The Modes of Scepticism: Ancient Texts and Modern Interpretations by Annas, Julia, Barnes, Jonathan(June 30, 1985) Paperback

by Julia Annas

Although the Hellenistic classic has had an enormous impact on Western thought when rediscovered in the sixteenth century, it has remained neglected in recent times. This new translation should interest laymen as well as professional scholars and philosophers.

Genres: Philosophy

Paperback

First published May 23, 1985

About the author

Julia Annas is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona and author of several books for Oxford University Press, including An Introduction to Plato's Republic and The Morality of Happiness. She is also series editor for the Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy.

Reviews

[Matt · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is a translation and commentary of the ancient sources for a very important philosophical method, which, like a lot of important ancient philosophical material, is transmitted late and second hand. The titular “modes of scepticism” are ten argumentative strategies which can be attributed to the ancient Skeptic Aenesidemus, but the evidence for them is found in the later authors Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius, and Philo of Alexandria. The authors help to frame and interpret the sources so that Aenesidemus’ original ideas can shine through. Along the way they provide interpretive essays for each of the ten modes, in which they address conflicts and contradictions in the ancient sources as well as noting the similarities or differences from modern skeptics like Descartes, Hume, etc.

If you are interested in ancient skepticism, this book is a good place to start. There is almost no Greek, and the few words that are mentioned are always transliterated and explained. (The authors do include an appendix for specialists where they address some of the textual issues in the Greek which they have had to consider in their translation.) There is a lot of information here. It is a dense book, but it also reads well. I read it slowly and took notes and I still have the impression that I should read it again to fully grasp everything.

The ancient sources for the ten modes are sometimes rather confusing or inconsistent, and the authors point out when the logic does not hold up to modern standards, but one might question whether we should read the ancients through this modern lens or attempt to understand them more within their own context. To be fair, the book does do this as well, showing both where skeptical ideas came from (often Plato and Aristotle) or the contemporary rivals (e.g. Stoics and Cyreniacs) with which the Skeptics were engaging. It’s an important work, and one that boy lay readers and scholars can benefit from.

[Vlad Dolghi · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting book, although I would argue it is too basic for the seasoned reader who expects more in-depth analyses of the philosophical arguments deployed. However, it is an introductory text, as the authors admit themselves, so I don't fault the book for that.

[Alessandro Veneri · Rating 3 out of 5]

On a philosophical level, I expected The Ten Modes to be more compelling for the case of scepticism. Sextus Empiricus confuses relativism with scepticism at lenght, and generally fails to explain why from opposing appearances necessarily follows suspension of judgement.

The most interesting part, I think, is to observe how ancient scepticism did not suffer from insulation at all, that is epistemological scepticism made them question not only the possibility of knowledge, rather the possibility of belief. Furthermore, ancient scepticism translated in a broad denial of the possibility of assessing any moral value; while ancients did not separate between epistemology and ethics, modern sceptics can well be moral sceptics without giving up their moral beliefs.
What ancient sceptics did, is to pretend to abstain from the formation of any belief altogether, something that will be challenged only by Hume, 1500 years later.

If sceptics had any goal of convincing anyone of sceptical arguments, it is hard to tell how all modes could in fact induce suspension of judgement. I am lead to think that one had to embrace scepticism already and to find in universal relativism a further, strong element to carry his scepticism even further. If someone was instead willing to accept probabilism, or even just plain relativism, as good answers to the sceptical argument, then he would remain unmoved by Sextus.
However, Sextus probably doesn't have any goal of this kind, and would thus remain unmoved himself by the fact that others aren't compelled to suspend judgement.

The strongest sceptical arguments are those of the Fourth Mode, the Agrippan charges of circularity and infinite regression of proof. To oppose them, philosophers have developed an array of arguments:
* if the circle of reason is large enough, beliefs can be coherent with each other, and that should be everything we may aspire to;
* soma basic beliefs are self-evident, and from them we should be able to infer everything else;
* basic beliefs are those with the highest explanatory power (since Aristotle);
* basic beliefs are ‘constitutive of our way of life’ (Wittgenstein).

[Iman xodafard]

این کتاب به بررسی ده الگوی شکاکیت پورونی به روایت سکستوس امپریکوس، دیوگنس لائرتیوس، و فیلون می‌پردازد. این ده الگو در کتاب "طرح‌های کلی شکاکیت پورونی"، به قلم سکستوس امپریکوس، بندهای ۳۵ تا ۱۶۳ ذکر شده است.
مقدمه کتاب بصیرت‌های خوبی درباره تاریخ شکاکیت و ریشه‌های آن ارائه می‌کند.