What do you think?
Rate this book
An Enemy We Created: The Myth of the Taliban-Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan, 1970-2010
To this day, the belief is widespread that the Taliban and al-Qaeda are synonymous, that their ideology and objectives are closely intertwined, and that they have made common cause against the West for decades.In An Enemy We Created , Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn debunk this myth and reveal the much more complex reality that lies beneath it. Drawing upon their unprecedented fieldwork in Afghanistan, as well as their Arabic, Dari, and Pashtu skills, the authors show that the West's present entanglement in Afghanistan is predicated on the false assumption that defeating the Taliban will forestall further terrorist attacks worldwide. While immersing themselves in Kandahar society, the authors interviewed Taliban decision-makers, field commanders, and ordinary fighters, thoroughly exploring the complexity of the relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda and the individuals who established both groups. They show that from the mid-1990s onward, the Taliban and al-Qaeda diverged far more often than they converged. They also argue that this split creates an opportunity to engage the Taliban on two fundamental renouncing al-Qaeda and guaranteeing that Afghanistan will not be a sanctuary for international terrorists. Yet the insurgency is changing, and it could soon be too late to find a political solution. The authors contend that certain aspects of the campaign in Afghanistan, especially night raids, the killings of innocent civilians, and attempts to fragment and decapitate the Taliban are having the unintended consequence of energizing the resistance, creating more opportunities for al-Qaeda, and helping it to attain its objectives.The first book to fully untangle the myths from the realities in the relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda, An Enemy We Created is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand what's really happening in Afghanistan.
538 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2011
3 people are currently reading
439 people want to read
About the author
Alex Strick van Linschoten
12 books147 followersI don't use Goodreads any more. I switched over to The StoryGraph. https://thestorygraph.com
Check it out!
Check it out!
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
June 18, 2015
This is a solid history of the relationship (and/or lack thereof) between Al Qaeda and the Taliban dating back to the anti-Soviet jihad period and on through 2011, when the book came out. I regret only just now getting to the book (though I did follow associated commentary by the authors at the time). At the time of writing, the international military coalition in Afghanistan was beginning to shift towards withdrawal from direct combat in Afghanistan, and portions of the international diplomatic community were beginning to seriously explore prospects for some form of negotiated political settlement with the Taliban that could bring an end to the conflict.
The term “affiliated with” does a lot of work in terrorism and counterterrorism analysis; its determination can quite literally amount to a death sentence. This book sets out to make the case that while the Taliban leadership was indeed “affiliated with” Al Qaeda in some forms, playing (at-times grudging) host prior to 2001, they are fundamentally a local movement whose aims have little to do with Osama bin Laden’s internationalist jihadi program and who should be considered independent of our broader counterterrorism campaign against Al Qaeda. The notion that the two groups were fundamentally intertwined formed a significant portion of the causus belli for the Afghanistan invasion, and for the ongoing counterinsurgency mission that followed from the mid-2000s, so making this separation would prove to be a key requirement for any form of political reconciliation.
Four years later, it seems to me that this argument has pretty definitively won out. With Bin Laden’s death, the shift of Al Qaeda’s operational center of gravity to Yemen and North Africa, and the rise of ISIS as a counter-claimant to the international mantle of jihad, policymaker attention has largely decamped from South and Central Asia for the Middle East, and left the question of what to do about the Taliban to the regional specialists, who for the most part now seem to accept it as a real local political force to be dealt with (though the question of whether or not its members can actually be accommodated in the Afghan political system remains under dispute). If we’re still insisting these days that the Taliban renounce Al Qaeda as one of our red lines for talks, I’ve missed it. The Talban, as the authors note, have also been quite deliberate about maintaining this localized focus and separation from Al Qaeda (while still avoiding directly denouncing it), at least since they reorganized to the point where they were able to start offering a political program of sorts.
Beyond the policy argument, the book offers a well-researched (I can only dream of some day matching this book for body-to-footnotes and references ratio) history of both the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Since the book is spanning approximately four decades and two complex organizations, there is some brevity involved, including in some places where I would’ve preferred greater elaboration or analysis of the primary sources and interviewees being cited. (The historical record gets notably less solid in the chapters from 2003 onwards.) On the other hand, many episodes that are often glossed over in other accounts get close scrutiny here. Through previous work in Kandahar, the authors have unique access to some of the Taliban “political” figures; although they reference a few Taliban factions who might be more inclined towards the Al Qaeda internationalist vision (primarily the late Mullah Dadullah, the Haqqanis, and unspecified members of the “new generation” of Taliban fighters emerging circa 2009-2011 — I would’ve liked more elaboration on the latter point, which does not seem to have come to pass in significant numbers in the years since), there is less to work with in terms of those group's motivations or interests. There is a lot of valuable details on the early history of the Taliban’s foundation and its pre-foundational origins in Soviet-era Kandahar, and some on the Taliban’s evolving insurgency structure (up to 2011, at least); the Al Qaeda portions are probably best read as supplementary to other dedicated histories to the organization.
The ultimate point here is that organizational and individual distinctions matter, and that even groups that may appear to be closely affiliated (either due to shared circumstance, ideological touchpoints, or a common enemy) will have their own distinct motivations, priorities, and strategies. Even if you don’t believe that such distinctions merited a different course of action in the wake of 9/11 — and such alternative history exercises are largely an exercise in speculative hindsight — it’s worth underscoring that choosing to view groups as an undifferentiated conglomerate will constrain your policy flexibility, with potentially serious consequences. Making those distinctions in real time is extremely challenging, and requires deep investments in fine-grained knowledge of the sort that this book offers. Should be part of any Afghanistan bookshelf.
The term “affiliated with” does a lot of work in terrorism and counterterrorism analysis; its determination can quite literally amount to a death sentence. This book sets out to make the case that while the Taliban leadership was indeed “affiliated with” Al Qaeda in some forms, playing (at-times grudging) host prior to 2001, they are fundamentally a local movement whose aims have little to do with Osama bin Laden’s internationalist jihadi program and who should be considered independent of our broader counterterrorism campaign against Al Qaeda. The notion that the two groups were fundamentally intertwined formed a significant portion of the causus belli for the Afghanistan invasion, and for the ongoing counterinsurgency mission that followed from the mid-2000s, so making this separation would prove to be a key requirement for any form of political reconciliation.
Four years later, it seems to me that this argument has pretty definitively won out. With Bin Laden’s death, the shift of Al Qaeda’s operational center of gravity to Yemen and North Africa, and the rise of ISIS as a counter-claimant to the international mantle of jihad, policymaker attention has largely decamped from South and Central Asia for the Middle East, and left the question of what to do about the Taliban to the regional specialists, who for the most part now seem to accept it as a real local political force to be dealt with (though the question of whether or not its members can actually be accommodated in the Afghan political system remains under dispute). If we’re still insisting these days that the Taliban renounce Al Qaeda as one of our red lines for talks, I’ve missed it. The Talban, as the authors note, have also been quite deliberate about maintaining this localized focus and separation from Al Qaeda (while still avoiding directly denouncing it), at least since they reorganized to the point where they were able to start offering a political program of sorts.
Beyond the policy argument, the book offers a well-researched (I can only dream of some day matching this book for body-to-footnotes and references ratio) history of both the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Since the book is spanning approximately four decades and two complex organizations, there is some brevity involved, including in some places where I would’ve preferred greater elaboration or analysis of the primary sources and interviewees being cited. (The historical record gets notably less solid in the chapters from 2003 onwards.) On the other hand, many episodes that are often glossed over in other accounts get close scrutiny here. Through previous work in Kandahar, the authors have unique access to some of the Taliban “political” figures; although they reference a few Taliban factions who might be more inclined towards the Al Qaeda internationalist vision (primarily the late Mullah Dadullah, the Haqqanis, and unspecified members of the “new generation” of Taliban fighters emerging circa 2009-2011 — I would’ve liked more elaboration on the latter point, which does not seem to have come to pass in significant numbers in the years since), there is less to work with in terms of those group's motivations or interests. There is a lot of valuable details on the early history of the Taliban’s foundation and its pre-foundational origins in Soviet-era Kandahar, and some on the Taliban’s evolving insurgency structure (up to 2011, at least); the Al Qaeda portions are probably best read as supplementary to other dedicated histories to the organization.
The ultimate point here is that organizational and individual distinctions matter, and that even groups that may appear to be closely affiliated (either due to shared circumstance, ideological touchpoints, or a common enemy) will have their own distinct motivations, priorities, and strategies. Even if you don’t believe that such distinctions merited a different course of action in the wake of 9/11 — and such alternative history exercises are largely an exercise in speculative hindsight — it’s worth underscoring that choosing to view groups as an undifferentiated conglomerate will constrain your policy flexibility, with potentially serious consequences. Making those distinctions in real time is extremely challenging, and requires deep investments in fine-grained knowledge of the sort that this book offers. Should be part of any Afghanistan bookshelf.
August 22, 2015
Composition: 3/5
Evidence: 2/5
Writing Style: 2/5
Balance: 2/5
This work brings important evidence and insight into the characters involved in and organizational development of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. It is most successful when it treats the Taliban as the subject of anthropological analysis. The work, however, lacks the needed humility proper for an inquiry based on a limited number of interviews. Generalizing the interviewees' responses to the entirety of the Taliban across its entire history leads the authors to voice confidence and certainty when there should have been nuance and modest speculation.
Overall, its most serious deficiency is the authors' approach of advocating for their major argument (that the Taliban and Al Qaeda were distinct groups)rather than testing their argument. This leads them to disregard interpretations and possibilities that challenged their position. It had a somewhat awkward readability as well. The cast of characters is huge and for those unfamiliar with Arabic names and terms the amount of new names and designations makes for a confusing narrative. This has less to do with the authors or writing and more to do with the subject matter; the authors did a good job organizationally to present the matter in a way to facilitate understanding.
If you were to read only one book on the Taliban, I would not recommend this book to be it. If you follow the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Afghan war more generally, this is a great addition to that larger body of work.
Evidence: 2/5
Writing Style: 2/5
Balance: 2/5
This work brings important evidence and insight into the characters involved in and organizational development of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. It is most successful when it treats the Taliban as the subject of anthropological analysis. The work, however, lacks the needed humility proper for an inquiry based on a limited number of interviews. Generalizing the interviewees' responses to the entirety of the Taliban across its entire history leads the authors to voice confidence and certainty when there should have been nuance and modest speculation.
Overall, its most serious deficiency is the authors' approach of advocating for their major argument (that the Taliban and Al Qaeda were distinct groups)rather than testing their argument. This leads them to disregard interpretations and possibilities that challenged their position. It had a somewhat awkward readability as well. The cast of characters is huge and for those unfamiliar with Arabic names and terms the amount of new names and designations makes for a confusing narrative. This has less to do with the authors or writing and more to do with the subject matter; the authors did a good job organizationally to present the matter in a way to facilitate understanding.
If you were to read only one book on the Taliban, I would not recommend this book to be it. If you follow the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Afghan war more generally, this is a great addition to that larger body of work.
March 31, 2013
A meticulously researched account of the assumptions that have framed our longest war. The authors, as residents of Khandahar, were able to have unprecendeted levels of access to information. Unlike many accounts of America's involvement in Afghanistan, this book is a much more scholarly and analytical account; free of an obvious idealogical bias. The authors have copious footnotes, and an exhaustive bibliography, that is alone an essential for anyone intrested in a serious study of the recent history of Afghanistan.
The only reason I can fathom that this book has not recieved more attention in the US, is it's fundamental rejection of the established post-9/11 narrative, which was to conflate the Taliban with Al Qaeda. Truly, it should cause policy makers significant axiety to realize that little was known or understood about the Afghan Taliban's existence as a political movement, with significantly different agendas and goals than the from of Al Qaeda. Anyone currently repsonsible for exploring any credible progress towards peace negotiations, needs to read this book. Yesterday.
The only reason I can fathom that this book has not recieved more attention in the US, is it's fundamental rejection of the established post-9/11 narrative, which was to conflate the Taliban with Al Qaeda. Truly, it should cause policy makers significant axiety to realize that little was known or understood about the Afghan Taliban's existence as a political movement, with significantly different agendas and goals than the from of Al Qaeda. Anyone currently repsonsible for exploring any credible progress towards peace negotiations, needs to read this book. Yesterday.
August 24, 2012
(Review based on ARC from NetGalley)
For more than a decade at this point, we have been fighting a war in Afghanistan, mostly premised on a connection between the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda. Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn show how, if that connection ever really existed, today it mostly exists in our imaginations. The Taliban and al-Qaeda come from different Islamic traditions, have different strategic aims, and appeal to different constituencies. So ultimately, given that Afghanistan doesn't have much inherent strategic value, and that the Taliban have never really been as radical as the West has thought, withdrawing from Afghanistan should not pose that much of a threat to us. In fact, we should probably get out sooner, rather than later, before the latest generation of Afghans become irrevocably radicalized. Everyone who is writing or thinking about Afghanistan should read this book. Perhaps that would bring some actual clarity to the debate over withdrawal.
For more than a decade at this point, we have been fighting a war in Afghanistan, mostly premised on a connection between the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda. Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn show how, if that connection ever really existed, today it mostly exists in our imaginations. The Taliban and al-Qaeda come from different Islamic traditions, have different strategic aims, and appeal to different constituencies. So ultimately, given that Afghanistan doesn't have much inherent strategic value, and that the Taliban have never really been as radical as the West has thought, withdrawing from Afghanistan should not pose that much of a threat to us. In fact, we should probably get out sooner, rather than later, before the latest generation of Afghans become irrevocably radicalized. Everyone who is writing or thinking about Afghanistan should read this book. Perhaps that would bring some actual clarity to the debate over withdrawal.
March 26, 2012
Erm. Well, I wrote it.
May 7, 2013
Excellent Primer on the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.
March 29, 2019
A very comprehensive and well documented history of relationship between Al Qaida and Afghan Taliban. Appreciation for well referenced text.
July 26, 2022
This is amongst the finest rebuttals to the myth of 'Talqaeda' and of the Taliban's supposed fusion with international jihadism in general. Linschoten and Kuehn trace the histories of Al Qaeda (AQ) and the Taliban (TB) from their origins to the early 2010s, the time of publication. They first discuss the forebears of the men who would eventually compose both organizations. For AQ, this would be the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly the radical faction founded by Sayyid Qutb, which advocated violent revolution against the various governments in the (Arab) Muslim world. For TB, this would be the tradition of apolitical Deobandi village madrassas. The authors note that there was a generational gap between AQ and TB. By the time that influential AQ leaders were in their late teens and early twenties, their TB counterparts were still children or young teenagers. Linschoten and Kuehn next trace the trajectories of these figures through the (1) Soviet war, then the (2) Civil War, and finally the (3) Taliban's major sweep. During (1), the would-be TB organized themselves into 'taliban / mullah fronts' which were informal groupings of students (or taliban) from the same madrassa or the same mullah who took arms against the Soviets; these were typically un- or only loosely affiliated to the Islamist parties. In contrast, the foreign Arab fighters who formed AQ were linked root and branch to the parties and transnational Islamist networks. During (2) the TB demobilized and returned to the madrassas since they found all warring parties repellant. Meanwhile, the Arabs either went abroad to new 'jihadi fronts' (e.g. Chechnya, Bosnia) or they remained with the Afghan parties in hopes of building an Islamist state. During (3), the TB was formed almost by accident, beginning with the remobilization of the taliban fronts and their lightning sweeps of all rivals. Linschoten and Kuehn insightfully note that at this stage, the TB operated purely in reaction to given circumstances; the movement proper thus arose post-hoc. In contrast, the Arab fighters remained at a distance from the TB, entering into agreements usually opportunistically. At this stage, AQ proper would be formed proper.
The TB would 'inherit' Bin Laden and AQ in their conquest of Jalalabad. Linschoten and Kuehn note that OBL was initially quite worried about what this would entail. They discuss the various precedents to 9/11 and convincingly argue that with all of them, the TB was completely unaware until the attacks actually happened and reached the news. Oftentimes, the TB, Mullah Omar especially, grew incensed at the trouble the Arabs were causing. Strangely, Omar still tolerated OBL's presence despite the latter's increasingly flagrant violations of his hosts' rules. Linschoten and Kuehn pin this on a growing bond of friendship between the two. This has not borne out well in light of more recent findings. In her own investigations–among them, an interview with OBL's son–Bette Dam finds that Omar and OBL greatly disliked each other for a host of reasons: ideological, organizational, personal, etc. With the American invasion and occupation, Linschoten and Kuehn note that the TB grew much more focused in nationalist aims of restoring Afghan sovereignty and in actual governance. Relations with the AQ were almost entirely limited to individual connections between members of both organizations. The authors' final discussions of peace talks have aged very poorly, hence my granting of 4 rather than 5 stars. The last two chapters were rendered entirely obsolete by 15 August, 2021. The discussion in the other chapters more than make up for it however.
The TB would 'inherit' Bin Laden and AQ in their conquest of Jalalabad. Linschoten and Kuehn note that OBL was initially quite worried about what this would entail. They discuss the various precedents to 9/11 and convincingly argue that with all of them, the TB was completely unaware until the attacks actually happened and reached the news. Oftentimes, the TB, Mullah Omar especially, grew incensed at the trouble the Arabs were causing. Strangely, Omar still tolerated OBL's presence despite the latter's increasingly flagrant violations of his hosts' rules. Linschoten and Kuehn pin this on a growing bond of friendship between the two. This has not borne out well in light of more recent findings. In her own investigations–among them, an interview with OBL's son–Bette Dam finds that Omar and OBL greatly disliked each other for a host of reasons: ideological, organizational, personal, etc. With the American invasion and occupation, Linschoten and Kuehn note that the TB grew much more focused in nationalist aims of restoring Afghan sovereignty and in actual governance. Relations with the AQ were almost entirely limited to individual connections between members of both organizations. The authors' final discussions of peace talks have aged very poorly, hence my granting of 4 rather than 5 stars. The last two chapters were rendered entirely obsolete by 15 August, 2021. The discussion in the other chapters more than make up for it however.
May 22, 2021
This book is excellent, and every American should be required to read this in high school as part of a history course about American foreign policy. It is a thorough anthropological work by two scholars who lived in Afghanistan during their research project. Rather than the "viewer from away," perspective given by so many who write about "terrorism," these scholars sought to understand the people and society in which radical political groups existed.
The authors used many primary sources, often including selections from the first English translations of different texts that were important to the intellectual and political development of both Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
The book also goes to great lengths to disspell the often repeated American myth that Al Qaeda and the Taliban are somehow the same group, despite having completely divergent goals, religious influences and origin stories.
5/5
The authors used many primary sources, often including selections from the first English translations of different texts that were important to the intellectual and political development of both Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
The book also goes to great lengths to disspell the often repeated American myth that Al Qaeda and the Taliban are somehow the same group, despite having completely divergent goals, religious influences and origin stories.
5/5
May 11, 2018
This book looks at the relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda (or lack of relationship). It describes their origins, as well as their tumultuous co-existence in Afghanistan prior to 9/11. Although the Bush regime described them as allies, the reality is that they were at best tense neighbors, who shared neither an ideology nor aims. Rather than cooperating in 9/11, the authors show how the Taliban were actually trying to prevent al-Qaeda from attacking outside nations and bringing attention to Afghanistan. Rather than the myth of global jihad, the Taliban are actually a Pashtun nationalist group with few interests outside the traditional Pashtun homeland.
March 31, 2013
I suppose I have to say this...
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews