Cha puts forward his analysis of North Korea, a state he calls the Impossible State as it "outlasted anyone's expectations" and is "a land of contradictions", with its people enduring "colossal economic mismanagement" with regular famines, along with a regime that shuts them out from the outside world and engages in secret police arrests, gulags, and public executions, and yet they remain convinced that they are "chosen", and believing in their "strong leader to protect them from the evils of the world." (ch 1) The state looks back towards its "best days" in the Cold War where the North was doing better than the South, and with that, its rhetoric and propaganda are seemingly stuck in that era, "spewing threats about American imperialists and South Korean puppet regimes." It also inculcates juche (that is, 'self-determination') ideology. juche consisted of four tenets: "(1) man is the master of his fate; (2) the master of the Revolution is the people; (3) the Revolution must be pursued in a self-reliant manner; and (4) the key to Revolution is loyalty to the supreme leader" (ch 2). "The economic manifestation of this concept was the Ch’ŏllima movement [which] espoused the idea that on the backs of the workers, the state would fly to a socialist paradise." This leads North Korean workers to labour and overwork, to the bewilderment of observers looking in from the outside (ch 2). A new strain of juche ideology, "reactionary in its rejection of the opening and reform policies that were tried from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s", came to the scene around 2008 and accelerated in 2011 (with Kim Jong-il's death), which "stresses the concept of “sŏn’gun” (“military-first”) politics." (ch 2)
Chapter 3 goes through the rise of Kim Il-sung, his son Kim Jong-Il, and his grandson (and Supreme Leader at time of writing) Kim Jong Un. With the rise of Kim Jong Un, many wondered if his upbringing and education outside North Korea would lead to a more enlightened leadership. However, Cha opines that there is unlikely to be any real change as "True reform... would require the courage to loosen the very political instruments of control that allow the regime its iron grip on the people[,] but the process of opening up will undeniably lead to the end of his political control." Additionally, "despotic regimes like North Korea cannot survive without ideology to justify their iron grip", and thus Kim Jong Un "will be forced to cling to the core but outdated ideological principles that worked during the Cold War, such as juche ideology (ch 3).
In Chapter 4, Cha then goes through a series of "bad decisions" North Korea made which "doomed its economy". The first was focusing exclusively on heavy industrial development while remaining allergic to trade (seeing it as "trade-based vulnerability") and imposed self-sufficiency in food, agriculture and light manufacturing – leading to reliance on patron aid from China to meet food shortfalls. The second was pushing Ch’ŏllima ideology which "drove massive inefficiencies in the economy because it always substituted longer work hours for technological innovation." Third, taking on large amounts of debt. Fourth, "Olympic envy" of the South leading to a number of "wasteful large-scale projects" in the 1980s which "hollow[ed] out the economy". Fifth, in reaction to Soviet abandonment in providing aid, refusing to reform and instead "consum[ing] aid as a form of revenue" and "effectively turn[ing] North Korea into an economy dependent wholly on external aid to survive." (ch 4) This refusal to substantially reform is further cemented in the present day with the abovementioned new strain of juche ideology, despite policies from other states such as the Sunshine Policy.
Chapter 5 lays out the conditions North Koreans live in, including gulags, forced repatriation by China of North Korean refugees, and chronic food shortages and famine. Chapter 6 covers North Korea's military and their weapons capability, including missiles and nuclear weapons. Cha lays out two of his worries: 1) Pyongyang lashing out violently if pushed into a corner (he relates this to prospect theory, where a "double or nothing" bet/mindset emerges if Pyongyang perceives itself to be in the domain of losses); and 2) Pyongyang's apparent belief or "feel[ing that] it is invulnerable to retaliation", as seen by their statements and missile/nuclear tests – and when they realise that their view is wrong, it may be "doubly dangerous" as they enter a "use it or lose it" dynamic and "move up the escalation ladder more quickly". These threats are challenging as they cannot be managed by conventional deterrence. Escalation and/or a miscalculation spiral between the North and South may also lead to war, leading to an unstable situation on the Korean peninsula. There is also no clear (/easy) solution – trying to help the regime move away from its domain of losses (and the "double or nothing" mindset) may mean more food assistance and economic engagement, which may be seen and criticised as rewarding bad behaviour and/or succumbing to extortion. Nuclear dialogue, while minimising the chances of a miscalculation, "would effectively convey a clear political message that the United States has resigned itself to accepting the DPRK as a nuclear weapons state, and had given up on denuclearization." (ch 6) On this note, the nuclear crisis arising from Pyongyang's nuclear capabilities and tests are covered in Chapter 7.
North Korea's international relations are covered in Chapter 8. With China, they are "mutual hostages" – China is the DPRK's only patron and the DPRK relies on China to survive, and China needs North Korea as "a strategic buffer on China's northeast border" (as China learnt in the Korean War). Russia, for the most part, exerts little influence on North Korea (except where the North is "at their absolute worst", eg. parties are deadlocked and dialogue is nonexistent). With Japan, the Japanese public is negative towards North Korea, especially after Kim Jong-Il admitted to the abduction of Japanese citizens from Japan in 2002.
Chapter 9 touches on the history of the efforts taken towards unification, including the South's Sunshine Policy. Cha outlines a few challenges with unification, including taking care of immediate needs of North Korean people (Cha opines that this will be a "large-scale humanitarian relief effort"), reconstitution of North Korea's infrastructure (eg. roads and railways, power and energy), population control (especially as "northerners migrate [south] in search of opportunity"), and monetary union. Another big issue that has to be resolved are "social aspects", including "transnational justice" – should elites from the North Korean regime be tried, or given a "golden parachute"? Should international tribunals like that for former Yugoslavia be convened? Additionally, there are political divisions that will have to be overcome, and help must also be given to the North Korean people themselves as they "face a period of psychological dislocation as decades of indoctrination and brainwashing under the Great Leader lose all meaning." (ch 9) Cha then concludes his book with chapters 10 and 11.
Lastly, in the Epilogue, Cha offers his thoughts on the Trump-Kim summit held in Singapore on 12 June 2018. He opines that Trump's unpredictability "may have played a role in bringing the North Koreans to the table" and his administration's exertion of pressure "has yielded some impressive results". However, the summit's fruit – a joint statement "that was vague on all elements of a potential deal, including denuclearization, security assurances, and a peace regime", was "underwhelming", though "there was no denying the historic nature of the meeting". Cha ends by urging Washington to "keep complete and permanent denuclearization at the top of its strategic priorities", and this would involve the following key components: 1) Washington must continue to strengthen the global coalition it has mustered; 2) The USA should put out a statement on nonproliferation to signal unambiguously to North Korea and other states that the US will hold anyone found to be complicit in a transfer of nuclear weapons accountable; 3) The US must upgrade its alliances with Japan and South Korea, including pushing for a joint statement with Japan and South Korea pledging that an attack on one would be treated as an attack on all; 4) While seeking nonproliferation assurance from Pyongyang, "it must also push for a counterproliferation coalition that shares intelligence about maritime nuclear smuggling and cooperates on law enforcement"; and 5) the US "must continue preparing both diplomatic and military plans for North Korea" to uphold deterrence against Pyongyang and create a credible off-ramp for it.
An insightful read; I must admit that I knew next to nothing about North Korea before reading this book. This book thus makes for a good introduction to the state, its history, and its position and action in relatively recent geopolitics.