Strategy and Arms Control by Thomas C. Schelling

by Thomas C. Schelling

2014 Reprint of 1961 Edition. Full facsimile of the original edition. Not reproduced with Optical Recognition Software. This study is an attempt to identify the meaning of arms control in the post war period. It presents an analysis of arms control with particular emphasis on the military policy involved. The general objectives of the study is to advance some aspects of the intellectual state of the art in arms control and to provide some concrete data on the technical and strategic problems of importance. Schelling remains relevant today for his work on game theory.

Genres: Politics, International Relations

Hardcover

First published January 1, 1975

About the author

Thomas Crombie Schelling was an American economist and professor of foreign affairs, national security, nuclear strategy, and arms control at the School of Public Policy at University of Maryland, College Park. He is also co-faculty at the New England Complex Systems Institute. He was awarded the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics (shared with Robert Aumann) for "having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis."

Excerpted from Wikipedia.

Reviews

[Mikhail Farhath-Kupriyanov]

A classic text on arms control and its potential implications an how it can work. Given that it is a foundational text, it's key to read but is ultimately dated and suffers from lack of sophisticated arguments.