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Wedemeyer: The Strategist Behind America's Victory in World War II, and the Prophet of Its Geopolitical Failure in Asia
Like many heroes of the Second World War, General Albert C. Wedemeyer's career has been largely overshadowed by such well-known figures as Marshall, Patton, Montgomery, and Bradley. Wedemeyer's legacy as the main planner of the D-Day invasion is almost completely forgotten today, eclipsed by politics and the capriciousness of human nature.
Yet during America’s preparation for the war, Wedemeyer was the primary author of the “Victory Program” that mobilized US resources and directed them at crucial points in order to secure victory over the Axis. In the late 1930s he had the unique experience of being an exchange student at the German Kriegsakademia, the Nazis’ equivalent of Fort Leavenworth’s Command and General Staff School. As the only American to attend, he was thus the only ranking officer in the US who recognized the revolutionary tactics of Blitzkrieg once they were unleashed, and he knew how to respond.
As US involvement in the European conflagration approached, Wedemeyer was taken under the wing of George C. Marshall in Washington. Wedemeyer conceived the plans for US mobilization, which was in greater gear than realized at the time of Pearl Harbor. The Victory Program, completed in the summer of 1941, contained actual battle plans and called for the concentration of forces in England in preparation for an early cross-channel invasion into France. However, to Wedemeyer's great disappointment (reflecting Marshall’s), he was not appointed to field command in the ETO once the invasion commenced; further, he had run afoul of Winston Churchill due to the latter’s insistence on emphasizing the Mediterranean theater in 1943.
Perhaps because of Churchill’s animosity, Wedemeyer was transferred to the Burma-China theater, where a year later he would replace General Stilwell. Ultimately, Wedemeyer's service in the Asian theater became far more significant, though less known. Had the US political establishment listened to Wedemeyer’s advice on China during the years 1943-48, it is possible China would not have been lost to the Communists and would have been a functioning US ally from the start, thus eliminating the likelihood of both the Korean and Vietnam Wars.
Despite Wedemeyer's key position at the crux of modern history, his contributions have been overlooked in most accounts of World War II and the Cold War beyond. In this work we gain an intimate look at a visionary thinker who helped guide the Allies to victory in their greatest challenge, but whose vision of the post-war world was unfortunately not heeded.
Yet during America’s preparation for the war, Wedemeyer was the primary author of the “Victory Program” that mobilized US resources and directed them at crucial points in order to secure victory over the Axis. In the late 1930s he had the unique experience of being an exchange student at the German Kriegsakademia, the Nazis’ equivalent of Fort Leavenworth’s Command and General Staff School. As the only American to attend, he was thus the only ranking officer in the US who recognized the revolutionary tactics of Blitzkrieg once they were unleashed, and he knew how to respond.
As US involvement in the European conflagration approached, Wedemeyer was taken under the wing of George C. Marshall in Washington. Wedemeyer conceived the plans for US mobilization, which was in greater gear than realized at the time of Pearl Harbor. The Victory Program, completed in the summer of 1941, contained actual battle plans and called for the concentration of forces in England in preparation for an early cross-channel invasion into France. However, to Wedemeyer's great disappointment (reflecting Marshall’s), he was not appointed to field command in the ETO once the invasion commenced; further, he had run afoul of Winston Churchill due to the latter’s insistence on emphasizing the Mediterranean theater in 1943.
Perhaps because of Churchill’s animosity, Wedemeyer was transferred to the Burma-China theater, where a year later he would replace General Stilwell. Ultimately, Wedemeyer's service in the Asian theater became far more significant, though less known. Had the US political establishment listened to Wedemeyer’s advice on China during the years 1943-48, it is possible China would not have been lost to the Communists and would have been a functioning US ally from the start, thus eliminating the likelihood of both the Korean and Vietnam Wars.
Despite Wedemeyer's key position at the crux of modern history, his contributions have been overlooked in most accounts of World War II and the Cold War beyond. In this work we gain an intimate look at a visionary thinker who helped guide the Allies to victory in their greatest challenge, but whose vision of the post-war world was unfortunately not heeded.
288 pages, Hardcover
First published March 19, 2012
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About the author
John J. McLaughlin
8 books3 followersJohn J. McLaughlin is a graduate of Seton Hall University of Law and later received his doctorate in history from Drew University in 2008, writing his dissertation on General Albert C. Wedemeyer. He is the founder and moderator of the New Jersey World War II Book Club, which sponsors monthly lectures by authors and historians. McLaughlin has written and lectured extensively on subjects related to World War II on both the strategic and tactical level. He currently lives in Short Hills, New Jersey.
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
January 2, 2013
General Albert C. Wedemeyer: America's Unsung Strategist in World War II by John McLaughlin. Be there no doubt, the author is a fan of General Albert C. Wedemeyer. The book is a statement of admiration for the general. This is not bad. I am very knowledgeable in military history as a historian by education and a former US Army officer. This book made me aware of a large gap in my knowledge. Yes, I had heard of General Wedemeyer. I was aware of his leadership in China. No, I had no idea he was the architect and strategist of the "Victory Program" which conceived the plans for US mobilization and included the D-Day invasion.
In the late 1930s he was an exchange student at the German Kriegsakademia, the Nazis' equivalent of Fort Leavenworth's Command and General Staff School. Because of this,he recognized the revolutionary tactics of Blitzkrieg once they were unleashed, and he knew how to respond.
The book is researched with the skill of a scholar and told in a straight forward way that is very engaging. We learn of a man who held key roles of strategizing on both the European and Asian fronts.
General Wedemeyer was an amazing intellect, one of the brightest minds the US has ever had. Dr. John McLaughlin did a great job of giving us the facts, telling the story, and leaving a tribute to General Albert C. Wedemeyer who was America's Unsung Strategist in World War II. The book is very good. It has lessons for military leaders, politicians, and strategic strategist.
In the late 1930s he was an exchange student at the German Kriegsakademia, the Nazis' equivalent of Fort Leavenworth's Command and General Staff School. Because of this,he recognized the revolutionary tactics of Blitzkrieg once they were unleashed, and he knew how to respond.
The book is researched with the skill of a scholar and told in a straight forward way that is very engaging. We learn of a man who held key roles of strategizing on both the European and Asian fronts.
General Wedemeyer was an amazing intellect, one of the brightest minds the US has ever had. Dr. John McLaughlin did a great job of giving us the facts, telling the story, and leaving a tribute to General Albert C. Wedemeyer who was America's Unsung Strategist in World War II. The book is very good. It has lessons for military leaders, politicians, and strategic strategist.
January 4, 2013
I was severely disappointed in this book. It was obvious the author had an agenda and was proselytizing, not laying out historical evidence of a well-reasoned argument. The continual re-hashing of points and typographical/factual errors (at the end of the book, within a paragraph of each other, the author gives two different dates for Wedemeyer's death, for instance) was another example of the amateurish nature of this work.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews