a general of his ability should be able to set civilian as well as military policy. Meanwhile, at the rebel capital at Richmond, Confederate president Jefferson Davis acceded to the belief of his top general, Robert E. Lee, that an invasion of the North by Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia could lead to a decisive military victory that would guarantee Confederate independence. Those decisions made at Washington and Richmond led directly to the carnage at Antietam, and to a fundamental change in the basis on which the American Civil War was fought.

In The Long Road to Antietam, Richard Slotkin, an emeritus professor at Wesleyan University, provides a well-written and thorough look at the political and military dimensions of the Civil War’s Maryland Campaign and Battle of Antietam. Where Slotkin’s interpretation differs from that of other students of Antietam is largely in his focus on McClellan’s political maneuverings in the weeks and months leading up to Antietam.

Anyone who has read about this period from the Civil War knows of McClellan’s predilection for grandiosity, his musings about what he would do if his army called upon him to take over the U.S. government and lead the Union war effort like a Caesar-esque dictator. In Slotkin’s reading, those musings are more serious than other historians have thought. Slotkin focuses on how “Even McClellan’s friends were concerned that he was breaching the wall between military and civil authority,” with a friend and fellow officer, General William “Baldy” Smith, warning McClellan that one of McClellan’s letters “looks like treason and will ruin you & all of us” (p. 100).

After about 130 pages of political preliminaries, Slotkin proceeds to a strategic and tactical review of the Confederate invasion of Maryland; the Union Army’s move northwest from Washington to block the rebel attack; the initial Union victory at the Battle of South Mountain on September 14, 1862, near Boonsboro, Maryland; and finally the much larger battle at Antietam three days later. Students of Antietam already know how the invasion of Maryland, combined with the need to reduce the Union garrison at Harpers Ferry, Virginia (now West Virginia), “confronted [Lee] with an extremely complex tactical problem. In trying to solve it he would expose his army to destruction” (p. 161). Lee’s decision to split his army into five several parts was characteristically bold, and reflected his belief that the usually cautious McClellan would move slowly enough to give Lee plenty of time to reunite the Army of Northern Virginia before giving battle; but a lost copy of Lee’s Special Orders No. 191 (forever after known as the “Lost Order”) found its way to McClellan, in “a piece of luck so outrageous and unearned that [McClellan] might be pardoned for thinking himself favored be providence” (p. 138).

Outnumbering his enemy almost two-to-one – and holding, as it were, a complimentary copy of the other team’s playbook – McClellan still dithered and hesitated enough to give Lee just enough time to reassemble the Army of Northern Virginia and line it up west of Antietam Creek near Sharpsburg, Maryland. In Slotkin’s telling, Antietam, from the Union perspective, is a story of brave soldiers fighting well in spite of often poor decisions by their commanders, as when Union General Edwin Sumner, commanding the Union II Corps, was overwhelmed by the battle action in which he saw the Union right wing engaged, and wrongly reported to headquarters that “I have no command…my command, [Nathaniel] Banks’ command and [Joseph] Hooker’s command are all cut up and demoralized” (p. 318). The Confederate soldiers, meanwhile, also fought well and were generally better led. Lee “embraced the chaos and fluidity of battle, confident in his own ability to read the play of forces, and in the ability of his corps and division commanders to execute his orders with initiative, energy, and good judgment”; but his erroneous belief “that his soldiers were markedly superior to those of the enemy in both combat skills and morale” (p. 319) caused him to take great risks that, as Antietam as elsewhere, would result in the loss of rebel soldiers whom the Confederacy ultimately could not replace.

Antietam was a tactical draw – a bloody watershed that resulted in 22,000 casualties (12,000 Union, 10,000 Confederate), including 2100 Yankees and 1600 rebels killed. In strategic terms, however, it may be the most important victory the Union ever won; in forcing Lee’s Confederate army back into Virginia, it enabled President Lincoln to issue the Emancipation Proclamation, with its declaration that enslaved people in areas that refused to end the rebellion would be “forever free.”

It is in his consideration of the Emancipation Proclamation and its impact that Slotkin’s emphasis on How the Civil War Became a Revolution (the book’s subtitle) becomes most clear. Slotkin argues persuasively that “by promising to eliminate slavery the Proclamation exposed the underlying problem of race in America – the contradiction between a political state based upon the presumption of civic equality and a culture deeply imbued with the values of white supremacy” (p. 408). McClellan’s vision of a restored Union with slavery intact was defunct – as was McClellan’s career, when he was relieved of command for failing to pursue the rebels after Antietam. By contrast, President Lincoln’s belief, expressed one year later in the Gettysburg Address, that the United States of America could have “a new birth of freedom” was vindicated.

As a Marylander who grew up in a Montgomery County neighborhood that was built adjacent to part of the Civil War defenses of Washington, D.C., I have always found Antietam fascinating. I have visited the Antietam National Battlefield many times, and I am glad when I find a book that has something new to say about the Maryland Campaign. Slotkin’s emphasis on the historically transformative quality of the Maryland Campaign, and on an intriguing political question -- just how serious was McClellan about deposing President Lincoln and taking over the United States Government? -- may be the most significant contribution made by The Long Road to Antietam.

[Bill · Rating 4 out of 5]

This kind of read to me like two books in one, and one of them was far better than the other. The beginning chapters and ending chapters provide insightful examinations of how the Civil War was waged politically and strategically in the lead-up to, and in the aftermath of, the pivotal Battle of Antietam. But in between is a somewhat less-impressive battle history of Antietam itself, which I suppose is a necessary part of the story to tell, but still somehow seemed like it could have been excised altogether and the book might have been better for it.

Slotkin portrays the Battle of Antietam as the war’s pivot point, where Lincoln shifted his approach from a “strategy of conciliation” to “an all-out war of subjugation.” As the war dragged on and seceded states showed no willingness to relent, Slotkin observes that “vindication of the rule of law, and the principles of justice, required that unjust rebellion be punished, not merely suppressed.”

And how better to do so, than to strike at the heart of the Southern economy and social structure, by targeting slavery itself? The nominal Union victory at Antietam allowed Lincoln to issue the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. But Slotkin rightfully points out that this change in Lincoln’s approach wasn't some sudden reversal, or a complete upending of the goal to restore the Union, replaced with a newfound determination to end slavery instead. The goal was always to restore the Union, with the end of slavery an eventual, hoped-for outcome. But the longer the fighting went on, Slotkin writes, “the costs of a continued war could not be justified, unless the root cause of the war was removed for all time,” as Lincoln determined that “victory would be meaningless if it left the institution of slavery intact.” 

Simultaneously, the Confederate strategy was changing as well, from a defensive posture to a more offensive approach. Invading the North might attract border states to the Confederacy, it might invite international recognition, and might help the electoral prospects of peace proponents in the North. 

But the bulk of the book, before and after Antietam, centers on Union Gen. George McClellan, and considers how he fit into, or did not fit into, this evolving Northern strategy while combating the evolving Southern strategy. As in most Civil War books, McClellan doesn’t come away looking very good here. But Slotkin avoids portraying him as a villain, or a braggart, or a coward. Instead, he considers the complexities and the political considerations that led McClellan to act and make decisions the way he did. 

McClellan is portrayed as always keeping a larger political goal in mind, as he hoped to wrest control of the conduct of the war from the politicians in Washington, and pursue his own desired outcome in the form of a negotiated settlement. Slotkin writes that McClellan saw his army, with him in charge, as “the only power in the land capable of saving the Republic from the twin menaces of secession and Radicalism.” McClellan comes across as obsessed with self-aggrandizement, always looking to protect his reputation, being cautious in battle because he couldn’t risk the stigma of defeat, and avoiding anything that could ultimately benefit his political enemies. His “incessant, incorrigible pursuit of power,” Slotkin writes, meant that “no military victory was worth winning if it redounded to the benefit of a Radical regime.”

Slotkin also examines what he considers the very real possibility of a military coup. He provides good context about contemporaneous revolutions in other countries that resulted in military dictatorships, so there was no reason to assume the same wouldn’t happen in the U.S., or that civilian leadership of the military was as accepted or taken for granted as it is today. While he suggests that many in McClellan’s orbit would have welcomed a coup, he does largely absolve McClellan of seriously considering it, concluding that he preferred military victory as “a clearer, cleaner, and more certain path to power than a coup.”

So all of this is very strong, as is Slotkin’s description of the military maneuvers in the months leading up to the Battle of Antietam. Once the battle begins, though, it seems somehow lifeless, and bloodless. Slotkin’s telling is very much from a generals’-eye view, considering the large-scale tactics and maneuvers. Opposing sides “make contact” or “meet resistance,” but the writing does nothing to convey the horrors of what was then the deadliest day in American history. His analysis of McClellan and Gen. Robert E. Lee’s performance is decent, as he observes that the cautious McClellan “mistrusted the chaos and fluidity of battle” while Lee “embraced” it. But the long, largely antiseptic recap of the battle does little to support the insightful chapters that precede and follow it. 

The book largely redeems itself at the end - the battle is quickly forgotten as Slotkin provides a thoughtful consideration of McClellan’s political and military failures and whether his strategy of reconciliation could have worked, as compared to the ultimate effectiveness of Lincoln’s approach. While Antietam was a turning point in the war - marking a notable Confederate setback in its failed efforts to bring the war to the North, the end of McClellan's troubled command, the impetus for the Emancipation Proclamation - Slotkin argues that nothing was really decisive except in retrospect. 

So I thought this book provided a solid analysis of both sides’ shifting strategies, and great insight into McClellan’s motivations, with Antietam as the key pivot point. But for a book named after a battle, its recounting of the battle itself proved to be its weakest and most discordant part, leaving this otherwise comprehensive book somewhat lacking in providing what could have been a definitive understanding of Antietam and its impact.

[David Eppenstein · Rating 4 out of 5]

"The Union won at Antietam because....it could better afford the costs of McClellan's ineptitude than the Confederates the costs of Lee's genius."

Those of us that enjoy reading history are frequently distracted by "what if" thoughts. What if this had happened or if this didn't happen? How would history have changed? The Battle of Antietam presents the reader with those thoughts. What if McClellan hadn't been handicapped by appallingly poor intelligence regarding the size of Lee's forces? What if McClellan had been more decisive and hadn't been conflicted by both his military and his political ambitions to the point of inaction? The Union forces were twice the size of Lee's. The Union forces were in better shape and were underestimated by Lee. McClellan was in the position to have destroyed Lee's army but didn't. He didn't because he was afraid of failure and what that would do to his military career. He was also afraid of succeeding because it would have conflicted with his political belief in the conciliatory theory of how the war should be fought and therein is the focus of this book and the significance of this battle.

As battles go this one is about as clear and as easy as one could hope to follow and understand. The author's maps and illustrations of troop movements were better than any other that I have encountered in my reading. In fact things are so clear to the reader you may have difficulty understanding why things were so mystifying to the generals on the field. But what is important is not the details of this battle but the opportunities it presented. Militarily the battle was insignificant as nothing of military value was achieved or lost except lives. The result is considered a stalemate even though, technically, it was a Union win because Lee abandoned the field. What most of this book is devoted to is the conflict between Lincoln and McClellan and the divergent political positions each represented. McClellan was a Democrat and a rising star in their ranks with serious political ambitions some of which bordered on treasonous and aren't we tired of that term right now? The Democrats favored the war policy initially followed by Lincoln at the start of the war of conciliation. This policy was one of armed resistance to secession with the hope of the South realizing their folly and returning to the union after some sort of compromise protecting slavery. By the Summer of 1862 Lincoln realized the South was not going to see the error of their ways and that conciliation was no longer worth pursuing. Lincoln now believed the only way to bring the South back to the union was by waging a war of subjugation, a total war that would break the South and up end their social order. It was this belief that inspired him to draft the Emancipation Proclamation in July, 1862. As we might all remember from our history lessons in school Lincoln decided not to announce this proclamation until the Union had had a military victory. Unfortunately, Lincoln was saddled with a battlefield commander that held him in contempt and was not interested in Lincoln's suggestions, thoughts, or even his orders because this general, McClellan, thought he was far more qualified to be making the decisions regarding war policy. It was this general that Lincoln had to depend upon to deliver the victory that would trigger the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation. It was only the fortunes of war and some incredible luck that delivered into McClellan's hands the infamous lost orders. A Union soldier found a set of Lee's orders to be delivered to one of his generals that had been lost by the courier. The orders clearly indicated that Lee's forces were to be divided and sent to specified locations. McClellan now had knowledge that his greatest military adversary was now at a reduced level of strength either less than his or no more than equal. Of course this was based on incredibly faulty intelligence and that even at full strength Lee's army was about half the size of McClellan's. However, even the risk adverse McClellan could not ignore this opportunity so he rushed to confront Lee. Lee also made his share of mistakes the first being to underestimate the morale and fighting effectiveness of this union army. What Lee was correct about was his assessment of McClellan as a field general. He knew McClellan was slow to act and cautious in the extreme. What resulted was a battle that was the most costly in terms of loss of life in American history and for nothing. It was a battle with no decision because McClellan was hesitant to employ the full strength of his army and when Lee finally abandoned the field after one day of battle and a second day when neither side wanted to start the fighting anew.

Lee took his severely battered army across the Potomac and back to Virginia. To Lincoln's extreme annoyance McClellan didn't pursue and when prompted to do so by Lincoln he ignored his president's order. Lee's leaving the field gave McClellan the technical victory but it didn't spare him the criticism of the president, the press, and the people. Now we the readers from the perspective of 150+ years later can wonder how things might have changed had Lee's army been destroyed on that field in Maryland. The war might have ended sooner, much sooner. McClellan would have been hailed a hero and might have defeated Lincoln in the 1864 election. General Grant would have been mentioned in history along with all those other Civil War generals without any reason to set him apart. It is doubtful that the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the Constitution would have been passed and slavery in some form probably might have continued until it died a natural death as a result of industrialization. Our country might have taken on an apartheid form of government to deal with our race issues and there are so many other points in history that would have been so much different. So a battle of no military merit fought to a stalemate actually was a turning point in world history. History has that effect on readers, it makes us think even when we aren't expecting it. Great book. Enjoy.

[CoachJim · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Antietam campaign was the product of parallel decision making by the political and military leadership of the Union and Confederacy, in response to the manifest failure of the strategies each party had been pursuing for the first year and a half of the struggle.

Much of this book describes the antics and scheming of George McClellan as the Commanding General of the Army of the Potomac. From the beginning he creates a cult-like atmosphere in “his” army. “More than obedience, McClellan needed the adulation of his soldiers.” What he needed was their love to offset his perceived political enemies. Their cheers and adulation soothed his ego. However, it is pointed out that he never visited the wounded in the field hospitals or shared the risks of battle.

McClellan is also linked to the Democratic party which felt that the ultimate goal must be to preserve White Supremacy. Here McClellan is thought to have chosen a very cautious conciliation strategy for the purposes of denying the “Radicals” the victory that would further their abolitionists goals. The worst part is his toying with the idea of staging a coup and becoming a dictator. He had many supporters in this idea. There is ample evidence that he was guilty of treason. He saw the Battle of Antietam as his need to win a battle to vindicate his character and military genius, and to save the nation from the “dual menace of Southern secession and Radical Despotism.” However, he needed to minimize the chance of a defeat which would allow his enemies to get rid of him. This led him to constantly over-estimate the strength of his opponent.

A second part of this book gives a detailed description of the fight by fight account of the battle at Antietam Creek. For some this will be a very thrilling account as the ebb and flow of the battles are described. As the story goes along you become familiar with the various locations of this battle. You start to recognize the West Woods, Middle Bridge, Sunken Road, and Dunker Church. My problem with this section was that all the units were usually referred to by the name of the commanding officer. Because all these names were “American” it was generally impossible for me to keep track of which units belonged to the Union and which to the Confederacy.

There is an accurate summary of the difficulties managing the battles in the Civil War. There was no way for units to communicate, and intelligence about the enemies position and movements was minimal.

The last chapter is an excellent summary of this book and the importance of the battle of Antietam. The essential argument is that it allowed Lincoln to issue his Emancipation Proclamation. Lincoln had given up on the idea that a quick series of military defeats would bring the South into negotiation. The Proclamation was a signal that he now committed the nation to a “war of subjugation, aimed at destroying the South’s ability to resist and uprooting its fundamental institution.” The importance of this is the central focus of this chapter. The South had chosen to go to war over the issue of slavery, and had they not seceded their peculiar institution might have lasted for a long time. Secretary Chase notes that abolition had little support in the North and that secession was a colossal mistake. Also the issue of slavery had been a major political issue for the young country for years prior to this. Lincoln’s Proclamation had removed the issue of slavery from any future political debate. (It is mentioned that the Civil Rights for the former slaves and their descendants would take much longer.)

by promising to eliminate slavery the Proclamation exposed the underlying problem of race in America—the contradiction between a political state based on the presumption of civic equality and a culture deeply imbued with the values of White supremacy.

I added this book to my reading list after reading a friend’s review.
You may read Matt’s Excellent review Here

[Jerome Otte · Rating 4 out of 5]

A dramatic, readable and at times humorous book.

Slotkin explores how Union war strategy shifted in the summer of 1862, leading up to and through Antietam. Although this is a familiar story, Slotkin adds a new take on it by exploring McClellan’s alleged contemplation of a coup. Slotkin argues that one of the reasons was so cautious with his army was that he wanted to preserve it for a possible coup attempt. Of course, Slotkin also provides extensive treatment of the Antietam campaign, and uses it to provide insight into McClellan’s interesting personality. Slotkin also compares the strategies of Lincoln and Lee, both of which risked much in order to achieve their desired ends. Lincoln eventually did receive his victory---not the one he hoped he would have but probably the best he could have hoped for with McClellan at the helm.

Slotkin gives us a fine portrait of the interplay between Lincoln and McClellan, the strategy and tactics of the Union and Confederate forces, and the personalities of the key figures. Along with the Peninsula campaign, Slotkin covers the the political situation of the North at the time, the possibility of foreign intervention, and the Union tilt towards a total-war policy. Slotkin also explains the command situation of the Confederacy: Davis was short-tempered and sensitive to any slights real or imagined, but he got along fine with Lee. Davis had a reasonably good grasp of military matters, while Lee was a quality general with no real political agenda (even if his strategic vision had its limits). McClellan, on the other hand, saw Lincoln as a well-meaning but incompetent buffoon surrounded by untrustworthy advisers like Stanton (who McClellan hated even more than Lincoln), and in any case McClellan was also politically ambitious. However, Lincoln could never bring himself to cashier McClellan at this point since his victory at Antietam made him seem so much more legitimate.

The book does have some problems. It doesn’t really present anything new. Slotkin frequently accuses McClellan of treason with no real evidence. Slotkin seems fond of caricatures: the all-knowing Lincoln, the near-perfect Lee, the timid McClellan, the brilliant Jackson, the half-insane Sumner, etc. These all make it easier for Slotkin to tell his tale, but how much they reflect reality is up to debate. There are also a few factual errors: Slotkin writes that John Gibbon was present at Bull Run, that Philip Kearny attended West Point, and that the Roulette farm was burned during the battle of Antietam, for example. He writes that Lee’s army was divided into corps, even though it was actually divided into wings. Slotkin often writes confidently that this figure or that person was thinking this or that at the time. For example, Slotkin writes that McClellan was more concerned with his reputation than with winning a victory and that he often came close to treasonous behavior. He even suggests that McClellan’s primary motive in winning at Antietam was to spite his superiors, and that McClellan’s lack of written orders was due to his desire to protect his reputation if anything went wrong. He provides no evidence to support this claim, and it seems more probable that McClellan simply wanted to retain a degree of flexibility. Despite accusations of treason, McClellan was actually a committed Unionist with a strong desire to serve his country---his inaction, political ambition and conduct regarding Lincoln notwithstanding. At one point Slotkin writes that “the victory [Antietam] also allowed Lincoln to fire the man who won the battle, Major General George McClellan, and thereby begin the military reorganization that would in the end produce victory for the Union”---even though McClellan was not removed until two months later. He also seems to confuse the effects of the two different emancipation proclamations. Slotkin also writes, “Almost from the start of hostilities there had been movements in Washington to transfer the president’s effective power as commander in chief to a professional soldier, who would be legally appointed to a temporary and limited dictatorship.” (There were? Like what? And where is the citation for this?) Elsewhere Slotkin writes that “What Lincoln knew was that from the moment McClellan first assumed high command, in July 1861, the general had incessantly schemed and conspired and politicked to gain control of the administration. In August and September the president would come to believe that McClellan was deliberately sabotaging the war effort, and that the ideas espoused at army headquarters were increasingly disloyal and by some accounts treasonous.” Slotkin does not expand on this, either, or provide the necessary evidence.

A fine, engaging, and well-written history of the spring, summer, and fall of 1862, with great coverage of politics and strategy. Although the the angle presented is not new, many of his assertions are unsupported, and much of the book is based on old research, this is still a fairly good book.

[Steven Peterson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Antietam was one of the bloodiest battles of the Civil War. Technically, perhaps, a draw. But, in all its implications, a Union victory. This volume is very readable; the author, Richard Slotkin, writes quite well.

Some key themes emerge here. The different strategic visions of President Abraham Lincoln and General George McClellan, commanding general of the Army of the Potomac; the common perspective of President Jefferson Davis and General Robert E. Lee; the issue of slavery; the political context of 1862; the state of the armies. The Emancipation Proclamation.

Timetable: McClellan failed miserably in the Seven Days, squandering his advantages and losing his courage in the face of Lee's aggressiveness; the dilatory response of McClellan while General John Pope was being targeted by the Confederate forces; Lincoln's decision to restore McClellan to larger command. All the while, the book considers the political context of both North and South. The Antietam campaign had a political element as well as a military component.

The book also discusses nicely the military side of this story. The action at Harper's Ferry, the battle for South Mountain, and--finally--Antietam. One gets a good sense of the military side of this battle.

The book has a real edge--with an analysis of McClellan that is hard nosed. And probably well deserved.

All in all, a good volume if you wish to know more about the background, battle, and aftermath of Antietam. The role of the battle in the issuing of the Emancipation Proclamation, which changed, at some level, the tone of the war.

[Eric Byrd · Rating 4 out of 5]

In this, Slotkin's usually perfect balance of combat narrative and socio-political analysis is weighted to the former - but I cavil. He is a great historian. Check out Lost Battalions: The Great War and the Crisis of American Nationality.

[Bob Pearson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Finished this book today -- the 150th anniversary of the battle -- as a gift from my wife. Slotkin's account of the battle goes well beyond the battlefield to embrace the political, military and national ambitions of North and South. It provides a very fine holistic view of events. The chances of the South winning the war, even in 1862, were not great. Slotkin makes the most of the story of Lee and Davis' willingness to roll the dice against a poorly led Federal Army to try to force a Union retreat inside United States territory. His account of McClellan's military and political state of mind is fascinating. I never knew there was serious consideration of finding a negotiated return of the South to the Union during the war and especially in the early years. Where Slotkin might be weakest is where he hoped to be strongest -- discussing the reasons and the timing for the Emancipation Proclamation. The pieces are there, but the argument boils down to Lincoln's resolve. The North largely was opposed to Negro equality, and the South was strengthened in its resistance once Confederates understand Lincoln's resolve to destroy slavery completely. What Lincoln did accomplish was to make African Americans equals by allowing freed slaves to join the Union Army. As he said, once they began to fight, no one could deny their right to be seen as equals. Lee (with Davis) and Lincoln appear as the great gamblers, each giving his all to turn the odds in their favor. As Slotkin so eloquently describes it, it was Lincoln, however, who launched the successful revolution.

[Christopher Saunders · Rating 3 out of 5]

Richard Slotkin's The Long Road to Antietam is a workmanlike recounting of the "bloodiest single day" of American Civil War. Slotkin, ordinarily a social historian, is an odd choice for a straightforward military history and he never quite adapts to the format. He does do a decent job sketching the political and strategic backdrop to the campaign, showing how the war was indeed at a crossroads of being a "war for Union" and about something grander, namely the abolition of slavery. And he highlights Lincoln and George McClellan's feud as less a clash of personality, though it's certainly that, than competing visions of America's future: Lincoln the visionary who viewed abolition as the cost of winning the war, McClellan the conservative who had no interest either in punishing the South or ending the "peculiar institution" - and, Slotkin argues, who seriously contemplated a coup against Lincoln. All well and good, but the heart of the book is Slotkin's account of the battle itself, and it's rather perfunctory and underwhelming: Slotkin doesn't have the skill at a blow-for-blow recounting of battles the way, say, a Bruce Catton or Shelby Foote does, so much of this segment reads like, "Brigade X attacked Brigade Y, then Brigade Z joined the fighting." The book's more interesting, then, in its interstitial material than what should be its core; it's readable enough, but compared to Stephen W. Sears' Landscape Turned Red it's decidedly underwhelming.

[Colin Mitchell · Rating 4 out of 5]

Essentially this is the account of Major General George McClellan's time as commander of the Federal Army of the Potomac. From his invasion of the southern states by amphibious landing and the assault upon Richmond, to his tactical win at the battle of Antietam in September 1862. His political affiliations and his great failures to pursue General Lee's Army of Northern Virginia after the latter's withdrawal from the Antietam battlefield.

The book shows General McClellans increasing paranoia with the political situation which ultimately leads to his dubious tactical decisions. I felt there was scope to pursue the psychological effects of this paranoia and the effect the huge numbers of dead and wounded would have had upon a commander.

I am always of an opinion that maps are an essential of this type of study and those surrounding the day at Antietam are good although the earlier time at the gates of Richmond and the seven days could have been enhanced with more maps. Even the one at Harpers Ferry failed with poor topography and not showing the gaps through the hills very well.

All round an excellent work.

[Matthew Bartlett · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Battle of Antietam has been analyzed many times in the history of Civil War writing and many wonder if this conflict, much like Gettysburg, has reached its cap of knowledge on what can be written. Here, in The Long Road to Antietam, Richard Slotkin takes an in depth look not only into the battle itself, but more so the months preceding and the political effects during the aftermath. Throughout his text, he turns the movements of the army along with the changes in the high command into a political narrative which is enthralling to the very last word. The end product is a new work which shines new information on the campaign as a whole and is a welcome addition into the echelon of the Antietam academia.
Richard Slotkin is an award winning historian and author and has written many books not only about the Civil War but about American History as a whole. He is the professor emeritus at Wesleyan University and is the recipient of the Michael Shaara Award for Civil War fiction and his work Abe. His American History Trilogy, Regeneration through Violence, The Fatal Environment and Gunfighter Nation won numerous accolades. He also is well versed on the Battle of the Crater with his fiction work The Crater and his nonfiction work No Quarter.
When readers approach this work, they should realize that the body of the research is not just about the Battle of Antietam, but more of the political ramifications of what happened because of this battle. The political world of the army during the onset of the campaign was brutal in the military not only with General McClellan in command, but the maniacal ways in which he applauded the resignation of General Winfield Scott. Most books state that Scott resigned due to medical reasons, but Slotkin presents information which may change the way people think about that whole event. Throughout the text, McClellan’s actions show how dedicated he was to his soldiers but not so much to his fellow staff and officers. As the armies begin to move and converge on many locations, including a chapter on the Second Battle of Manassas, it becomes clear that anyone wishing to stand in the way of McClellan was about to get steamrolled over. However, it seems that McClellan himself still wanted the approval from his superiors in Washington at every turn. The premise of the work, which is never lost through the text, is that this campaign would thrive on the future Emancipation Proclamation and this idea of the Civil War would then become a revolution of freedom for those in bondage. Slotkin handles this with a great amount of scholarship and academia unmatched in many works on the politics of the war.
The Long Road to Antietam is highly recommended for anyone reading about the Civil War, especially Antietam enthusiasts. This book gives new light to otherwise overlooked segments of the campaign mainly the realm of the political spectrum. The narrative was quite flowing and at some times even page turning due to the very nature of the military and political backstabbing. Mr. Slotkin has once again delivered a fine work to the Civil War audience.

Matthew Bartlett - Gettysburg Chronicle

[Neill Goltz · Rating 5 out of 5]

Just finished “Long Road to Antietam” by Richard Slotkin.

While trying to set-aside my own personal bias - both emotional due to ancestor participation and death* at Antietam, and favor of academic over popular literature related to the Civil War - I will truly say that this is a Extraordinary Book, and quite possibly the finest analysis I have read on the Emancipation Proclamation.

Mr. Slotkin believes that Antietam was the turning point of the war, and he delivers not only a stunning, hour-by-hour, blow-by-blow history of the battle itself which will fully-appeal to those who focus on military history but, more importantly, an epic story of the bigger picture of the exorcism of slavery as America's Original Sin.

The preliminaries and aftermath of the political situation Lincoln was managing in his relationship with General George B. McClellan is the key study of the book.

I must confess that in conversations with an co-worker some years ago I excused McClellan’s well-known reluctance, after fully training and equipping the Army of the Potomac, to fully engage it in battle. I did so by way of using the analogy/example of someone who restores a classic car to beautiful working order, and then is naturally reluctant to take it out of the garage and risk damaging it again.

Mr. Slotkin completely pulls the curtain back from my then-juvenile impression, by showing the duplicity of both McClellan and his senior staff - very possibly treasonous - in its communications with Lincoln and his cabinet, leaks to the press, and less than enthusiastic prosecution of the required military effort itself.

HIs analysis and presentation of the change in the language of the Emancipation document itself, from its draft presentation by Lincoln to his Cabinet written before Antietam, and the changes after the battle to its final, published form, is remarkable.

The heroism of a small group of senior officers at McClellan’s headquarters in opposing the very real urging of other senior McClellan sycophants to march the Army on Washington and create a military dictatorship is a story that probably needs its own book. The potential parallel to Sulla’s march on Rome and the ultimate overthrow of the Republic is mind-boggling.

Truly, a must-read book.

* https://www.facebook.com/LandscapeTur...

[Marty Weghorn · Rating 4 out of 5]

While I still think Shelby Foote's epic Civil War trilogy set the bar very high for histories of that conflict, I enjoyed this one. Coverage of the actual fighting at South Mountain and Sharpsburg/Antietam take up surprisingly little space in this book, but those accounts can be found in numerous other accounts (including Stephen Sears' excellent "Antietam: Landscape Turned Red"). Instead, the focus is mainly on General George B. McClellan's state of mind and motives for the actions he took - or more characteristically, didn't take - to fight the battles. While brilliant at raising, training and motivating his Army of the Potomac, McClellan was a dismal battlefield tactician, whose decisions were always predicated upon not losing battles rather than winning them in order to further his own ambitions. Just as he saw non-existent armies to his front, he conjured up political enemies to his rear...enemies that would have been quieted or eliminated had he been the fighting general he claimed to be.

Slotkin dwells on McClellan's political philosophy, which was at odds with his Commander-in-Chief, Abraham Lincoln. When Lincoln made public the Emancipation Proclamation, McClellan was encouraged to, and seriously contemplated, "changing front" to march on the capital. I've read other Civil War historians that have mentioned this possibility, but Slotkin goes more deeply into the correspondence, actions and journals of McClellan and his supporters to lend real credence to this theory. Thankfully, Little Mac was as tepid in his political tactics as he was on the field of battle. As popular as he was with the public and common soldier, I don't personally believe his military coup would have succeeded. But the ramifications and after effects of the aatempt would have brought down the Lincoln administration and doomed the nation.

[Peter · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great book for those looking to take a deeper dive into Civil War history. Not an introductory text, however.

The great feat here is that the author manages to balance an extremely detailed, day-by-day and at times hour-by-hour, account of the Confederate Maryland campaign of 1862 with a rich overarching narrative that places the campaign in the context of evolving strategic thinking of the major figures of the War - Davis, Lee, McClellan, and most importantly, Lincoln. Military history can be dry and hard to follow, as names, troop counts, and maneuvers blur together, but Slotkin manages to balance detail with analysis. As the book unfolds, Slotkin argues persuasively that Lincoln came to understand that the war could only be won through a total defeat of the enemy army (as opposed to the capture of Richmond), and to achieve this objective, he needed generals willing to carry out this vision. More importantly, he needed to embrace that the abolition of slavery was a necessary consequence of (and potentially catalyst for) a Union victory, and in doing so, revolutionized (Slotkin's term) the meaning of the war.

The only letdown is the (understandably) limited scope. The ultimate case for Lincoln's revolution draws on additional events - the issuance of the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation in the days following Antietam and Lincoln's decision to replace McClellan (again, and permanently), among others. After such rich and rewarding analysis of the events leading up to and including Antietam, the final pages' coverage of these moments feels rushed. But this criticism is really a testament to how compelling Slotkin's treatment of the material he covers is. I was left wanting more. Luckily for me, there is no shortage of additional reading for a deeper analysis of these events.

[Brian · Rating 4 out of 5]

Richard Slotkin provides a nice addition to any Civil War library with his compelling book - The Long Road to Antietam. Slotkin focuses on the political run-up to the battle, particularly General McClellan and his motivations, political ambitions, and general poor leadership when it comes to tactical decisions on a battlefield.

Slotkin also spends considerable time with the Emancipation Proclamation, it's effect on the war, and Lincoln's reason for doing it.

While Slotkin perhaps overstated the crisis of government - military versus civilian leadership of the army and McClellan's desire to stage a coup, there is no denying the love the troops did have for the General. And for good reason, as McClellan kept his troops safe from harms way.

Recommended, not for the details which other books do better, but the entire well-rounded package which explains the political forces of the day and the reasons behind decisions and outcomes.

[Jason Russell · Rating 5 out of 5]

I had this book on my "wishlist" for a long time and it did not disappoint. Slotkin does a superb job of putting the Maryland invasion/Battle of Antietam into context, both before and after the actual fighting. He writes with a certain verve and a swift pace, admirably bringing alive not only the main personalities, but also the struggles on South Mountain, at Harper's Ferry, and at Sharpsburg. The book never bogged down. I would have finished it earlier but I was reading/studying Bradley Gottfried's "Maps of Antietam" concurrently.

The closing passages, wherein he ties it all together--the meaning of Antietam and the Emancipation Proclamation, the political decisions of Lincoln, McClellan's delusions and plottings--are exceptional.

While McClellan is still, for me, the most frustrating (annoying? upsetting?) individual of the Civil War, I came away with a little understanding of what made him tick.

[Heinz Reinhardt · Rating 4 out of 5]

It is strange how the very best works of history are sometimes written by novelists.
Richard Slotkin has penned an excellent, if purposely controversial, look at McClellan, Lincoln, Lee and Davis, and the war in the East in the summer of 1862 that culminated in the indecisive bloodbath along Antietam Creek.
The controversy comes with Slotkin's appraisal of General George B. McClellan as an aspiring traitor to the very government his actions protected. It is no secret that McClellan was a Democrat, and therefore against many of the platforms of Lincoln and the Republicans. Then again, the clear majority of the Union military leadership was staunchly conservative, as all militaries regardless of culture or ethnicity tend to be, and Democrat. Does Little Mac's association with the Democrats make him then, ergo, a traitor?
Slotkin does not play the all too common game so prevalent within academia of placing excoriating blame by mere association. He understands, superbly, the complexity of human interaction and by extension the boggling complexity of historical events.
Slotkin takes the time, to show through McClellan's own writings, his actions on the Peninsula and during the disastrous Second Manassas campaign, and his own ruminations with his inner circle post Emancipation Proclamation, that McClellan was bent upon a military coup in Washington.
This is the main thesis of the book, and that Lincoln, seeing no other choice for victory, decided upon social revolution to weaken the Southern infrastructure. While I am not entirely convinced of his assertion of McClellan as an aspiring Caesar, it is impossible now to not seriously consider the notion.
Slotkin does, as well, a superb job with the narration of events military. His praise of the Rebel military, and his understanding of the complexity of their motives, is a welcome burst of logic injected into a story that is threatened by the current machinations of political ideology. Lee comes across as the military genius that he was, though Slotkin rightly judges him a bit harshly for daring McClellan to strike him again following the slaughter of Antietam. Davis, too, gets praised for his handling of the Rebel war effort, though my own views are that, despite teething troubles, Lincoln's handling was far superior.
The narrative level is that of the operational, and rather than detailed tactical descriptions, Slotkin focuses upon the command level of Lee and McClellan, and their respective Corps commanders.
All of this put in perspective by not losing sight of either the broader military strategic situation, or the international political dimension. And though I am not absolutely convinced of his main thesis, it is presented to logically, and written so wonderfully, that I cannot but thoroughly enjoy this book.
This is an overall excellent work of history, one that I hope earns a wide audience as the years go by.
Very highly recommended.

[A · Rating 4 out of 5]

Fine. Maybe for me deserves 3 stars, but eh... it's a good history, but i am already pretty familiar with the whole arc of this tale and i was hoping for some new thinking or at least a refresh for me (i don't always remember everything too good). but ... turns out i remembered pretty well (from 20 years ago?). As to new insights, not really. Heavy focus on missed union opportunities (due to McClellan) which is all good and well, but oft told. Author was - i think - fair minded about constantly bringing up false intelligence estimates being a critical reason (excuse) for McClellan and... fair enough, though one wonders (with the author, Lee, and Lincoln among others) if McClellan would ever find a a reason to doggedly attack (even if with accurate intelligence). If i learned anything it was on the loose tongues / treason talk of those around McClellan and maybe (?) McC himself ... well told and and scary. Some gestures toward criticism of Lee (too risky movements) counting too much on McClellan's passivity, but it is a bit of tiny gesture, as ultimately the author is at least as laudatory as most other accounts of Lee. Still... well told.

[Robert LoCicero · Rating 4 out of 5]

A masterful look at the run up to and Civil War battle known as Antietam (for the Union) and the Battle of Sharpsburg (for the Confederacy). Author Slotkin provides detailed information through rotating viewpoints of the engagements and strategies of Robert E. Lee for the Confederacy and George B. McClellan for the Union. These military commanders along with their political leaders, Abe Lincoln and Jeff Davis, moved their troops into positions to either have a successful invasion of Maryland for Lee or defend the Union territory and maneuver for a deathblow to the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) by McClellan. The Long Road in the title refers to the difficulties that all parties had in attempting to achieve those objectives. President Lincoln was sorely distressed by the inability of his earlier military commanders to carry out a winning campaign against Lee and put much faith in McClellan to use his excellent organization and motivational skills to finally damage the Confederate ANV. McClellan seemed never ready to move and this was making the President concerned as a quick victory over the Confederacy was needed to maintain the willingness of the Union population to fight this war. And President Lincoln was also contemplating a document to free the slaves residing in the southern states and he felt a big military victory would help to ease the tumult that would result from such an Emancipation Proclamation. Such a change in the reasoning for fighting this war against the successionist south was bound to cause a furor in northern cities. General Lee also wanted to threaten the north through invasion to damage Union morale and thus weaken their willingness to support this war against the south. As it was the Union forces were larger though Lee considered that McClellan's reluctance to fight that major battle made the odds more even in an eventual confrontation. That confrontation occurred at the site of the Antietam creek near the Maryland town of Sharpsburg. It was a bloody battle with a huge number of casualties on both sides. The Union could have dealt a massive blow against Lee if they had attacked on the second day. As it turned out, McClellan hesitated and when he was finally ready to attack, Lee had pulled his army back behind the Potamac River into northern Virginia. McClellan's hesitation was because he did not want to deliver a death blow to Lee's army; he felt that by not subjugating the Confederacy they would eventually seek a ceasefire and mutual agreement to end the slaughter. Of course this ran against Lincoln's plan (and of the Congressional Radicals) that wanted the south forced back into the Union and via his proclamation pave the way for elimination of slavery. There was tremendous infighting among Lincoln, his cabinet, the military command and the politicians and public in the northern states. This grand story is told in interesting and well-documented manner by author Slotkin. He views the Lincoln machinations as creating a revolution that would be successful in eventually saving the Union. All he needed was the right instrument for completing that task. As it turns out his choice of McClellan to fight that battle was incorrect. Later on Lincoln would find such a battler in the hero of the western theatre, General U.S. Grant. This is a fine volume and I recommend it highly for those readers interested in this most important episode of the American Civil War. These 1862 events could possibly be called the turning point of the war, though the Battle of Gettysburg is usually viewed as that.

[Bap · Rating 4 out of 5]

Antietam was a battle that checked the South's first invasion of the North and was enough of a victory to prompt Lincoln to issue the Emancipation Proclamation as a sign that the period for temporizing and half measures was over. This would be a war to the finish, to the bitter end. Tactically , lee should never have fought to a draw against 2 to 1 odds. His troops were scattered when the union found a copy of lost order no. 91 which contained a blueprint that Lee had divided his army with Jackson bringing Harpers Ferry. It was a near thing.

[Ali Hassan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Richard Slotkin’s The Long Road to Antietam offers a fresh interpretation of one of the Civil War’s bloodiest battles, examining how the events leading up to Antietam transformed the war into a broader struggle for emancipation.

Slotkin analyzes both the military strategies and political decisions that shaped the battle’s outcome, while also emphasizing its significance in shifting the Union’s war aims from preservation to revolution. His thorough research and gripping narrative make this a standout work on the Civil War.

[Jason · Rating 4 out of 5]

A fantastic account of the battle itself, but more importantly, an enlightening discussion of the events, politics, attitudes, and personalities from before and after the battle that made Antietam a major turning point.

Those looking for the most robust and detailed account of the battle itself will be better off with Sears’ “Landscape Turned Red,” but for a succinct, but comprehensive, look at how Antietam changed the war—a reader could do no better.

[David · Rating 5 out of 5]

The author does an exceptionally fine job of weaving together the political, strategic, operational and tactical elements of the Antietam campaign. He makes a good case for his argument that 1862 marked the moment when Union war aims became revolutionary (a distinction often reserved for 1863). His analysis of the struggle for power between Lincoln and McClellan is particularly well considered. I learned a lot from the book.

[Guy Priel · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very well written account. Provides another perspective on the causes of the Civil War. I have read a lot of Civil War books and they never fsil to disappoint. This one wad no exception. A very enjoyable account.

[Mark Sixbey · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent read

A very good summary if the Battle if Antietam. Fired with historical fact and commentary. A must read for history buffs.

[Jon · Rating 3 out of 5]

I have tremendous respect for Richard Slotkin based on his "myth trilogy" (Gunfighter Nation, etc) which I think are pathbreaking books which explain so much of the source of standard American narratives. I have not fbrought myself up to speed on his general career, however, so I don't know how his thinking has evolved since Gunfighter Nation. When I saw a bulletin board display about the Civil War that included a dust jacket for this book, I got very excited. I expected detailed and new analysis.

I was disappointed, however. Not because the book is bad, and the primary theme, that Antietam was a turning point not just militarily but politically, is very important to grasp for anyone interested in United States history. Prior to this battle, the mainstream political thinking in the North was to try to reconcile with the South, and even accept slavery. After the battle everything changed and the goal became to annhilate the slavocracy.

The historical irony of the situation is that George McClellan, the Union commander of the Army of the Potomac, himself strongly felt that the North's strategy should be to bring the South to a negotiated settlement. McClellan (as Slotkin lays out in detail) had an inappropriate self image of himself as the savior of the Republic from the twin evils of secessionism and radicalism.

The battle itself was more or less a one-day stalemate, at a very bloody cost. (The total casualties far exceeded any battle the United States armed forces had ever fought to that point, although several later Civil War battles were even more gruesome.) What happened was McClellan had a chance to follow up after the first day's battle and wipe out Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, but he chose not to give battle and the rebel army was able to escape and recuperate. McClellan's hesitation derived entirely from his political outlook, and Lincoln then fired him. This effectively purged the army from any compromise thinking.

Of course the other practical outcome was that in the wake of the battle Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation. This issuance was of a dubious and untested constitutional character, and it was Lincoln going out on a limb which prompts Slotkin to call the events surrounding the battle a revolution.

All these points are interesting. The problem is that Slotkin could easily and just effectively made the points in a shorter essay, and a long book should not have been necessary. What the book gets bogged down in is detail after detail of tactics and fighting. It is necessary to bring up a certain amount of practical detail in order underscore the argument, that McClellan's battlefield decisions reflected his political thinking and were designed to promote his personal political thinking, but there is quite a bit more detail than is necessary.

If you are a Civil War history buff, it is worth the time to read. However for me I am more interested in how the Civil War related to other historical developments and so it took precious time away from other pursuits.

[James Murphy · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Long Road to Antietam is fascinating history. Briefly, it's a book about the 1862 Civil War invasion of Maryland by Robert E Lee's Army of Northern Virginia and the Union response which led to the Battle of Antietam. It's a book about George B McClellan, the commander of that Union Army of the Potomac, and his strained relations with Abraham Lincoln and his administration. It's a full discussion of the motivations for the Emancipation Proclamation, issued after that battle, and its impact on the war and, in fact, all of American history following September 1862.

To say it's an account of the Battle of Antietam doesn't do justice to Slotkin's achievement. The battle itself is discussed comprehensively, perhaps one of the best accounts I've read, especially in terms of decision-making by the high commands involved. But the Antietam Campaign itself takes up only about 40% of the book. Slotkin's grand history necessarily discusses the causes and progress of the war, the nature of chattel slavery in the South and its economic and political influence on the country, the friction between the command staff of the Army of the Potomac created by McClellan's ambition to wrest control of the war from Lincoln's administration and bring abut a compromise peace, and, finally, how Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation changed the war from one whose goals had been restoration of the Union through conciliation and an acceptance of slavery into one whose intent was to subjugate the South and destroy slavery as an institution. It's a big story. Slotkin tells it well. He writes with clarity about these complex issues. He writes in prose that flows as easily through the mind as spring-swollen streams moving heavily but irresistibly from point to sparkling point.

The revolution Slotkin writes about is Lincoln's. In explaining the Emancipation Proclamation he changes perspectives. At least mine. I've been reading the Civil War since I was a pup but have never had things so clearly and convincingly explained as Slotkin does here. And I've never read analysis of George B McClellan so perceptive, have never read of how thick was the Army of the Potomac's mood for coup and the establishment of a military dictatorship, here so intelligibly demonstrated by Slotkin's use of the contemporary records. This is a terribly interesting book which overturns--or sharply shifts--perspectives of the conduct of the war in the east in 1862.

[Derek Weese · Rating 4 out of 5]

Thanks to the sesquicentennial of the American Civil War there are plenty of books being published on the Civil War especially it's military events. Sadly, this tends to lean towards only the already really well dug into areas. Battles/Operations like Stones River, Seven Pines, Shiloh (no one discusses the 2nd Day of Battle to any satisfaction so to be fair no one has written a definitive book on Shiloh thus far...), Chickamauga and 2nd Mannassas get largely ignored.
Thus it was with hesitation I ordered this book, but Antietam is like Stones River, Napoleons 1813 Campaign, Operation Barbarossa and the Eastern Front in general and Roman Military history: I can't get enough of it so I bought it...and I wasn't dissapointed.

Mr. Slotkin wrote a very good book though he doesn't really cover any new ground but takes a new slant on it. He accuses McClellan of treason, a charge I can't quite buy but I do agree that as a field commander McClellan was way out of his depth. (He would have been a good Cheif of General Staff, however.)

Slotkin's coverage of the military events is very sound if not in detail. Though to my knowledge not a military historian Slotkin gets military operations right and he has a good understanding of the ebb and flow and control of chaos inherent in military leadership. (Of which as he asserts, Lee was the master.)
As far as the political side I was pleasantly surprised to see a bucking of the trend of overly patriotic tomes that ignore the white supremacy of the Republican Party and the North in general. Very good treatment of that issue as well. He also handles Lincoln fairly though I still don't believe Lincoln was a humantiarian emancipator: his emancipatory policies were political in nature and Slotkin does discuss the possibility of re-colonization of the slaves back to Africa; something most northerners were in support of.

Overall a very good book. I reccomend it.

[Molly · Rating 4 out of 5]

**I received a copy of this book through a Goodreads First Reads giveaway.

Trumpets of victory should accompany my finishing of this book! Just under three months to read it, but fully worth the time. Dr. Slotkin recounts his meticulous research clearly, successfully walks the delicate line between expressing his well-founded opinions while maintaining a rule of historical objectivity, and imparts information in a way that is at times riveting, humorous, infuriating, and triumphant.

General George McClellan does not come off well in the end - his inflated sense of self is almost preposterous, and his actions (or lack thereof, on most occasions) bordering on insubordination, even on treason, were maddening in the extreme. But the reputations a number of other Union generals did not emerge unscathed, either. Slotkin makes it clear that, at this midpoint in the war, it was anybody's game; although the Union had superior strength, their leadership was largely incompetent.

I knew essentially nothing about the Battle of Antietam going into this book, let alone the political and military circumstances immediately preceding and following it. Dr. Slotkin's work has soundly remedied this situation, and I enjoyed the learning process quite a lot. The last few sections of the book, focusing on post-battle analysis and conclusion, were a little repetitive, but also brought up some interesting points, particularly on the changes that the Emancipation Proclamation brought not only for the slaves, but in terms of immediate political repercussions and effects on international relations.