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The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran
The dramatic secret history of our undeclared thirty-year conflict with Iran, revealing newsbreaking episodes of covert and deadly operations that brought the two nations to the brink of open war
For three decades, the United States and Iran have engaged in a secret war. It is a conflict that has never been acknowledged and a story that has never been told.
This surreptitious war began with the Iranian revolution and simmers today inside Iraq and in the Persian Gulf. Fights rage in the shadows, between the CIA and its network of spies and Iran's intelligence agency. Battles are fought at sea with Iranians in small speedboats attacking Western oil tankers. This conflict has frustrated five American presidents, divided administrations, and repeatedly threatened to bring the two nations into open warfare. It is a story of shocking miscalculations, bitter debates, hidden casualties, boldness, and betrayal.
A senior historian for the federal government with unparalleled access to senior officials and key documents of several U.S. administrations, Crist has spent more than ten years researching and writing The Twilight War, and he breaks new ground on virtually every page. Crist describes the series of secret negotiations between Iran and the United States after 9/11, culminating in Iran's proposal for a grand bargain for peace-which the Bush administration turned down. He documents the clandestine counterattack Iran launched after America's 2003 invasion of Iraq, in which thousands of soldiers disguised as reporters, tourists, pilgrims, and aid workers toiled to change the government in Baghdad and undercut American attempts to pacify the Iraqi insurgency. And he reveals in vivid detail for the first time a number of important stories of military and intelligence operations by both sides, both successes and failures, and their typically unexpected consequences.
Much has changed in the world since 1979, but Iran and America remain each other's biggest national security nightmares. "The Iran problem" is a razor-sharp briar patch that has claimed its sixth presidential victim in Barack Obama and his administration. The Twilight War adds vital new depth to our understanding of this acute dilemma it is also a thrillingly engrossing read, animated by a healthy irony about human failings in the fog of not-quite war.
For three decades, the United States and Iran have engaged in a secret war. It is a conflict that has never been acknowledged and a story that has never been told.
This surreptitious war began with the Iranian revolution and simmers today inside Iraq and in the Persian Gulf. Fights rage in the shadows, between the CIA and its network of spies and Iran's intelligence agency. Battles are fought at sea with Iranians in small speedboats attacking Western oil tankers. This conflict has frustrated five American presidents, divided administrations, and repeatedly threatened to bring the two nations into open warfare. It is a story of shocking miscalculations, bitter debates, hidden casualties, boldness, and betrayal.
A senior historian for the federal government with unparalleled access to senior officials and key documents of several U.S. administrations, Crist has spent more than ten years researching and writing The Twilight War, and he breaks new ground on virtually every page. Crist describes the series of secret negotiations between Iran and the United States after 9/11, culminating in Iran's proposal for a grand bargain for peace-which the Bush administration turned down. He documents the clandestine counterattack Iran launched after America's 2003 invasion of Iraq, in which thousands of soldiers disguised as reporters, tourists, pilgrims, and aid workers toiled to change the government in Baghdad and undercut American attempts to pacify the Iraqi insurgency. And he reveals in vivid detail for the first time a number of important stories of military and intelligence operations by both sides, both successes and failures, and their typically unexpected consequences.
Much has changed in the world since 1979, but Iran and America remain each other's biggest national security nightmares. "The Iran problem" is a razor-sharp briar patch that has claimed its sixth presidential victim in Barack Obama and his administration. The Twilight War adds vital new depth to our understanding of this acute dilemma it is also a thrillingly engrossing read, animated by a healthy irony about human failings in the fog of not-quite war.
656 pages, Hardcover
First published July 19, 2012
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3470 people want to read
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April 6, 2017
What We Didn't Know About the U.S. Relationship With Iran
If you were among those who sighed with relief when Barack Obama was reelected because you’d been concerned that a Republican administration would invade Iran, David Crist has news for you. In fact, The Twilight War is full of surprises, even for one who stays relatively well informed about world affairs. The underlying message — the meta-message, if you’ll permit that conceit — is that what we normally consume on a daily basis as “news” is an awkward mixture of critical opinion, wishful thinking, rumor, partisan posturing, self-serving news leaks, and a smattering of hard information.
When it comes to Iran, the purveyors of news have done an especially poor job of keeping us informed. As David Crist makes clear in this illuminating report on the three decades of conflict, tension, miscalculation, and profound misunderstanding that have characterized our two countries’ relationship, we have indeed engaged in what can only be described as war for several extended periods. And when I say war, I mean soldiers, sailors, and air force pilots shooting at one another, laying mines, launching missiles at ships and ground facilities, and generally forcing one or both of the two governments to decide between escalation and retreat. There was even one heart-stopping incident during the Reagan Administration when a rogue, high-ranking U.S. Admiral conspired with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to invade Iran with massive force — and, apparently, was ordered to pull back from the brink largely because the Administration was consumed with covering up the President’s active role in the Iran-Contra affair.
The 2004 Presidential election campaign brought into the spotlight the U.S. support for Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s because Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had been photographed shaking hands with Saddam. Then we learned, some of us for the first time, that the U.S. had supplied weapons and munitions to Iraq. However, what went largely unreported was the extent to which the U.S. military built up its forces in the Persian Gulf to prevent Iran from flanking Iraq or widening the war to the Gulf Arab states, provided combat intelligence that helped Iraq turn back Iranian advances, and even intervened with force on Iraq’s side from time to time.
It was this history — combined with an understanding of the neoconservative design on the region — that led the Iranian leadership to conclude in 2003 that the U.S. invasion of Iraq presaged an imminent attack on Iran itself. The Ayatollah Khamenei and his minions were so frightened of this prospect that they used every backchannel available to them to attempt to get the U.S. to the negotiating table, where they were prepared to arrive at a grand solution to the differences between the two countries. Are you surprised to learn that the Bush Administration flatly rejected the overtures?
In other words, this has been a nail-biting relationship. Even worse, the outlook today doesn’t look any brighter than it ever has.
Author David Crist is a military historian for the U.S. Government, a reserve Marine Corps colonel, and the son of one of the early four-star commanders of CENTCOM, which was created in the 1980s to coordinate U.S. military affairs involving Iran and the Middle East. Given this pedigree, it’s not unfair to wonder whether Crist himself is guilty of some of the same sins I attributed earlier to the news media. Clearly, he’s extremely well informed and had access to military and government archives that might well be closed to other writers. However, a little poking around on the Web reveals that Crist got at least a few of his facts wrong, and in some places his interpretation of events has clearly been colored by his official associations.
The Twilight War is an especially dense work. The hardcover edition runs to 656 pages, but it reads as though it’s a thousand, largely because Crist (military historian to the core) seems to include a capsule biography of every other officer and combatant engaged in every firefight he reports. Like the epic dramas of Cecil B. DeMille, The Twilight War has a cast of thousands. All in all though, this is a revealing and important book, well worth reading, even if that means slogging through the mud.
If you were among those who sighed with relief when Barack Obama was reelected because you’d been concerned that a Republican administration would invade Iran, David Crist has news for you. In fact, The Twilight War is full of surprises, even for one who stays relatively well informed about world affairs. The underlying message — the meta-message, if you’ll permit that conceit — is that what we normally consume on a daily basis as “news” is an awkward mixture of critical opinion, wishful thinking, rumor, partisan posturing, self-serving news leaks, and a smattering of hard information.
When it comes to Iran, the purveyors of news have done an especially poor job of keeping us informed. As David Crist makes clear in this illuminating report on the three decades of conflict, tension, miscalculation, and profound misunderstanding that have characterized our two countries’ relationship, we have indeed engaged in what can only be described as war for several extended periods. And when I say war, I mean soldiers, sailors, and air force pilots shooting at one another, laying mines, launching missiles at ships and ground facilities, and generally forcing one or both of the two governments to decide between escalation and retreat. There was even one heart-stopping incident during the Reagan Administration when a rogue, high-ranking U.S. Admiral conspired with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to invade Iran with massive force — and, apparently, was ordered to pull back from the brink largely because the Administration was consumed with covering up the President’s active role in the Iran-Contra affair.
The 2004 Presidential election campaign brought into the spotlight the U.S. support for Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s because Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had been photographed shaking hands with Saddam. Then we learned, some of us for the first time, that the U.S. had supplied weapons and munitions to Iraq. However, what went largely unreported was the extent to which the U.S. military built up its forces in the Persian Gulf to prevent Iran from flanking Iraq or widening the war to the Gulf Arab states, provided combat intelligence that helped Iraq turn back Iranian advances, and even intervened with force on Iraq’s side from time to time.
It was this history — combined with an understanding of the neoconservative design on the region — that led the Iranian leadership to conclude in 2003 that the U.S. invasion of Iraq presaged an imminent attack on Iran itself. The Ayatollah Khamenei and his minions were so frightened of this prospect that they used every backchannel available to them to attempt to get the U.S. to the negotiating table, where they were prepared to arrive at a grand solution to the differences between the two countries. Are you surprised to learn that the Bush Administration flatly rejected the overtures?
In other words, this has been a nail-biting relationship. Even worse, the outlook today doesn’t look any brighter than it ever has.
Author David Crist is a military historian for the U.S. Government, a reserve Marine Corps colonel, and the son of one of the early four-star commanders of CENTCOM, which was created in the 1980s to coordinate U.S. military affairs involving Iran and the Middle East. Given this pedigree, it’s not unfair to wonder whether Crist himself is guilty of some of the same sins I attributed earlier to the news media. Clearly, he’s extremely well informed and had access to military and government archives that might well be closed to other writers. However, a little poking around on the Web reveals that Crist got at least a few of his facts wrong, and in some places his interpretation of events has clearly been colored by his official associations.
The Twilight War is an especially dense work. The hardcover edition runs to 656 pages, but it reads as though it’s a thousand, largely because Crist (military historian to the core) seems to include a capsule biography of every other officer and combatant engaged in every firefight he reports. Like the epic dramas of Cecil B. DeMille, The Twilight War has a cast of thousands. All in all though, this is a revealing and important book, well worth reading, even if that means slogging through the mud.
April 12, 2026
Updated April 12, 2026
Seeing the Three Stooges, Vance, Kushner, and Witkoff, conducting what now passes for American diplomacy predictably fail in "negotiations" with Iran, only the Lord and Allah know what will come next. One of the concluding observations of this book, written more than thirteen years ago, was ringing in my brain this morning:
The United States, with Israel's support, initiated a war against Iran early this morning (if you haven't caught on by now, weekends when most Americans are sleeping is when the Trump regime does most of its most outrageous violations of the Constitution and basic human decency).
I read this book last year because it was obvious that what happened this morning was going to occur. Literally nothing about this regime is unpredictable, except for timing. Should you want to get an understanding of why this is happening, and although this book was published more than a decade ago, it is now essential reading. Anyone who does won't be able to do anything about American-led terrorism in Iran, but they'll understand that what we're seeing is just a continuation, more of the same that began in the 1940s.
Here are some additional thoughts I wrote and posted after writing the short rant above, should they interest you. The worst thing about seeing an out-of-control train about to hit you is knowing that it was coming just as it became a dot on the horizon.
Original review:
My immediate reaction upon finishing this was that it is the best book on American public policy I have ever read. It covers the period from just before the hostage crisis of 1979 until the middle of the first of Obama administration. Anyone working on American-Iranian relations or anything having to to do with the Middle East and Persian Gulf who has not read this book is committing dereliction of duty. I'll need some time to gather my thoughts. Crist's narrative makes a convoluted, deadly history of misunderstandings understandable. Plus he was never afraid to pass judgment from the point of view of a policy historian. Exceptional.
Seeing the Three Stooges, Vance, Kushner, and Witkoff, conducting what now passes for American diplomacy predictably fail in "negotiations" with Iran, only the Lord and Allah know what will come next. One of the concluding observations of this book, written more than thirteen years ago, was ringing in my brain this morning:
By refusing to talk to Iran, the United States operated blindly. American diplomats and intelligence analysts had minimal insight into the opinions of the Iranian people or its government and largely depended on third parties for information and insight into the country. In the end, American policy rested on prejudice and supposition more than fact.Updated February 28, 2026
The United States, with Israel's support, initiated a war against Iran early this morning (if you haven't caught on by now, weekends when most Americans are sleeping is when the Trump regime does most of its most outrageous violations of the Constitution and basic human decency).
I read this book last year because it was obvious that what happened this morning was going to occur. Literally nothing about this regime is unpredictable, except for timing. Should you want to get an understanding of why this is happening, and although this book was published more than a decade ago, it is now essential reading. Anyone who does won't be able to do anything about American-led terrorism in Iran, but they'll understand that what we're seeing is just a continuation, more of the same that began in the 1940s.
Here are some additional thoughts I wrote and posted after writing the short rant above, should they interest you. The worst thing about seeing an out-of-control train about to hit you is knowing that it was coming just as it became a dot on the horizon.
Original review:
My immediate reaction upon finishing this was that it is the best book on American public policy I have ever read. It covers the period from just before the hostage crisis of 1979 until the middle of the first of Obama administration. Anyone working on American-Iranian relations or anything having to to do with the Middle East and Persian Gulf who has not read this book is committing dereliction of duty. I'll need some time to gather my thoughts. Crist's narrative makes a convoluted, deadly history of misunderstandings understandable. Plus he was never afraid to pass judgment from the point of view of a policy historian. Exceptional.
October 4, 2012
I commend Dr Crist for the incredible level of detail he offers in this book...it made for great reading! Additionally, I very much appreciate his position (highlighted constantly throughout the book) that this "twilight war" is the fault of BOTH sides and will only be fixed if both sides set aside years of acrimony and distrust. However, I do feel that Dr Crist rushed the portion covering the Obama presidency. I would've enjoyed reading more about the attempted assassination of the Saudi ambassador, an event which, despite Dr Crist's evidence, I still do not believe received official (i.e. Supreme Leader) blessing.
The Reagan administration (1981-89) takes up approx. three hundred pages or more than half the book. This may not indicate any political bias either way as the Reagan administration was tasked with dealing with the Iran-Iraq war, the 1983 marine barracks bombing in Lebanon by Hezbollah, and Iran-Contra affair. No president since Reagan has been tasked with dealing with quite so much on the Iran front.
This twilight war, like any other war conventional or otherwise has ebbed and flowed, perhaps explaining why some presidents get so much coverage, while some get decidedly less. The war was hot during the Reagan and Bush II administrations, while other presidents had other concerns (Bush I had the Gulf War, while Clinton had his own personal conduct to deal with, for example.)
Crist because of his unique position is able to take the reader on ships and airplanes that had the task of patrolling the Persian Gulf with the pilots and crewmen while simultaneously taking us inside presidential administrations to detail the decision making and infighting among administration officials, which I feel is the ultimate strength of the book.
The Iran issue created divisions within every American presidents administration and perhaps surprisingly within the leadership of Iran towards the United States as well. This ultimately creates a book where both sides come out looking equally at fault and no president comes out looking spectacular. Both Iran and the United States have missed opportunities to potentially lessen the hostilities.
This is an extremely interesting, well written and thorough book that reviews that past 30 years or so of interactions, both political and military, between the US and Iran. Working with a breadth of materials, and a knowledge of the arena surely aided by his father being one of the Marine generals in charge of military forces in the region, the author traces how the US and Iran have been waging a simmering and sometimes active war, ranging from the Iran-Contra affair to the arming of Iraqi insurgents. It crosses many different administrations, both in the US and Iran, and paints a less than positive picture of both. You'll see how the mistrusts and various agendas prevented potential relations between the two countries, as well as places where they cooperated on issues such as the war in Afghanistan. There is a good balance to the military and political aspects, both covert and overt. You'll learn about the cooperation between the US and Iran during various administrations (such as major arms sales during the Reagan administration despite clear warning signs) as well as deep cooperation between the US and Iraq prior to the US-Iraqi wars. The book goes beyond Iran to cover Hezbolla, Lebanon, and many other related issues.
Although there are a few places in the book that could use some editing, overall it flowed very well, and covered an extremely complex topic in depth without simplifications, and with what to me, at least, seemed like very little bias. Much of the time it certainly felt as if the information were so detailed as to be classified... which really added to the sense of completeness.
Despite the book's length and depth, this is an easy and quick read. Crist can tell a story, and he is equally comfortable writing both the viewpoints of a SEAL or pilot or grunt as he is about admirals, generals, and cabinet secretaries. He is equally facile narrating battles and internecine warfare in the United States' national security apparatus. He has a point of view too. It comes through, not so subtly, in his references to one president as the "decider" (who, thanks to a protective NSC director who later became a cabinet secretary, was hardly given anything important to decide on Iran until it was too late to make any decisions that made a difference) and his descriptions of American officials for whom not talking to Iran when Iran might be ready to talk is a matter of faith, and not reason. No doubt due to the opacity of its government, he has a harder time describing internal deliberations in post-Pahlevi Iran, but he nevertheless shows time after time the difficulties of judging whether overtures from Iran have the support of those who count in its government, and thus whether such engagement in the end might be a waste of time.
Crist shows how the origins of the steaming mass of rubbish that has become American-Iranian political relations has its roots in the Cold War; the United States was so focused - one may even say distracted - with the Soviet Union, that out depth and breadth of intelligence was extremely shallow, our political and intelligence bench narrow. As Iran imploded in revolution in 1979, the US was largely caught off guard, and made a number of missteps that were misunderstood by the newly born Iranian Islamic Republic. Relations became more critical and the stakes rasied with the "Carter Doctrine" - essentially stating that American national interests were tied to the export of oil. This doctrine shaped American policy in the Arabian Gulf to the present day.
The level of detail Crist goes into in discussing the evolution of policy is superb, as each action by one party has an immediate (and frequently opposite reaction) from the other side. The origins of Iran's involvement in Hezbollah (and American missteps in the Lebanese civil war), the Achille Lauro incident and Iran-Contra in the 80s are all examples of the escalating conflict and the proxy fighting that was, in many respects, reminiscent of the proxy wars and combative invectives between the US and the USSR at the height of the Cold War.
What I found most interesting (and what took up a good quarter of the book) was the "hot war" waged between Iran and the US in the Persian Gulf in the 1980s. This includes not only the well publicized incidents with the USS Stark and USS Vincennes and, but also lesser known incidents: the USS Samuel B. Roberts striking a mine, American operatives and Marines engaging with (and destroying) the Sirri oil platforms. I had forgotten that this was taking place simultaneously as Iraq and Iran were battering each other inflicting thousands of casualties on each other.
While Crist points out there is plenty of blame to pass around for the poor state of affairs between Iran and America (on both sides), he certainly treats George H.W. Bush - and especially his cabinet - to a scathing assessment of their handling of foreign policy in the region. Rumsfeld in particular is treated pretty harshly: inundating subordinates in the Defense Department with micromanaging "snowflake memos," placing demands on subordinate generals to have invasion and occupation plans submitted within 30 days and (what I found to be most egregious), his role in creating a "myopic policy" in Iraq that included no exploration of the ramifications of the removal of Iran's long-time archrival when the US invaded Iraq. Little wonder then, that the Iranians saw every action by the US as an attempt to overthrow its Islamic Republic; in fact, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Feith actively sought to make this happen. No one should have been surprised when Iran actively infiltrated the Iraqi army and policy following the American invasion and occupation. Sadly, we were, the result of a "woefully unprepared Foreign Service." Crist concludes his brilliant history with a close examination of Iran's nuclear policy, and the difficulties leaders in both countries now face towards reaching any sort of rapprochement, in spite of the more moderate election of Khatani in the early 2000s, and overtures (and more missed opportunities ) in May 2003 and again in December, 2003.
I was favorably impressed with most of the politicians and military figures discussed in this book. The majority of them were truly honorable and capable persons performing very complex jobs during stressful and chaotic times. With the advantage of 20/20 hindsight, I would have made some decisions differently, but I have no real confidence that my decisions would have led to better outcomes. The most consistent impression I derived from this book, was the very sobering realization that there are no easy solutions to the problems bedeviling US/Iran relations. There are many easy answers, but no easy solutions. Even with the advantage of hindsight, it is still unclear to me that there was a RIGHT answer to many of the policy decisions discussed in this book. While many people love to blame the Iran hostage crisis on Carter's supposed spinelessness and the Iran-Contra scandal on Reagan's naivety, this book clearly shows the complexity of these issues.
A remarkably fair and even handed book, highest recommendation.
The Reagan administration (1981-89) takes up approx. three hundred pages or more than half the book. This may not indicate any political bias either way as the Reagan administration was tasked with dealing with the Iran-Iraq war, the 1983 marine barracks bombing in Lebanon by Hezbollah, and Iran-Contra affair. No president since Reagan has been tasked with dealing with quite so much on the Iran front.
This twilight war, like any other war conventional or otherwise has ebbed and flowed, perhaps explaining why some presidents get so much coverage, while some get decidedly less. The war was hot during the Reagan and Bush II administrations, while other presidents had other concerns (Bush I had the Gulf War, while Clinton had his own personal conduct to deal with, for example.)
Crist because of his unique position is able to take the reader on ships and airplanes that had the task of patrolling the Persian Gulf with the pilots and crewmen while simultaneously taking us inside presidential administrations to detail the decision making and infighting among administration officials, which I feel is the ultimate strength of the book.
The Iran issue created divisions within every American presidents administration and perhaps surprisingly within the leadership of Iran towards the United States as well. This ultimately creates a book where both sides come out looking equally at fault and no president comes out looking spectacular. Both Iran and the United States have missed opportunities to potentially lessen the hostilities.
This is an extremely interesting, well written and thorough book that reviews that past 30 years or so of interactions, both political and military, between the US and Iran. Working with a breadth of materials, and a knowledge of the arena surely aided by his father being one of the Marine generals in charge of military forces in the region, the author traces how the US and Iran have been waging a simmering and sometimes active war, ranging from the Iran-Contra affair to the arming of Iraqi insurgents. It crosses many different administrations, both in the US and Iran, and paints a less than positive picture of both. You'll see how the mistrusts and various agendas prevented potential relations between the two countries, as well as places where they cooperated on issues such as the war in Afghanistan. There is a good balance to the military and political aspects, both covert and overt. You'll learn about the cooperation between the US and Iran during various administrations (such as major arms sales during the Reagan administration despite clear warning signs) as well as deep cooperation between the US and Iraq prior to the US-Iraqi wars. The book goes beyond Iran to cover Hezbolla, Lebanon, and many other related issues.
Although there are a few places in the book that could use some editing, overall it flowed very well, and covered an extremely complex topic in depth without simplifications, and with what to me, at least, seemed like very little bias. Much of the time it certainly felt as if the information were so detailed as to be classified... which really added to the sense of completeness.
Despite the book's length and depth, this is an easy and quick read. Crist can tell a story, and he is equally comfortable writing both the viewpoints of a SEAL or pilot or grunt as he is about admirals, generals, and cabinet secretaries. He is equally facile narrating battles and internecine warfare in the United States' national security apparatus. He has a point of view too. It comes through, not so subtly, in his references to one president as the "decider" (who, thanks to a protective NSC director who later became a cabinet secretary, was hardly given anything important to decide on Iran until it was too late to make any decisions that made a difference) and his descriptions of American officials for whom not talking to Iran when Iran might be ready to talk is a matter of faith, and not reason. No doubt due to the opacity of its government, he has a harder time describing internal deliberations in post-Pahlevi Iran, but he nevertheless shows time after time the difficulties of judging whether overtures from Iran have the support of those who count in its government, and thus whether such engagement in the end might be a waste of time.
Crist shows how the origins of the steaming mass of rubbish that has become American-Iranian political relations has its roots in the Cold War; the United States was so focused - one may even say distracted - with the Soviet Union, that out depth and breadth of intelligence was extremely shallow, our political and intelligence bench narrow. As Iran imploded in revolution in 1979, the US was largely caught off guard, and made a number of missteps that were misunderstood by the newly born Iranian Islamic Republic. Relations became more critical and the stakes rasied with the "Carter Doctrine" - essentially stating that American national interests were tied to the export of oil. This doctrine shaped American policy in the Arabian Gulf to the present day.
The level of detail Crist goes into in discussing the evolution of policy is superb, as each action by one party has an immediate (and frequently opposite reaction) from the other side. The origins of Iran's involvement in Hezbollah (and American missteps in the Lebanese civil war), the Achille Lauro incident and Iran-Contra in the 80s are all examples of the escalating conflict and the proxy fighting that was, in many respects, reminiscent of the proxy wars and combative invectives between the US and the USSR at the height of the Cold War.
What I found most interesting (and what took up a good quarter of the book) was the "hot war" waged between Iran and the US in the Persian Gulf in the 1980s. This includes not only the well publicized incidents with the USS Stark and USS Vincennes and, but also lesser known incidents: the USS Samuel B. Roberts striking a mine, American operatives and Marines engaging with (and destroying) the Sirri oil platforms. I had forgotten that this was taking place simultaneously as Iraq and Iran were battering each other inflicting thousands of casualties on each other.
While Crist points out there is plenty of blame to pass around for the poor state of affairs between Iran and America (on both sides), he certainly treats George H.W. Bush - and especially his cabinet - to a scathing assessment of their handling of foreign policy in the region. Rumsfeld in particular is treated pretty harshly: inundating subordinates in the Defense Department with micromanaging "snowflake memos," placing demands on subordinate generals to have invasion and occupation plans submitted within 30 days and (what I found to be most egregious), his role in creating a "myopic policy" in Iraq that included no exploration of the ramifications of the removal of Iran's long-time archrival when the US invaded Iraq. Little wonder then, that the Iranians saw every action by the US as an attempt to overthrow its Islamic Republic; in fact, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Feith actively sought to make this happen. No one should have been surprised when Iran actively infiltrated the Iraqi army and policy following the American invasion and occupation. Sadly, we were, the result of a "woefully unprepared Foreign Service." Crist concludes his brilliant history with a close examination of Iran's nuclear policy, and the difficulties leaders in both countries now face towards reaching any sort of rapprochement, in spite of the more moderate election of Khatani in the early 2000s, and overtures (and more missed opportunities ) in May 2003 and again in December, 2003.
I was favorably impressed with most of the politicians and military figures discussed in this book. The majority of them were truly honorable and capable persons performing very complex jobs during stressful and chaotic times. With the advantage of 20/20 hindsight, I would have made some decisions differently, but I have no real confidence that my decisions would have led to better outcomes. The most consistent impression I derived from this book, was the very sobering realization that there are no easy solutions to the problems bedeviling US/Iran relations. There are many easy answers, but no easy solutions. Even with the advantage of hindsight, it is still unclear to me that there was a RIGHT answer to many of the policy decisions discussed in this book. While many people love to blame the Iran hostage crisis on Carter's supposed spinelessness and the Iran-Contra scandal on Reagan's naivety, this book clearly shows the complexity of these issues.
A remarkably fair and even handed book, highest recommendation.
June 22, 2018
The author, a senior historian for the government, tackles a difficult, convoluted, complex and politically charged topic – the US/Iranian “relationship” over the last thirty plus years – a conflict which seemingly has been on the brink of disaster, i.e. war, for most of that time. Covering five presidencies, multiple “close calls” and missed opportunities, the clash of cultures and religion, and political infighting on both sides - all of this brewing within the cauldron of the Middle East - The story presented here is not a pretty one, but the result is a coherent and engaging narrative – at times reading like an action/espionage thriller – albeit one with real world and deadly consequences.
The thirty years covered here are tumultuous to say the least - the hostage crisis, the Iranian/Iraqi War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Lebanon, the founding of Hezbollah, the Reagan administration’s arms for hostage “deal”, the repeated and continual “minor” armed confrontations in the Persian Gulf, the first Gulf War and then the second – each new president wrestling with the confounding theocracy in Iran. The author does an excellent job of balancing the big picture with first-hand accounts from inside government meetings, military commands and soldiers/sailors “on the ground” – or on the sea - on both sides of the conflict. (The bureaucratic infighting between hard-liners and those looking to open doors of communication – again on both sides – is equally fascinating and frustrating to read.) Crist’s research is extraordinary, in its detail and presentation. And today as Iran is attempting to become a nuclear power – the thirty years of walking the US/Iran tightrope balancing diplomacy with military threats and embargoes – shows how difficult this relationship is, for as the more things change, unfortunately the more they remain the same.
Valuable reading and highly recommended.
The thirty years covered here are tumultuous to say the least - the hostage crisis, the Iranian/Iraqi War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Lebanon, the founding of Hezbollah, the Reagan administration’s arms for hostage “deal”, the repeated and continual “minor” armed confrontations in the Persian Gulf, the first Gulf War and then the second – each new president wrestling with the confounding theocracy in Iran. The author does an excellent job of balancing the big picture with first-hand accounts from inside government meetings, military commands and soldiers/sailors “on the ground” – or on the sea - on both sides of the conflict. (The bureaucratic infighting between hard-liners and those looking to open doors of communication – again on both sides – is equally fascinating and frustrating to read.) Crist’s research is extraordinary, in its detail and presentation. And today as Iran is attempting to become a nuclear power – the thirty years of walking the US/Iran tightrope balancing diplomacy with military threats and embargoes – shows how difficult this relationship is, for as the more things change, unfortunately the more they remain the same.
Valuable reading and highly recommended.
July 13, 2025
كتاب مهم لأي واحد عايز يعرف سبب العداء بين إيران والولايات المتحدة من البداية خالص، بعد ثورة 79
الكتاب ضم كمية معلومات كانت جديدة بالنسبالي، وكانت مفيدة جدًا بالنسبالي لفهم بدايات الصراعات الدائر دلوقتي.
مهم جدًا وينصح به، ولكن عيبه هو الإسهاب في تفاصيل كتيرة ملهاش لازمة ودي تقريبًا كانت 25% من الكتاب تقريبًا بس في النهاية الكتاب هيفيدك جدا
April 22, 2026
I really enjoyed this. It was published in 2012, so I wouldn't mind seeing a follow up book detailing the Obama deal up to the Trump administration, but very good nonetheless! The author glossed over a few things that seemed important to me, like the Shah's brutal secret police and troubling US and Israel actions, but as an ex soldier that was to be expected. Worth the read for anyone interested in US/Iran history!
January 17, 2020
With the targeted killing of Qods Force commander Qaseem Soleimani in the weeks proceeding the writing of this review, Iran has once more resurfaced in the news cycle. The hawks root for more bloodshed and war, while the doves insist this action makes the United States the bad guys.
Being a bit of a foreign policy and history jack-of-all-trades, I knew enough to know that Iran is not some innocent nation minding its own business when we suddenly blew up their special forces commander, but I also recognized I didn't know as much on Iran as I thought I did, and that additional research was required. Of course, I knew Qods Force funded and supported terrorist groups and that they'd taken over our embassy in 1979 (a fact any basic student of American special operations history knows), but I figured that it was as good of a time as any to dig into a book that had been recommended to me years ago and that had collected dust on my shelf as I delved into other works.
David Crist's THE TWILIGHT WAR is perhaps one of the most extensive and well-researched accounts on any topic that I have ever read. It's clear that Crist (a vaunted historian and reserve Marine officer) has done the research (by his account, over 400 interviews were conducted in the course of writing this book), and each step of the play-by-play has been captured, good and bad, by both sides.
From the final days of the Shah's rule, to the year-plus long takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran, to the Lebanon intervention, to the Iran-Iraq War, to the Khobar Tower bombings, to the Global War on Terror and Iraqi Freedom, Crist touches on every bit of American-Iran relations in what has been now a 41-year cold war that has at times heated up.
After reading this book, my conclusion closely mirrors Crist's assessment: this conflict is driven by mutual hatred and distrust. American attempts at rapprochement have been spurned by Iranian hardliners. Iranian attempts at rapprochement have been spurned by American hardliners. Both sides have been responsible for the deaths of innocent civilians. It's a vicious cycle that is bound to continue, especially with the Trump administration pulling out of the nuclear deal established by Obama, Shia militia escalation towards American forces in Iraq, and the aforementioned Soleimani killing.
I would strongly recommend this book to anyone seeking to intelligently comment on this conflict, whether or not they agree with my assessment. It is an incredibly written fountain of facts, and a well-informed argument will only enrich the debate.
Being a bit of a foreign policy and history jack-of-all-trades, I knew enough to know that Iran is not some innocent nation minding its own business when we suddenly blew up their special forces commander, but I also recognized I didn't know as much on Iran as I thought I did, and that additional research was required. Of course, I knew Qods Force funded and supported terrorist groups and that they'd taken over our embassy in 1979 (a fact any basic student of American special operations history knows), but I figured that it was as good of a time as any to dig into a book that had been recommended to me years ago and that had collected dust on my shelf as I delved into other works.
David Crist's THE TWILIGHT WAR is perhaps one of the most extensive and well-researched accounts on any topic that I have ever read. It's clear that Crist (a vaunted historian and reserve Marine officer) has done the research (by his account, over 400 interviews were conducted in the course of writing this book), and each step of the play-by-play has been captured, good and bad, by both sides.
From the final days of the Shah's rule, to the year-plus long takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran, to the Lebanon intervention, to the Iran-Iraq War, to the Khobar Tower bombings, to the Global War on Terror and Iraqi Freedom, Crist touches on every bit of American-Iran relations in what has been now a 41-year cold war that has at times heated up.
After reading this book, my conclusion closely mirrors Crist's assessment: this conflict is driven by mutual hatred and distrust. American attempts at rapprochement have been spurned by Iranian hardliners. Iranian attempts at rapprochement have been spurned by American hardliners. Both sides have been responsible for the deaths of innocent civilians. It's a vicious cycle that is bound to continue, especially with the Trump administration pulling out of the nuclear deal established by Obama, Shia militia escalation towards American forces in Iraq, and the aforementioned Soleimani killing.
I would strongly recommend this book to anyone seeking to intelligently comment on this conflict, whether or not they agree with my assessment. It is an incredibly written fountain of facts, and a well-informed argument will only enrich the debate.
March 2, 2013
I have followed US-Iranian relations for over forty years and David Crist's work is the best that I have come across. It is a maticuously researched book that explores most diplomatic and military aspects of the American-Iranian relationship since the decline of the Shah and his overthrow in 1979. Crist explores the role of all the major players during the period and he raises important questions as to whether the deterioration of Washington's relationship with Teheran could have been avoided are at least lessened significantly. The importance of this book can not be measured as Christ provides insight as to why Teheran has been the real victor resulting from the American invasion of Iraq. the twilight war may someday evolve into a "hot" war and policy makers and the general public should read this book very carefully. It is written in such a manner that the general public and the academic can benefit from. Based on current events Crist lays out some scary possibilities whether it pertains to the past or the future.
March 21, 2026
Mission 2026: Binge reviewing (and rereading on occasion) all previous Reads, I was too slothful to review, back when I read them.
Revisiting this tome in the shadow of the 2026 Iran–United States conflict is not just an act of rereading—it is an experience that feels uncannily like watching history catch up with analysis.
When I first read the book sometime around 2018 or 2019, it struck me as an extraordinarily detailed, almost exhaustive chronicle of a long, uneasy hostility that rarely erupted into open war but simmered continuously beneath the surface of global politics. Back then, it felt like a study in patterns—covert operations, naval stand-offs in the Persian Gulf, proxy conflicts, intelligence manoeuvres, diplomatic misfires. It was history, albeit recent history.
Now, rereading it in the present moment, against the backdrop of the 2026 crisis, the book no longer feels retrospective. It reads like a slow ignition—an account of strains that were always moving towards something larger, something inevitable, something we are now witnessing unfold in real time.
Crist’s central thesis—that the United States and Iran have been engaged in a sustained, undeclared conflict since the Iranian Revolution—acquires a frightening clarity today. What once seemed like episodic hostility now appears as a continuous strategic rivalry, evolving across decades but never truly dissipating.
The events of 2026—the escalation from proxy tensions to direct military confrontation—do not appear sudden when placed against Crist’s narrative. They feel like the logical culmination of a long series of miscalculations, retaliations, and entrenched suspicions.
The recent conflict, triggered by coordinated strikes from the United States and Israel on Iranian strategic targets, including the dramatic elimination of Iran’s Supreme Leader, marks a rupture that is at once shocking and strangely predictable.
Crist’s book prepares the reader, almost subconsciously, to recognise this moment not as an aberration but as an escalation long in the making.
What is principally prominent during this rereading is how accurately Crist captures the psychology of both sides. America appears throughout the book as a superpower attempting to manage and contain a regional adversary, often relying on technological superiority, alliances, and strategic pressure.
Iran, on the other hand, emerges as a state shaped by historical grievances, revolutionary ideology, and a deep-seated suspicion of Western intervention. These psychological frameworks create a cycle of action and reaction that becomes self-perpetuating. Each side interprets the other’s moves as confirmation of its worst fears, thereby justifying further escalation.
In the context of 2026, where missile strikes, drone warfare, and cyber operations have become daily realities, this cycle appears more dangerous than ever. The conflict is no longer confined to the shadows; it has spilled into open confrontation across multiple domains.
Crist’s narrative also illuminates the role of proxies and indirect warfare, a theme that has become central to the current crisis. The 2026 conflict is not limited to direct engagements between the United States and Iran; it extends across the Middle East and beyond, involving allied states, militias, and non-state actors.
Iranian missile and drone attacks on American bases in countries such as Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan, in addition to strikes on Israeli territory, demonstrate how the battlefield has expanded geographically.
Crist’s account of earlier proxy confrontations makes it clear that this expansion is not new; it is simply more visible and more intense now. The “twilight war” he describes—fought in shadows, through intermediaries, and often denied publicly—has stepped into daylight without losing its complexity.
One of the most distressing aspects of both the book and the present crisis is the role of miscalculation. Crist recurrently emphasises how close the two nations have come to open war in the past, often due to misunderstandings or unintended escalations. That sense of precariousness is magnified in 2026.
The large-scale American airstrike on Kharg Island, targeting numerous military installations, signals a shift towards more direct and aggressive action. In chorus, the careful avoidance of immediate damage to critical oil infrastructure reveals a calculated restraint, suggesting that both sides are still attempting to manage the scale of the conflict even as they escalate it.
This duality—aggression tempered by caution—runs throughout Crist’s narrative and remains a defining feature of the current situation.
Equally significant is the expansion of the conflict into non-traditional domains. Cyber warfare, which Crist touches upon in its earlier forms, has now become a central theatre of confrontation.
Attacks on digital infrastructure, financial systems, and communication networks demonstrate how modern warfare operates beyond physical battlefields.
The targeting of diplomatic missions, the use of drones in urban environments, and the global reach of retaliatory threats further blur the boundaries between war and peace. Iran’s warnings that American and allied officials could be targeted worldwide underscore the extent to which the conflict has transcended regional limits.
What was once a geographically contained rivalry has become a global security concern.
The economic dimension of the conflict also resonates strongly with Crist’s analysis. The disruption of maritime trade, particularly through the Strait of Hormuz, highlights the interconnected nature of modern geopolitics.
This narrow passage, through which a significant portion of the world’s oil supply flows, has become a critical pressure point. Threats to shipping, rising insurance costs, and the potential for supply disruptions have already begun to ripple through global markets.
Crist’s emphasis on the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf feels almost prophetic in this context. He demonstrates how control over this region has always been central to the rivalry, and the events of 2026 confirm that its significance has only intensified.
Another aspect that stands out during this rereading is the international response. The decision by countries such as Switzerland to halt arms exports to the United States reflects a growing unease within the global community.
The conflict is no longer perceived as a bilateral issue; it carries implications for international stability as a whole. Crist’s book, while focused primarily on the United States and Iran, hints at this broader dimension by showing how other nations have historically been drawn into the conflict, whether through alliances, economic interests, or diplomatic pressures.
In 2026, that broader involvement has become more explicit, with the potential for further escalation looming in the background.
Stylistically, this book remains a remarkable achievement. Crist manages to balance an immense amount of detail with a narrative that remains accessible and engaging. His ability to weave together military history, intelligence operations, and diplomatic developments creates a multi-layered account that captures the complexity of the conflict without reducing it to simplistic explanations.
Rereading the book now, one appreciates not only its scholarship but also its narrative foresight. It does not predict specific events, but it maps the structural dynamics that make such events possible.
What lingers most powerfully after this rereading is a sense of unease. The book suggests that the conflict between the United States and Iran is not driven by a single issue that can be easily resolved. It is rooted in deeper historical, ideological, and strategic factors that resist quick solutions.
The events of 2026, with their combination of direct military action, proxy warfare, cyber attacks, and economic disruption, illustrate how multifaceted this conflict has become. It is no longer possible to view it as a series of isolated incidents; it is a continuous process, evolving and adapting to new circumstances.
In the end, this book, in the present moment feels like standing at a threshold between past and future. The book provides a lens through which the current crisis becomes more comprehensible, yet it also intensifies the sense of uncertainty about what lies ahead. History, as
Crist presents it, is not a closed chapter but an ongoing narrative, one in which the past constantly informs the present.
And as the events of 2026 continue to unfold, one cannot help but feel that we are still very much inside the twilight—caught between shadow and full-scale war, between restraint and escalation, between the fragile hope of resolution and the ever-present possibility of catastrophe.
A must read.
Revisiting this tome in the shadow of the 2026 Iran–United States conflict is not just an act of rereading—it is an experience that feels uncannily like watching history catch up with analysis.
When I first read the book sometime around 2018 or 2019, it struck me as an extraordinarily detailed, almost exhaustive chronicle of a long, uneasy hostility that rarely erupted into open war but simmered continuously beneath the surface of global politics. Back then, it felt like a study in patterns—covert operations, naval stand-offs in the Persian Gulf, proxy conflicts, intelligence manoeuvres, diplomatic misfires. It was history, albeit recent history.
Now, rereading it in the present moment, against the backdrop of the 2026 crisis, the book no longer feels retrospective. It reads like a slow ignition—an account of strains that were always moving towards something larger, something inevitable, something we are now witnessing unfold in real time.
Crist’s central thesis—that the United States and Iran have been engaged in a sustained, undeclared conflict since the Iranian Revolution—acquires a frightening clarity today. What once seemed like episodic hostility now appears as a continuous strategic rivalry, evolving across decades but never truly dissipating.
The events of 2026—the escalation from proxy tensions to direct military confrontation—do not appear sudden when placed against Crist’s narrative. They feel like the logical culmination of a long series of miscalculations, retaliations, and entrenched suspicions.
The recent conflict, triggered by coordinated strikes from the United States and Israel on Iranian strategic targets, including the dramatic elimination of Iran’s Supreme Leader, marks a rupture that is at once shocking and strangely predictable.
Crist’s book prepares the reader, almost subconsciously, to recognise this moment not as an aberration but as an escalation long in the making.
What is principally prominent during this rereading is how accurately Crist captures the psychology of both sides. America appears throughout the book as a superpower attempting to manage and contain a regional adversary, often relying on technological superiority, alliances, and strategic pressure.
Iran, on the other hand, emerges as a state shaped by historical grievances, revolutionary ideology, and a deep-seated suspicion of Western intervention. These psychological frameworks create a cycle of action and reaction that becomes self-perpetuating. Each side interprets the other’s moves as confirmation of its worst fears, thereby justifying further escalation.
In the context of 2026, where missile strikes, drone warfare, and cyber operations have become daily realities, this cycle appears more dangerous than ever. The conflict is no longer confined to the shadows; it has spilled into open confrontation across multiple domains.
Crist’s narrative also illuminates the role of proxies and indirect warfare, a theme that has become central to the current crisis. The 2026 conflict is not limited to direct engagements between the United States and Iran; it extends across the Middle East and beyond, involving allied states, militias, and non-state actors.
Iranian missile and drone attacks on American bases in countries such as Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan, in addition to strikes on Israeli territory, demonstrate how the battlefield has expanded geographically.
Crist’s account of earlier proxy confrontations makes it clear that this expansion is not new; it is simply more visible and more intense now. The “twilight war” he describes—fought in shadows, through intermediaries, and often denied publicly—has stepped into daylight without losing its complexity.
One of the most distressing aspects of both the book and the present crisis is the role of miscalculation. Crist recurrently emphasises how close the two nations have come to open war in the past, often due to misunderstandings or unintended escalations. That sense of precariousness is magnified in 2026.
The large-scale American airstrike on Kharg Island, targeting numerous military installations, signals a shift towards more direct and aggressive action. In chorus, the careful avoidance of immediate damage to critical oil infrastructure reveals a calculated restraint, suggesting that both sides are still attempting to manage the scale of the conflict even as they escalate it.
This duality—aggression tempered by caution—runs throughout Crist’s narrative and remains a defining feature of the current situation.
Equally significant is the expansion of the conflict into non-traditional domains. Cyber warfare, which Crist touches upon in its earlier forms, has now become a central theatre of confrontation.
Attacks on digital infrastructure, financial systems, and communication networks demonstrate how modern warfare operates beyond physical battlefields.
The targeting of diplomatic missions, the use of drones in urban environments, and the global reach of retaliatory threats further blur the boundaries between war and peace. Iran’s warnings that American and allied officials could be targeted worldwide underscore the extent to which the conflict has transcended regional limits.
What was once a geographically contained rivalry has become a global security concern.
The economic dimension of the conflict also resonates strongly with Crist’s analysis. The disruption of maritime trade, particularly through the Strait of Hormuz, highlights the interconnected nature of modern geopolitics.
This narrow passage, through which a significant portion of the world’s oil supply flows, has become a critical pressure point. Threats to shipping, rising insurance costs, and the potential for supply disruptions have already begun to ripple through global markets.
Crist’s emphasis on the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf feels almost prophetic in this context. He demonstrates how control over this region has always been central to the rivalry, and the events of 2026 confirm that its significance has only intensified.
Another aspect that stands out during this rereading is the international response. The decision by countries such as Switzerland to halt arms exports to the United States reflects a growing unease within the global community.
The conflict is no longer perceived as a bilateral issue; it carries implications for international stability as a whole. Crist’s book, while focused primarily on the United States and Iran, hints at this broader dimension by showing how other nations have historically been drawn into the conflict, whether through alliances, economic interests, or diplomatic pressures.
In 2026, that broader involvement has become more explicit, with the potential for further escalation looming in the background.
Stylistically, this book remains a remarkable achievement. Crist manages to balance an immense amount of detail with a narrative that remains accessible and engaging. His ability to weave together military history, intelligence operations, and diplomatic developments creates a multi-layered account that captures the complexity of the conflict without reducing it to simplistic explanations.
Rereading the book now, one appreciates not only its scholarship but also its narrative foresight. It does not predict specific events, but it maps the structural dynamics that make such events possible.
What lingers most powerfully after this rereading is a sense of unease. The book suggests that the conflict between the United States and Iran is not driven by a single issue that can be easily resolved. It is rooted in deeper historical, ideological, and strategic factors that resist quick solutions.
The events of 2026, with their combination of direct military action, proxy warfare, cyber attacks, and economic disruption, illustrate how multifaceted this conflict has become. It is no longer possible to view it as a series of isolated incidents; it is a continuous process, evolving and adapting to new circumstances.
In the end, this book, in the present moment feels like standing at a threshold between past and future. The book provides a lens through which the current crisis becomes more comprehensible, yet it also intensifies the sense of uncertainty about what lies ahead. History, as
Crist presents it, is not a closed chapter but an ongoing narrative, one in which the past constantly informs the present.
And as the events of 2026 continue to unfold, one cannot help but feel that we are still very much inside the twilight—caught between shadow and full-scale war, between restraint and escalation, between the fragile hope of resolution and the ever-present possibility of catastrophe.
A must read.
November 16, 2012
Perhaps those currently hankering for a war with Iran, will be glad to know that one has been going on for quite some time. I'm fascinated by Iran for a number of reasons (its non-Arabic position in the middle east, the dual levels of existence as shown in Marjane Satrapi's graphic novels, source of amazing cinema and so on).
But mostly I fear these days that Iran is being bandied about as the USA's next foe to be most feared. Sort of the way the USSR was long ago. Ultimately I feel that most earthlings are far more similar than jingoists want us to consider.
Anyways, I finished this over a month ago. One thing that stuck with me was the US shooting down Iran Air 655. Crist's account seemed to lead up to a notion of William Roger's battle-hunger combined with monitoring ineptitude. But then Crist closes his comments citing Iran as isolated from the international community, barring Syria, in their outrage over this event.
That just didn't seem to match up with Crist's account, and the loss of 290 civillian lives. I honestly do not recall ever hearing about this horrible incident.
So considering things like that, on top of the whole Shah puppet play, the US siding with Irag in the brutal Iran-Iraq war, I can see how Iran would see the US as the much larger threat here. And that gets underscored in various battles recounted through-out (Iran and their mining campaign and the crushing responses from the US).
On the flip side, Crist's account of the so-called Captain Nasty, and repeated attempts to tie Iran's Revolutionary Guard to terrorism around the world, help to portray the Iranian side as blood-thirsty as well. Khobar Towers I vaguely recall, and that too helps cement the fact that it takes two to tangle, but as tragic as that was (the accounts are harrowing) still blowing the commercial airliner out of the sky sticks with me even more painfully.
But from Khobar Towers, we get a clear impression of renegade forces, and the supreme ruler of Iran not being aware of the Quds or other forces. Similarly, on the US side, Crist presents Admiral Ace Lyons
and his Window of Opportunity.
One almost wonders, does a loaded gun *want* to fire?
Anyways, I suspect that unlike myself, most people who will read this book, tend to read many others in the (modern) military history genre. For me the writing was very clear, well-paced and reading was an easy task. Understanding what was happening and why, much more difficult by nature.
Not too glad about what I read, but glad I read it.
But mostly I fear these days that Iran is being bandied about as the USA's next foe to be most feared. Sort of the way the USSR was long ago. Ultimately I feel that most earthlings are far more similar than jingoists want us to consider.
Anyways, I finished this over a month ago. One thing that stuck with me was the US shooting down Iran Air 655. Crist's account seemed to lead up to a notion of William Roger's battle-hunger combined with monitoring ineptitude. But then Crist closes his comments citing Iran as isolated from the international community, barring Syria, in their outrage over this event.
That just didn't seem to match up with Crist's account, and the loss of 290 civillian lives. I honestly do not recall ever hearing about this horrible incident.
So considering things like that, on top of the whole Shah puppet play, the US siding with Irag in the brutal Iran-Iraq war, I can see how Iran would see the US as the much larger threat here. And that gets underscored in various battles recounted through-out (Iran and their mining campaign and the crushing responses from the US).
On the flip side, Crist's account of the so-called Captain Nasty, and repeated attempts to tie Iran's Revolutionary Guard to terrorism around the world, help to portray the Iranian side as blood-thirsty as well. Khobar Towers I vaguely recall, and that too helps cement the fact that it takes two to tangle, but as tragic as that was (the accounts are harrowing) still blowing the commercial airliner out of the sky sticks with me even more painfully.
But from Khobar Towers, we get a clear impression of renegade forces, and the supreme ruler of Iran not being aware of the Quds or other forces. Similarly, on the US side, Crist presents Admiral Ace Lyons
and his Window of Opportunity.
One almost wonders, does a loaded gun *want* to fire?
Anyways, I suspect that unlike myself, most people who will read this book, tend to read many others in the (modern) military history genre. For me the writing was very clear, well-paced and reading was an easy task. Understanding what was happening and why, much more difficult by nature.
Not too glad about what I read, but glad I read it.
May 30, 2016
A very detailed account of the United States and Iran proxy war that has been going on for over 30 years. I remember talking to some of the trainers in Iraq grumping about all the Iranians stirring up problems with their training programs. The story begins with the fall of the Shah and the rise of the Islamic Republic. CIA operatives attempted to get the hostages out while a rescue mission failed disastrously in the desert. Next was Lebanon and our backing of the Christian militias against the Shia militias during the Lebanese civil war. This resulted in the bombing of the Marine barracks and significant loss of life. The Iraq-Iran 9 year war led to Iranian strikes against Gulf state tankers due to their support of Baghdad. This led to the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers. One night an Iraqi jet fired an exocet into the USS Stark. Later I would do a computer engineering project for the US Navy trying to replicate the electrical battle damage. Mines and speedboats followed. The US Navy then destroyed several Iranian frigates and oil platforms. Later Afghanistan and Iraq invasions allowed the Quds to target the US military with IEDs and Shia surrogates. Now we face a nuclear capable Iran sooner or later?
This book discusses many things that I remember reading about as a child. I did not understand that they were all part of a woven tapestry of tit-for-tats spanning three decades until now. This book also cleared up many misunderstandings on my part due to the Shia/Sunni, Arab/Persian, and the Us/Them events that happened it seems eons ago. As I look at the wars in progress, almost all of them are in the Persian Gulf pitting Sunni and Shia against each other as it has been since the dawn of Islam. The Gulf states fear Shia/Persian Iran. They were against us removing Saddam who provided a not so pleasant buffer against the Shia Iran. Now with Saddam out of the way, Iran has gladly influenced the Iraqi Shia population putting Sunni Kuwait and Saudi Arabia that much closer. We of course did not think about this in all our endeavors. It is all much clearer now for me.
I highly recommend this book. It will be long due to the author's exquisite detail. His detail is necessary though to convey the history and complexities of the "foe" we face. I highly recommend adding this to your reading goals.
This book discusses many things that I remember reading about as a child. I did not understand that they were all part of a woven tapestry of tit-for-tats spanning three decades until now. This book also cleared up many misunderstandings on my part due to the Shia/Sunni, Arab/Persian, and the Us/Them events that happened it seems eons ago. As I look at the wars in progress, almost all of them are in the Persian Gulf pitting Sunni and Shia against each other as it has been since the dawn of Islam. The Gulf states fear Shia/Persian Iran. They were against us removing Saddam who provided a not so pleasant buffer against the Shia Iran. Now with Saddam out of the way, Iran has gladly influenced the Iraqi Shia population putting Sunni Kuwait and Saudi Arabia that much closer. We of course did not think about this in all our endeavors. It is all much clearer now for me.
I highly recommend this book. It will be long due to the author's exquisite detail. His detail is necessary though to convey the history and complexities of the "foe" we face. I highly recommend adding this to your reading goals.
August 24, 2019
This reviewer/tortured completionist really struggled to finish this book. For what Crist intended, this exhaustive (not hyperbole) account of U.S.-Iranian diplomatic and military encounters post-Islamic Revolution gets the job done—which is to say it covers so much military minutiae during certain stretches that I daydreamed about reading a novel to end my summer. Its best moments are when Crist ventures into the broader contours of U.S. foreign policy, contextualizing the incessant conflicts with Iran as both part of a greatly flawed approach and also as a very nuanced anomaly. However, these passages are sporadic and somewhat offhand, suggesting the historian always intended to rigidly stick to his objective of reporting firsthand accounts and government records. Does this add to my understanding of the various flare-ups between these two adversaries? Yes. Is this a good introduction to the topic? Absolutely not. Am I glad I read it? I can't say I am.
August 23, 2019
قبل البدء بالحديث عن هذا العمل لا بد من التنويه إلى أنه من أجل فهم عقلية الشعب الإيراني وإلقاء نظرة سريعة على مجريات أهم الأحداث التي واكبت تنصيب الشاه محمد رضا بهلوي ملكاً على إيران وحتى قيام ثورة الخميني فقد سبق قراءة هذا الكتاب، عدة كتب أثّرت في فهمي الأكبر لهذا العمل أذكر منها سياسياً: ( من بلاط الشاه إلى سجون الثورة لإحسان نراغي)، ( مذكرات فرح بهلوي)، ( المتعة الزواج المؤقت عند الشيعة للدكتورة شهلا حائري) وهي كتب أنصح بقراءتهاجميعاً.
بالعودة إلى هذا العمل فإنني أجده عملاً ضخماً تناول علاقة إيران مع الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية أثناء تولي ٦ من رؤوسائها بدءاً من رونالد ريغن وحتى ترامب والدول العربية بشكل شمولي.
سيخرج القارئ من هذا العمل بعقلية واسعة حول فكر وسياسة دولة إيران متعطشاً لمعرفة المزيد من خبايا أسرارها وتخطيطاتها
October 28, 2022
There’s too much to say about this. It’s dense, it’s long, it’s comprehensive. It’s a delicate and balanced effort in explaining what the hell has been going on for thirty years, especially for a generation (like mine) that was born king after the horror of 1979 died down and struggles to grasp how alienating that was.
When it wasn’t getting too into the heavy weeds or military logistics and bios, I really valued this book and its insights. It did a good job of identifying flashpoints that were unavoidable, and moments that could have been breakthroughs that were squandered.
Given all that happened and all that’s discussed here, I can’t believe we’re not at all out war with Iran. I think first and foremost, this book gives perspective on how not to make the same mistake, and how critically the US needs ti examine it’s often emotion-based foreign policy - we have got to stop making our internet in something nations based on whether or not we like their form of government - because what’s most grotesque about this book is that the original booking point of our unending enmity with Iran began in 1953, when we agreed to overthrow Mossadeqh “becasue soviets :/“ - yet for fifty years we’ve sat at the table with Saudi Arabia, while their government commits the same sins as Iran.
A lot to discuss and think about, but I’m exhausted after spending a month powering this. If you have any interest in this part of the world or this history, this is a MUST read. And take your time.
(also read Guests of the Ayatollah, obviously)
When it wasn’t getting too into the heavy weeds or military logistics and bios, I really valued this book and its insights. It did a good job of identifying flashpoints that were unavoidable, and moments that could have been breakthroughs that were squandered.
Given all that happened and all that’s discussed here, I can’t believe we’re not at all out war with Iran. I think first and foremost, this book gives perspective on how not to make the same mistake, and how critically the US needs ti examine it’s often emotion-based foreign policy - we have got to stop making our internet in something nations based on whether or not we like their form of government - because what’s most grotesque about this book is that the original booking point of our unending enmity with Iran began in 1953, when we agreed to overthrow Mossadeqh “becasue soviets :/“ - yet for fifty years we’ve sat at the table with Saudi Arabia, while their government commits the same sins as Iran.
A lot to discuss and think about, but I’m exhausted after spending a month powering this. If you have any interest in this part of the world or this history, this is a MUST read. And take your time.
(also read Guests of the Ayatollah, obviously)
December 10, 2021
Incredibly insightful and painful book. The author takes you through decades of debacles and hope that then turns to disappointment.
It is impossible to separate the Middle East and the region’s oldest civilization: Persia, and its perceived entitlement to reign supreme, and how it sees the west standing in its way.
Crist does a great job conveying multiple perspectives and biases in how they clash with each other at negotiating tables, and how it turns deadly on the open waters and on land.
Seeing this now throughout my career, I can’t help but cringe at the lost opportunities, painfully obvious actions, and well-calculated actions all sides took in ways that have shaped where we are today.
I hope the author adds a few more chapters after the Obama administration to reflect the seeming stalemate with where we are now.
Great book for anyone who is coming to this region or is to focus on it.
It is impossible to separate the Middle East and the region’s oldest civilization: Persia, and its perceived entitlement to reign supreme, and how it sees the west standing in its way.
Crist does a great job conveying multiple perspectives and biases in how they clash with each other at negotiating tables, and how it turns deadly on the open waters and on land.
Seeing this now throughout my career, I can’t help but cringe at the lost opportunities, painfully obvious actions, and well-calculated actions all sides took in ways that have shaped where we are today.
I hope the author adds a few more chapters after the Obama administration to reflect the seeming stalemate with where we are now.
Great book for anyone who is coming to this region or is to focus on it.
March 9, 2026
This book was an incredibly in depth history of the ongoing conflict between the US and Iran that most of the US population has no idea about. I’ve always known our news is not true news but only what they want us to know but reading histories like this makes you realize how bad the deception is. As someone who is a half Persian US born citizen, I appreciated Crist’s neutrality on the topic. It was generally a delivery of facts and not opinions. He shows where both sides have made mistakes. I gave the book four stars because I found myself wishing he had explored more of the religious side and historical reasons why the Iranian people & government think the way they do. He hits on it a little in the epilogue talking about how Iranians view themselves as superior to other Middle Eastern countries because of their long history. However I realize that could probabaly be a book unto itself. I know I’ll becoming back to the book for refreshers. It’s so well explained but it’s SOO much information.
January 21, 2020
A slog to be sure, but an insightful history into the US’s ever-simmering conflict with Iran.
January 19, 2024
Very good read. Interesting to see how Iran still operates very much like they did then.
August 1, 2012
The United States and Iran have been bitter enemies since the Iranian takeover of the American embassy in 1979. Few Americas are aware of how bitter the enmity has been. David Crist’s important new book, subtitled "The Secret History of America’s Thirty –Year Conflict with Iran," outlines the origins and background of the conflict and details the numerous military confrontations that have brought us to the brink of outright war several times. Crist is a Marine colonel whose father was a four-star Marine general in charge of the U.S. Central Command, the organization tasked with military operations in the Middle East. He has an excellent sense of military tactics and strategy, and describes battlefield and naval confrontations with an aura of authenticity.
Crist’s narrative begins in 1979 with the overthrow of the Shah, and thus omits a discussion of American participation in the coup that overthrew the government of Mohammad Mosaddegh and installed the Shah in 1953. This omission is hard to justify; it is an important element in understanding the intense hatred of the United States that motivated Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and many of the students who overran the American Embassy and precipitated the hostage crisis of Jimmy Carter’s presidency.
The United States was slow to recognize how implacable an enemy the clerical regime in Iran was because the Americans were worried more about Soviet intervention than the rise of an unallied adversary. Nonetheless, the U.S. clearly sided with Iraq shortly after Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in 1981. The U.S. wanted to make sure oil kept flowing through the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz, despite Iran’s efforts to prevent Iraq’s allies, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, from using those waters to transport petroleum. For several years, the U.S. Navy confronted the Iranian navy (such as it was) in a nasty standoff that has become known as the “tanker war.”
The actual fighting between the U.S. and Iran has almost always been asymmetric: Iranian speedboats vs. U.S. Navy destroyers, cruisers, or air craft carriers or suicide bombers vs. traditional military. In recent years, Iranian armed and financed surrogates like Hezbollah and Shiite Iraqi insurgents have carried out terrorist attacks against American targets.
A few times in the past 30 years, the interests of the two adversaries coincided. The Iranians were somewhat helpful in both U.S. wars against Iraq, and they initially were helpful in the war against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. On the other hand, several incidents have almost resulted in outright war between the U.S. and Iran; Crist observed one such case himself in 2003.
A persistent theme of the book is that Iran is difficult to deal with because its government is so incompetent—it is never quite clear who (if anyone) is actually in charge. Crist sees this phenomenon as a potential cause of a “war of miscalculation.” Drawing upon hundreds of interviews and research into military archives, Crist reveals that there have been a number of “close calls” and he sees no prospect for better relations any time soon.
The author is especially critical of Ronald Reagan’s handling of Iran. He was too empathetic toward hostages held by Iranian surrogates, and found himself out-negotiated and bamboozled by the wily Persians. Crist is not especially favorable about Jimmy Carter either, although Mark Bowden, in Guests of the Ayatollah suggested that Carter was tougher than is generally known. Crist gives George W. Bush low marks for focusing on the moral iniquity of Iran, a position bound to do nothing but further alienation.
Crist ends his long and detailed account pessimistically. He suggests that Iran has become even more belligerent over time, and that the U.S. has not been sufficiently firm. He does not see much hope for avoiding an escalation of the “twilight” war with Iran unless the two sides begin to speak one another’s language, in all senses of the phrase.
Evaluation: Crist’s occasionally commits some common misuses of words. He confuses disinterest (impartiality) with lack of interest and he writes that Colin Powell is “precise in his verbiage,” which is a pretty good trick since verbiage means “an excess of words for the purpose.”
Crist emphasizes the military aspects of the confrontation somewhat more than the political aspects, which may account for his omission of a discussion of the effects of the 1953 CIA-backed overthrow of Mohammad Mosaddegh. Nevertheless, this book is full of insights about important aspects of the U.S.-Iran relationship, especially given the current tension over Iran’s nuclear ambitions. And based on past history, it is extremely unlikely that the Iranians have told or will tell the truth about their nuclear program. This book is highly recommended for anyone interested in the real state of affairs in today’s Middle East.
Crist’s narrative begins in 1979 with the overthrow of the Shah, and thus omits a discussion of American participation in the coup that overthrew the government of Mohammad Mosaddegh and installed the Shah in 1953. This omission is hard to justify; it is an important element in understanding the intense hatred of the United States that motivated Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and many of the students who overran the American Embassy and precipitated the hostage crisis of Jimmy Carter’s presidency.
The United States was slow to recognize how implacable an enemy the clerical regime in Iran was because the Americans were worried more about Soviet intervention than the rise of an unallied adversary. Nonetheless, the U.S. clearly sided with Iraq shortly after Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in 1981. The U.S. wanted to make sure oil kept flowing through the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz, despite Iran’s efforts to prevent Iraq’s allies, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, from using those waters to transport petroleum. For several years, the U.S. Navy confronted the Iranian navy (such as it was) in a nasty standoff that has become known as the “tanker war.”
The actual fighting between the U.S. and Iran has almost always been asymmetric: Iranian speedboats vs. U.S. Navy destroyers, cruisers, or air craft carriers or suicide bombers vs. traditional military. In recent years, Iranian armed and financed surrogates like Hezbollah and Shiite Iraqi insurgents have carried out terrorist attacks against American targets.
A few times in the past 30 years, the interests of the two adversaries coincided. The Iranians were somewhat helpful in both U.S. wars against Iraq, and they initially were helpful in the war against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. On the other hand, several incidents have almost resulted in outright war between the U.S. and Iran; Crist observed one such case himself in 2003.
A persistent theme of the book is that Iran is difficult to deal with because its government is so incompetent—it is never quite clear who (if anyone) is actually in charge. Crist sees this phenomenon as a potential cause of a “war of miscalculation.” Drawing upon hundreds of interviews and research into military archives, Crist reveals that there have been a number of “close calls” and he sees no prospect for better relations any time soon.
The author is especially critical of Ronald Reagan’s handling of Iran. He was too empathetic toward hostages held by Iranian surrogates, and found himself out-negotiated and bamboozled by the wily Persians. Crist is not especially favorable about Jimmy Carter either, although Mark Bowden, in Guests of the Ayatollah suggested that Carter was tougher than is generally known. Crist gives George W. Bush low marks for focusing on the moral iniquity of Iran, a position bound to do nothing but further alienation.
Crist ends his long and detailed account pessimistically. He suggests that Iran has become even more belligerent over time, and that the U.S. has not been sufficiently firm. He does not see much hope for avoiding an escalation of the “twilight” war with Iran unless the two sides begin to speak one another’s language, in all senses of the phrase.
Evaluation: Crist’s occasionally commits some common misuses of words. He confuses disinterest (impartiality) with lack of interest and he writes that Colin Powell is “precise in his verbiage,” which is a pretty good trick since verbiage means “an excess of words for the purpose.”
Crist emphasizes the military aspects of the confrontation somewhat more than the political aspects, which may account for his omission of a discussion of the effects of the 1953 CIA-backed overthrow of Mohammad Mosaddegh. Nevertheless, this book is full of insights about important aspects of the U.S.-Iran relationship, especially given the current tension over Iran’s nuclear ambitions. And based on past history, it is extremely unlikely that the Iranians have told or will tell the truth about their nuclear program. This book is highly recommended for anyone interested in the real state of affairs in today’s Middle East.
June 15, 2020
Drawing from accounts of senior officials of both countries and newly declassified records, the author - a senior historian in the US federal Govt, recounts the conflict with Iran from the time of the Iranian revolution to secret negotiations after 9/11 to Iran’s nuclear programme and sanctions against it as also the dynamics in the Middle-East. Recommended for anyone interested in foreign policy and the Middle East issue (US-Iran interactions more specifically).
August 31, 2012
This book could have been titled “Trapped by History with No Way Out” because it shows each side has compelling reasons for its actions. The author presents a balanced account from the Iranian revolution of 1979 to 2012 so it covers a lot of ground. It provides much behind the scenes information including the spy wars, the naval war in the gulf, and intra-governmental conflicts. It shows how both sides had their share of “rogue commanders” and it shows how various peace initiatives from both sides failed due to bad timing and distrust.
The book begins in 1978 just prior to the Iranian revolution and during the years when American foreign policy was fixated on the big game of containing the Soviet Union in which every foreign policy challenge was perceived in that context. The tyrannical Shah of Iran, put in place by a CIA inspired coup, was widely hated yet Carter publicly supported him in some naive belief that would preserve his power when it only shifted more hatred towards the U.S. which in time lead to the storming of the U.S. embassy and the capturing of the embassy staff. This in turn caused the U.S. population to turn against Iran.
While the U.S. did not know of Iraq’s plan to invade Iran in 1980 the U.S. tacitly supported Iraq’s invasion of Iran out of the hatred generated by the hostage crisis. When Iraq started losing the U.S. shared critical intelligence which was key to preventing Iraqi defeat and even allowed Iraq to take the offensive which eventually forced Iran to agree to peace in 1988. Iran viewed this as a proxy war with the U.S. calling the shots. In response Iran developed its own proxies, most notably Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Iran found itself surrounded by enemies: the Sunni Arab states of the gulf, the U.S., and Israel. Because of this and like Israel Iran decided it needed nuclear weapons. Iran also sought to keep its enemies off balance by promoting the Israeli - Palestinian (Sunni Arab) conflict, and training and supplying guerrilla groups to attack U.S. forces in Iraq even during the withdrawal phase.
In the end U.S., European, and Arab concerns boil down the threat posed by a nuclear Iran with its capability of proxy and missile warfare. This is why President Obama has committed the U.S. to attack Iran if diplomatic efforts fail to stop Iran’s nuclear development. The author seems pessimistic that peace is now possible.
The book begins in 1978 just prior to the Iranian revolution and during the years when American foreign policy was fixated on the big game of containing the Soviet Union in which every foreign policy challenge was perceived in that context. The tyrannical Shah of Iran, put in place by a CIA inspired coup, was widely hated yet Carter publicly supported him in some naive belief that would preserve his power when it only shifted more hatred towards the U.S. which in time lead to the storming of the U.S. embassy and the capturing of the embassy staff. This in turn caused the U.S. population to turn against Iran.
While the U.S. did not know of Iraq’s plan to invade Iran in 1980 the U.S. tacitly supported Iraq’s invasion of Iran out of the hatred generated by the hostage crisis. When Iraq started losing the U.S. shared critical intelligence which was key to preventing Iraqi defeat and even allowed Iraq to take the offensive which eventually forced Iran to agree to peace in 1988. Iran viewed this as a proxy war with the U.S. calling the shots. In response Iran developed its own proxies, most notably Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Iran found itself surrounded by enemies: the Sunni Arab states of the gulf, the U.S., and Israel. Because of this and like Israel Iran decided it needed nuclear weapons. Iran also sought to keep its enemies off balance by promoting the Israeli - Palestinian (Sunni Arab) conflict, and training and supplying guerrilla groups to attack U.S. forces in Iraq even during the withdrawal phase.
In the end U.S., European, and Arab concerns boil down the threat posed by a nuclear Iran with its capability of proxy and missile warfare. This is why President Obama has committed the U.S. to attack Iran if diplomatic efforts fail to stop Iran’s nuclear development. The author seems pessimistic that peace is now possible.
April 7, 2017
This history is a very good and detailed summary of key clashes and other interactions between Iran and the US since the 1979 revolution. According to the author, the work began as a dissertation of the relations between the two countries during the Reagan presidency. There are some excellent retellings of events, the USS SAMUEL B ROBERTS crew's heroic struggle to save their ship, and some of the special ops actions during the same tanker war. The trouble I have with the book are the almost cartoonish portrayals of key policy askers and military figures. ADM Lyons, PACFLT in the 1980s, apparently gave the author full access to his papers. The author returned the favor by treating the Admiral as an unaccountable warmonger. Reagan was indecisive, Clinton pragmatic, Bush 43 characterized as the media painted him. And don't forget about those dreaded Neo-Cons! Whether it reflects a laziness or a bias, it became rather distracting in the latter half of the book. On page 457, one of the author's themes emerged more clearly, that key leaders in Iran advocated a joint US-Iran effort to remove Saddam Hussein. "Overthrowing Saddam Hussein merely served as the launching pad to grasp the brass ring: an end to two decades of hostility between Washington and Tehran." It is almost a ludicrous idea, that Tehran has secretly dreamt of a normalized relationship with the US while simultaneously resourcing terrible terrorist movements that continue to disfigure the Middle East landscape from Lebanon to Yemen. And much of that thesis is propped up by his description of a careening US foreign policy that bears a large responsibility for Iran's decisions to foment terror and third party destruction. We bear much of the blame is what I took away, and given the excellence of my reading comprehension, I don't believe I erred in my conclusion. Which is a shame, because on the surface what appears to be an excellently researched book still left me not ready to trust fully the author's interpretation of events. That is a problem.
November 16, 2012
Very interesting book written by the son of one of the major players, who himself has decades of experience in the region. What struck me as one of the defining moments (and there are many) in the relationship between Iran and the US was when, after Iran had deceived the US on trading weapons for hostages (see Iran/Contra), the US reneged on a different deal after the Iranians had delivered on their end. Sure, the US could say it was justified because of the previous deceptions, but it showed that neither country was willing to "play fair." And that's pretty much gets us to where we are today.
One very funny story (and there weren't many) was about an engineer/sailor on a US battleship who was a thorn in the side of his commanders. He got in trouble on and off ship, and would drop the occasional smart-ass note in the suggestion box: one asked that portholes be installed underside so he could get some sunlight while working deep in the ship's bowels. Eventually, the ship was hit by an Iranian missile and nearly split in half, with the deck being the only thing holding the ship together. The engineer/sailor, instead of running topside as all were ordered, stayed down below to make sure the ship's generators kept running. If the ship lost power, they would be plunged into darkness and unable to fight the fires that were consuming the vessel. He nearly killed himself by performing a "suicide start" on a generator, but kept the power on. If he hadn't, the ship would have undoubtedly sank. A few weeks later, while the ship was in dry dock, the commander found another note in the suggestion box. This time it was a note of thanks from the engineer/sailor: he had asked for a porthole underside and, boy, did they really come through!
One very funny story (and there weren't many) was about an engineer/sailor on a US battleship who was a thorn in the side of his commanders. He got in trouble on and off ship, and would drop the occasional smart-ass note in the suggestion box: one asked that portholes be installed underside so he could get some sunlight while working deep in the ship's bowels. Eventually, the ship was hit by an Iranian missile and nearly split in half, with the deck being the only thing holding the ship together. The engineer/sailor, instead of running topside as all were ordered, stayed down below to make sure the ship's generators kept running. If the ship lost power, they would be plunged into darkness and unable to fight the fires that were consuming the vessel. He nearly killed himself by performing a "suicide start" on a generator, but kept the power on. If he hadn't, the ship would have undoubtedly sank. A few weeks later, while the ship was in dry dock, the commander found another note in the suggestion box. This time it was a note of thanks from the engineer/sailor: he had asked for a porthole underside and, boy, did they really come through!
July 14, 2018
Iran and the United States have spent the last 30 years jockeying for dominance in the Middle East and influence with the other Arab countries. They have fought shadow battles and have come close to open conflict on multiple occasions. This is the documentation of the close calls and low-grade conflict.
Why I started this book: On the Army, Navy and Special Operations reading list, this was a book that I wanted to cross off all three lists.
Why I finished it: This book is dense with facts, personalities and events. And it perplexed me to have a book about the strained relationship between Iran and the US have mere passing mentions of the embassy hostages... especially since that incident played a roll in President Carter being a one term president. This book also highlights the many missed opportunities on both sides for rapprochement and understanding.
Why I started this book: On the Army, Navy and Special Operations reading list, this was a book that I wanted to cross off all three lists.
Why I finished it: This book is dense with facts, personalities and events. And it perplexed me to have a book about the strained relationship between Iran and the US have mere passing mentions of the embassy hostages... especially since that incident played a roll in President Carter being a one term president. This book also highlights the many missed opportunities on both sides for rapprochement and understanding.
November 5, 2012
An outstanding history of a very, VERY complicated relationship between Iran and the U.S. David Crist, son of General George Crist (Ret.), has written an amazing accounting of both military and diplomatic events that have taken place between these two countries over the last 30 years. So much misunderstanding, wrong-headed decisions, and miscommunications between both countries over many years are brought to light in this book.
This book is required reading to all who have an interest in the Middle East. Although it took me quite a while to get through it, I am very pleased that I did. I now have a much greater understanding of the issues and complicated nature of the Persian Gulf.
This book is required reading to all who have an interest in the Middle East. Although it took me quite a while to get through it, I am very pleased that I did. I now have a much greater understanding of the issues and complicated nature of the Persian Gulf.
February 12, 2016
4.5 stars - 4 for the reading / writing, and another half star for the sheer amount information this book contains and the overall novelty of the topic. Appreciate the ending notes about how the book came together and which sources were used. Given the difficulty in obtaining information from Middle East archives, the author's determination in working to meet with as many Iranian / Middle Eastern officials who were involved in some of the events described in the book as possible is praiseworthy. Also, you're looking for a blow by blow of US military actions vis a vis Iran since the 1970s, this is it. Given the publication date, it also includes as much as I would guess is available on everything in the last 10 years.
March 9, 2013
An excellent scholarly and even-handed account of US-Iran relations since the 1970s, with most emphasis on Reagan years. Critical of both sides, and especially poor decisions by the Americans, it also covers military actions undertaken by both sides (and covert ones as well) as Iran struggled with Iraq and to gain hegemony in the region, with the US protecting its intewests and that of its local allies. Some of his research came as a surprise to me and I learned quite a bit. This would be requirted reading for anyone interested in fully understanding the how and why of much of Iranian actions. Not a quick or easy read, but worth the time spend reading it carefully.
June 11, 2014
Timing is everything - since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 every time one side has leaned forward to create a new relationship the other has not responded. The extensive volume portrays the "almost war" that has existed between these tow nations but also share the complexity of each nation's polity. I also appreciated how Crist shared how little we know about political struggles within the Islamic Republic.
A must-read for foreign affairs fans, it dhows how complex the world really is - and how must the US and Iran have in common.
A must-read for foreign affairs fans, it dhows how complex the world really is - and how must the US and Iran have in common.
January 21, 2013
An awesome modern history of the troubled relationship between Iran and the United States. As a US citizen the lack of common knowledge on these many events troubles me. The animosity of these two nations could have been put to bed long ago if not for arrogance. A great read for anyone with an interest.
April 29, 2014
Outstanding in-depth history of US-Iranian relations since the fall do the Shah. Best I've read yet. We forget how many violent interactions there have been between our two states, especially in the 1980's and 1990's. This is one of those rare "must reads" to understand the animus and conflict that exists between us. And just how committed and dangerous the Iranian regime truly is.
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