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Free Market Fairness
Can libertarians care about social justice? In "Free Market Fairness," John Tomasi argues that they can and should. Drawing simultaneously on moral insights from defenders of economic liberty such as F. A. Hayek and advocates of social justice such as John Rawls, Tomasi presents a new theory of liberal justice. This theory, free market fairness, is committed to both limited government and the material betterment of the poor. Unlike traditional libertarians, Tomasi argues that property rights are best defended not in terms of self-ownership or economic efficiency but as requirements of democratic legitimacy. At the same time, he encourages egalitarians concerned about social justice to listen more sympathetically to the claims ordinary citizens make about the importance of private economic liberty in their daily lives. In place of the familiar social democratic interpretations of social justice, Tomasi offers a "market democratic" conception of social justice: free market fairness. Tomasi argues that free market fairness, with its twin commitment to economic liberty and a fair distribution of goods and opportunities, is a morally superior account of liberal justice. Free market fairness is also a distinctively American ideal. It extends the notion, prominent in America's founding period, that protection of property and promotion of real opportunity are indivisible goals. Indeed, according to Tomasi, free market fairness is social justice, American style.
Provocative and vigorously argued, "Free Market Fairness" offers a bold new way of thinking about politics, economics, and justice--one that will challenge readers on both the left and right.
Provocative and vigorously argued, "Free Market Fairness" offers a bold new way of thinking about politics, economics, and justice--one that will challenge readers on both the left and right.
368 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2012
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February 25, 2014
Rarely a book comes along that feels like a breath of fresh air. This is especially rare in the academic circles of post-Rawlsian/Nozickian political philosophy. Tomasi's book should be read as an exciting new research program, which I personally pretty much agree with.
"Free Market Fairness" is a wonderful opening towards a reconciliation of the classical liberal camp (here re-interpreted in a non-libertarian, or non-absolutist, Smithian/Hayekian way) with the "high liberal", social justice camp (of Rawls, Mill, Keynes and others).
For good and ill, Tomasi tries to combine the best of both worlds. This is both laudable and somewhat excessive. The synthesis is weak, but it succeeds in opening up uncharted horizons.
The author's bold claim is that, as a matter of principle, classical liberalism, ever since the times of Locke, Mandeville and Smith, and, in more concrete terms, the founding of the American republic, has provided, and (especially if updated to the 21st Century with some spices from the kitchen cabinet of John Rawls) continues to provide a perfectly competitive and compelling alternative to the post-Rawlsian social-democratic, left-liberal paradigm. The book offers a new "centrist" understanding the normative dimension of liberal politics.
The argument is that not only the left can claim monopoly on ethical virtue and social justice. Tomasi claims that a "market democracy" based on limited government and constitutional protection of citizen's economic liberties, answers (as well or better than the kind of social democratic regimes favoured by Rawls himself) Rawls's criteria of "justice as fairness." Market democracy - a combination of limited government interventions and a robust market economy - grants all citizens, including the poorest, the best chances of making it. Tomasi does not argue for perfect laissez-faire, although he is open to that possibility, but rather for a limited government that provides some form of safety net, health care and environmental regulation, but does all this in the full knowledge of the threat posed to economic liberty by excessive regulation.
Tomasi argues from the Rawlsian case, showing how the Difference Principle, among other things, lends itself to a market democratic appropriation. This is all very fantastic stuff. His version of justice includes a strong protection of individual choice - for the rich as well as for the poor. But he claims this is no obstacle to liberal justice, but, in fact, its prerequisite.
Tomasi makes a convincing case, from classical liberal premises rooted in personal freedom and a concern for the poor, that economic liberty is the perfect illustration of a human right that even worst-off people deserve the maximum dose of, because it enables them the self-authorship of their own lives, and maximizes their chances of advancing in life based on their own choices and merits.
His argument is elaborate - and a bit all over the place, basing his argument on rather general notions of market democracy. In a way he bites off more than he can chew, because he tries to have his cake and eat it too. (How's that for mixing metaphors?) It's not easy to make Rawls and Hayek perfect bedmates, and it would be too kind to say Tomasi has entirely succeeded. But he has laid the groundwork, by showing that the choice between extensive government regulation of the economy, on the one hand, and pure free market fanaticism, on the other hand, is a false choice.
Nor is this simply a straw man argument: the academia really is pretty much divided into two camps, with very little room in the middle, although they themselves would probably see it otherwise. As a student of Locke myself, the neglected power of limited government as a source of ethical virtue has long been neglected, to the detriment of the whole profession, and of society. Books like this are needed to shake up the established encampments in long-waged, worn-out wars.
I believe, with the author, that rescuing economic liberty as a central concept of justice, liberty and fairness, is not something to be left only to hard-line libertarians or conservatives. We need people who realize that, even though socialism is a bad idea (for moral as well as economic reasons), we should endow all citizens with proper education, healthcare and a guaranteed minimum income (or basic income, as it is sometimes called), because it is just and fair. Classical liberal doctrine shows us that a framework of social justice is compatible with a healthy market-based democracy with a limited government aimed to curtail regulation.
The book rambles on too long. The insecurity of the argument is buttressed by unnecessary repetition. The author also likes to tell stories - such as recounting the whole history of liberalism and paraphrasing a dozen other thinkers - which makes the book a bit journalistic. In addition to verbosity, repetition and superficiality, the author claims incredible powers of synergy. This makes him a bit suspect in my eyes; perhaps it's envy, or perhaps healthy suspicion of strong claims requiring stronger evidence than is presented herein.
But whether the market-oriented "social justice, American style" (as Tomasi calls his approach) works as a research program, it's too early to say. I am looking forward to further elaborations on this topic by the author, his students, and rivals. This could be a really fruitful road - and definitely neither to serfdom nor to anarchy.
"Free Market Fairness" is a wonderful opening towards a reconciliation of the classical liberal camp (here re-interpreted in a non-libertarian, or non-absolutist, Smithian/Hayekian way) with the "high liberal", social justice camp (of Rawls, Mill, Keynes and others).
For good and ill, Tomasi tries to combine the best of both worlds. This is both laudable and somewhat excessive. The synthesis is weak, but it succeeds in opening up uncharted horizons.
The author's bold claim is that, as a matter of principle, classical liberalism, ever since the times of Locke, Mandeville and Smith, and, in more concrete terms, the founding of the American republic, has provided, and (especially if updated to the 21st Century with some spices from the kitchen cabinet of John Rawls) continues to provide a perfectly competitive and compelling alternative to the post-Rawlsian social-democratic, left-liberal paradigm. The book offers a new "centrist" understanding the normative dimension of liberal politics.
The argument is that not only the left can claim monopoly on ethical virtue and social justice. Tomasi claims that a "market democracy" based on limited government and constitutional protection of citizen's economic liberties, answers (as well or better than the kind of social democratic regimes favoured by Rawls himself) Rawls's criteria of "justice as fairness." Market democracy - a combination of limited government interventions and a robust market economy - grants all citizens, including the poorest, the best chances of making it. Tomasi does not argue for perfect laissez-faire, although he is open to that possibility, but rather for a limited government that provides some form of safety net, health care and environmental regulation, but does all this in the full knowledge of the threat posed to economic liberty by excessive regulation.
Tomasi argues from the Rawlsian case, showing how the Difference Principle, among other things, lends itself to a market democratic appropriation. This is all very fantastic stuff. His version of justice includes a strong protection of individual choice - for the rich as well as for the poor. But he claims this is no obstacle to liberal justice, but, in fact, its prerequisite.
Tomasi makes a convincing case, from classical liberal premises rooted in personal freedom and a concern for the poor, that economic liberty is the perfect illustration of a human right that even worst-off people deserve the maximum dose of, because it enables them the self-authorship of their own lives, and maximizes their chances of advancing in life based on their own choices and merits.
His argument is elaborate - and a bit all over the place, basing his argument on rather general notions of market democracy. In a way he bites off more than he can chew, because he tries to have his cake and eat it too. (How's that for mixing metaphors?) It's not easy to make Rawls and Hayek perfect bedmates, and it would be too kind to say Tomasi has entirely succeeded. But he has laid the groundwork, by showing that the choice between extensive government regulation of the economy, on the one hand, and pure free market fanaticism, on the other hand, is a false choice.
Nor is this simply a straw man argument: the academia really is pretty much divided into two camps, with very little room in the middle, although they themselves would probably see it otherwise. As a student of Locke myself, the neglected power of limited government as a source of ethical virtue has long been neglected, to the detriment of the whole profession, and of society. Books like this are needed to shake up the established encampments in long-waged, worn-out wars.
I believe, with the author, that rescuing economic liberty as a central concept of justice, liberty and fairness, is not something to be left only to hard-line libertarians or conservatives. We need people who realize that, even though socialism is a bad idea (for moral as well as economic reasons), we should endow all citizens with proper education, healthcare and a guaranteed minimum income (or basic income, as it is sometimes called), because it is just and fair. Classical liberal doctrine shows us that a framework of social justice is compatible with a healthy market-based democracy with a limited government aimed to curtail regulation.
The book rambles on too long. The insecurity of the argument is buttressed by unnecessary repetition. The author also likes to tell stories - such as recounting the whole history of liberalism and paraphrasing a dozen other thinkers - which makes the book a bit journalistic. In addition to verbosity, repetition and superficiality, the author claims incredible powers of synergy. This makes him a bit suspect in my eyes; perhaps it's envy, or perhaps healthy suspicion of strong claims requiring stronger evidence than is presented herein.
But whether the market-oriented "social justice, American style" (as Tomasi calls his approach) works as a research program, it's too early to say. I am looking forward to further elaborations on this topic by the author, his students, and rivals. This could be a really fruitful road - and definitely neither to serfdom nor to anarchy.
June 11, 2014
When Tomasi’s book first came in 2012, it got a lot of attention in libertarian circles. He challenged a lot of preconceived notions about libertarianism, fairness, and justice. Tomasi sets out in this book to create a kind of hybrid between the commitments typically associated with libertarians (and/or classical liberalism, market liberalism, etc.) and the commitments normally tied to what he calls High Liberalism (welfare liberalism, modern liberalism, egalitarian liberalism, etc.).
A more provocative way to put what Tomasi gives us in this book is a Rawlsian libertarianism. I over simply here, but Tomasi essentially takes the core premises of Rawls’ conception of justice as fairness and uses it to defend a kind of libertarianism. Or rather, he argues that a proper understanding of what is required by justice as fairness and the moral premises behind it is best realized in a regime that thoroughly protects economic liberty (alongside—and for similar reasons—political liberty). Further, the demands of social justice are best met under such a system as well.
Whatever you might ultimately think about the overall argument (and I remain skeptical though sympathetic), you have to give Tomasi credit for engaging in this huge revisionary project. At worst, it is an engaging and enlightening exercise to see what might happen if you accept Rawlsian starting points but add to it the moral importance of economic liberty. It’s an interesting way to learn about and further one’s understanding of Rawls (as well as economic liberty). At best, Tomasi has put forward a program the reunites the divided liberal house and sets it a more solid moral foundation.
Ultimately, I don’t think Tomasi’s project is successful on the latter account. This is because I do not think the moral foundations upon which the project is based are the correct ones. Nevertheless, the book is worth a read by anyone interested in liberty or justice. If you more libertarian minded, you will get a presentation of the modern liberal point of view that is fair, charitable, and clear. This better prepares you to understand the philosophical viewpoint that you are up against without misrepresentation or oversimplification. If you more in the Rawlsian vein, you ought to read it because it will challenge many of the ways you might think about justice as fairness and related ideas. Either way, you may not come to agree with Tomasi but you will most certainly learn something.
A more provocative way to put what Tomasi gives us in this book is a Rawlsian libertarianism. I over simply here, but Tomasi essentially takes the core premises of Rawls’ conception of justice as fairness and uses it to defend a kind of libertarianism. Or rather, he argues that a proper understanding of what is required by justice as fairness and the moral premises behind it is best realized in a regime that thoroughly protects economic liberty (alongside—and for similar reasons—political liberty). Further, the demands of social justice are best met under such a system as well.
Whatever you might ultimately think about the overall argument (and I remain skeptical though sympathetic), you have to give Tomasi credit for engaging in this huge revisionary project. At worst, it is an engaging and enlightening exercise to see what might happen if you accept Rawlsian starting points but add to it the moral importance of economic liberty. It’s an interesting way to learn about and further one’s understanding of Rawls (as well as economic liberty). At best, Tomasi has put forward a program the reunites the divided liberal house and sets it a more solid moral foundation.
Ultimately, I don’t think Tomasi’s project is successful on the latter account. This is because I do not think the moral foundations upon which the project is based are the correct ones. Nevertheless, the book is worth a read by anyone interested in liberty or justice. If you more libertarian minded, you will get a presentation of the modern liberal point of view that is fair, charitable, and clear. This better prepares you to understand the philosophical viewpoint that you are up against without misrepresentation or oversimplification. If you more in the Rawlsian vein, you ought to read it because it will challenge many of the ways you might think about justice as fairness and related ideas. Either way, you may not come to agree with Tomasi but you will most certainly learn something.
May 5, 2020
This book is extremely important despite some major limitations. Tomasi's aim is to expand Rawls's notion of basic rights to include a thick conception of economic freedom and then to argue that a society that provides opportunities to all citizens to exercise these basic liberties, along with the other political and civil liberties, can claim to embody social justice and be justifiable to each individual, according to procedures similar to that of Rawls's own approach.
First the good: Tomasi rightly takes issues with a widespread prejudice amongst academic philosophers to downgrade the type of agency manifested in economic activity, to view at instrumental, merely a negative freedom to not be interfered with, and less valuable than modes of agency manifested in non-economic forms of collective action. Instead, Tomasi argues, personal economic activity, buying and using productive property, choosing a profession or particular job, or making purchasing decisions, represent for many people a fundamental component of rational agency. In this regard, he compares economic liberty to religious liberty, both being, on this view, equally essential components of moral personhood, the capacity to freely choose one's ends. Though he does not make the connection, Tomasi's views should be compared with Hegel's account of the importance of particularity, including especially particular choices concerning economic matters, and its contribution to the realization of freedom.
The bad: Free Market Failures suffers from the same limitations facing any attempt to engage in ideal theory. This can be seen in Chapter 7, which amounts to an absurd comparison of Rawslian social justice with Tomasi's ideal of free market fairness. Tomasi aims to conduct this at the level of ideal theory, which he argues requires that each view must be able to give an account of its conditions of realization, but with the caveat that these conditions need not be at all probable but merely not impossible. From this assumption, Tomasi argues that a regime characterized by unregulated capitalism could result in growing wages for the poorest segment of the population, affordable and high-quality provisions of social services to the entire population, and a free market solution to climate change. And since none of these claims violate any known "laws" of economics and political sociology, Tomasi takes himself to be entitled to say that regimes embodying free market fairness, i.e., unregulated or very lightly regulated market based societies, are not impossible. In the same chapter, Tomasi also argues that any governmental effort to promote social justice, through various social programs, is very likely to fall short of its aims. Despite, this given the focus on ideal theory, one cannot claim that Rawls's preferred regimes are unrealizable, because they too do not violate "laws" of economics or political sociology.
Of course, the laws of economics or political sociology don't rule out a regime ruled by benevolent purple unicorns but this wouldn't make it relevant to answering pertinent political questions. This is not to say that ideal theory cannot be beneficial but there seems to be little point in an extended discussion of the acceptability of two very improbable but not impossible political regimes.
The ugly: At times, Tomasi's comes off someone who has watched too much Fox Business. Cliches are tossed around about the unregulated capitalism as obviously promoting more growth and regulated business as obviously inefficient. Little effort was made to draw upon economic theory to consider the actual implications of different forms of regulation. And when there was some effort in this regard, too often the author relies upon public choice theory and assumes that public officials are necessarily rent-seeking, cartel-forming dupes.
Here is an example: "[M]arket democracy sees private economic liberty as a protector of the environment." Come again. Here is appealing to the idea that property rights could be more fully assigned to internalize externalities. But even still, on its face this type of statement is absurd. We might imagine a better world, where a more extensive market would eliminate climate change but at this point, and any time in the foreseeable future, this is largely a fantasy. And addressing climate change is going to require, to a non-negligible extent, limits to economic freedom.
Despite these criticisms, Tomasi's book is very well written, enjoyable to read, and extremely insightful. Especially for those the left, it is important to learn from Tomasi and others how economic liberty can be a real manifestation of rational agency.
First the good: Tomasi rightly takes issues with a widespread prejudice amongst academic philosophers to downgrade the type of agency manifested in economic activity, to view at instrumental, merely a negative freedom to not be interfered with, and less valuable than modes of agency manifested in non-economic forms of collective action. Instead, Tomasi argues, personal economic activity, buying and using productive property, choosing a profession or particular job, or making purchasing decisions, represent for many people a fundamental component of rational agency. In this regard, he compares economic liberty to religious liberty, both being, on this view, equally essential components of moral personhood, the capacity to freely choose one's ends. Though he does not make the connection, Tomasi's views should be compared with Hegel's account of the importance of particularity, including especially particular choices concerning economic matters, and its contribution to the realization of freedom.
The bad: Free Market Failures suffers from the same limitations facing any attempt to engage in ideal theory. This can be seen in Chapter 7, which amounts to an absurd comparison of Rawslian social justice with Tomasi's ideal of free market fairness. Tomasi aims to conduct this at the level of ideal theory, which he argues requires that each view must be able to give an account of its conditions of realization, but with the caveat that these conditions need not be at all probable but merely not impossible. From this assumption, Tomasi argues that a regime characterized by unregulated capitalism could result in growing wages for the poorest segment of the population, affordable and high-quality provisions of social services to the entire population, and a free market solution to climate change. And since none of these claims violate any known "laws" of economics and political sociology, Tomasi takes himself to be entitled to say that regimes embodying free market fairness, i.e., unregulated or very lightly regulated market based societies, are not impossible. In the same chapter, Tomasi also argues that any governmental effort to promote social justice, through various social programs, is very likely to fall short of its aims. Despite, this given the focus on ideal theory, one cannot claim that Rawls's preferred regimes are unrealizable, because they too do not violate "laws" of economics or political sociology.
Of course, the laws of economics or political sociology don't rule out a regime ruled by benevolent purple unicorns but this wouldn't make it relevant to answering pertinent political questions. This is not to say that ideal theory cannot be beneficial but there seems to be little point in an extended discussion of the acceptability of two very improbable but not impossible political regimes.
The ugly: At times, Tomasi's comes off someone who has watched too much Fox Business. Cliches are tossed around about the unregulated capitalism as obviously promoting more growth and regulated business as obviously inefficient. Little effort was made to draw upon economic theory to consider the actual implications of different forms of regulation. And when there was some effort in this regard, too often the author relies upon public choice theory and assumes that public officials are necessarily rent-seeking, cartel-forming dupes.
Here is an example: "[M]arket democracy sees private economic liberty as a protector of the environment." Come again. Here is appealing to the idea that property rights could be more fully assigned to internalize externalities. But even still, on its face this type of statement is absurd. We might imagine a better world, where a more extensive market would eliminate climate change but at this point, and any time in the foreseeable future, this is largely a fantasy. And addressing climate change is going to require, to a non-negligible extent, limits to economic freedom.
Despite these criticisms, Tomasi's book is very well written, enjoyable to read, and extremely insightful. Especially for those the left, it is important to learn from Tomasi and others how economic liberty can be a real manifestation of rational agency.
January 1, 2016
Free Market Fairness is an attempt to marry Rawlsianism and Hayekianism.
Tomasi goes to great lengths to say that he is not trying to convince Rawlsians to be Hayekians, or Hayekians to be Rawlsians, but that he thinks there is a view which takes components of each, is genuinely distinctive from both, and is superior. However, his fundamental framework is basically Rawlsian. There's a lot of discussion of 'two moral powers', public reason, institutions being acceptable to those who are coerced, etc. Within that Rawlsian framework he definitely diverges from the standard, Theory of Justice type Rawlsianism. But if you don't buy that framework, you're unlikely to find the overall argument of the book compelling.
The book starts with a nice history of liberal thought at the beginning (both from the Rawlsian and Hayekian angles), before getting down to the substantive stuff. He discusses - convincingly, to my mind - how people's economic activity can be a part of what he calls 'self-authorship' and living a life one sees as meaningful. His argument chimes with the Christian (at least, Protestant) view of the dignity of work and value of working hard and serving others. In a similar vein he argues that there is something intriniscally good about you providing for you and your family, rather than you and your family being provided for (he has a nice discussion of how Rawlsians focus on people's status rather than their agency). He thinks that the standard Rawlsian view denies the value in these things and practices 'economic exceptionalism': accepting the importance of basic liberties like free speech, freedom of religion and so on, but denying the importance of economic liberties in the development of citizens as moral agents. Fundamentally, he thinks that (at least some) economic liberties ought to be added to the 'basic scheme' in Rawls's famous two principles.
But Tomasi's also concerned about distributional issues: he just wants them to be addressed in a way that respects economic liberties. He discusses at length options in this space, and even goes through the big names of classical liberalism (Smith, Locke, Nozick, more) and shows that, contrary to the standard interpretation, they care about distributional issues (in a strong sense). Generally it is very implausible (except for Smith) and seems to me to be eisegesis.
For me the book dropped off somewhat in the second half. A whole chapter is devoted to 'institutional guarantees', and what it means to guarantee an outcome. This is very much in the technical Rawlsian tradition which seems to focus on conceptual distinctions at the expense of substantive arguments. Similarly another whole chapter is on what it means to 'realise' justice, again in a technical sense which doesn't seem too important to me. The lack of substantiveness is highlighted in the final two pages. He summarises his argument that free market fairness and standard Rawlsianism both realise justice as fairness, are both feasible and so on. He then says so that our choice is a moral one, "which conception of fairness... offers us the more inspiring ideal?" But is that what we are to choose upon - which ideal is more inspiring? It seems to me that a more fundamentally moral argument is called for. But that is generally lacking.
Tomasi goes to great lengths to say that he is not trying to convince Rawlsians to be Hayekians, or Hayekians to be Rawlsians, but that he thinks there is a view which takes components of each, is genuinely distinctive from both, and is superior. However, his fundamental framework is basically Rawlsian. There's a lot of discussion of 'two moral powers', public reason, institutions being acceptable to those who are coerced, etc. Within that Rawlsian framework he definitely diverges from the standard, Theory of Justice type Rawlsianism. But if you don't buy that framework, you're unlikely to find the overall argument of the book compelling.
The book starts with a nice history of liberal thought at the beginning (both from the Rawlsian and Hayekian angles), before getting down to the substantive stuff. He discusses - convincingly, to my mind - how people's economic activity can be a part of what he calls 'self-authorship' and living a life one sees as meaningful. His argument chimes with the Christian (at least, Protestant) view of the dignity of work and value of working hard and serving others. In a similar vein he argues that there is something intriniscally good about you providing for you and your family, rather than you and your family being provided for (he has a nice discussion of how Rawlsians focus on people's status rather than their agency). He thinks that the standard Rawlsian view denies the value in these things and practices 'economic exceptionalism': accepting the importance of basic liberties like free speech, freedom of religion and so on, but denying the importance of economic liberties in the development of citizens as moral agents. Fundamentally, he thinks that (at least some) economic liberties ought to be added to the 'basic scheme' in Rawls's famous two principles.
But Tomasi's also concerned about distributional issues: he just wants them to be addressed in a way that respects economic liberties. He discusses at length options in this space, and even goes through the big names of classical liberalism (Smith, Locke, Nozick, more) and shows that, contrary to the standard interpretation, they care about distributional issues (in a strong sense). Generally it is very implausible (except for Smith) and seems to me to be eisegesis.
For me the book dropped off somewhat in the second half. A whole chapter is devoted to 'institutional guarantees', and what it means to guarantee an outcome. This is very much in the technical Rawlsian tradition which seems to focus on conceptual distinctions at the expense of substantive arguments. Similarly another whole chapter is on what it means to 'realise' justice, again in a technical sense which doesn't seem too important to me. The lack of substantiveness is highlighted in the final two pages. He summarises his argument that free market fairness and standard Rawlsianism both realise justice as fairness, are both feasible and so on. He then says so that our choice is a moral one, "which conception of fairness... offers us the more inspiring ideal?" But is that what we are to choose upon - which ideal is more inspiring? It seems to me that a more fundamentally moral argument is called for. But that is generally lacking.
May 15, 2019
Not great and not too bad, it feels like the book references a lot of philosophers but does not engage with their work, instead it seems to try and make "gotcha" arguments. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the chapter where he tries to establish that free market types implicitely want a minimum for the distribution to be achived. This part feels a bit strange, instead of interpreting their positions and the principles behind their positions(which presumably is how they intend for the positions to be re-constructed), the author sort of purposefully mis-characterizes the various authors to say what he wants them to say. The part on Hayek was especially aggravating, saying that Hayek was basically in 100% agreement with Rawls, when clearly Hayek says, the Rawlsian argument holds for the part of the pie that is NOT a result of a thesis. Now you may argue that not everything is a spontanous order, that some things are designed, and for those you can apply Rawlsian principles, but to claim that Hayek supported the division of the whole pie by Rawlsian principles is simply silly. The part trying to pull in lefty thinkers into the fold is more readable but mostly because he doesn't care so much to mis-interpret them but because he flatly argues against them.
I don't envy the task of this book, its a book about moderation. It tries to show how the extremes of the left and right can be re-conciled. Ultimately it fails but for a goal that is this ambitious it gave it a good run.
I don't envy the task of this book, its a book about moderation. It tries to show how the extremes of the left and right can be re-conciled. Ultimately it fails but for a goal that is this ambitious it gave it a good run.
October 6, 2016
Free Market Fairness is simply an outstanding book, worthy of all five stars.
The book starts with a discussion of the history of liberal thought and its three main strands of classical liberalism, libertarianism, and high liberalism (which I would prefer to call progressivism, but whatever). This history alone is worth reading. It's remarkably fair and charitable to all sides, and it sets the syncretic stage for the rest of the book.
Tomasi's basic idea is simple. Economic work is a dimension along which many individuals pursue self-development and find meaning in their lives. Given this, thick economic liberty should be protected to the same degree as other basic liberties. This includes strong property rights (including of the means of production), respect of and enforcement of economic contracts, low regulation, and low taxes.
Just as free speech and other basic liberties aren't absolute, neither are economic liberties. They can be overridden, but the justification to do so must be strong and cast in terms of protecting other basic liberties. Tomasi argues that such a regime of "market democracy" can satisfy John Rawls's difference principle, whereby (at the level of ideal theory) only those institutions should be chosen that are likely to benefit the least advantaged members of society. Market democracy satisfies the difference principle given the economic growth it encourages. Indeed it probably satisfies the difference principle better than Rawls's own preferred regimes of property-owning democracy or "liberal socialism".
Most of this argument is directed at high liberals. But for his project to succeed Tomasi also must persuade libertarians and classical liberals that social justice is both coherent and defensible. To this end he gives a long discussion of what he calls the "distributional adequacy condition" that he argues many libertarians and classical liberals implicitly defend (or at least acknowledge the moral salience of) even if they explicitly reject social justice. This discussion involves a delightful who's who of thinkers in these traditions, including most prominently a heterodox social justice interpretation of Hayek, who, Tomasi shows, not only endorses a number of institutions aimed at protecting society's worst off, but also employs an objectivity device similar to Rawls's veil of ignorance. Namely, Hayek contends when thinking about institutions, we should ask ourselves where we would want our children to grow up if we had no idea what social class they would be born into. Tomasi makes a good case that many of these thinkers, in light of their own substantive arguments, have more of an allergic reaction to social justice (when well-defined) than they do principled objections.
In an especially illuminating section on Hayek, Tomasi discussed the Austrian's concepts of cosmos (emergent order) and taxis (order of intentional design). These two kinds of order are conceptually distinct, but they shouldn't be seen as either/or. Taxitic and cosmoic orders coexist in nested structures. Firms obviously have a purpose, but they exist within the more cosmoic order of the market.
Tomasi gives the example of tweaking the boundary conditions of a sugar solution to create rock candy. The sugar and water molecules aren't individually directed; they just follow the physical forces comprising solution chemistry. The crystallization is a spontaneous process, but the macroscopic characteristics of the rock candy were determined by human design. The cosmoic order is used instrumentally for human purposes. Another example would be the methods of gardening. In the same way, the rules of a constitutional or market order can and should be tweaked for human purposes, namely social justice.
"When considering any social system as a whole, cosmos and purpose, far from being opposites or antagonists, go together. In the social setting, spontaneous orders seem positively to require such normative evaluations: evaluations, that is, in terms of social justice."
The book starts with a discussion of the history of liberal thought and its three main strands of classical liberalism, libertarianism, and high liberalism (which I would prefer to call progressivism, but whatever). This history alone is worth reading. It's remarkably fair and charitable to all sides, and it sets the syncretic stage for the rest of the book.
Tomasi's basic idea is simple. Economic work is a dimension along which many individuals pursue self-development and find meaning in their lives. Given this, thick economic liberty should be protected to the same degree as other basic liberties. This includes strong property rights (including of the means of production), respect of and enforcement of economic contracts, low regulation, and low taxes.
Just as free speech and other basic liberties aren't absolute, neither are economic liberties. They can be overridden, but the justification to do so must be strong and cast in terms of protecting other basic liberties. Tomasi argues that such a regime of "market democracy" can satisfy John Rawls's difference principle, whereby (at the level of ideal theory) only those institutions should be chosen that are likely to benefit the least advantaged members of society. Market democracy satisfies the difference principle given the economic growth it encourages. Indeed it probably satisfies the difference principle better than Rawls's own preferred regimes of property-owning democracy or "liberal socialism".
Most of this argument is directed at high liberals. But for his project to succeed Tomasi also must persuade libertarians and classical liberals that social justice is both coherent and defensible. To this end he gives a long discussion of what he calls the "distributional adequacy condition" that he argues many libertarians and classical liberals implicitly defend (or at least acknowledge the moral salience of) even if they explicitly reject social justice. This discussion involves a delightful who's who of thinkers in these traditions, including most prominently a heterodox social justice interpretation of Hayek, who, Tomasi shows, not only endorses a number of institutions aimed at protecting society's worst off, but also employs an objectivity device similar to Rawls's veil of ignorance. Namely, Hayek contends when thinking about institutions, we should ask ourselves where we would want our children to grow up if we had no idea what social class they would be born into. Tomasi makes a good case that many of these thinkers, in light of their own substantive arguments, have more of an allergic reaction to social justice (when well-defined) than they do principled objections.
In an especially illuminating section on Hayek, Tomasi discussed the Austrian's concepts of cosmos (emergent order) and taxis (order of intentional design). These two kinds of order are conceptually distinct, but they shouldn't be seen as either/or. Taxitic and cosmoic orders coexist in nested structures. Firms obviously have a purpose, but they exist within the more cosmoic order of the market.
Tomasi gives the example of tweaking the boundary conditions of a sugar solution to create rock candy. The sugar and water molecules aren't individually directed; they just follow the physical forces comprising solution chemistry. The crystallization is a spontaneous process, but the macroscopic characteristics of the rock candy were determined by human design. The cosmoic order is used instrumentally for human purposes. Another example would be the methods of gardening. In the same way, the rules of a constitutional or market order can and should be tweaked for human purposes, namely social justice.
"When considering any social system as a whole, cosmos and purpose, far from being opposites or antagonists, go together. In the social setting, spontaneous orders seem positively to require such normative evaluations: evaluations, that is, in terms of social justice."
December 8, 2013
Interesting Quotes:
“[P]roviding a guarantee [with respect to the requirements of justice as fairness] in the form of a government program is not the same as delivering the good in question. Indeed, if we consider the way real societies function, official guarantees in the form of government-run programs sometimes may make the delivery of the good *less* likely than it might otherwise be. As [David] Schmidtz explains, the issuing of government guarantees regarding social goods not only collectivizes but also *externalizes* responsibility for the provision of those goods. This is why such guarantees sometimes exacerbate problems they were intended to alleviate: ‘If we wanted to guarantee that the poor would be left behind, here would be the way to do it: teach them that their welfare is someone else’s responsibility.’”
- John Tomasi, Free Market Fairness, (quoting David Schmidt, “Guarantees,” in Person, Polis, Planet: Essays in Applied Philosophy).
“Hayek rejects the idea of social justice in an uncompromising way. He allows for a social safety net but carefully distinguishes that from any requirement of social justice. Within the liberal world of the Great Society, there is not even conceptual space for the idea of social justice: the phrase *social justice* ‘does not belong to the category of error but to that of nonsense, like the term ‘a moral stone.’’ . . .
“However, all political orders are the product of human intentionality. To see why, consider our paradigm of spontaneous order, the crystals of rock candy on a string. As the solution cools, crystal facets begin to form according to the general rules of molecular chemistry . . . The crystals grow according to their own internal principles; no one controls or intends the precise outcome of that process of growth. And yet at a more general level, human intentionality and conscious design pervade the entire process. After all, some one or some group had to decide to create the conditions in which the candy crystals could spontaneously form . . . The makers of rock candy are in this way very like the designers of a constitution to govern a liberal society. Even without being able (or seeking) to control the details of the order that will emerge, both sets of orders require a maker, and that maker’s intentionality pervades the order that results . . .
“A commitment to the ideal of a free society as a spontaneous order is compatible with the affirmation of some external standard of holistic evaluation, including a standard that expresses distributional concerns . . . Social justice . . . provides the evaluative standard that allows us to know when the equal freedom promised by liberalism is in danger of being lost and explains to us why that threat is something worth fighting back against. Indeed, for Hayek, we might say the phrase ‘the Great Society without social justice’ belongs not to the category of error but to that of nonsense. That phrase would make about as much sense as ‘naturally occurring rock candy on a string.’”
-John Tomasi, Free Market Fairness
“[P]roviding a guarantee [with respect to the requirements of justice as fairness] in the form of a government program is not the same as delivering the good in question. Indeed, if we consider the way real societies function, official guarantees in the form of government-run programs sometimes may make the delivery of the good *less* likely than it might otherwise be. As [David] Schmidtz explains, the issuing of government guarantees regarding social goods not only collectivizes but also *externalizes* responsibility for the provision of those goods. This is why such guarantees sometimes exacerbate problems they were intended to alleviate: ‘If we wanted to guarantee that the poor would be left behind, here would be the way to do it: teach them that their welfare is someone else’s responsibility.’”
- John Tomasi, Free Market Fairness, (quoting David Schmidt, “Guarantees,” in Person, Polis, Planet: Essays in Applied Philosophy).
“Hayek rejects the idea of social justice in an uncompromising way. He allows for a social safety net but carefully distinguishes that from any requirement of social justice. Within the liberal world of the Great Society, there is not even conceptual space for the idea of social justice: the phrase *social justice* ‘does not belong to the category of error but to that of nonsense, like the term ‘a moral stone.’’ . . .
“However, all political orders are the product of human intentionality. To see why, consider our paradigm of spontaneous order, the crystals of rock candy on a string. As the solution cools, crystal facets begin to form according to the general rules of molecular chemistry . . . The crystals grow according to their own internal principles; no one controls or intends the precise outcome of that process of growth. And yet at a more general level, human intentionality and conscious design pervade the entire process. After all, some one or some group had to decide to create the conditions in which the candy crystals could spontaneously form . . . The makers of rock candy are in this way very like the designers of a constitution to govern a liberal society. Even without being able (or seeking) to control the details of the order that will emerge, both sets of orders require a maker, and that maker’s intentionality pervades the order that results . . .
“A commitment to the ideal of a free society as a spontaneous order is compatible with the affirmation of some external standard of holistic evaluation, including a standard that expresses distributional concerns . . . Social justice . . . provides the evaluative standard that allows us to know when the equal freedom promised by liberalism is in danger of being lost and explains to us why that threat is something worth fighting back against. Indeed, for Hayek, we might say the phrase ‘the Great Society without social justice’ belongs not to the category of error but to that of nonsense. That phrase would make about as much sense as ‘naturally occurring rock candy on a string.’”
-John Tomasi, Free Market Fairness
December 21, 2012
I liked a lot of the beginning of the book where he discussed the origins, similarities, and differences of various strands of "liberal" thought including libertarianism. But I thought as the book went on stuff got more and more muddled. Maybe it's just me, I've never really grasped the point of Rawls' work and a lot of the book was about trying to justify a left/moderate form of libertarianism within an overall Rawlsian perspective.
October 3, 2022
La tesis de Tomasi es desafiante y personalmente me resultó convincente. Plantea una defensa de la libertad económica como derecho fundamental básico que permite la libertad de las personas, a la vez que promueve un ideal de justicia social como fundamento último de la evaluación política. En otras palabras, se sostiene que el matrimonio Hayek-Rawls es posible y a esta unión la denomina "market democracy".
December 19, 2014
This book tries to find common ground between the so called classical liberal and high liberal theories of political philosophy. But instead of seeking a compromise between the positions espoused by Hayek, Friedman and other defenders of the thick view of economic liberties characteristic of classical liberalism and the Big Government ideals of social justice seen in Rawls, Dworkin and the high liberal tradition, Tomasi chooses to delimitate the common ground and the differences between the branches of liberal thought, in a way that dismisses some of the straw-men both branches built about themselves and their "opponents".
After that, he proposes a research program that he calls market democracy, combining the typically high liberal worries about social justice and self-government with the classical liberal emphases on thick economic liberties and spontaneous order. In fact, Tomasi argues, the defense of a thick set of economic liberties is essential to full self-ownership. At the same time, the market democratic program provides a solid, non-consequential, basis for the defense of such liberties, usually seen as secondary by the high liberal tradition, and brings a view of social justice that has roots in classical liberalism.
The title of the book comes from Tomasi's favored interpretation of the market democratic program, based on Rawls's Justice as Fairness: by relying on market mechanisms and widening the set of economic liberties that are to be considered as fundamental, the author shows that such a hybrid fares no worse than either liberal socialism or property-owning democracy on the task of fulfilling the conditions of justice as fairness.
Given its Rawlsian influences, it's not surprising that Free Market Fairness focuses on ideal theory and presents a case for that emphasis, not without noting the problems with such abstract, high-level models.
As expected of such an open proposal, there are many aspects of both market democracies and Free Market Fairness that still warrant further exposition, but the book succeeds in presenting a research program that brings interesting questions.
After that, he proposes a research program that he calls market democracy, combining the typically high liberal worries about social justice and self-government with the classical liberal emphases on thick economic liberties and spontaneous order. In fact, Tomasi argues, the defense of a thick set of economic liberties is essential to full self-ownership. At the same time, the market democratic program provides a solid, non-consequential, basis for the defense of such liberties, usually seen as secondary by the high liberal tradition, and brings a view of social justice that has roots in classical liberalism.
The title of the book comes from Tomasi's favored interpretation of the market democratic program, based on Rawls's Justice as Fairness: by relying on market mechanisms and widening the set of economic liberties that are to be considered as fundamental, the author shows that such a hybrid fares no worse than either liberal socialism or property-owning democracy on the task of fulfilling the conditions of justice as fairness.
Given its Rawlsian influences, it's not surprising that Free Market Fairness focuses on ideal theory and presents a case for that emphasis, not without noting the problems with such abstract, high-level models.
As expected of such an open proposal, there are many aspects of both market democracies and Free Market Fairness that still warrant further exposition, but the book succeeds in presenting a research program that brings interesting questions.
January 21, 2013
This book is all map and no territory. It's not discussing real phenomena that exist out in the world; it's just concerned with refining definitions and terms from different philosophers stuck in the ivory tower. Not sure that anything in here is original, convincing, or illuminating.
December 9, 2015
I have not started it yet, but it was recommended in Reason magazine as written by a "bleeding heart" libertarian. Supposedly it is about how John Rawls ideas could function in Hayek's free-market.
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