What do you think?
Rate this book
Adapting Minds: Evolutionary Psychology And The Persistent Quest For Human Nature
Was human nature designed by natural selection in the Pleistocene epoch? The dominant view in evolutionary psychology holds that it was—that our psychological adaptations were designed tens of thousands of years ago to solve problems faced by our hunter-gatherer ancestors. In this provocative and lively book, David Buller examines in detail the major claims of evolutionary psychology—the paradigm popularized by Steven Pinker in The Blank Slate and by David Buss in The Evolution of Desire —and rejects them all. This does not mean that we cannot apply evolutionary theory to human psychology, says Buller, but that the conventional wisdom in evolutionary psychology is misguided.
Evolutionary psychology employs a kind of reverse engineering to explain the evolved design of the mind, figuring out the adaptive problems our ancestors faced and then inferring the psychological adaptations that evolved to solve them. In the carefully argued central chapters of Adapting Minds , Buller scrutinizes several of evolutionary psychology's most highly publicized "discoveries," including "discriminative parental solicitude" (the idea that stepparents abuse their stepchildren at a higher rate than genetic parents abuse their biological children). Drawing on a wide range of empirical research, including his own large-scale study of child abuse, he shows that none is actually supported by the evidence.
Buller argues that our minds are not adapted to the Pleistocene, but, like the immune system, are continually adapting, over both evolutionary time and individual lifetimes. We must move beyond the reigning orthodoxy of evolutionary psychology to reach an accurate understanding of how human psychology is influenced by evolution. When we do, Buller claims, we will abandon not only the quest for human nature but the very idea of human nature itself.
Evolutionary psychology employs a kind of reverse engineering to explain the evolved design of the mind, figuring out the adaptive problems our ancestors faced and then inferring the psychological adaptations that evolved to solve them. In the carefully argued central chapters of Adapting Minds , Buller scrutinizes several of evolutionary psychology's most highly publicized "discoveries," including "discriminative parental solicitude" (the idea that stepparents abuse their stepchildren at a higher rate than genetic parents abuse their biological children). Drawing on a wide range of empirical research, including his own large-scale study of child abuse, he shows that none is actually supported by the evidence.
Buller argues that our minds are not adapted to the Pleistocene, but, like the immune system, are continually adapting, over both evolutionary time and individual lifetimes. We must move beyond the reigning orthodoxy of evolutionary psychology to reach an accurate understanding of how human psychology is influenced by evolution. When we do, Buller claims, we will abandon not only the quest for human nature but the very idea of human nature itself.
550 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2005
14 people are currently reading
652 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
March 16, 2012
Evolutionary psychology is a subject that invites so much controversy that even most academic types can't seem to keep their heads screwed on straight when it's brought up. Buller is not one of those types. His goal is not to naysay, but to save evolutionary psychology from itself. Buller and I are in hearty agreement that evolutionary psychology could be, in theory, a robust and powerful research program, but much of what has actually passed for "research" under its banner has been incredibly shoddy. Thus, he distinguishes between what he calls lower-case "evolutionary psychology" and capital "Evolutionary Psychology" (EP). Buller's EP appellation is similar to another nickname, the "Santa Barbara school," which derives from the fact that UCSB hosts the Center for Evolutionary Psychology.
The book includes a brief introduction to basic biological and evolutionary reasoning for the educated layperson. Most of the rest of it is dedicated to thorough take-downs of theories held up as the poster children of EP. He demonstrates that EP rests on questionable theoretical assumptions (e.g., massive modularity) and empirical flaws, such as flat-out ignoring much of cultural and paleoanthropology and taking a very narrow view of evolutionary biology. Much of EP simply fails to meet the standards of traditional evolutionary biology.
There are a few shaky arguments and a thin treatment of the literature in places, but overall, this is probably the most thorough and definitive refutation of the EP paradigm. Another good feature of the book is Buller's refutations of some of the naive critics of EP. He breaks down Stephen Jay Gould's famous critique of EP and exposes is it as a straw man. Buller aims for thoroughness and accuracy, dispensing with the polemical hyperbole of many previous anti-EP works (e.g., Rose and Rose's Alas Poor Darwin), and hits his target.
This is definitely aimed at an academic audience and will likely be a slog for the general reader, but it is required reading for anyone interested in evolutionary psychology.
The book includes a brief introduction to basic biological and evolutionary reasoning for the educated layperson. Most of the rest of it is dedicated to thorough take-downs of theories held up as the poster children of EP. He demonstrates that EP rests on questionable theoretical assumptions (e.g., massive modularity) and empirical flaws, such as flat-out ignoring much of cultural and paleoanthropology and taking a very narrow view of evolutionary biology. Much of EP simply fails to meet the standards of traditional evolutionary biology.
There are a few shaky arguments and a thin treatment of the literature in places, but overall, this is probably the most thorough and definitive refutation of the EP paradigm. Another good feature of the book is Buller's refutations of some of the naive critics of EP. He breaks down Stephen Jay Gould's famous critique of EP and exposes is it as a straw man. Buller aims for thoroughness and accuracy, dispensing with the polemical hyperbole of many previous anti-EP works (e.g., Rose and Rose's Alas Poor Darwin), and hits his target.
This is definitely aimed at an academic audience and will likely be a slog for the general reader, but it is required reading for anyone interested in evolutionary psychology.
August 1, 2012
If Evolutionary Psychologists were to argue that the sky is blue, Buller would surely argue that, contrary to appearances, the sky is actually plaid. This is presumably only a minor exaggeration. Buller attempts to critique the entire paradigm of Evolutionary Psychology (EP) here, attacking it with both empirical and theoretical considerations. His conclusion? Everything EP says is pretty much dead wrong. While I don't think the arguments presented warrant a complete overthrow of EP's research tradition, in certain areas Buller does convincingly challenge some standard notions of the program.
Since this is such a large work, making many major and minor points, with sometimes technical and intricate arguments, it would be impossible to "counter" each and every portion that I disagree with here. Instead, I'll limit my remarks to a more imprecise generality, which will hopefully be sufficient to give my overall impressions.
First, the empirical side of things (although Buller actually starts with the theoretical). Like the theoretical, I find his empirical critique of EP to be a mixed bag of sorts. Some of his arguments provide a refinement of, or replacement for, certain EP theories that inadequately try to explain certain data sets. This aspect of the work is exemplified when Buller looks at marriage and mating, which are both areas that I think helpful criticisms are offered. In other areas, like parenthood and some stuff about modularity, Buller tries to offer ad hoc theories to account for the data that don't seem anymore plausible than EP's own. Some of them even seem far less plausible, as if Buller is arguing against EP solely for the sake of arguing against EP. An especially large flaw (which is particularly relevant to talk of modularity) is Buller's complete lack of mention of the Baldwin Effect--like, literally, nowhere in the book does he mention it. It's such an important phenomenon, and has been dicussed by EPs to such an extent, that it almost appears like its absence was planned, rather than being a product of oversight. Finally, some of his criticisms have already been successfully answered by the psychologists themselves, so it's worth reading their responses to Buller's book.
Like I mentioned, the theoretical side of things has some good as well as some bad, too. The good is that Buller emphasizes areas of evolution, apart from selection, that EP unjustly de-emphasizes or tends to ignore. He is also largely correct in the difficulty in which EPs face in determining adaptations. And there's some criticisms that seem valid insofar as they criticze specific formulations of various EP doctrines (like massive modularity and human nature), but that could relatively easily be reformulated so as to avoid the criticism. But the bad, on the other hand, reaches its pinnacle in the final chapter--"Human Nature" (the scare quotes are Buller's own). Buller makes the (somewhat forgivable) mistake of assuming that the concept of "human nature" presupposes a theory of natural kinds of species and a sort of naive essentialism. I say the mistake is forgivable because EPs themselves have sometimes been less than stellar at formulating precise definitions of their more theoretical concepts. Nevertheless, neither a theory of natural kinds nor any kind of "essentialism" are necessary for the concept of "human nature" to be comprehensible.
EPs should really welcome this book. It illuminates all the areas in which EP may need to have better empirical backings, and it challenges some theoretical claims that deserve closer scrutiny. Some of Buller's criticisms are misplaced, sure, but it would be difficult to say that anyone with an interest in any sort of evolutionary psychology could just ignore this work.
Since this is such a large work, making many major and minor points, with sometimes technical and intricate arguments, it would be impossible to "counter" each and every portion that I disagree with here. Instead, I'll limit my remarks to a more imprecise generality, which will hopefully be sufficient to give my overall impressions.
First, the empirical side of things (although Buller actually starts with the theoretical). Like the theoretical, I find his empirical critique of EP to be a mixed bag of sorts. Some of his arguments provide a refinement of, or replacement for, certain EP theories that inadequately try to explain certain data sets. This aspect of the work is exemplified when Buller looks at marriage and mating, which are both areas that I think helpful criticisms are offered. In other areas, like parenthood and some stuff about modularity, Buller tries to offer ad hoc theories to account for the data that don't seem anymore plausible than EP's own. Some of them even seem far less plausible, as if Buller is arguing against EP solely for the sake of arguing against EP. An especially large flaw (which is particularly relevant to talk of modularity) is Buller's complete lack of mention of the Baldwin Effect--like, literally, nowhere in the book does he mention it. It's such an important phenomenon, and has been dicussed by EPs to such an extent, that it almost appears like its absence was planned, rather than being a product of oversight. Finally, some of his criticisms have already been successfully answered by the psychologists themselves, so it's worth reading their responses to Buller's book.
Like I mentioned, the theoretical side of things has some good as well as some bad, too. The good is that Buller emphasizes areas of evolution, apart from selection, that EP unjustly de-emphasizes or tends to ignore. He is also largely correct in the difficulty in which EPs face in determining adaptations. And there's some criticisms that seem valid insofar as they criticze specific formulations of various EP doctrines (like massive modularity and human nature), but that could relatively easily be reformulated so as to avoid the criticism. But the bad, on the other hand, reaches its pinnacle in the final chapter--"Human Nature" (the scare quotes are Buller's own). Buller makes the (somewhat forgivable) mistake of assuming that the concept of "human nature" presupposes a theory of natural kinds of species and a sort of naive essentialism. I say the mistake is forgivable because EPs themselves have sometimes been less than stellar at formulating precise definitions of their more theoretical concepts. Nevertheless, neither a theory of natural kinds nor any kind of "essentialism" are necessary for the concept of "human nature" to be comprehensible.
EPs should really welcome this book. It illuminates all the areas in which EP may need to have better empirical backings, and it challenges some theoretical claims that deserve closer scrutiny. Some of Buller's criticisms are misplaced, sure, but it would be difficult to say that anyone with an interest in any sort of evolutionary psychology could just ignore this work.
December 11, 2012
The book to read from THE refuter of Pop Evolutionary Psychology
The lowercase versus capitalized versions of the phrase is a key talking point of Buller's, as he carefully does NOT throw the baby out with the bathwater.
He sees a legitimate place for "ev psych" as a scientific discipline that has offered some, **modest to moderate** insight into human nature and may offer more, more serious, and, yes, more controversial insights in the future.
However, "Ev Psych," a field arguably as much "secular metaphysics" (my phrase) as science, is a whole different kettle of fish. Buller says so, and shows why, starting with just-so stories.
Butler also uses rhetorical questions to good effect. For example, how do Ev Psychers square the alleged high modularity of the brain with its known plasticity? How can we really extrapolate from today's societies to those of 40,000 years ago, let alone 400,000, and claims with perfect confidence we know in what order human changes happened, let alone whether they were caused by genetic evolution rather than cultural evolution, doubly let alone what genes were selected for and why.
Better, here's a rhetorical anecdote of evidence. Interestingly, abuse by single-parent genetic fathers is even higher than by stepfathers. This of course has no EP explanation and is a shot across the bow to EP's explanation of the abuse "scenario."
Ultimately, what's behind these just-so stories, etc., are philosophical preconceptions, my "secular metaphysics," and Butler is on good ground here.
And, speaking of philosophical preconceptions, I disagree with another reviewer that philosophy has nothing to teach science. Wittgenstein and Popper did earlier, and philosophy of science still does today.
It's stances like that which can lead to lay perceptions of science as a priesthood and reinforce ideas of "scientism."
The lowercase versus capitalized versions of the phrase is a key talking point of Buller's, as he carefully does NOT throw the baby out with the bathwater.
He sees a legitimate place for "ev psych" as a scientific discipline that has offered some, **modest to moderate** insight into human nature and may offer more, more serious, and, yes, more controversial insights in the future.
However, "Ev Psych," a field arguably as much "secular metaphysics" (my phrase) as science, is a whole different kettle of fish. Buller says so, and shows why, starting with just-so stories.
Butler also uses rhetorical questions to good effect. For example, how do Ev Psychers square the alleged high modularity of the brain with its known plasticity? How can we really extrapolate from today's societies to those of 40,000 years ago, let alone 400,000, and claims with perfect confidence we know in what order human changes happened, let alone whether they were caused by genetic evolution rather than cultural evolution, doubly let alone what genes were selected for and why.
Better, here's a rhetorical anecdote of evidence. Interestingly, abuse by single-parent genetic fathers is even higher than by stepfathers. This of course has no EP explanation and is a shot across the bow to EP's explanation of the abuse "scenario."
Ultimately, what's behind these just-so stories, etc., are philosophical preconceptions, my "secular metaphysics," and Butler is on good ground here.
And, speaking of philosophical preconceptions, I disagree with another reviewer that philosophy has nothing to teach science. Wittgenstein and Popper did earlier, and philosophy of science still does today.
It's stances like that which can lead to lay perceptions of science as a priesthood and reinforce ideas of "scientism."
July 11, 2009
this book kicks the shit out of evo psych and it does it in such a thorough, intelligent way. he attacks both scientifically and philosophically which is awesome, and while it's a tough read as it gets very detailed about evolution, it's worth it.
February 4, 2017
Podría haber sido más corto para lo que dice. No me ha impresionado mucho porque gran parte de lo que dice ya lo sabía y sigo peléandome para encontrar las referencias que da para bastante de lo que es nuevo, pero hace una introducción bastante razonable de teoría evolutiva, el paradigma actual en psicología evolutiva y por qué lo que sabemos de neurociencia y genética humanas refuta mucho de los principios fundacionales de este paradigma. Como lista para el que quiera consultar capítulos sueltos si eso (se puede) disputa la evidencia de:
-Ultramodularismo e hiperadaptacionismo que llevan esta investigación por el mal camino
-Que los hombres prefieren por narices mujeres jóvenes y las mujeres hombres con recursos
-La explicación estándar de los celos que da la evopsych y las diferencias entre sexos en estos
-Y la afirmación de que los padres adoptivos maltratan mucho más debido a que no reciben signos de parentesco genético por parte de los cachorros sapiens si estos no son hijos biológicos.
Una cosa graciosa pero efectiva que hace es preceder sus críticas de otros críticos de la evopsych más incompetentes, los refuta y luego se basa en parte en lo dicho en el proceso para refutar también la evopsych. Algún fallo menor (el más sangrante tomarse 10% de hijos nacidos fuera del matrimonio en serio y como un mínimo, cifras de 1-2% son mucho más cercanas a la realidad http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/gnx... http://www.cell.com/trends/ecology-ev... ) y aunque su último capítulo en por qué el concepto de "naturaleza humana" es un disparate desde el punto de vista tanto filosófico como desde la biología evolutiva está bastante bien lo considero incompleto.
-Ultramodularismo e hiperadaptacionismo que llevan esta investigación por el mal camino
-Que los hombres prefieren por narices mujeres jóvenes y las mujeres hombres con recursos
-La explicación estándar de los celos que da la evopsych y las diferencias entre sexos en estos
-Y la afirmación de que los padres adoptivos maltratan mucho más debido a que no reciben signos de parentesco genético por parte de los cachorros sapiens si estos no son hijos biológicos.
Una cosa graciosa pero efectiva que hace es preceder sus críticas de otros críticos de la evopsych más incompetentes, los refuta y luego se basa en parte en lo dicho en el proceso para refutar también la evopsych. Algún fallo menor (el más sangrante tomarse 10% de hijos nacidos fuera del matrimonio en serio y como un mínimo, cifras de 1-2% son mucho más cercanas a la realidad http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/gnx... http://www.cell.com/trends/ecology-ev... ) y aunque su último capítulo en por qué el concepto de "naturaleza humana" es un disparate desde el punto de vista tanto filosófico como desde la biología evolutiva está bastante bien lo considero incompleto.
November 29, 2014
In "Adapting Minds," Buller criticizes Evolutionary Psychology. Specifically, he attacks Evo Psych notions of "human nature," individual Evo Psych studies, and Evo Psych's guesswork methodology. He isn't against all evolutionary psychology, but he shows how the popular, mainstream, dominant (capitalized) Evolutionary Psychology misses the mark.
Although the arguments were good, the writing wasn't. Upon reading this book, I wished I had found a text that was more clear and concise in making the same points. Don't get me wrong, it contains powerful criticisms of Evolutionary Psychology a la Pinker. I'll use the main points of this book to argue against idiots who claim things like "10,000 years isn't enough time for our species to have developed Post-Pleistocene adaptations," or "all women prefer the color pink because cavewomen had to locate berries." But the book is written in academese. Buller's prose is cumbersome, inelegant, redundant, and pedantic. I can only recommend "Adapting Minds" insofar as I'm aware of no other publication so comprehensive in damning Evo Psych. Not even Gould manages to hit Pinker and company quite this hard.
Although the arguments were good, the writing wasn't. Upon reading this book, I wished I had found a text that was more clear and concise in making the same points. Don't get me wrong, it contains powerful criticisms of Evolutionary Psychology a la Pinker. I'll use the main points of this book to argue against idiots who claim things like "10,000 years isn't enough time for our species to have developed Post-Pleistocene adaptations," or "all women prefer the color pink because cavewomen had to locate berries." But the book is written in academese. Buller's prose is cumbersome, inelegant, redundant, and pedantic. I can only recommend "Adapting Minds" insofar as I'm aware of no other publication so comprehensive in damning Evo Psych. Not even Gould manages to hit Pinker and company quite this hard.
September 16, 2022
The best I've read on this subject, though that's not a crowded field. The majority of this is very solid, though it does get pretty far into the weeds and I wish it had focused more on the follow-up research than on alternate explanations.
December 30, 2016
This is a very detailed critique against evolutionary psychology. It is not for light reading, but it is essential that it exists, and probably also that it engages with EP on this level. I find Buller's critique convincing over all (although I do not quite follow what he means with the individual as a metaphysical category. Or rather, I might have to work that out further, but I don't quite agree.) Anyway, I have only seen one or two responses to this book from EP, but really it is very damaging to their whole cause. I am a little surprised that there is not more attention given to Buller.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews