1867: Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution: The Passing of the second Reform Bill

Cambridge Studies in the History and Theory of Politics

by Maurice Cowling

The passage of the Reform Bill of 1867 is one of the major problems in nineteenth-century British history. Mr Cowling provides a full-scale explanation, based on a wide range of archive material, including four major manuscript collections not previously used. Mr Cowling pays equal attention to the view taken by Parliament of the class structure and to the ambitions and strategies of politicians in Parliament and outside. He sets this detailed historical narrative in an analytical framework, the assumptions of which he discusses at length.

Genres: History

451 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1967

About the author

Maurice John Cowling was a British historian. A fellow of Peterhouse, Cambridge, for most of his career, Cowling was a leading conservative exponent of the 'high politics' approach to political history.

Reviews

[Isabella · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is not easy to read, at least for me, even though I think I am relatively familiar with the events and figures. The first reason is that the Reform of 1867 itself is not a simple event, with its numerous changes, stages, and amendments. Moreover, in my opinion, it is not a question of principle like the first reform or the repeal of Corn Laws, which means that there was not a very clear yes-or-no line. Another reason might just lie in the author’s method and opinion.
The author’s primary purpose is that the Act of 1867 was not as democratic as it seemed; instead, it offered advantages to the Conservative cause and party by securing electoral benefits and maintaining the political status quo. “It was to prevent the ‘utter ruin’ of the Conservative party.” In fact, the bill was not a challenge to the existing system but rather a strategic move by the Conservative leaders, who saw it as a way to strengthen their position and settle future political questions. Therefore, the center of this book is on those complicated parliamentary maneuvers. The author rejected the traditional Liberal/Whig view that the reform of 1867 was primarily a consequence of public agitation. He believed that the event resulted from the conflict of different parties and actors with various interests.
One point that is especially excellent and impressive is the author’s analysis of Disraeli’s shift of emphasis. In his speeches, Dizzy asserted the principle of the Conservative party to combat that of Gladstone and Bright. By stressing rated residential suffrage and the personal rating principle, the Conservative party was not putting the enfranchisement on the mere basis of “numbers” but rather on the evidence of the trustworthiness of the electors. To do so, Dizzy could make his proposal more ambiguous and, therefore, more flexible to attract votes from the Liberal left. Their votes were needed because the votes of neither the Adullamites nor Conservatives were reliable. However, he was able to use such a maneuver because he had the support of the cabinet, and there was no effective resistance from the Conservatives in the Commons. Moreover, the House of Commons as a whole showed a strong dislike of the rule of numbers, which gave him a larger freedom to act. This subtle trick was quite interesting, but I didn’t notice it before.
Reading this book can hardly be described as enjoyable, but with its comprehensive information, unique opinions, and profound analysis, it is undoubtedly worth some effort. By the way, the appendices are also very helpful.

[Karen Leonard]

tedious